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Abstract 
 
The sterling area was a financial alliance of countries using sterling as their principal 
international reserves. Recent studies have highlighted how external assistance 
prolonged the international use of sterling in the 1950s-60s. This thesis explores the 
sterling area’s internal institutional arrangements (e.g. reserve management practices 
and the set-up of central banks), which had complex effects on the member countries. 
Three case studies examine reserve developments in Australia, Ireland and the UK. 
Together they reveal a currency construction that supported the persistent use of 
sterling, but lacked stability. 
   
The first paper presents a new account of Australia’s reserve management in 1950-68, 
emphasising the importance of reserve pooling. Acquisition of non-sterling assets in 
1951-61 was limited to gold production and undermined by Australia’s balance-of-
payments volatility. Diversification (substituting other assets for sterling) only began in 
1962, largely through the build-up of the IMF ‘gold tranche’. Diversification was 
gradual, hidden, and constrained by sterling area membership. 
 
The second paper examines the development of Ireland’s central bank, with its 
currency board arrangements, before and after the sterling devaluation of 1967. Before 
1967, development was constrained, as an under-resourced central bank and 
independent commercial banks competed for sterling liquidity. Meanwhile government 
treated sterling area membership as a contract with the UK. Devaluation broke both 
constraints, leading to a forceful diversification, and centralisation of commercial bank 
reserves in the central bank in 1968-9. 
 
The third paper applies a contemporary methodology to review sterling crises during 
the years 1950-67, identifying balance-of-payments flows associated with each crisis. 
The ‘sterling balances’ of the sterling area underwent significant changes in all the 
crises, and notable (balance-of-payments) declines in those of 1951-2, 1955 and 1957. 
Sterling’s recurring problem was the balance of payments of the sterling area as a 
whole. The system’s limited cohesion failed to address this, contributing to instability. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and critical discussion 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
This PhD thesis is concerned with the sterling area system, and its operational effects 
on its members’ international reserves, during the 1950s-60s. The sterling area was a 
financial alliance of countries, mainly associated with the former British Empire,1 which 
agreed informally to use sterling as their principal international reserve currency. Its 
post-war heyday was the comparatively stable period between the sterling 
devaluations of 1949 and 1967.2 During this period, the US dollar and sterling were the 
only major reserve currencies. 
 
This is a paper-based PhD thesis, incorporating three separate papers, presented as 
Chapters 2-4. The papers deal with different aspects of the sterling area system 
(central bank reserve management, the widening of central bank powers, and sterling 
crises) and different countries within it (Australia, Ireland and the UK respectively). In a 
paper-based thesis, the connections between and issues arising from the three papers 
are discussed through an introduction and critical review (presented here as Chapter 
1) and a conclusion (Chapter 5).  
 
Sterling area countries, defined by UK exchange controls applying from 1939 to 1972, 
constituted the major part of sterling’s use as an international currency.3 Much has 
been written about the UK’s policy perspectives on the sterling area, and about 
sterling’s wider role in the international monetary system. Less attention has been 
given to the policies of leading independent sterling area (ISA) countries. This 
dissertation considers their role. 
                                               
1
 Canada was the principal exception, having decided not to join the 1930s sterling bloc (Sargent, ‘Britain’) 
2
 In Sep/1949, sterling was devalued from US$4.03 to US$2.80; in Nov/1967, from US$2.80 to US$2.40 
3
 See Schenk, The decline, and Britain, for background 
13 
 
 
Independent countries are the key to understanding the sterling area system. Without 
them, sterling would have been only a managed colonial reserve currency, ending with 
decolonisation.4 With them, sterling continued as a global international currency. Why 
did these countries persist in holding sterling? In what ways did they co-operate with 
the UK in reserve management? What was their role in the stability of sterling?  
 
As a voluntary currency system, the sterling area gives the appearance of being a 
precedent when considering international economic institutions and international 
finance problems today. Stability and persistence are issues that are posed about the 
US dollar’s international reserve role. Alliances and controls are mooted features of the 
potential expansion of the renminbi. Stability and cohesion are uncertainties 
overhanging the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone. Sterling’s past international 
role and the UK’s historic focus on sterling area relationships also contributed to, and 
arguably still influence, Britain’s awkward relationship with Europe and concerns about 
European currency arrangements.  
 
Sterling’s persistence as an international currency during this period is something of a 
puzzle. Sterling was subject to more than a few bouts of weakness during the 1950s-
60s, and the US dollar seemed to have superior attractions for much of the period. An 
aim is to improve understanding about why and how sterling was used in ISA 
countries, encompassing both sterling’s reserve role (held by central authorities) and 
its commercial role (used by private agents). 
  
In order fully to understand sterling in the 1950s-60s, three constituencies must be 
addressed: the UK itself, the rest of the sterling area (RSA) and all other countries and 
multilateral institutions that comprised the non-sterling area (NSA). This is a vast policy 
                                               
4
 British colonies had less reserve management freedom 
14 
 
landscape when considered over two decades. The leading economic historian of 
sterling and the sterling area for this period, Professor Catherine Schenk, has tackled 
much of it, particularly from the perspective of UK policy,5 and the support provided to 
sterling by the NSA (e.g. from the USA, OECD, IMF or BIS). Schenk argued that the 
UK and major countries and organisations in the NSA had a common interest in 
preserving sterling’s international role for the sake of the international monetary 
system.6  
 
External support and a generalised common interest do not, however, fully explain 
divergent behaviours towards sterling by the RSA and NSA groups, broadly 
understood and also evident in this thesis. The RSA’s greater persistence with sterling 
suggests the need for additional analysis of leading countries within the independent 
sterling area. Discovering the RSA/ISA perspective on reserve management is 
challenging. Eichengreen reasoned that ISA countries, holding more sterling than 
seemed justified by economic fundamentals, must have been motivated by loyalty to 
the UK.7 However, the well-informed UK Treasury historian of the ‘sterling balances’ 
argued that it was ‘impossible to summarise’ RSA countries’ policies since each RSA 
country had its own reasons for being part of the sterling area, and for sticking with it or 
not.8 It is noticeable that, at various points, some countries left the area (e.g. Egypt, 
Iraq, Southern Rhodesia, Burma), while others (e.g. South Africa) gradually 
disengaged although remaining within the area.  
 
RSA countries’ perspective can thus only be revealed by investigating the relevant 
government and central bank archives in some qualitative depth. Access can be an 
issue, particularly for central bank archives, which are essential for the analysis. 
                                               
5
 Schenk, Britain, and The decline 
6
 Schenk, The decline 
7
 Eichengreen, Global imbalances, p134 
8
 TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances since the war’, Symons, 1972, p59. The sterling balances were net 
liquid external liabilities of the UK in sterling, see idem and Schenk, Britain 
15 
 
Schenk has made a close study of reserve management in Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore.9 There has also been an analysis of Australia and New Zealand (a slightly 
later period),10 and more tangential studies of Ghana, Nigeria11 and South Africa.12 But 
these were only first forays, and in other areas, Ireland, the Indian region,13 the West 
Indies, Kuwait14 and the Middle East, other parts of Africa, reserve management 
analysis focused on the use of sterling in this period has not yet been undertaken. 
 
What conclusions have been drawn from these few country case studies? Broadly, 
Schenk and others have found that RSA countries held sterling for rationally self-
interested reasons. Although the transactional reasons for holding sterling weakened 
as trading relationships widened, RSA countries persisted with sterling because, like 
the leading NSA countries and organisations, they had a collective interest in 
preserving its value. For large holders such as Malaysia and Australia, it was hard to 
dispose of their sterling reserves without adverse repercussions.15 Schenk described 
these collective interests as ‘network externalities’.16                  
 
A principal aim of the PhD is to build on Schenk’s work and to fill gaps in 
understanding of RSA countries’ reserve management. I also believe that the wider 
literature about sterling’s history requires adjustment in certain areas. In general, 
writings about sterling have tended to underestimate or oversimplify the role and 
importance (both for the UK and internationally) of the sterling area during this period.  
 
                                               
9
 Schenk, ‘The empire strikes’; ‘The evolution’; ‘Malaysia’; ‘The dissolution’ 
10
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’ 
11
 Schenk, ‘Monetary institutions’ for Malaya, Ghana and Nigeria; Stockwell, ‘Instilling’ for Ghana 
12
 Henshaw, ‘Britain, South Africa’ 
13
 There is a study of India-UK sterling negotiations, but this relates principally to the 1940s (De P. Abreu, 
‘Britain as a debtor’) 
14
 Smith discussed Kuwait’s entry into the sterling area, but not reserve management (Smith, ‘’A 
vulnerable point’’) 
15
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’; Schenk, ‘Malaysia’ 
16
 Schenk, The decline, p89. Schenk’s focus on network externalities contrasts with an earlier literature, 
which portrayed RSA behaviours as bilaterally ‘negotiated’ with the UK, and involving costly UK 
concessions (Strange, Sterling) 
16 
 
Firstly, sterling’s slow decline as a reserve currency in the twentieth century is 
sometimes invoked by commentators to provide lessons for the current day, when 
arguing for the persistence of the dollar as the dominant international currency.17 But 
such comparisons can neglect the importance of the sterling area’s historical context of 
rules and controls, which placed self-imposed constraints on RSA countries and limited 
the role of private agents.18 Secondly, the sterling area is sometimes proposed as a 
co-operative financial system, bearing favourable comparison with other historical co-
operative arrangements.19 But the nature of its co-operation has not been well-defined. 
Sterling area countries co-operated together financially closely in some ways, barely in 
others. The mechanisms of the sterling area system need to be better understood. 
Thirdly, it has been proposed that the sterling area lost its significance after the 
achievement of sterling convertibility in the mid- to late-1950s, so that by the 1960s the 
sterling area relationships had become irrelevant.20 This is not true, as the case 
studies herein show. Fourthly, the 1950s-60s saw frequent sterling crises. These 
crises have largely been attributed to UK balance-of-payments problems and 
speculative capital movements in developed financial markets.21 A broad investigation 
of the role of the sterling area in these crises has not been undertaken.   
 
Two of the three papers are primarily central bank case studies, addressing Australia 
(an earlier and longer time period than has been previously covered) and Ireland (a 
new country investigation) respectively. The third paper applies contemporary 
methodology to investigate the role of the whole sterling area in sterling crises of this 
period. 
 
                                               
17
 Helleiner highlighted the slow decline of sterling from the 1960s as a lesson for the dollar (Helleiner, The 
status quo) 
18
 These aspects were, however, emphasised in Schenk, Britain 
19
 Cooper, ‘Almost a century’, p86 
20
 Robertson and Singleton, ‘The Commonwealth’, p265; Singleton and Robertson, Economic relations, p3 
21
 For the literature, see the sterling crises paper 
17 
 
As already noted, we should be wary of generalising from sterling area case studies to 
the sterling area as a whole. Even so, case studies can help our understanding of the 
sterling area, which consisted of unequal players. By the second half of the 1960s, 
Ireland was among the top five holders of sterling, five countries which collectively held 
around half the area’s sterling reserves.22 Australia held that top five position 
throughout the period, and was arguably the most important and influential sterling 
area country outside the UK. If the sterling area is a puzzle to be completed by 
historians, these countries were two of the biggest pieces on the table. They also have 
significant, accessible archives and by the mid-1960s they were far more committed to 
sterling than, say, India or South Africa. 
 
The Australia case focuses on central bank and government policies, since in Australia 
all gold and foreign exchange (‘FX’), including sterling, was mobilised into the central 
bank throughout the period. The story emerging from the literature was about a country 
gradually distancing itself from sterling from the early 1950s by diversifying in line with 
trade and capital flows. Australia still maintained significant sterling holdings for 
voluntary transactional and prudential reasons by the late 1960s.  
 
However, the new collected evidence provides little support to the traditional story on 
Australia, since this country did not distance itself from the sterling area until very late.  
Apart from a significant decision in 1951 to retain its gold production, which was in fact 
a reversion to pre-1947 policy, Australia did not take any deliberate steps to diversify 
from sterling until 1962, after the UK applied for membership of the EEC. Rather, its 
diversification appears to have been blown off the policy path taken by that 1951 
decision, with some major purchases of sterling for gold and dollars in 1952-61. From 
1965, when its policymakers became very concerned about sterling’s prospects, the 
                                               
22
 Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Kuwait and Malaysia (Strange, Sterling, p89; BOE:EID1A129/2-4) 
18 
 
Australian central bank largely continued to follow the sterling area ‘reserve-pooling’23 
rules. The diversification was discreet, for instance by encouraging the build-up of 
Australia’s ‘gold tranche’ at the IMF, and occasionally not converting dollar receipts 
into sterling. Australia’s reserve management in the 1950s-60s, although rational and 
deliberate, appears to have been significantly influenced by Australia’s membership of 
and commitment to the sterling area. The paper explains the ways in which this 
occurred.  
 
The Ireland case study describes the transition of the country’s young central bank 
from a ‘virtual’ currency board towards a more independent institution. The Central 
Bank of Ireland was able to diversify its reserve holdings dramatically away from 
sterling, despite remaining in a ‘virtual’ monetary union with the UK (continuously 
pegging its currency to sterling on a no-margins one-for-one convertible basis), and 
notwithstanding the dominant share of the UK in Ireland’s trade. Ireland is also 
interesting because of its private holdings of sterling, and the commercial banks’ use of 
this currency as liquid banking reserves. Notional central bank powers to widen 
reserve assets beyond sterling and gold were taken from the 1950s, but diversification 
really began only in 1968.  
 
The sudden Irish diversification of 1968 was a political decision and not only a direct 
response to the 1967 sterling devaluation. Until then, Ireland’s reserve management 
had been constrained by the ‘tripartite’ institutional set-up of its banking system and 
the relative weakness of its central bank. The full desired programme of diversification 
could only be completed after centralising commercial banks’ sterling holdings in the 
central bank. This was achieved in 1968-9 as part of a far-reaching package of policy 
and legislative measures (1968-72) which conferred more power on the Irish central 
bank. As for Australia, then, the institutional set-up of the ‘sterling link’ at first 
                                               
23
 Reserve pooling and sterling area rules are discussed later in this chapter 
19 
 
constrained the central bank in the 1950s-60s. However, institutional change allowed 
the central bank to break these constraints, despite the continuation of the sterling link.      
 
The third paper is a period piece. Engaging with debates of the time about the causes 
of sterling crises, it applies a contemporary methodology to explore the sterling area’s 
role in sterling crises of the years 1950-67 (ending with the 1967 devaluation). The 
contemporary economist Richard Kahn issued two full reports on the sterling crises of 
1964-8.24 A simplified version of his balance-of-payments accounting approach is used 
to track movements in the wider sterling area’s sterling holdings, against movements in 
the UK’s international reserves (after taking account of international assistance from 
the NSA), during the major reserve downturns after 1950. The sterling area’s sterling 
holdings declined significantly during the crises of 1951-2, 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1964, 
and would have declined in the 1961 crisis, but for an IMF drawing by Australia. These 
declines in RSA sterling holdings were principally driven by the fundamental balance of 
payments of the RSA, rather than by loss of confidence in sterling (although there was 
a sizeable confidence movement in 1964). The declines of 1951-2, 1955 and 1957 are 
notable because, according to Kahn’s framework, they appear larger than other 
contributory factors behind the loss of reserves. There, are, however, certain critiques 
that could be made about this contemporary analysis, as the paper sets out. 
 
The methodology and sources of each paper vary, as discussed in the three papers. 
But each relies on qualitative and deep engagement with new archival information, 
particularly from the relevant central banks (Australia, Ireland and the UK respectively). 
Using this data, each paper finds patterns of behaviour which have not been 
addressed in the literature, and so together they clarify our understanding of the 
sterling area, and broaden knowledge about topics such as central bank evolution and 
reserve management. 
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In summary, as exemplified by Australia and Ireland, the persistence of sterling as a 
world currency derived not from pure economic externalities but also from institutional 
factors – the implied rules and institutional inheritance of sterling area membership – 
combined with an economic and political calculus that sterling area membership was 
beneficial for the country concerned, and an element of trust that the UK would act to 
defend the pound’s value. The cohesion of the sterling area was largely limited to 
consultation, reserve pooling and the design of exchange controls (the rules of sterling 
area membership), none of which were perfect or addressed the fundamental 
payments imbalance with the wider world of the whole sterling area (UK plus RSA). 
This fundamental imbalance lay behind the instability of sterling. 
 
These findings re-emphasise the institutional foundations of the sterling area system, 
which has in recent times largely been analysed in terms of the transactional and risk-
optimising drivers highlighted by the economic theory of reserve currencies. The 
sterling area was an inter-governmental arrangement, and the commercial role of 
sterling, both within and outside the sterling area, was largely influenced by national 
exchange controls and the use of sterling as a reserve currency by RSA countries. The 
thesis thus confirms and builds on Schenk’s early arguments about the institutional 
foundations of the RSA’s sterling reserves.25 Summative conclusions and original 
findings from the three papers are brought together in Chapter 5. 
 
This introductory chapter links the three core papers and proceeds as follows. Section 
2 engages critically with the literature regarding reserve currencies, monetary rules 
and institutions, and monetary co-operation and co-ordination. Section 3 provides a 
critical review of the literature on the sterling area, with a special focus on its monetary 
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and exchange rate arrangements. Section 4 summarises the motivations of the thesis 
and defines the research questions to be explored in Chapters 2-4.                   
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Section 2: Reserve currencies and monetary institutions – critical discussion of the 
literature 
 
This Section addresses economic determinants of international currencies and reserve 
composition; monetary rules and institutions; and monetary co-operation. 
  
2.1 Economic determinants of international currencies and reserve composition 
 
Government organisations and private agents hold international reserves for a variety 
of reasons. Collectively, these demand factors, combined with supply factors (namely, 
the attributes of issuers of reserve currencies, including the willingness of these 
countries for their currencies to be so used) explain the size and composition of 
international reserves in the world.    
 
2.1.1 Economic determinants – supply factors 
 
Let us start with the supply factors. Firstly, there are the benefits of issuing an 
international currency, with two sets of economic benefits being commonly described. 
The first are seigniorage revenues, the net profits derived by a central bank from 
issuing currency. The second arise from increased activity (and profits) in the domestic 
financial markets of the issuing country.26 
  
Economists argue that there are additional benefits. An international currency can 
grant the issuing country the ‘exorbitant privilege’27 of running balance-of-payments 
deficits without the need for policy adjustment. Instead, foreign countries can either 
finance these deficits, delaying adjustment, or adjust their own policies by expanding to 
accommodate the issuing country’s policies. Implicit in this ‘instrumental’ benefit is an 
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economic bargain between the issuing country and the countries providing financing or 
policy accommodation.28 A related idea is the strategic benefits enjoyed by the issuing 
country’s corporations and banks in their international operations.29     
 
Another recent economic argument is that ‘the residents of the issuing country 
experience an increase in the purchasing power of their currency both at home and 
abroad’, with these benefits far exceeding those of seigniorage.30 Under this theoretical 
approach, the expansion of international currency has terms-of-trade benefits for the 
issuer, reducing domestic inflation and increasing the exchange rate. (The logical 
corollary is that, if the process is put into reverse, there is an opposite economic effect: 
increasing domestic inflation and putting downward pressure on the exchange rate).    
 
A final set of benefits, more political than economic, fall under the headline of 
‘structural power’ or ‘geopolitics’. An international currency provides the issuer with 
economic weapons, and converts foreign users of the currency into exposed 
stakeholders. Together these agenda-setting and shared-interest advantages help an 
issuing country to pursue geopolitical goals.31 Kirshner categorised such weapons of 
‘monetary dependence’ into four types: enforcement, expulsion, extraction and 
entrapment.32 On the other hand, it has been argued, such benefits on the upside 
produce additional burdens on the downside, for an international currency in decline. 
Referencing sterling’s decline from the 1960s, Kirshner highlighted the monetary 
‘overhang’ of international reserves that must be absorbed, creating ‘chronic monetary 
pressure’,33 and the loss of prestige and credibility, with the result that, with increased 
international concern, external discipline is swift and ‘the long leash is replaced by an 
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exceptionally tight choker’.34 It seems that the fear of inflation and loss of monetary 
control deterred West Germany from allowing its currency to become internationally 
used in the 1950s-60s, while Japan prevented the yen’s wider use in order to protect 
its industrial strategy.35     
 
Secondly, on the supply side, there are the fundamental economic attributes which 
reserve currencies possess. There is broad consensus about these. Lim, considering 
the prospects of the dollar and euro, described five ‘facilitating factors’ of a reserve 
currency issuer on which economists agree: large economic size, a well-developed 
financial system, confidence in the currency’s value, political stability and ‘network 
externalities’. Network externalities arise because the general use of particular reserve 
currencies encourages their wider use through positive feedback effects in demand 
and efficiencies in supply. Incumbent reserve currencies also have an advantage 
through sunk costs and lock-in arrangements, leading to inertia. Debates between 
economists about the prospects for the dollar and the euro have reflected different 
weights being attached to the five factors.36  
 
Applying this framework to the 1950s-60s, however, suggests only one plausible 
economic reason for sterling’s persistence relative to the dollar as a reserve currency. 
On economic size, financial system, confidence and political stability, the dollar 
seemingly had the edge over sterling in this period. Conventional network externalities 
are also supposed to favour the dominant reserve currency, once a ‘tipping point’ has 
been passed, and in reserve currency use the dollar had clearly overtaken sterling by 
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the mid-1950s.37 Almost by default, among economists, inertia is commonly taken to 
be the reason for sterling’s slow decline.38  
 
There is a debate about the role of inertia. Chinn and Frankel, looking at the late 
twentieth century, found inertia, and the non-linear pattern of network externalities 
implied by a tipping point, to be significant empirical features of reserve currencies.39 
But Eichengreen and Flandreau, considering the inter-war period, in which the share of 
the dollar and sterling in reserve currencies fluctuated, cast doubt on inertia, 
incumbency and network effects.40 They attributed sterling’s resurgence in the 1930s 
to the politics of the sterling area countries, which tended to hold sterling to the 
exclusion of other currencies.41 Eichengreen was particularly doubtful about the power 
of network externalities and inertia over international currencies, arguing that they may 
influence the use of a key currency as a means of exchange, but not so much as a 
store of value, where it is confidence, stability and expected returns that matter.42 In 
any event, inertial forces are being weakened by financial innovation and technology.43 
 
According to an article by Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl, using aggregate reserve data 
from 1948, the drivers of different key currency holdings may have changed as the 
Bretton Woods system transitioned around 197344 into a world of floating exchange 
rates – in a new view ascribing greater importance to liquidity, dealing costs, exchange 
controls and other institutional factors. During this transition, inertia and policy 
credibility became more influential while network effects became less so. On the one 
hand, the increase in inertia’s role meant that the ‘upheaval hypothesis’ (under which it 
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was thought the move to floating would cause central banks to hold less reserves and 
diversify away from the dollar) was not fulfilled: the dollar remained the dominant 
currency. Inertia in the Bretton Woods period was less important, because of the 
decline of sterling and the rise of the dollar in this period. The sterling area was 
constrained from diversifying into other currencies by political ties, and the UK had in 
place strong monitoring and enforcement technologies such as exchange controls, but 
gradually sterling’s reversal took place under Bretton Woods. On the other hand, the 
authors argued, the decline in the role of network effects after Bretton Woods reflected 
a reduction in switching costs as financial markets offered more liquidity. They also 
found that policy measures to promote or protect the take-up of key currencies were 
generally ineffective, while policies to restrict a currency’s international use were more 
successful.45  
  
Engaging principally with the economic debate about inertia, and economists’ reserve 
currency models, Schenk sought to identify the inertia affecting sterling’s reserve 
currency use in the post-war period. In contrast to an earlier literature which had 
stressed the UK’s geopolitical ambitions and pursuit of prestige,46 the answer was 
‘institutional support mechanisms, which delayed the tipping point for the pound’.47 
More specifically, ‘sterling’s role was prolonged by the structure of the international 
monetary system and by collective global interest in its continuation’.48 
 
2.1.2 Economic determinants – demand factors 
 
With its focus on ISA countries and central bank case studies, this thesis takes 
particular interest in the demand-side perspective of the individual central bank, which 
is distinct from the supply-side aspects or the global aggregates. The attention is also 
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on developing countries, which formed the bulk of the RSA. (While not low-income 
countries, Australia and Ireland were both agricultural exporters prioritising 
development). On this demand side of the economic literature, the principal decision 
variables are the size and currency composition of reserves, and, across that currency 
composition, the portfolio of assets to be held. The primary focus here is on the 
currency composition, but these aspects are inter-linked, and it is instructive to begin 
with the general appetite for reserves.  
 
Studies of the demand for reserves take as their starting point the functions of money 
and the reasons for holding it. A common typology references the use, by private 
agents and official holders, of international money as a medium of exchange, unit of 
account and store of value. This is set out in Table 1: 
 
 Functions of money 
Levels of analysis: Medium of exchange Unit of account Store of value 
Private Vehicle currency 
(foreign exchange 
trading), trade 
settlement 
Trade invoicing Investment currency 
Official Intervention currency Exchange rate anchor Reserve currency 
Table 1: Roles of an international currency 
Source: The table is taken from Cohen and Benney, ‘What does’, Table 1, p1020. There is a similar table 
in Chinn, ‘Emerging market economies’, p157, which cites Kenen, ‘The role’, as the original source; and in 
Krugman, ‘The international role’, likewise referencing Cohen, The future. A similar table appears as Table 
1.1 in Schenk, The decline, p2, and is also described in words in Helleiner and Kirshner, ‘The future’, pp3-
4  
 
For example, the vehicle currency role means that the US dollar, for market efficiency 
reasons, is today used predominantly as the currency against which other currencies 
are traded in the FX market. Similarly, central banks use a particular international 
currency or currencies for intervention purposes, in order to stabilise or influence the 
external value of the domestic currency. Different functions require different attributes 
(e.g. liquidity and widespread acceptability for a medium of exchange, stability for a 
unit of account, and confidence, long-term stability and expected returns for a store of 
value). 
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The demand for reserves, following theories of the demand for money, is often divided 
into transactions, precautionary and speculative motives. Heller’s seminal work on 
optimal reserves argued that private agents occupy the transactions (for trade) and 
speculative (for investment) space, while within central banks, which do not trade and 
should not speculate, demand for reserves is precautionary.49 Since reserves finance 
balance-of-payments deficits, precautionary reserve management is a policy 
alternative to other policies, such as economic adjustment or external financing,50 
which must together form a coherent economic strategy i.e. incorporating 
‘macroeconomic policies, exchange rate regimes, financial sector soundness, and debt 
management’.51 Heller’s model recognised these trade-offs by optimising reserves in 
the context of the income cost of adjusting to an external imbalance (a function of trade 
openness, proxied by the ratio of imports to GNP), the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves (the difference between the social return on capital and the yield on liquid 
reserves), and the volatility of reserves. Heller estimated empirically the optimal 
reserves of a range of countries in 1963, finding actual reserves more than adequate in 
most developed countries (albeit not the UK) but mainly insufficient in the primary-
producing regions of Latin America, Asia and Oceania.52 Although mindful of the 
model’s limitations (it did not address the greater needs of reserve currency issuers 
and was focused on small countries), Heller concluded that the optimal reserves 
framework was superior analytically to the prevailing reserves/imports rule-of-thumb 
measure of reserve adequacy.53  
 
Heller’s model prompted further work on optimal reserves. A ‘buffer stock’ approach 
hypothesised that reserves followed an inventory model. They would decline from their 
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optimal level until they reached a minimum at which adjustment would be actioned in 
order to restore them to their optimal level.54 While Heller saw openness as lowering 
the income cost of adjustment, the buffer stock model regarded openness as 
increasing income fluctuations, by increasing exposure to international shocks. 
Another optimal reserves model took the exhaustion of reserves to be much more 
costly than mere policy adjustment: it was really the cost of default, which could have a 
devastating cumulative income effect on a country, a multiple of one year’s GNP. 
Estimating a cost-of-default function and applying it to Israel in the 1970s, the model 
seemed to explain actual reserves more closely than the other versions.55                 
 
Although there has been an extensive literature on the holding of international 
reserves,56 and the range of relevant factors could be identified (e.g. ‘openness, 
vulnerability to shocks, the nature of the exchange regime and the response of the 
relevant monetary authorities to uncertainty’),57 Bird and Rajan argued that the 
optimising model foundered on the difficulty of implementing it empirically with 
precision.58 Consequently, there is still great reliance on rules of thumb. Since the 
capital account crises of the 1990s, for developing countries these rules of thumb are 
now focused more on the potential capital flight of external investors (hence a view that 
reserves should exceed external debt with a maturity of less than one year) as well as 
of domestic holders of wider money, including deposits (hence reserves/M2 is another 
common yardstick). However, reserve management still needs to take into account the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves, suggesting a greater potential role for contingent 
financing arrangements, allowing owned reserves to be reduced.59 As emerging 
countries’ central bank reserves have mushroomed since the first big capital account 
crises, economists have sought anew to diagnose empirically the motivations behind 
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countries’ holding of reserves. Three key motivations have been identified in this 
recent literature – transactional (related to trade fluctuations),60 precautionary (a 
response to the uncertainty, scale and speed of capital movements) and mercantilist 
(in which the reserves accumulated arise from an artificially low exchange rate adopted 
in pursuit of other objectives, consequently this excess of reserves is held for the future 
and not invested domestically to provide a social return).61 
 
The end of fixed exchange rates, as the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1973, 
prompted academic interest in the composition of foreign exchange reserves (or 
COFER). Out of these studies, two dominant theories of the determinants of currency 
composition have emerged: the mean-variance theory, an optimising portfolio 
approach focusing on expected currency risks and returns; and the transaction theory, 
which argues that currencies held reflect the currencies used in ‘the financing of 
foreign trade, the settlement of foreign debt obligations and the purchases and sales of 
FX’.62  
 
Both theoretical ideas were addressed in a 1978 study, by Heller and Knight, which 
named as relevant motivational drivers for central bank reserves: safety, liquidity, risk 
aversion, yield, and political and institutional factors, particularly international monetary 
arrangements.63 The authors argued that central banks were highly risk-averse and 
addressed policies towards wider societal goals. An efficient risk-minimising approach 
was for the currencies held to match those used for anchoring/pegging or intervention 
(which itself tended to follow currency peg arrangements). They hypothesised that 
currencies held by central banks would reflect a country’s relevant exchange rate 
arrangements and trade orientation, and found empirical support for both elements in 
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the 1970s data.64 This, then, was the first articulation of the transactions view, which 
gave prominence to the currency peg.65    
 
Empirical studies of COFER have been hampered by lack of access to data, since 
individual country holdings are usually treated as confidential.66 The leading studies of 
the transactions view have enjoyed privileged access to confidential IMF COFER data: 
Dooley, Lizondo and Mathieson (DLM), covering 1976-85, and Eichengreen and 
Mathieson, updating the DLM analysis for 1979-96.67 DLM addressed the mean-
variance optimising theory but their optimising model was rationally applied to the net 
foreign asset position of a country (reserve assets less foreign liabilities in each 
currency). 68 The conclusion was that this net asset solution was independent of the 
transaction costs involved in converting currencies or replenishing reserves, which 
were however key determinants of the gross asset (reserves) position.  DLM tested the 
transactions influences on gross reserves empirically and found evidence that, among 
developing countries, COFER was determined particularly by currency pegging 
arrangements, and also trade flows (the volume of imports and exports traded with key 
currency countries) and debt service payments (the amounts denominated in the key 
currencies). Eichengreen and Mathieson’s work broadly confirmed these results, and 
highlighted the remarkable stability of COFER and these transaction demand 
relationships over time. Overall, then, central banks seek to avoid unnecessary 
exchange transactions in their gross reserve management. 
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By contrast, the mean-variance theorists have focused on expected returns and risk in 
portfolio management, reasoning that central banks will wish to diversify their holdings 
in order to reduce risk, and to maximise profits like other investors. The optimising 
approach involves, first, establishing an efficiency frontier of feasible portfolios along 
which expected returns are maximised for given levels of risk; and then selecting the 
risk-return combination on the frontier which maximises the investor’s utility. Expected 
risk of a given portfolio is derived from the variances and covariances of assets’ past 
returns. Key questions here are those of measurement – e.g. how are expected 
returns to be estimated, and in what units is risk to be expressed? Ben-Bassat 
hypothesised that central banks had perfect foresight (expected returns from different 
currencies were equal to their actual ex-post returns) and that risk is measured against 
a country’s import basket (the currencies of the countries from which it imports) since 
the purpose of reserves is to pay for imports. Looking at Israel in 1972-6, he found that 
a low-risk optimal portfolio calculated in this manner closely matched Israel’s actual 
currency portfolio. A similar finding was made for developing and semi-industrial 
countries in this period, using Heller and Knight’s data.69 Examining the Korean central 
bank’s portfolio in 1980-7, and now using valuable information about the currency (not 
simply the country source) of imports, Dellas and Chin similarly found support for the 
mean-variance theory, whether assuming that expected returns reflected perfect 
foresight, or that they followed a random walk.70 
 
In recent times, economists have used these two competing theories to address 
questions about the likelihood of diversification away from the dollar. The changes in 
reserve composition during 1978-2006 were summarised by Wooldridge. While US 
dollars, Treasury securities and (especially for developing countries) bank deposits 
continued to dominate central bank reserves, there were significant changes. Gold’s 
share steadily declined. Maturities of government securities were lengthened and there 
                                               
69
 Ben-Bassat, ‘The optimal composition’ 
70
 Dellas and Chin, ‘Reserve currency preferences’ 
33 
 
was credit diversification in securities portfolios, particularly into US agencies and 
higher-quality asset-backed securities. Aggregate currency shares were affected 
variously by exchange rate changes, a portfolio switch into the euro, and the 
compositional effect of hugely increased reserve holdings by dollar-pegging developing 
countries. Wooldridge predicted that diversification away from the dollar might proceed 
more rapidly than in the past. Active diversifiers are obscured by the aggregate 
numbers, and some diversification is hidden in the growing use of sovereign 
investment funds. Excess reserves increase the profit motive and desire to diversify, 
while lower transaction costs in the euro have reduced the constraints on 
diversification.71 Nevertheless academic studies reflecting on these major euro, 
liquidity and excess reserve developments have generally continued to highlight the 
importance of the currency peg/intervention currency in reserve portfolios, as shown by 
the examples below. 
 
Papaioannou, Portes and Siourounis reasoned that a representative central bank in 
1995-2005 would adopt a (low-risk) mean-variance approach – not if its reserves were 
low, in which case the intervention currency would dominate, but if its reserves were of 
a reasonable size. They also built transaction costs, together with debt, trade and 
pegging constraints, into their optimising model. The best fit to actual portfolios derived 
from assumptions that currencies would enjoy equal returns, tempered by transaction 
constraints (currency reserve shares at least half the level of debt or trade shares) and 
by costs of rebalancing the portfolio to meet transaction needs. The biggest influence 
on reserves was the currency peg/effective reference currency. By making the central 
bank’s domestic currency the reference, pegging arrangements were recognised by 
the model and found to have large effects on optimal portfolios – for instance when 
Russia’s dollar peg broke down in 1999.72  
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Ito, McCauley and Chan also stressed the significance of (and historical evidence for) 
a domestic currency numeraire for the central bank, whereby currency reserves 
strongly reflected currency pegs.73 They investigated, for 25 countries in 2010-13, the 
relative contribution to COFER of dollar invoicing of exports and domestic currency co-
movement with the dollar (called dollar weight in their article – in effect a behavioural 
currency anchor rather than a formal peg). Both variables, together with the dollar’s 
share in FX trading, exhibited a strong contribution to COFER. Analysis of six central 
and east European central banks over 1997-2013 suggested an important initiating 
role for trade invoicing, changes in which led sometimes dramatic changes in the dollar 
or euro weight of these countries, which in turn altered the dollar and euro shares in 
reserves. The authors concluded that significant growth in renminbi invoicing could 
lead, through changed currency management, to a relatively rapid take-up of renminbi 
in central bank reserves.74        
 
Along the same lines, the Australian central bank is unlikely to diversify majorly away 
from the dollar, so long as the dollar continues to play a large role in its debt service 
and intervention activities, according to Soesmanto, Selvanathan and Selvanathan. 
The authors argued that the central bank is a conservative investor, focused on policy 
and operational matters, and emphasising liquidity and capital preservation. Testing 
transactions influences in 2000-12, they confirmed significant roles in COFER for (1) 
the currency share of debt service, (2) the share of exports to a reserve currency 
country (a negative relationship as such currencies are earned through exports), and 
(3) the currency share of FX intervention.75   
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In recent years the views and experiences of central bank practitioners and specialists 
have also been published in regular updated surveys and articles – for instance, How 
Countries Manage Reserve Assets, a 2003 book edited by Pringle and Carver.76 
Sometimes the theory is contradicted by the practice. For instance, while DLM argued 
that external liabilities and assets should be managed together in order to optimise 
COFER, more than a decade later Pringle and Carver stated that among central banks 
the practice was ‘not widespread’.77 However, the importance of intervention reserves 
for managing a currency peg is a given in these articles. Other reasons for intervention 
are to prevent a disorderly collapse in a floating currency, to manage and guide a 
floating currency, or, more controversially, to correct a long-run disequilibrium in asset 
markets which private markets have, for various reasons, failed to address.78 Case 
studies continued to confirm the importance of currency pegging. The Danish central 
bank, managing a tight currency peg against the euro, was taking hardly any exchange 
risk other than in the euro.79 Many developing and emerging countries have not taken 
advantage of greater exchange rate flexibility, continuing to intervene heavily, and, 
Williams argued, there is no evidence that greater use of exchange rate flexibility 
would influence their demand for reserves – a denial of Heller and Knight’s original 
claim.80    
 
It is also clear from these writings that the importance of intervention and other 
transactions depends in part on the size of a country’s reserves: ‘only countries with a 
high and stable stock of reserves enjoy the luxury of unrestricted investment choice’.81 
Countries stressing debt service and imports for reserve adequacy tended to have low 
levels of reserves.82 Many central banks split reserves into different ‘liquidity’, 
‘investment’ and ‘rainy-day’ sub-portfolios. The liquidity part would address 
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intervention, the investment part might correspond to a targeted stable minimum level 
of reserves, which could be invested in bonds since it is unlikely to change (if 
necessary, the bonds could be converted into liquidity through repo financing), while 
the rainy-day fund might be invested in SDRs or gold as a kind of disaster insurance.83 
Persaud also recommended that the reserves required for intervention could be 
divided into liquid and illiquid portions in order to enhance yield, but their relative size 
should be based on the size of the FX market in the country concerned: a highly liquid 
FX market requires liquid intervention reserves.84  
 
Among these studies, Persaud’s article considered how small, open economies, which 
naturally prefer fixed exchange rate arrangements, can adjust to a world characterised 
by major capital account crises. While policy credibility might be enhanced by formal, 
rule-based arrangements (either a clean float with inflation targeting, or harder fixes, 
such as currency boards and monetary unions), these are not suitable for many 
countries, which have instead accumulated large reserves to support currency pegs or 
heavily managed floating exchange rates. But the absolute scale of reserves required 
to defend against crises is too expensive to maintain, and holding relatively high 
reserves may not succeed as a strategy. Persaud’s preference was that central banks 
arrange contingent credit lines contra-cyclically, allowing owned reserves to be 
focused on intervention and servicing the costs of such insurance.85  
 
From the above studies, it is apparent that central banks, mandated to preserve 
monetary and financial stability, prioritise security, liquidity and yield in their portfolios, 
they change slowly, and they are often constrained in their reserve management by 
transaction needs. But the requirements of individual central banks vary. There are 
times when security and loss-avoidance require making a pro-active shift in COFER, 
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and there are institutional settings in which the deliberate pursuit of profit has taken 
place or is justified. This variety is shown in the literature around central banks’ 
balance sheets and risk management. 
 
The recent risk management literature recommends a pro-active integrated approach 
by central banks. Briere et al considered the risk of rising interest rates on central bank 
portfolios. Using monthly reserve data from 1986-2015, they identified risk-reducing 
and return-increasing strategies that could be applied to standard benchmark 
portfolios. Taken together, these strategies could greatly improve risk-return, reaching 
the efficiency frontier without (the authors argued) having to trade return against risk. 
For instance, a benchmark based on average central bank portfolios could be 
significantly improved in risk terms by introducing currencies such as the Australian 
and Canadian dollar which are weakly correlated to the US dollar. And allocations to 
mortgage-backed securities, high-yield corporate bonds and equities could significantly 
increase returns.86 A similar point was made by Fisher and Lie about 
compartmentalised investment constraints (e.g. a defined liquidity sub-portfolio). By 
relaxing normal liquidity, currency, duration and credit constraints, they claimed that 
risk could be reduced by 150 basis points for the same return, or a similar return 
improvement obtained without additional risk.87  
 
With increasing transparency, central banks need to take a consistent, strategic but 
flexible approach to risk, as argued in a range of studies brought together by Bernadell 
et al.88 Cardon and Coche recommended three steps: (1) a clear governance 
hierarchy, from oversight committee to investment committee to portfolio managers, 
setting (2) investment principles which meet policy requirements and derive (3) a long-
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term risk-return profile on which liquidity and currency constraints can be overlaid.89 A 
variety of risk approaches can be discussed e.g. in currency reserve management, 
navigating between wealth preservation and liquidity preservation,90 employing 
dynamic, stochastic methods to resolve different macro-policy and risk-return 
objectives,91 adopting a value-at-risk framework, using computer power to calculate 
continuously a probability of maximum acceptable loss within a given timeframe,92 or, 
when considering market risks, focusing on the outcomes necessary for continued 
central bank financial independence (profit generation, capital preservation and the risk 
of potential loss).93 The risk management problems and approaches of central 
monetary institutions in, say, the Czech Republic,94 Hong Kong95 and Venezuela96 are 
shown to be very different from each other in practice. 
 
Pro-active currency shifts have been found in historical cases. Ugolini showed how the 
new National Bank of Belgium operated under a fixed silver standard in the 1850s. 
Because the central bank’s foreign currency bills portfolio was opaque to outside 
observers, it used open market operations in this portfolio to present a strong free 
silver bullion97 position to the market, and took advantage of other institutional aspects 
of the market to defer discount rate increases when the Belgian franc was under 
pressure. But, with the central bank enjoying excess resources funded by zero-interest 
government deposits, the FX portfolio was also actively managed in the pursuit of 
profit, the bank regularly ‘buying low and selling high’ among half a dozen currencies in 
this parity-based world, with considerable resulting variation in COFER.98         
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The relative attraction of profit maximisation to central banks historically depended on 
their ownership, governance and mission. Serving shareholders, privately-owned 
central banks might pursue profits if not otherwise constrained. Flandreau showed 
how, early in the nineteenth century, concerns that privately-owned central banks were 
profiting through inflation at the expense of citizens led to them being constrained by 
simple rules such as specie convertibility; later, concerns that they were profiting from 
their discretionary market power in interest rate-setting during crises led to a restriction 
of the profits or dividends that could be taken from interest rates. Subsequently central 
bank independence from government emerged as a bargain between shareholders 
and citizens – profitable protected status for the shareholders, and the unimpeded 
prioritisation of the simple rule by the central bank, leading in turn to problems in the 
1930s when the rule seemed to work against the welfare of citizens. Thus the adoption 
of rules or discretion and the independence of central banks have been related to time 
consistency and monitoring problems in their agency role.99 
 
The inter-war period presented two interesting cases of large changes in sterling 
exposures, driven by central banks with different institutional settings. Accominotti 
showed how the Banque de France, a privately-owned independent central bank with 
large sterling holdings, anticipated sterling’s risk of devaluation and deliberately tried to 
protect its exposed capital position – firstly, by rebalancing its portfolio from sterling to 
dollars from June 1929; then, from October 1930, refraining from further sterling sales 
when it realised that such action would precipitate devaluation and the very capital 
losses that it was seeking to avoid – a situation described as a ‘sterling trap’. The 
devaluation in September 1931 did indeed prove costly for the Banque de France, 
which had to be bailed out by the government and lost its independence as a result.100 
By contrast, Japan’s FX holdings in the 1920s-30s were largely under government 
control, in a variety of exchange frameworks – floating exchange rates (1920-30), gold 
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exchange standard (1930-1), collapse and exchange controls (1931-4), stabilisation 
with sterling peg (1934-9), dollar peg (1939+). The currency mix between dollars and 
sterling fluctuated significantly, with sterling initially dominant, the dollar dominating 
immediately after the war, sterling recovering to pre-eminence in the mid-1920s and 
the dollar again by the end of that decade; sterling was again dominant by the mid-
1930s and the dollar recovered the lead in 1939. The study showed a net debtor’s 
strategic reserve policy towards the choice of ‘reference currency’ and portfolio mix 
that was focused on liquidity and security i.e. both transactional (interest payments, 
funding opportunities, ease of FX dealing, trade) and risk-minimising (stable reference 
currency) considerations.101 
 
A final element to consider on the demand side of reserve management is politics. 
Helleiner argued that, in some cases, the economic arguments were insufficient to 
explain reserve management behaviour, and an important role for politics should be 
acknowledged. In Helleiner’s taxonomy, politics intervened in two ways. Firstly, political 
factors could affect one or more of the three economic determinants of reserve 
currencies (he described these as confidence, liquidity and transactional networks but 
in effect they were the same as Lim’s five factors) and thus influence a currency’s 
economic attractions indirectly. Secondly, politics could intervene directly. This was 
relevant to currencies – such as sterling in the post-war years, as he argued – in which 
market actors did not play a significant role in conferring international status, and in 
which state authorities were not solely driven by economic considerations. In such 
cases states using an international currency (‘follower states’) would be influenced by 
domestic politics and political relations both with the currency issuer and other follower 
states, potentially volatile factors which could make the international currency 
particularly fragile. Note that Helleiner’s political dimensions were not intended to be 
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exclusive drivers of international currencies, but rather they augmented the arguments 
of the economists.102  
   
Taking stock of these supply and demand literatures together, a number of issues 
present themselves as relevant to a study of central bank reserves in the sterling area 
in the 1950s-60s. On the supply side (the UK in respect of sterling) there is a debate 
about costs borne by a country whose international currency faces potential decline. 
On the demand side, apart from any political aspects, there is the interplay between 
transactions and risk-return motives, related to perceptions about the adequacy of 
reserves, as well as the governance underlying reserve management, and the general 
institutional setting (liquidity and transaction costs in different financial centres, the 
international monetary system). It is particularly to the latter – the system of monetary 
rules and institutions – that we now turn attention. Most recent demand-side studies 
have taken place under floating exchange rate environments. The ‘elephant in the 
room’ for this thesis is the fixed exchange rate environment of Bretton Woods. 
 
2.2 Monetary rules and institutions 
 
Before reviewing the specific monetary institutions of that time, it is necessary to 
discuss terms. According to North, ‘institutions’ are constraints which guide human 
interactions. Their purpose is to reduce uncertainties and transaction costs (costs of 
measurement and enforcement) in human interaction arising from the complexity of 
problems, and individuals’ inability to solve them. These constraints can be formal 
(explicitly written) or, more pervasively, informal. Both types are significantly influenced 
by the effectiveness of enforcement. Institutional change occurs via a process in which 
institutions present incentives and opportunities, leading to actions by ‘organisations’ 
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(groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives), which alter 
the institutions.103 
 
By contrast, McKinnon took Mundell’s definitions of monetary ‘system’ (‘an aggregation 
of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to some form of control’) and 
monetary ‘order’ (‘the framework and setting in which the system operates’).104 
McKinnon’s ‘order’ thus equated to North’s ‘institution’. McKinnon’s interest lay in 
defining the various monetary orders (sets of rules) which had taken place during 
1879-1992. He described two such monetary orders for Bretton Woods, namely the 
‘Spirit of the Treaty’ agreed in 1945, and the actual ‘Fixed-Rate Dollar Standard’ which 
really prevailed between 1950 and 1970.105 The rules for the latter are repeated in full 
in Table 2. These rules were not recorded; instead they were McKinnon’s interpretation 
of how the game was being played and how it might have continued. Thus McKinnon’s 
‘rules’ equated to North’s ‘informal constraints’. 
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THE FIXED RATE DOLLAR STANDARD, 1950-1970 
 
 
Industrial countries other than the United States 
 
I. Fix a par value for the national currency with the U.S. dollar as the numeraire, and keep 
exchange rate within one percent of this par value indefinitely.  
II. Free currency convertibility for current-account payments; use capital controls to 
insulate domestic financial markets, but begin liberalization. 
III. Use the dollar as the intervention currency, and keep active official exchange reserves 
in U.S. Treasury Bonds. 
IV. Subordinate long-run growth in the domestic money supply to the fixed exchange rate 
and to the prevailing rate of price inflation (in tradable goods) in the United States. 
V. Offset substantial short-run losses in exchange reserves by having the central bank 
purchase domestic assets to partially restore the liquidity of domestic banks and the 
money supply (Bagehot’s Rule). 
VI. Limit current account imbalances by adjusting national fiscal policy (government net 
saving) to offset any divergences between private saving and investment. 
 
The United States 
 
VII. Remain passive in the foreign exchanges: practice free trade with neither a balance-of-
payments nor an exchange rate target. Do not hold significant official reserves of foreign 
exchange. 
VIII. Keep U.S. capital markets open to foreign governments and private residents as 
borrowers or depositors. 
IX. Maintain position as a net international creditor (in dollar-denominated assets) and limit 
fiscal deficits. 
X.  Anchor the dollar (world) price level for tradable goods by an independently chosen 
American monetary policy. 
Table 2: McKinnon’s rules for the Fixed Rate Dollar Standard, 1950-70 
Source: McKinnon, ‘The rules’, p16, Rule Box 3 
 
Note that McKinnon’s rules for the Fixed Rate Dollar Standard above were limited to 
industrial countries (including the UK), whereas his Spirit of the Treaty rules applied to 
all countries.106 McKinnon did not explain this deliberate limitation, but the complication 
presented by the sterling area may have been one of the underlying reasons 
(alongside special consideration of developing countries and agricultural trade under 
Bretton Woods). McKinnon’s interpretation was also based on the well-known 
redundancy problem, that equilibrium in N-1 currencies determines equilibrium in the 
Nth currency (here, the dollar). Rules VII to X addressed the redundancy problem of 
how to solve the extra degree of policy freedom.107  
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There is a technical problem here, associated with McKinnon’s limitation of the rules to 
industrial countries: unless all countries engaged in trade are considered to be part of 
the system, the redundancy problem technically does not arise, so how did non-
industrial sterling area countries fit in? McKinnon attributed sterling crises to the UK’s 
breach of Rule IV – running over-inflationary policies.108 Still, the logic of McKinnon’s 
Rule Box based on the redundancy problem is that the sterling area as a whole (UK 
and RSA) should collectively, as a single entity, be following Rules I to VI. For 
instance, under Rule VI, the sterling area as a whole should be limiting current account 
imbalances and adjusting national fiscal policies. 
 
McKinnon’s Rules I-VI also incorporated the well-known Mundell-Fleming trilemma 
between fixed exchange rates, freedom of international capital movements and 
independent monetary policy (only two of the three are possible).109 Under the ‘Spirit of 
the Treaty’, capital controls were supposed to facilitate adjustable pegs and national 
macroeconomic autonomy. But the ‘Fixed Rate Dollar Standard’ rules were different, 
with indefinitely fixed exchange rates (Rule I) creating an uneasy tension between, on 
the one hand, weakening capital controls (Rule II), and, on the other, short-term 
monetary autonomy (Rule V) together with long-term macroeconomic constraints 
(Rules IV and VI).110 A distinction has been made between the 1950s, when ‘regional 
payments solutions replaced the global multilateralism that the Bretton Woods system 
had been supposed to create’,111 and the 1960s, when current account convertibility 
had been achieved and international capital flows, short-term and long-term, increased 
in speed and scale, leading to the trilemma-based policy conflicts which brought down 
the system.112 According to the regional payments solutions argument, the sterling 
area, like the European Payments Union (EPU), had an instrumental purpose in the 
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1950s, which it no longer enjoyed following the achievement of current account 
convertibility. It is tempting to think that the sterling area’s own national arrangements 
of currency pegging and capital controls corresponded nicely to those of the trilemma, 
but this would be to confuse capital controls designed to insulate a national economy 
(the classic trilemma) with the different capital controls required to insulate an 
integrated group of countries (the sterling area) from the NSA. As described above, the 
only consistent way to incorporate the sterling area into McKinnon’s Rule Box is to 
treat the sterling area as a single entity governed by Rules I-VI.     
   
There can be no doubt, as will be seen, that the sterling area operated under informal 
constraints in the North sense (there was no codification of rules), somewhat vague 
constraints which applied to the UK and RSA countries, typically on a variable and tacit 
bilateral basis between the UK and each country. Yet the sterling area also was 
presented as a public ‘organisation’ or coalition, like (but not the same as) the British 
Commonwealth, with a known membership defined by UK law. Certain practices, such 
as pegging to sterling, were easy to identify; and official documents, contemporary 
media and subsequent historiography often confidently described its rules as though 
they were quite formal. 
 
Lipson’s analysis of informal international agreements gives clues about why, like 
NATO or OPEC, this combination of public face and informal arrangements might have 
been an optimal combination for the sterling area. Since no international agreements, 
from public treaties to tacit agreements, are binding on the participants (there being no 
third-party enforcement), formal treaties are really about committing the state publicly 
via reputation. It is beneficial to the participants, and particularly to the originator and 
manager of such a system, to create a public impression of unity and voluntary 
stability. But formal treaties are hard to achieve, so informal agreements can substitute 
for them: they are typically secret, simple (unratified), flexible, and quick to negotiate. 
46 
 
Informal agreements also have corresponding disadvantages: they are less reliable, 
lacking public commitment and easier to abrogate. Informal agreements also vary 
according to the level of government involved and the form of the agreement – e.g. 
joint communiques, oral bargains, secret treaties and tacit agreements.113 The tacit 
bargains are hard to identify, or to distinguish from prudent self-interest. They may be 
a mirage, but they can sometimes be uncovered by reactions to violations of the 
perceived bargain: a tacit bargain is revealed by responses expressing regret more 
than surprise. They and hidden agreements can also easily lead to 
misunderstandings.114           
 
Although its constraints were tacit, the public nature of the sterling area’s presented 
rules, regularly repeated in contemporary media and the historiography (pegging to 
sterling, pooling reserves, and co-ordinating capital controls), may have reflected such 
a need to present commitment to an external audience. Implicit in McKinnon’s rules 
and the trilemma is the concept of a stable equilibrium as a desirable international 
monetary objective. Equilibrium also was the focus of the ‘rules versus discretion’ 
debate in domestic monetary policy. Those favouring rules argued that discretionary 
monetary policy suffered from this problem of time-inconsistency. There were always 
short-term incentives to create inflation surprises, but in the long run they would result 
in higher inflation and therefore an inferior long-term equilibrium. The solution was 
credible formal rules, compared with which even reputation was a relatively weak 
commitment mechanism.115 Bretton Woods was a time of monetary discretion, when 
there was incomplete understanding of monetary policy.116 Still, public rules stressing 
stability, order and control would have served a reassuring purpose for the sterling 
area beyond the internal reasons for their creation.   
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As an inter-governmental institution, the sterling area had both economic and political 
dimensions. The interplay of economics and politics in this thesis is situated in the 
‘economic approaches to politics’ dimension of political economy, which is concerned 
with economic reasoning. The specific application here is the ‘economic analysis of 
institutions’.117 There are two broad schools in the economic analysis of institutions. 
One treats institutions as exogenous, and addresses the effects of institutions on 
economic behaviour and activity. The other regards institutions as endogenous, and is 
a theory of how institutions arise and how they change.118 Here there is an empirical 
focus on the institutional effects of the sterling area on reserves and reserve 
management and domestic financial systems, which takes the sterling area as a given.  
        
The above discussion highlights the need for definitions in the thesis. Firstly, the 
Northian definitions of ‘institution’ and ‘organisation’ seem appropriate to this case. The 
word institution is often more conventionally applied to, say, facilitating bodies like the 
IMF or EPU, but these were both Northian institutions (sets of rules and constraints) 
and Northian organisations (groups of people including appointees and co-opted 
bureaucracies). However, while the sterling area was a Northian institution, it is by no 
means clear that it was an organisation. Those who discussed sterling area matters 
had other day jobs. So it is better, following North, to keep these concepts of institution 
and organisation separate. The sterling area was more a ‘financial alliance’ of 
countries than an organisation. (Occasionally it will be necessary to accept more 
conventional uses of the word institution, as in ‘central monetary institution’, meaning a 
Northian organisation such as a central bank). It should also be noted that a Northian 
institution is more than just constraints. North also emphasised transaction costs and 
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effective enforcement: ‘an essential part of the functioning of institutions is the 
costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment’.119  
 
Secondly, there is the use of the word ‘rules’. Since much of the historiography has 
confidently described sterling area rules, it seems prudent to accept this term, even 
though we are really talking about Northian informal constraints, as distinct from written 
rules. These were usually tacit rules (interpreted here in the same way that McKinnon 
interpreted the rules of the Fixed Rate Dollar Standard), which need to be evidenced 
as far as they can. For the RSA countries, they were British rules in the sense of 
British officials’ expectations of non-violation. Much of the historiography’s discussion 
of rules has derived from British sources. We are describing reserve management 
‘practices’ of peripheral central banks. Those practices might include following, or 
violating, perceived British sterling area rules. As already noted, tacit agreements lead 
to misunderstandings about what the rules actually are. 
 
Thirdly, within the informal constraints which we will call rules, there are different types. 
North stressed the importance of ‘conventions’ that solve co-ordination problems, 
being rules that were never designed, and are maintained by mutual self-interest. He 
distinguished such self-enforcing institutions of exchange from those which required an 
element of enforcement, in which the institution served to reduce the costs of 
measurement and enforcement.120 The distinction is important in the context of the 
sterling area because, as will be discussed, UK authorities liked to present the sterling 
area as a mutually self-interested club, ruled by conventions, which had evolved 
voluntarily as a matter of convenience – whereas in practice it witnessed some 
enforcing behaviour or enforcement debates among UK officials (e.g. regarding 
expulsion). The extent to which the sterling area operated via convention or elements 
of deliberate design and enforcement is therefore moot. This distinction can also be 
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linked to the taxonomy of political scientists, in which co-operation is tacit, negotiated 
or enforced.121   
 
2.3 Monetary co-operation 
 
Rules and constraints are closely linked to the concept of ‘co-operation’, which is the 
raison d’etre of the Northian institution. The co-operation literature is related to general 
equilibrium theory, the costs of transacting, and particularly to game theory.122 Major 
insights of game theory are that co-operation is more sustainable in repeated games, 
where there are few players, information about players is easy to obtain, benefits 
significantly exceed costs (such as the public good externalities of a stable 
international monetary system), or players are not wholly driven by self-interested 
economic motives.123 There are numerous definitions of different types of international 
monetary co-operation in the literature. For instance, a distinction was made by Bordo 
and Schenk between central bank ‘co-operation’ – ‘the sharing of information and 
techniques of central banking, the discussion of common problems and occasional/ad 
hoc emergency lending or other operations between central banks in periods of 
financial crisis’ – and ‘co-ordination’ – ‘policy actions formally agreed and taken by 
groups of policy makers… aimed at achieving beneficial outcomes for the international 
system as a whole’.124 While this division served the authors’ purpose well, in the 
sterling area I prefer a distinction between talk (to be defined as ‘consultation’) and all 
forms of action (encompassed by the word ‘co-operation’). This is not to devalue co-
operative consultation, or the types of active co-operation possible, but to reflect the 
different balance between consultation and active co-operation in the sterling area, and 
to focus on the revealed preferences of action. Using Toniolo’s definitions, I also 
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distinguish ‘formal co-operation’ (meaning ad hoc agreed actions of all types, however 
simple or elaborate) and ‘informal co-operation’ (meaning the longer-term following of 
rules of the game, which is a less demanding form of co-operation linked to repeated 
behaviour and reputation).125  
 
It is instructive to consider the forms of international monetary co-operation that took 
place during the Bretton Woods years, and relevant comparisons with those of other 
periods. Bordo and Schenk’s recent survey related the effectiveness of domestic 
monetary rules to the effectiveness of international co-operation. They argued that, if 
domestic monetary rules acted as credible commitment mechanisms (as under the 
classical gold standard 1880-1914 or the ‘Great Moderation’ 1985-2006), then 
international monetary co-operation performed a limited role, such as international 
lender of last resort activity, and was largely successful in this. However, in the 
intervening years, domestic monetary rules were usually not credible or consistent with 
international objectives, such as fixed exchange rates, and international co-operation 
was therefore unsuccessful.126 
 
The authors’ criticism of Bretton Woods was that there was ‘no underpinning domestic 
rule to support the system’,127 and the USA pursued inflationary policies from 1965. In 
other words, McKinnon’s Rules IV-V, each running in opposite directions, and Rule X, 
were not backed by a credible domestic commitment mechanism. At the same time, 
however, there was ‘an elaborate effort at institutionalized coordination’128 in these 
years, which reflected a consensus that the Great Depression period had been a co-
operative failure, and stable conditions favourable to the growth of international trade 
needed to be prioritised, e.g. via the IMF or BIS. The authors highlighted three major 
efforts to defend pegged exchange rates in the 1960s, namely the Gold Pool, co-
                                               
125
 Toniolo, Central bank cooperation, p5 
126
 Bordo and Schenk, ‘Monetary policy coordination’ 
127
 Bordo and Schenk, ‘Monetary policy coordination’, p24 
128
 Bordo and Schenk, ‘Monetary policy coordination’, p16 
51 
 
ordinated lines of credit among G10 central banks, and bilateral swap lines between 
the Federal Reserve and other major central banks.129 These efforts at co-operation 
had varying success and prolonged the system, but the system ultimately foundered 
on inconsistencies with domestic policies. The key insight is that rules and co-
operative organisations together can shape international monetary co-operation. Other 
authors have adopted more positive views about the role of, and need for, international 
monetary co-operation.130 This debate is partly about short-term and long-term 
horizons and priorities.  
 
Implicit in the debates around Bretton Woods are three different types of co-operation. 
One is the co-operation involved in the creation and design of a stable international 
monetary system. The second is the co-operation involved in trying to make the 
system work well, and to improve flaws in its design, or address changes in external 
conditions, in order to maintain it as a stable system. The third is the co-operation 
involved in keeping it together through short-term fixes, effectively ‘fire-fighting’. These 
forms of co-operation address different aspects of stability, the first two considering 
fundamentals, the third short-term confidence. 
 
McKinnon’s Rule Box looked at the first question, and sought to interpret the de facto 
rules of Bretton Woods. This is easier to do than for the sterling area because of the 
open, public and multilateral nature of the design debates underlying Bretton Woods. 
Fixed exchange rates, and growing multilateral trade, were at the core of the 
designers’ aims. Still, there have been other interpretations about these rules. For 
instance, McKinnon argued that the gold-dollar parity was not essential to its stability, 
while Eichengreen called it a ‘gold-dollar system’.131 Others have looked through the 
rules and argued that the system was stable for other reasons. For instance, as 
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already noted, there is the argument that there was a long-term stable bargain 
between the USA on the one hand (exorbitant privilege), and Europe and Japan on the 
other (export-led growth), which the USA has revived more recently with China and 
other industrialising countries.132 There was also the ‘banker to the world’ view of US 
deficits of the time, suggesting that borrowing short and lending long was profitable 
and stable (banks can lend a multiple of their reserves and depositors cannot all 
withdraw their funds at the same time).133   
 
The second type of co-operation tried to address fundamental flaws. Bordo, while 
recognising the macroeconomic achievements of the system, highlighted three 
fundamental problems: the growth of liquidity, asymmetry of adjustment, and 
confidence in the dollar.134 The liquidity problem was a dilemma highlighted by Triffin: 
scarce gold was inadequate for the world’s growing liquidity needs, but dollars could 
not expand sufficiently without jeopardising confidence in its value relative to gold.135  
The adjustment problem was related to the trilemma. With more liberal capital flows, 
lower growth led to increased distributional conflicts and greater policy priority towards 
internal balance, putting pressure on fixed exchange rates.136 In practice creditor 
countries such as West Germany found it easy to resist revaluation, and the pressure 
to adjust fell on the debtors.137 Finally the dollar confidence problem was related to the 
already-mentioned ‘credibility’ of the commitment of the USA (at the core of the 
system) to its creditors. Compared with the universal rules of the classical gold 
standard, Bordo and Kydland argued, Bretton Woods lacked credibility, because for 
the USA there was ‘no explicit enforcement mechanism other than reputation and 
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commitment to gold convertibility’.138 When the USA adopted inflationary policies after 
1965, major countries in the system’s periphery were reluctant to follow US 
leadership.139 There seems to be a consensus in the historiography that co-operative 
efforts were directed too much to trying to solve the ‘problem’ of liquidity (e.g. through 
the long and ultimately fruitless debates leading to the creation of the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights), and not enough to the problems of adjustment and credibility.140 The 
inevitability of the breakdown of Bretton Woods remains the prevailing view.141  
 
Bretton Woods, then, was a vulnerable regime, ‘rigid and brittle’,142 forming a transition 
between the shared assumptions of the gold standard, and the free-for-all of floating 
exchange rates.143 Consequently much of the co-operation effort was directed towards 
supporting prevailing exchange rate parities in the short term, both between gold and 
the US dollar, and between the US dollar and other currencies.144 Since Bretton 
Woods was the overarching framework in which the post-war sterling area operated, 
and the sterling area was a form of regional co-operation within it, it is instructive to 
look at two other examples of such regional co-operation, the 1960s Gold Pool and the 
1950s EPU. 
 
The Gold Pool was designed to protect the gold-dollar parity, by involving in the USA’s 
market defence of the parity seven European countries with a collective interest in 
preserving the Bretton Woods system. Eichengreen observed that the Gold Pool of 
1961-8 ‘collapsed after six years and barely two years after sustained sales of gold 
commenced’,145 so it was not particularly successful. He likened it to a cartel with a 
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number of weaknesses: (1) lack of a shared diagnosis of the problem, (2) no 
enforcement mechanism, (3) a free-riding, non-compliant competitive fringe of 
countries outside the Gold Pool, (4) incompatibility with the market-based official image 
of Bretton Woods, (5) lack of public transparency, reducing commitment and 
confidence, and (6) dynamic instability, as dollar reserves increased relative to gold.146  
 
By contrast, the EPU (1950-8) has been judged a successful co-operative enterprise 
involving 18 European countries, which ‘promoted multilateral settlements, encouraged 
the removal of trade barriers, and cemented the stability of exchange rates’,147 only 
liquidating itself when the Bretton Woods goal of current account convertibility had 
been attained. Kaplan and Schleiminger claimed that its greatest benefits were 
intangible: ‘European economic integration and financial co-operation’.148 The EPU 
framework engendered a co-operative spirit during complex negotiations over the 
management of specific intra-European problems and crises.149 Toniolo highlighted the 
importance of ‘the EPU mechanism, which somehow obliged its board to press for 
adjustment both by deficit and surplus countries’.150 Eichengreen argued that the EPU 
was not technically required (Europe could have moved earlier to convertibility) and its 
significance lay in the support it provided to the social cohesion in Europe which 
underlay rapid growth in these years.151 By contrast Toniolo suggested that earlier 
convertibility would have been premature, and the EPU enabled first the liberalisation 
of intra-European trade, generating gains from competition while discriminating against 
US goods and protecting European incomes, and subsequently the gradual 
liberalisation of extra-European trade.152     
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In contrast to the multilateral overarching framework of Bretton Woods, it should be 
observed that these were both discriminatory arrangements. Each also had 
administrative organisational underpinnings. In the case of the Gold Pool, the UK acted 
as agent of the Pool’s members, with the agent’s dealings being shared pro rata 
among the members according to fixed proportions. As well as having precise rules 
about the mixture of gold and credit in monthly settlement, the EPU had strong 
governance in the form of the EPU managing board, with ad hoc problems being 
negotiated throughout the 1950s. Both these regional arrangements offer a 
comparison against which the sterling area can be assessed. 
 
To summarise on rules, institutions, organisations and co-operation, the international 
monetary framework of the 1950s-60s was highly institutionalised, co-operative and 
governed by rules. The discussion highlights the importance of both informal 
constraints and consistent, credible domestic policies within an international monetary 
system. But the sterling area’s position in that framework is shadowy and hard to 
extricate. Informal, tacit agreements are difficult to identify. If the IMF’s members 
including the UK were all pegging closely to the dollar, what did it mean for sterling 
area countries to be pegging to sterling? While institutions such as the Gold Pool 
(1961-8) and EPU (1950-8) were clearly formed to support the Bretton Woods 
framework, the practices of the sterling area, such as reserve pooling, long pre-dated 
Bretton Woods, so to what extent was the sterling area truly an interim solution ‘formed 
to allow multilateral trade without full convertibility’?153 In short, did the sterling area 
matter? The next section reviews the sterling area and its associated literature. 
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Section 3: Monetary and exchange arrangements of the sterling area: critical 
discussion of the literature 
   
This section discusses the sterling area literature in three parts. Firstly, it reviews the 
British exchange controls which defined the sterling area. Secondly, it discusses the 
reciprocal rules of the sterling area system. Thirdly, it considers the ‘problem of the 
sterling balances’ which dominated policy in relation to the sterling area. We begin with 
a brief overview of the relevant sterling area literature.   
 
Alongside more general references, there are three types of specialist literature 
regarding the sterling area, overlapping in places, but recognisable. Most of this 
literature has been centred on the UK, although some authors took the viewpoint of a 
sterling area member.154 First were thorough contemporary analyses, particularly in the 
early 1950s, seeking to explain the global role of, motivations behind, and prospects 
for the sterling area. An example is the 1951 mission study by the United States’ 
European Cooperation Administration (ECA). For the ECA, the sterling area’s 
importance derived from its scale (comprising a quarter of the world’s population and 
international trade), its sourcing of resources (it produced half the world’s gold, while 
leading net exports included wool, rubber, jute, tin, cocoa, diamonds and tea), and its 
cohesion.155      
 
Given the technical nature of the sterling area, and client secrecy surrounding its 
workings, it was inevitable that this literature should be informed by contact with (and 
perhaps carry the blessing of) UK officialdom. Nevertheless, not all analyses were 
optimistic about the future prospects of the sterling area in the face of decolonisation, 
and from the mid-1950s, a second type of literature emerged which was highly critical 
of UK official policy. Taking their cue from frequent sterling crises, its authors accused 
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UK officials of imposing domestic economic costs on the UK in pursuit of international 
prestige. Leading works in this genre were those of Shonfield and Strange.156 
   
Thirdly, there is the historical literature. With the collapse of the sterling area in the 
1970s and the apparent vindication of the critics, interest in the topic waned. During 
these years, historical memoranda were produced by UK Treasury insiders on different 
aspects: while they are technically TNA primary documents, they were historically 
motivated in-depth studies, and have been sufficiently cited that I have treated them as 
secondary material for this review. Then, with the opening up of government historical 
archives from the 1990s, external historians engaged with sterling area material. 
Schenk began by making a close study of the 1950s sterling area, analysing archival 
documents, and subsequently extended this to later periods and work in other 
countries. The conclusions were revisionist, criticising the critics and arguing that their 
assertions about economic costs for Britain were not supported by the primary 
material. Other historians have not delved so deeply, but there have been individual 
studies of sterling area countries, including reserve management and international 
financial relations and negotiations with the UK. However, it is fair to say that the focus 
has been on specific issues, and, unlike in the first category, sterling area rules and 
practices, although mentioned, have been in the background. If this review appears to 
draw heavily on Schenk and contemporaries, it is because these have made in-depth 
studies of the monetary and exchange arrangements of the sterling area.   
 
The point about this for a new researcher looking at the sterling area in the 1950s-60s 
is that the sterling area was a highly contested policy topic in the UK, and other 
countries. There were critics on the outside (and the inside) attacking official policy. 
And there were officials on the inside both defending policy against the critics and 
trying to present the sterling area as a source of stability in the face of sterling crises. 
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In other words, while there was an explicit critique of the sterling area in the secondary 
literature, there was also an implicit official narrative. This narrative was not presented 
explicitly in the secondary literature, but it can be found in primary documents and in 
parts of the secondary literature. This makes a documentary study of the sterling area 
particularly challenging. Minimum questions which a researcher must ask of any 
document, primary or secondary, include the following. How well-informed was the 
author about the sterling area? What was the source of the author’s information? And 
what was the standpoint of the author, or the author’s source, in this contested field?   
   
So there have been numerous studies of the sterling area at different times, but 
sterling’s international use was subject to change over many years, from the 
nineteenth century to the 1970s and beyond, and not all versions have been consistent 
or clear. With rules hard to pin down, many authors have preferred to emphasise the 
general fluidity of arrangements, painting a picture of the post-war sterling area as a 
cohesive association of countries, whose importance lay not so much in their banking 
arrangements but in their trading relations.157 However, in terms of monetary and 
exchange arrangements, a more precise technical exposition of the sterling area is 
needed, and was provided by Sargent’s discussion of UK exchange controls in 1952. 
Sargent’s summary has the benefit of being well-informed, analytical and explanatory 
(type 1 in the above literature categorisation), but not uncritical.158  
 
3.1 The sterling area as defined by UK exchange controls 
 
Sargent made the argument that any currency area rests on two principles of 
discrimination. Firstly, international transfer of currency within the area is easier than a 
transfer from inside to outside. Secondly, it is easier for (some or all actors resident in) 
a country inside the area to transfer the currency outside the area, or to exchange the 
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currency for an outside currency (the right of convertibility), than is the case for a 
country outside the area. The sterling area thus arose from inconvertibility and 
exchange controls. ‘As long as the pound sterling was a fully convertible currency… 
there was no Sterling Area’.159 This means that the sterling area’s monetary and 
exchange arrangements cannot be considered in isolation but have to be judged in the 
wider relative context of those between the UK and NSA countries.  
 
Before 1931, various countries held substantial amounts of sterling in their 
international reserves, for the reasons given in Section 2. These reasons included: 
convenience in terms of trade, debt service or liquidity, such as London’s role in 
financing trade and providing debt capital; sterling’s status as a leading gold-
convertible currency under the pre-WW1 gold standard and the 1924-31 gold 
exchange standard; and considerations of risk and return.160      
 
In 1931, sterling’s convertibility into gold at a fixed rate ended, and sterling floated on 
the currency exchanges. There was a period of currency confusion, but by 1933, a 
loose ‘sterling bloc’ of countries had emerged, which pegged their currencies to 
sterling at a fixed rate without exchange controls. According to Sargent, these 
countries were the British Dominions (except Canada), the British colonies, Egypt, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Portugal and Siam.161 But Sayers noted 
that the exact membership of the bloc, if defined as ‘the area in which sterling 
circulated most easily’, was hard to pin down.162 The sterling bloc enjoyed the practical 
advantage of mutual trade at a fixed exchange rate which satisfied Sargent’s first 
                                               
159
 Sargent, ‘Britain’, p531 
160
 Sargent, ‘Britain’, p532 
161
 Sargent distinguished the above countries from more restrictive sterling peggers: Japan, Greece, 
Latvia, Yugoslavia, Argentina and Bolivia (Sargent, ‘Britain’, p532). The Dominions apart from 
Canada/Newfoundland were Australia, pre-partition India, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa. 
However, Sargent did not mention Iraq, Iran or Uruguay, all referenced within the sterling bloc by Cassels 
(The sterling area, p26)   
162
 Sayers, Financial policy, p228 
60 
 
principle, but he said that this was a matter of convenience rather than a special 
privilege, as sterling remained convertible world-wide.163 
 
War in 1939 forced the UK to introduce exchange controls in order to protect its 
international reserves, and the sterling area then came into being as a distinct smaller 
group of countries, defined by British exchange controls. The sterling area now 
satisfied both of Sargent’s principles.164 As Sayers explained, these controls were 
debated and introduced over time, and their design reflected a compromise between 
the liberal ‘good banker’ approach which would help supply credit to the UK, and the 
strict German exchange control system which would preserve precious resources. 
They began with the mobilisation (the sweeping up into the Treasury’s Exchange 
Equalisation Account (EEA) at the Bank of England) in the UK of all ‘designated’ hard 
currencies and gold, and strict Treasury control over subsequent use of these assets, 
policed by agent banks.165 The regulations included the additional Treasury control of 
sterling payments to non-residents. The sterling area countries were those countries 
specifically exempted from formal British control over sterling payments. This was only 
feasible because of assurances from sterling area countries that ‘exchange restrictions 
substantially parallel to those enforced by the United Kingdom’ would be imposed.166 
The sterling area initially comprised the entire British Commonwealth (including neutral 
Ireland but excluding Canada, Newfoundland and Hong Kong), together with Egypt, 
Sudan and Iraq.167 In order to gather hard currency, the UK introduced dollar-invoicing 
for exports to the NSA, and bilateral payments agreements (regarding sterling’s use) 
with NSA countries, at each step securing the agreement of sterling area countries.168 
The administration of controls in the sterling area was thus decentralised at a national 
level, but, through central bank contacts, enjoyed ‘a considerable degree of 
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coordination’.169 There was a ‘partial pooling’ into the UK of the hard currency 
resources of the sterling area, South Africa being an exception.170 In return, as central 
banker for the group, the UK agreed to supply automatically the hard currencies 
required for necessary imports from the NSA by sterling area countries. In RSA 
countries, capital transactions were controlled by direct regulations, and imports were 
controlled by import licensing. Through this control, the UK was able to pay for war 
supplies with sterling, in effect additional sterling credit – about £2.5bn from the RSA, 
and £0.5bn from the NSA.171 
 
The UK emerged from the war with two major problems: an urgent current account 
deficit until the recovery of exports, and the threat of redemption posed by these large 
sterling reserve holdings – the ‘sterling balances’.172 For the RSA countries, there were 
similar concerns about how imports from the dollar area would be financed.173 
Reflecting these concerns, the British exchange control arrangements carried over into 
the post-war period. The years 1945-9 remained a ‘bilateral phase’ of fixed exchange 
rates, as described by Tew. There were widespread controls internationally, and, 
outside the sterling area, countries would only accept limited amounts of each other’s 
currency before requiring settlement in hard currency, either gold or US dollars.174 This 
much had not changed, but the context was now different. The common purpose of 
war aims, and the difficulties of wartime trade, had previously acted as significant 
constraints on sterling area spending. The need for effective controls was even greater 
in the period of reconstruction, pent-up demand and dollar scarcity that followed the 
war. The sterling area’s special exempt status was formalised as the ‘scheduled 
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territories’ under new legislation, The 1947 Exchange Control Act. The UK’s exchange 
control system became more complex and nuanced.175   
 
How can we track the many sterling exchange control changes that took place in the 
post-war period? According to Tew, after the bilateral phase (1945-9), there followed a 
binary period (1950-8), in which there was considerable free use of sterling outside the 
dollar area, and finally the years of multilateral convertibility after December 1958.176 
One needs a starting point of reference. Again, Sargent provided a succinct tabular 
summary of British exchange control, which showed the sterling area’s privileged 
position in the freedom of sterling payments in 1952. This is reproduced as Table 3. 
With some qualifications (described by Sargent and below), sterling could be 
transferred freely within the sterling area for either current or capital purposes, and 
sterling was also effectively convertible for use everywhere else by drawing on the 
sterling area’s ‘dollar pool’ (the hard currency reserves held by the EEA).177 The three 
qualifications were as follows. Firstly, current spending was constrained by import 
licensing and government contracts. Secondly, unlike the UK, certain sterling area 
countries (Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) restricted capital flows to the 
sterling area, and South Africa also withdrew from the pooling arrangements in 
December 1947. Thirdly, as a result of events in 1947 (see below), the sterling 
holdings of certain sterling area countries (e.g. India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Iraq) were 
temporarily blocked and hard currency spending rations were imposed on them.178  
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Sterling held by 
residents of: 
Freely transferable 
 within area shown 
Freely transferable to 
 outside area shown 
For current 
transactions 
For capital 
transactions 
For current 
transactions 
For capital 
transactions 
American Account 
Area 
 
Yes 
 
* 
 
Yes 
 
* 
 
Sterling Area 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Transferable 
Accounts Area† 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No‡ 
 
No 
Bilateral Area and 
Residual Group 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No¶ 
 
No 
Table 3: The sterling exchange control system, 1952 
Source: Reproduced from Sargent, ‘Britain’, p535 
Notes: 
* Sterling Balances only; sterling held in the form of securities can be transferred outside sterling area only 
in the event of repayment 
† Sterling in transferable accounts only 
‡ Except for payments to Residual Group and Sterling Area 
¶ Except for payments to Sterling Area    
 
Sargent’s table described the transferability of sterling (the obverse of convertibility) on 
current and capital account for countries categorised by British exchange controls. 
Compared with the wartime controls, the only important new category in Sargent’s 
table was the Transferable Accounts Area. The American Account Area was granted 
official convertibility (effectively during and) after the war, in order to discourage 
exchanges in the unofficial, free sterling market. During the war, countries with bilateral 
agreements with the UK could only spend sterling in the sterling area (becoming the 
Bilateral Area in Sargent’s table). The Residual Group only differed from the Bilateral 
Group in that it could receive payments from the Transferable Accounts Area.179 
 
Transferable accounts emerged out of the Bank of England’s plan to implement the 
American Loan Agreement of 1945, which, in return for US$3.75 billion of low-interest 
long-term funds, required the UK to settle outstanding sterling balances (either 
cancelling, blocking or releasing them), and to bring in non-discrimination and currency 
convertibility by mid-1947.180 The British plan was to introduce convertibility country by 
country into the NSA in the year running up to the deadline (it was argued that the 
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sterling area already enjoyed convertibility through the dollar pool). Each relevant NSA 
country was asked to negotiate a transferable account agreement with the UK, 
agreeing to accept sterling without question in current trade in return for the right to 
transfer the sterling to the American Account Area or to exchange it with the UK for 
hard currency. Transferable accounts thus occupied a place in the exchange control 
hierarchy just below the sterling area and above the bilateral area. This meant that 
when convertibility had to be suspended in the sterling crisis of August 1947, the 
suspension was administratively a simple matter: a change to each transferable 
account agreement so that transfers to the American Account area were no longer 
allowed. In addition, certain countries which had proved a source of dollar drain for the 
UK (e.g. Argentina, Belgium, Brazil and Canada) were reallocated from the 
transferable accounts area to the bilateral area.181 
 
Thus the sterling area’s ‘privilege’ was in relation to these other areas, and in this 
relative assessment it mattered which countries were in which area, particularly the 
transferable accounts area, since this area enjoyed some freedom of transferability.182 
In 1952, the sterling area was little changed from its wartime composition, consisting of 
‘the British Colonies, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and 
Ceylon, together with certain countries outside the British Commonwealth, Burma, 
Iraq, Jordan, Iceland and the Irish Republic’.183 Egypt, Sudan and Palestine had 
departed the area in the 1940s. Libya was persuaded to join in 1952. Following regime 
changes, Iraq left in 1959, Southern Rhodesia (formerly a colony) in 1965, Burma in 
1966. These membership changes were recorded and explained in Symons’ 
memorandum.184  
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In the 1950s, transferable accounts became the principal instrument of the British drive 
to extend the use and acceptability of sterling, and also towards ‘non-resident’ (i.e. 
NSA) convertibility.185 The creation of the EPU in July 1950 led to a significant 
widening of the transferable accounts area during 1950-51: it now incorporated most 
Western European countries. Through the multilateral settlement rules for intra-EPU 
trade, the EPU provided de facto partial (and, during 1950-8, increasing) gold- or 
dollar-convertibility to its members’ currencies. The EPU also required the gradual 
removal of intra-EPU import controls. The whole sterling area was included in the EPU 
trading arrangements via the UK’s membership, so that the UK’s EPU surpluses and 
deficits were in fact those of the sterling area as a whole. The EPU thus constituted a 
major step towards free trade outside the dollar area. In March 1954 there was a 
further widening of the transferable accounts area, encompassing most of the non-
dollar non-sterling area (NDNSA), and extension of the freedoms granted within the 
area (transferable accounts were no longer restricted to central monetary institutions, 
and capital as well as current payments were liberalised). Then in February 1955 the 
Bank of England began intervening in unofficial transferable sterling exchange markets 
such as those located in Zurich and New York, to ensure that the free rates quoted no 
longer diverged by more than about 1 per cent from the official sterling-dollar exchange 
rate. This meant that de facto non-resident convertibility had been achieved. In 
December 1958 the American account and transferable accounts areas were merged, 
thus establishing formal non-resident convertibility. In February 1961, as the UK 
adopted Article VIII of the IMF’s rules, all UK controls on current payments (such as 
import controls) were prohibited.186 
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In short, the sterling area lost its relative current payments privilege during the 1950s, 
significantly in 1950 with the EPU, de facto in February 1955, and completely in 
December 1958 with convertibility. This left freedom of capital flow from the UK as the 
principal privilege that persisted into the 1960s. The UK’s long-standing policy of 
capital controls affecting UK residents towards the NSA fluctuated during the 1960s, 
first loosening, then tightening, but always remaining in place.187 The exemption from 
UK control of sterling transfers towards the sterling area (the definition of the sterling 
area) did not end until June 1972.188 Still, there were indirect and moral suasion 
measures addressing UK capital flow to the sterling area. First, in July 1961, the UK 
Chancellor expressed concern publicly about capital outflows to/the lack of remittances 
from the RSA (while introducing formal NSA capital control measures). More significant 
were the UK’s imposition of Corporation Tax in April 1965 (removing tax advantages 
for overseas investment) and the ‘Voluntary Programme’ introduced in May 1966 as a 
temporary measure (rolled over in subsequent years) to restrain direct investment into 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland.189 Since these were the countries 
principally benefiting from UK capital flow, the sterling area’s capital flow privilege was 
thus reduced.      
 
If, following Sargent, privilege and discrimination were the raison d’etre of the sterling 
area, it is the decline of the sterling area’s privileged status during the 1950s-60s that 
makes these years particularly interesting. Sterling area countries enjoyed a 
mechanism of easy access to Western European and other NDNSA trade in the 1950s 
in Tew’s ‘binary phase’, but the relative advantage was less clear after convertibility.190 
The difficulty was summarised by the economist Scammell in 1961. He had described 
the sterling area as ‘one of the most successful voluntary organisations for mutual 
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monetary advantage ever evolved’,191 but was now beginning to question its purpose 
and prospects: 
 
‘The Sterling Area has been three things in its day; a fixed exchange club of 
countries with broadly similar interests and policies; a group organised for 
economic warfare; and a group organised for defence against the dollar 
problem. At no stage have objects been defined.’192  
  
So the sterling area still existed under the definition of UK exchange controls in 1960, 
but its reason for existing was much less obvious than in 1948. Why did it then persist 
until 1972? Or was this persistence a mirage, and were sterling area countries not 
operating under constraints at all – in essence was the sterling area an irrelevance? 
Some authors seem to have thought so. Contrary to the UK exchange control definition 
of the sterling area, Kirshner said that, after 1958, the sterling zone, which no longer 
needed a dollar pool, shrank to only Britain and its remaining colonies.193 Robertson 
and Singleton stated that dollar pooling ended in 1958.194 This historical uncertainty 
about what the sterling area was, and was for, demands another definition of the 
sterling area, based on its operating practices. 
 
3.2 The sterling area defined by working practices and British rules 
 
The previous sub-section showed that membership of the sterling area was the 
unilateral decision of the UK government. In return for an exemption from UK 
exchange controls, however, the British expected sterling area countries to follow 
certain rules. In the sterling area literature these rules have been expressed fairly 
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consistently. As summarised by Schenk, members would peg their currencies to 
sterling (the ‘peg’), they would pool their hard currency reserves by selling them to the 
UK in return for sterling (the ‘pool’), and they would operate national exchange controls 
in order to establish a ring of exchange control restricting the flow of hard currency in 
and out of the area (the ‘controls’).195  
 
What is less clear from the literature is how these rules worked in practice. It seemed 
that their country implementation was a bilateral question with the UK. Shonfield, citing 
South Africa’s special position and political constraints on the colonies, stated: 
 
‘it is highly misleading to talk about the sterling area as if it were one simple 
and coherent body with a single set of rules obeyed equally by all comers’.196 
 
Grey, writing in 1952, thought the words ‘rules’ and ‘area’ were too formal for this free 
association of countries, ‘who have each an interest in the well-being of others and 
who gain more by standing together than by standing alone’.197 He stressed four 
working practices, holding working balances in London, pooling reserves, allowing 
fairly free intra-sterling area capital movements, and engaging in parallel devaluations 
(in 1949), but argued that there was little in the way of common policy or effective 
external control or discrimination, in contrast to contemporary American perceptions of 
the sterling area.198 Extensive control was impossible in this loose association: ‘the 
sterling area will break up rather than be governed by a tight rein’.199  
 
At the other extreme, citing secondary sources from the 1950s, Kirshner put forward 
the sterling area in the 1940s-50s as an example of both British extraction (by paying 
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war expenditure with sterling and then devaluing) and entrapment (interdependence 
restricting the reserve freedom of the RSA). He argued that the UK deliberately 
encouraged discrimination against the dollar, particularly among the countries which 
decolonised in this period.200 Symons’ Treasury perspective revealed that the British 
officials had expectations of sterling area behaviour: sterling area countries were not 
supposed to acquire large non-sterling reserves, but those expectations were not 
always met. New Zealand, Nigeria, Jordan and Jamaica were firm holders for most of 
the period, Malaysia, Kuwait and Pakistan fairly steady. Libya, Iraq, Burma and Ceylon 
were poor holders, India reluctant, Australia initially loyal, but later independent and 
lacking confidence.201 
 
3.2.1 The sterling area and the sterling peg 
 
Let us delve deeper into these three rules, beginning with the sterling peg. It is clear 
from the economic literature that pegging has important reserve management effects: 
pegging to sterling at narrower margins than the IMF’s dollar peg would require sterling 
reserves for intervention purposes. The difficulty with the rule of the peg is one of 
measurement: in a world of fixed exchange rates, were sterling area countries truly 
committed to pegging to sterling, or was there some kind of implicit dollar pegging 
going on in the background? The sterling peg was not necessarily a hard peg: 
countries could and did adjust their sterling parities, just as they could under Bretton 
Woods rules with respect to the dollar and gold.  
 
The sterling area’s sterling pegging would only have been tested against the dollar if 
sterling had floated on the exchanges, which was seriously considered in 1952-5 but 
not acted upon. Fforde reported a Bank of England official’s review of the first full 
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Commonwealth discussion about this plan in September 1952: ‘the floating rate 
attracted considerable suspicion from all except the Canadians’.202 Although initial 
concerns were allayed and Burnham presented this floating of the sterling exchange 
rate as a missed opportunity for the UK, it is interesting that in November-December 
1952 India, Pakistan and Ceylon ‘would not give a firm undertaking that they would 
maintain a de facto link with sterling (reserving the right instead to link to the dollar)’ in 
the event of a float; and the UK Chancellor in turn considered ‘pegging to the dollar 
incompatible with full membership of the sterling area’.203 These countries signed up to 
the December 1952 Commonwealth communique supporting the ‘Collective 
Approach’,204 but as Burnham and Fforde revealed, it was a compromise that gave the 
Asian countries an opt-out from sterling pegging if the day of floating ever came.205 In 
the 1960s, it seemed that pegging to sterling was not essential for membership of the 
sterling area. Schenk noted that Nigeria and Ghana moved their pegs away from 
sterling in 1962 and 1965 respectively, in ‘a gradual disintegration of the sterling area 
by developed and developing members over the 1960s’.206         
 
For clues about pegging, there were the 1949 and 1967 sterling devaluations, which 
have received wide coverage in the economic history literature.207 All sterling area 
countries except Pakistan matched the 1949 devaluation (30.5%), but most did not 
follow that in 1967 (14.3%).208 The logic of all moving together did linger in the 1950s 
and even the 1960s. In 1962, for instance, the economist Perkins was arguing that if all 
the sterling area countries devalued together, ‘it would reduce the extent to which 
sterling would have to be devalued in order to secure a given effect upon the 
reserves’.209 Still, in considering Australia’s possible response to a sterling devaluation 
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or sterling floating in 1962, Perkins in fact argued that, against tradition, Australia might 
not devalue by the same amount or even at all.210 In 1967, by contrast, it seems that 
the UK government did not want Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore to 
follow sterling’s devaluation and asked Australia not to do so, fearing that others might 
follow their lead.211    
 
So sterling pegging was a firmer rule in the 1950s. The preparations for Bretton Woods 
in 1942-4 also indicated that there were potential advantages for sterling pegging even 
under fixed exchange rates. There was alignment of sterling area countries with the 
UK in these negotiations. When the UK invited officials from Canada, Australia, India, 
New Zealand and South Africa to discuss Keynes’s Clearing Union proposals at a 
London conference in October 1942, there appeared to be general agreement (except 
from the Bank of England) that the idea was good and should be tried out.212 In the 
Anglo-American negotiations, the UK’s debates with the USA were strongly motivated 
by concerns about the international position of sterling and the sterling area.213 The UK 
wanted its sterling balances to be settled between the UK and its creditors, not 
included in the scheme, and in the proposed convertibility provisions it sought 
reassurance that only new, not previous, accruals of currency would be made 
convertible. It stressed a larger, more accessible Fund and more freedom to alter 
parities and pursue domestic priorities.214 It was thus concerned with the interests of 
debtors over creditors. Australia held even stronger views that creditors should be 
penalised, and also wanted more generous drawings and more domestic freedom to 
pursue full employment rather than focus so much on exchange stability and balance-
of-payments stabilisation.215 So although Bretton Woods was introducing an implicit 
dollar peg for all the IMF’s members, there was a case, with adjustable parities, and 
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priorities more aligned with the UK than with the USA, that the sterling peg remained 
most important for sterling area countries as they entered the post-war period. Certain 
ISA countries, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand, were slow to join the IMF.216  
 
3.2.2 The sterling area and controls 
 
The secondary literature contains relatively little about the sterling area’s (as opposed 
to the UK’s) application of exchange and other controls. There seemed to be general 
agreement that controls were weaker in parts of the sterling area than in the UK.217 So 
the question was whether this was a problem, and, if so, what could be done about it. 
 
As earlier noted, membership of the wartime sterling area had seemingly been granted 
on the basis of assurances made to the UK about controls. Egypt was removed from 
the sterling area in July 1947, because its lack of controls over sterling payments made 
it impossible to ensure that Egypt’s large post-war sterling reserves could be 
blocked.218 So removal from the sterling area was a possible sanction for non-
compliance. However, it is unclear what other penalties short of expulsion the UK 
authorities could have adopted if they were unhappy. The negotiations between the UK 
and sterling area countries over sterling area issues were primarily bilateral; the carrots 
and sticks of such negotiations reflected bilateral relations in the round.219    
 
Exchange control was a Bank of England specialism, and the post-war Bank did not 
have a positive view of controls, so it was understandable that it might have been 
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tolerant of gaps in the sterling area’s control.220 Moreover, from 1948 through the 
1950s, most of the UK authorities’ exchange control headaches were about ‘cheap 
sterling’, which concerned the NSA and its unofficial exchange markets (primarily the 
interplay between the transferable accounts area and the American account area), 
rather than, specifically, the sterling area.221  
 
Sterling area exchange control lacunae were also hard to eliminate and could even 
have positive effects. This was shown in Schenk’s paper regarding the ‘Hong Kong 
gap’ in the 1950s. In Hong Kong and Kuwait, there were free exchange markets, which 
allowed UK residents to buy dollar securities with sterling. Schenk argued that this free 
market was of benefit to Hong Kong, supporting its exports and capital inflows, and 
since Hong Kong accrued sterling reserves, this was of net benefit to the sterling area. 
The gap also may have been helpful to the UK as a vent for large firms and relieving 
pressure arising from other restrictions. It was only when the dollar drain through this 
route became too large that the UK authorities, in July 1957, intervened by changing 
UK exchange control rules. The drain was also small relative to that from ‘leads and 
lags’ (advances and delays in the timing of trade settlements) which were not 
preventable by exchange controls, and some aspects of trade (e.g. invisibles) were not 
covered by UK exchange controls.222  
 
Increasingly in the 1950s, the UK policy direction was also against import controls in 
the sterling area. In the 1952 ‘Collective Approach’, the UK was pressing for the 
removal of quantitative restrictions while encouraging more discrimination against the 
NSA in the form of Commonwealth trade preference (lower tariffs within the 
Commonwealth than outside). This pressure was resisted by certain sterling area 
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members such as India.223 As explained in Section 2, the positioning of Bretton Woods 
in relation to the monetary trilemma encouraged national capital and import controls in 
those countries which prioritised domestic development and were concerned about 
balance-of-payments deficits. In 1952-60, Australia stabilised its balance of payments 
through general import controls, including against the sterling area, which was not to 
the liking of UK policymakers.224 Thus, in the 1950s-60s, sterling area countries 
needed little additional incentive to operate capital and import controls, which also did 
not seem to be such a high priority for the UK. By 1960, Schenk argued, there was not 
much significance to the sterling area as a discriminatory co-operative arrangement.225              
 
Nevertheless, while it is not particularly prominent in the sterling area literature, one 
can find there evidence of an important hard side to sterling area exchange controls. 
Due to exchange controls, all intra-sterling area trade settlement had to be in sterling 
area currencies, primarily sterling, and in practice there seemed to have been no 
uncontroversial exceptions to this rule.226 Within the sterling area, Egypt had had an 
‘obligation to accept sterling without limit for payment for exports or to provide Egyptian 
currency against sterling for UK expenditure inside Egypt’.227 When Burma demanded 
payment in dollars for rice sold to Ceylon in 1951, UK officials ‘felt strongly enough 
about the Ceylon deal to consider Burma’s expulsion’.228 In 1966, sterling was 
estimated to constitute 90 per cent of intra-sterling area trade; in 1967, trade between 
the sterling area and the NSA was thought to be 60 per cent in sterling, down from 70 
per cent in 1964.229 These high percentages suggest a support mechanism for sterling 
trade settlement. In particular, currency of intra-sterling area trade settlement appears 
to have been a subject on which UK officials felt strongly and where RSA countries 
had limited discretion to be non-compliant. 
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3.2.3 The sterling area and the pool 
 
The pooling rule was that countries should sell all accruing gold and hard currency to 
the UK in return for sterling. While normally the rule was not written down, in the case 
of Libya, it was articulated in a secret 1951 exchange of letters setting out 
 
‘the rights and duties of sterling area membership, including the right to draw 
on the Central Reserves for foreign currency commitments and the duty to 
pay into the reserves all US and Canadian dollars earned, and to limit 
drawings of these currencies  in times of stringency to those required to meet 
essential needs.’230 
 
Both contemporaries and historians recognised the economic rationale, during years of 
dollar scarcity, of these pooling arrangements in terms of risk-sharing, insurance and 
efficiency. Drawings on the pool were mitigated over time and space by other 
contributions, and supported countries’ emergency needs. The system allowed the 
sterling area as a whole to economise on its aggregate holdings of hard currency.231  
 
Recent literature has examined the strengths and weaknesses of regional reserve 
pooling. In the economic literature, the rationale for regional reserve pooling (as 
opposed to inter-regional reserve/credit arrangements such as the IMF) is sometimes 
questioned on risk diversification grounds, because country-level shocks are more 
correlated within than across regions. However, Basu, Bi and Kannan provided a 
theoretical argument that the extent of regional trade linkages was important since 
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responses to shocks have regional terms-of-trade effects which can only be fully 
internalised through a regional pool.232 
 
There have also been empirical studies. In existing regional monetary unions, the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union and the CFA Franc Zone in West and Central 
Africa, pooling is achieved through a central banking/monetary arrangement for the 
region. Gains can be expressed in terms of a better coverage index (the ratio of 
average reserves to reserve variability) arising from the lower variability of pooled 
reserves compared to individual country reserves. Gains from pooling were shown to 
be significant in both cases. However, the outcomes for individual countries within the 
region were asymmetric (countries with ex-ante lower coverage gained more), and too-
ready access to pooled reserves created fiscal and monetary indiscipline. The system 
also needed institutional governance that was both firm, with specified limits on credit 
access, and flexible, adjusting to shocks in the terms of trade.233 
 
The 1997 Asian crisis and subsequent increase in Asian countries’ international 
reserves prompted a debate about whether reserve pooling should be implemented 
there. Chang and Rajan examined the Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF). A regionally-pooled source of credit might provide funds more speedily, and 
with less conditionality, than the IMF. If crisis contagion is regional through 
interdependence, there is a regional interest in responding to it. They thought the main 
benefit would be in securing policy reform more effectively, by achieving regional 
consensus.234 Bird and Rajan argued that an AMF could provide a supplement to the 
IMF: a framework for regional financial co-operation covering domestic financial 
systems, exchange rate policies and short-term contingency lending.235 According to 
Rajan, regional arrangements to provide liquidity in response to regional crises would 
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have more of the features of a credit union than the IMF possesses: all countries would 
be more strongly motivated to ensure its success. He also said that prudential and 
supervisory standards are more appropriately set at the regional level.236 Still, the case 
for reserve pooling in Asia was not overwhelming. While analysis based largely on 
reserves/imports showed significant excess reserves in aggregate, creating savings 
via pooling,237 coverage index analysis suggested smaller aggregate savings, and 
these were asymmetrically distributed, with some countries gaining little or nothing. 
Given the Asian countries’ focus on owned reserves and exchange rate independence, 
achieving regional monetary co-operation would face political obstacles and the Chang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) for Asian central bank currency swaps was a natural first step.238 
 
In considering the relevance of this recent literature, it should be noted that the sterling 
area was not a region, but it was linked by trade, particularly bilateral trade with the 
UK.239 One of the main benefits of the system was supposed to be the complementary 
balance between UK manufacturing and RSA primary production, internalising shocks 
to the terms of trade between these types of goods.240   
 
The sterling area was also not a credit union – no country could rely on receiving credit 
from the UK – nor was it a monetary union. Countries could only draw on the dollar 
pool to the extent of their owned sterling reserves. In the latter respect of a limit based 
on contributions, the mechanism was closest to that of the East Caribbean 
arrangement, which also had this feature. But the East Caribbean Central Bank held 
more foreign assets than could be drawn by the members, while the RSA’s sterling 
reserves were a multiple of the dollar pool (see below). Unlike in a monetary union, 
these sterling reserves also enjoyed international acceptability beyond their value as 
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the ‘domestic’ token that could be exchanged with the central authority – an important 
distinction which became the source of analytical controversy for the sterling area (see 
Wright versus Kamarck below). Despite these differences, the questions of asymmetric 
gains/losses, governance and co-operation were clearly important issues for the 
sterling area. 
 
In 1954 Wright attempted to analyse the working of the sterling area’s dollar pooling at 
a country and aggregate level during 1939-52. He argued that pooling, while informal 
and flexible, consisted of three principles: national mobilisation of hard currency into 
each central authority, the sale to the UK for sterling of all new accruals of hard 
currency (above a base level) and import-licensing control of dollar imports which 
initially was limited to ‘essential’ imports. However, such import claims of need, 
together with the ‘moral claims’ of countries which had contributed to the pool, led to 
excess pressure on the pool. In terms of contributions to and drawings on the dollar 
pool, Wright argued that the UK and colonies had in effect passed significant 
international dollar aid and colonial surpluses to the ISA, making the colonies big 
losers and the ISA big gainers.241 The calculus of country gainers and losers was 
extended by Bhagat for 1945-58, with a broadly similar conclusion.242 Wright also 
referred to possible effects of ‘dollar-saving’ intra-sterling area exports, arguing that 
these increased sterling area trade at the expense of trade with the dollar area; and to 
the dollar-economising effect of reserve pooling, which freed up dollars for expenditure 
on more dollar imports.243 
 
Wright’s article drew a strong critique from Greaves (in relation to the colonies) and 
more generally from Kamarck.244 There were several strands to their criticisms, but 
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most important was that Wright’s analysis, by focusing only on and deriving normative 
conclusions from drawings on the dollar pool, was simplistic and incomplete. Kamarck 
found discussion of ‘dollar-saving’ exports similarly misleading and unnecessary. 
Rather, since spending sterling in the NDNSA (then a large source of external deficit 
for the sterling area) and in the UK could also cause, indirectly, a loss of dollars from 
the reserves, he argued, 
 
‘in assessing the contribution made by a sterling-area country to the dollar 
position of the whole area, it is necessary to consider not only its dollar 
accounts but its global balance of payments’.245 
 
Wright, in response, tried to defend his claim of effective, if not deliberate, colonial 
exploitation vis-à-vis Greaves. With Kamarck he agreed that, under convertibility, each 
country’s global balance of payments became important to the analysis, but defended 
his ‘lopsided’ treatment for the years of sterling inconvertibility, which he said covered 
most of the 1939-52 years. He also queried how to judge between the dollar and the 
global payments analyses if they led to different conclusions.246 
 
Wright’s broad agreement with Kamarck over the correct analysis under convertibility 
suggests that, in 1955, when de facto convertibility had already been achieved and the 
problem of dollar scarcity was disappearing, the dollar pool drawings analysis was 
already at best incomplete (sterling was not just a domestic token of no international 
value), and certainly so when Bhagat was writing. Still, such analysis inevitably 
suggested conflicts between perceived contributors and drawers, as well as, through 
these debates, controversy over the measurement of contributions and drawings. 
Symons argued that countries which derived no benefit from membership of the 
sterling area (he listed Kuwait, other Persian Gulf states, Libya, Iraq, Burma and 
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Ceylon) usually became poor holders of sterling; their diversification set a bad example 
for others; and excluding them from the area was problematic because of the effect on 
confidence.247 
 
According to Zupnick, dollar pooling also had serious macroeconomic effects on the 
sterling area. Lacking discipline and a co-ordination mechanism, it was inflationary and 
led to a misallocation of resources. The inflation arose because the ISA could draw 
freely on the dollar pool in order to industrialise, generating inflation in the ISA, and this 
expenditure also drew forth complementary, ‘unrequited exports’248 from the UK, 
creating more inflation there too. The misallocation arose from uncontrolled drawings 
on the pool, unbalanced drawing (restraint by the UK and colonies, but not the ISA) 
and emergency action taken during sterling crises causing projects to be abandoned 
following an intensification of import controls.249     
 
3.2.4 Rules: sterling area attitudes after the restoration of convertibility 
 
It is clear from the above discussions that convertibility was of great significance for the 
sterling area. In respect of the pool, Zupnick highlighted the differences between the 
‘sterling bloc’ (convertibility) and ‘sterling area’ (inconvertibility) periods. In the latter 
period, sterling area countries were ‘obliged’ to sell their hard currency earnings to 
London; there was ‘implicit discrimination’ against hard currency goods and in favour of 
sterling goods; and 
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‘sterling area countries were expected to frame their relevant economic 
policies in the light of the state of the central reserves rather than with 
reference to the state of their individual sterling reserves’.250 
 
When did all this come to an end? According to Schenk, the sterling crisis of 1952 was 
the ‘last gasp of strictly coordinated sterling area policy’ and from this year, when the 
sterling area endorsed the ‘Collective Approach’ to freer trade and payments, ‘trade 
discrimination was abandoned by successive members’.251 This view was also 
expressed by Symons, who stated that, after 1952, ‘the policies of individual countries 
became related to their own reserves position and not to that of the Central 
Reserves’.252 
 
The attitudes of leading financial commentators on the post-convertibility sterling area 
were revealed in 1959 in a discussion in the Oxford Bulletin of Statistics about the 
area’s future policy direction. The organiser, Scott, contrasted the then status quo with 
three recent radical proposals emanating from within the UK, and sought external 
responses. First was the idea of ‘Britain alone’, represented by the writers Day and 
Shonfield. In response to frequent sterling crises, they were proposing blocking, 
funding or guaranteeing the RSA’s sterling reserves, imposing exchange controls 
against the sterling area and restricting UK current and capital spending there, 
effectively bringing the sterling area to an end. Another idea, ‘One world with flexible 
exchange rates’, supported by Meade and Scammell (and also favoured by Scott), was 
that the UK should, while continuing to reduce barriers to trade, engage in managed 
floating of its exchange rate. Sterling area countries might be persuaded to accept this 
by the offer of dollar guarantees for official holdings, and, in the view of Meade, should 
introduce flexible rates for their own currencies. A third idea, ‘The Club’, associated 
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with Amery, Balogh and Sargent, proposed increasing the discrimination between 
members and non-members, including the possible reversal of convertibility for the 
NSA.253 Various responses came from well-informed commentators in ten 
countries/regions.254 It is hard to encapsulate all these responses (Scott provided a 
summary),255 but, in short, the RSA view on ‘Britain alone’ was outright hostile and 
retaliatory, the view on floating was mainly hostile, and the view on ‘The Club’ was 
mixed, at best. Australia, New Zealand and possibly Ghana would only welcome the 
club if it included Europe, while India, Iraq, South Africa and Ireland did not welcome it. 
Most writers favoured the status quo, which was seen as generally beneficial to the 
RSA countries in terms of its mix of freedom, capital inflow, trade preferences and 
access to the UK market.256 Iraq clearly found sterling area membership too 
constraining. It sought monetary and exchange rate independence, and resented the 
historic blocking of its sterling reserves, the 1949 devaluation and, in particular, the 
constraints of its past currency board.257 At the other extreme, the Indian 
correspondent expressed indifference, instead stressing India’s insufficient reserves 
and reliance on American and IMF/World Bank capital.258 
 
These writers may not have been wholly representative of policy or wider opinion, but, 
to the extent that they were, one can infer that, in 1959, there was a sterling area 
commitment to the rule of the sterling peg, but it was contingent on sterling not being 
devalued or floating against the dollar (the Australians wanted a dollar guarantee). 
There seemed to be little commitment to sterling area discrimination against the NSA 
(Australia, India, New Zealand and Pakistan had all imposed restrictions on UK and 
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sterling area goods).259 And there was no obvious sterling area policy co-ordination. 
The unanswered question is the extent to which sterling area countries still felt 
‘obliged’ to sell their dollars and gold to the UK in return for sterling, or whether their 
pooling of reserves was, as under the sterling bloc, now entirely voluntary (which 
Wright had predicted would be the case with convertibility).260 The diversification of 
sterling area countries’ reserves is covered with the ‘sterling balances’ below. 
 
3.2.5 The sterling area and co-operation/consultation 
 
Before turning to the sterling balances, let us consider an additional rule for the sterling 
area: that of co-operation, both overall, and over and beyond the informal rules of the 
peg, controls and pool. As a co-operative system, the sterling area was located within 
the field of international finance, in the relations of governments and central banks. Co-
operative institutions such as the British Commonwealth (political) and Commonwealth 
trade preference (trade) were closely related but separate matters.  
 
As we saw, Zupnick alluded to economic policy co-ordination as a key distinguishing 
feature of the sterling area, while Schenk noted that co-ordinated trade policy ended in 
1952. Symons criticised the one-sidedness of the system i.e. its core-periphery 
structure: the UK’s bilateral approach did not engender a sense of partnership. The 
1949 conference to agree dollar economies was a high point in co-operation, but, after 
1952, consultation between members was ‘not as comprehensive as had been 
envisaged’ and the ‘club spirit’ waned.261 
 
The contemporary economist Day in 1954 presented the sterling area as a bargain 
structured around convenience, stability and discrimination. The last was in Britain’s 
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favour, allowing a higher standard of living than would have prevailed in its absence, 
while the first two favoured the RSA. In essence, the bargain was the export of British 
capital in return for discrimination: however, he said that the costs for the UK of 
maintaining the arrangement were high and increasing, as colonies became 
independent, independent countries industrialised and the focus on development 
increased.262 Bell similarly considered the sterling area’s declining cohesion.263 The 
American academic, Polk, saw the lack of co-ordination as a weakness of the system, 
but thought its club culture, in which countries helped each other out, was a source of 
strength.264 
  
Other more recent authors, such as Cooper and Singleton, described the sterling area 
as a highly co-operative system, aiming to protect sterling’s value and the reserves of 
the sterling area as a whole, although Singleton observed that interest in the sterling 
area waned in the 1960s.265 Cassels similarly in 1951 was upbeat about consultation, 
referring to the strengthening of collaborative ties between sterling area central banks 
after the war, and describing the setting up in 1947-8 of two London-based 
consultative committees of sterling area representatives, the Sterling Area Statistical 
Committee and the Commonwealth Liaison Committee. He argued that these acted as 
a ‘permanent secretariat for the meetings of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers at 
which all major questions of Sterling Area policy now receive consideration’.266 
  
None of these descriptions are necessarily contradictory – they were made at different 
times and addressed different things – but they do suggest a wide variety of emphases 
in the literature about the sterling area, from highly co-operative to displaying little co-
operation. 
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3.2.6 The RSA’s expectations of the UK 
 
Finally, when discussing the tacit rules of the sterling area, the RSA had expectations 
of the UK. Firstly, there were the exchange control exemptions which defined the 
sterling area, in particular the importance of UK capital flow. When the British 
government tried to limit this, for example through the above-mentioned 1966 
Voluntary Programme, there was a negative reaction. Thus the economist Perkins, 
generally favourable to the sterling area system, wrote in 1968: 
 
‘in the past the risks run by Australia in holding sterling may have been a 
reasonable price to pay for relatively free access to British capital. But if this 
favourable treatment continues to be eroded, Australia might well reduce 
correspondingly the amount she is prepared to risk in unguaranteed 
reserves’.267 
     
Secondly, as shown in the Libyan exchange of letters, a counterpart to reserve pooling 
was that the Bank of England should not refuse RSA requests for hard currency in 
exchange for their sterling, ensuring sterling convertibility at all times for members of 
the sterling area, unless otherwise by agreement.   
 
Above all, the UK should act to preserve sterling’s value against the US dollar. Indeed, 
to the extent that the UK was successful in this, RSA countries had little to fear from 
using sterling as their principal reserve. Schenk noted that Britain’s (modest) 1967 
devaluation produced ‘a profound sense of betrayal’ among RSA countries.268   
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How seriously did the UK take these obligations? Schenk argued that the sterling area 
did not constrain British policy in the 1950s,269 and that from the early 1960s British 
policymakers aimed to retire sterling’s international role.270 However Brittan, a well-
informed journalist and civil servant, wrote in 1971 that ‘the most important drawback’ 
of sterling’s reserve currency role ‘was that it greatly strengthened official inhibitions 
against devaluation’.271 Capie also noted that the Bank of England, where there was 
‘greater concern than elsewhere for the holders of sterling’272 engaged in market 
support for the currency in 1964-7 on a ‘huge scale with close to total freedom’.273 
Through its actions the Bank delayed devaluation, and two leading officials with 
responsibility for sterling’s international position, Parsons and Bridge, who had led the 
defence of sterling, left the Bank soon after devaluation.274 Oliver and Hamilton 
showed that even after devaluation the Bank continued to give high priority to the 
maintenance of the sterling area.275 
 
3.3 The sterling area and the ‘sterling balances’ 
 
Much of the debate about the sterling area in the 1950s-60s has concerned the 
‘problem of the sterling balances’ arising from the scale of the UK’s monetary 
obligations following the war. Fforde said this problem had three dimensions. The first 
dimension, the most urgent, was the ‘release of wartime accumulations’. The second 
was ‘the volatility of untied balances and the ratio of UK reserves to external monetary 
liabilities’. The third, the most long-term, was diversification, being the accumulation of 
separate reserves of gold or dollars by RSA countries.276  
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The sterling balances problem covered both RSA and NSA countries. Table 4 provides 
an overview of their sterling reserves (the UK’s net external liabilities277 in sterling) in 
1949-69, set against UK official reserves of gold and convertible currency. It is just a 
snapshot on three dates based on public data: there was significant variation of 
individual countries’ holdings within these groups and from year to year. The main 
features to observe are the scale of the sterling obligations relative to reserves, and 
the varying geographic distribution of the RSA holdings, some increasing and some 
decreasing over time. 
 
£m 1949 1959 1969 
Sterling area country groups:    
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 463 463 230 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon 774 254 212 
Caribbean Area 65 112 184 
East, Central and West Africa 336 628 293 
Middle East 8 338 388 
Far East 195 592 794 
Other 280 304 428 
    
Total sterling area countries 2107 2691 2529 
Total non-sterling area countries 986 682 763 
Total international organisations - non-sterling area 576 705 2123 
    
Total sterling balances – world 3669 4078 5415 
UK official reserves of gold and convertible currency 603 977 1053 
Table 4: Sterling balances, by country groups, compared with UK official reserves, as 
at end of December, 1949, 1959 and 1969 (£m) 
Source: BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, Table 21, pp125-7, Table 22(1), p131,Table 22(4), pp142-3 and 
Table 27, pp162-3 
Note: Sterling balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling 
 
3.3.1 The wartime accumulations and associated political/economic problems 
 
The wartime accumulations dimension was associated particularly with the large 
blocked sterling holdings of pre-partition India and Egypt. Egypt had been removed 
from the sterling area, and, at £774m, the sterling holdings of India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon in 1949 were already £578m less than they had been at the end of 1945.278 
                                               
277
 Although for convenience this phrase is used throughout the dissertation, the definition was technical 
and excluded certain illiquid assets/liabilities, see the crises paper 
278
 BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, Table 21, p125 
88 
 
Moreover, between 1950 and 1952, ‘the geographical distribution of the sterling 
balances shifted dramatically from the independent wartime holders to new colonial 
holdings’.279 During the rest of the 1950s the holdings in the Indian region were further 
recycled into firmer hands.280 
 
So the wartime accumulations were on the way to resolution by 1950. Still, the 
spending of such reserves could have negative macroeconomic consequences. Grey 
in 1952 argued that, alongside the UK’s previous cheap money policy (which 
admittedly ended that year), and the UK’s capital exports to the RSA, the too rapid 
drawing down of the sterling balances, generating unrequited exports from the UK, had 
inflationary consequences throughout the sterling area.281 
 
The UK’s negotiations with wartime creditors could also be the source of longer-term 
political problems. De Paiva Abreu made a focus of the UK’s difficult negotiations, both 
during the war and shortly afterwards, with wartime creditors, Brazil, Portugal and 
India.282 De P. Abreu argued that in each case, the agreements, relating to blocking, 
exchange guarantees or trade commitments, favoured the UK. In the case of Brazil, 
the Brazilian policymakers negotiated badly, allowing too much sterling to be blocked 
and not optimising the guarantees negotiated with the British.283 Portugal, seeking 
wartime protection against Spain and post-war legitimacy for the Salazar regime and 
Portuguese Empire, sold valuable war goods to the UK on credit, and later agreed to a 
long-term loan to the UK.284 India had a weak bargaining hand: an incomplete wartime 
agreement led to a huge expansion of sterling balances, and exchange guarantees 
were refused by the UK because India was part of the sterling area (on the grounds 
that, if sterling were to be devalued, the rupee would be expected to follow). Low 
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interest rates, constrained releases of sterling balances (delaying imports), and the 
devaluation of 1949 proved costly for India.285 De P. Abreu’s method involved an ex-
post calculation of gains and losses: perhaps not surprisingly, given the 1949 
devaluation, the UK was recorded as the ‘winner’ of these negotiations. If so, it may 
have been a hollow victory. Symons argued that the UK’s harsh treatment of India, 
Egypt and other such creditors led to distrust in sterling by these countries, contributing 
to difficulties faced in the 1960s.286            
 
Another big spender of sterling in the late 1940s was South Africa. Relations between 
the UK and South Africa were a complicated mixture of economics and politics, but 
here the sides were more evenly matched. Rooth’s 1945-50 study showed how, while 
the pro-UK United Party governed in South Africa, South Africa’s bargaining position 
against the UK was strong and it spent heavily in the dollar area during the 1947 
sterling convertibility crisis, after which South Africa was excluded from automatic 
access to the dollar pool. Following the election of a Nationalist government in May 
1948, South Africa’s reserve position was weak and it weakened further with capital 
outflows, forcing this anti-UK government to be more pragmatic and make an 
agreement with the UK about selling gold production through London. Rooth went so 
far as to call this process a ‘recolonisation’.287 Henshaw’s 1931-61 study showed how, 
despite political differences, the strong mutual economic dependence of the UK and 
South Africa kept the latter in the sterling bloc/area between 1933 and 1972. South 
Africa was reliant on British capital investment in gold production, and on the British 
market for sales of fruit and jam. For the UK, South Africa’s status as the world’s 
dominant gold producer made its post-1947 membership of the sterling area (despite 
no longer being part of the dollar pool or retaining large amounts of sterling) a matter of 
symbolic importance for the apparent strength of the area. The mutual economic 
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dependence meant that each side could take different political paths without 
threatening the economic relationship. By the end of the 1950s, South Africa had 
attained a more economically insulated position.288      
                           
3.3.2 Volatility of the untied sterling balances, and the balances/reserves ratio 
 
It was Fforde’s second dimension that arguably attracted the most debate in the 
literature. There was much contemporary focus on the sterling balances/reserves ratio 
which seemed to pose a threat to sterling. Shonfield, attacking the official narrative for 
the sterling area, claimed that, in order to prevent this overhang from collapsing – he 
described it, as it was often described, as a banking arrangement and the risk, that of a 
run on the bank – the UK had entered into a ‘hard bargain’ with RSA countries, giving 
them automatic access to the dollar pool, and preferential access to British capital 
investment.289 The result was high investment and balance-of-payments deficits in the 
RSA, financed by the UK.290 Moreover, UK investment into Australia and Rhodesia 
‘does not help West Africa or Malaya or India in any way to conserve their sterling 
balances’.291 He referenced India’s spending under its second Five-Year Plan in 1956-
7 and noted that, when the UK refused a £200m loan to India in 1957, the Indian 
response was to reduce the sterling backing for the Indian currency and spend the 
sterling thereby saved. Since the Indian Finance Minister had also said that India was 
prepared to spend all its sterling to meet essential imports, Shonfield claimed that this 
showed that even sterling balances purported by UK officials to be illiquid could be 
liquefied and spent.292      
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Writing in the 1990s, Schenk took an opposing view, arguing that the fragility of sterling 
arising from the overhang of sterling balances relative to inadequate reserves had 
been exaggerated.293 Addressing this ‘spurious’294 ratio, which was of long standing – 
operating as an international banker on thin reserves295 – Schenk showed that, once 
additional assets such as IMF reserves and an unpublicised large equity portfolio were 
included in reserves, the ratio of net sterling liabilities to UK reserves was stable, at 
less than 3:1, from around 1950.296 In other words, for sterling there was no Triffin 
dynamic of a deteriorating ratio. This was a ‘banker to the sterling area’ stability 
argument for sterling. In support of Schenk’s argument, while contemporaries and 
historians might have talked about a threat of a confidence-driven run on the bank by 
the RSA,297 there was little evidence provided for it until 1964.298   
 
Schenk’s second argument about this ratio was based on the sterling area’s balance of 
payments in the 1950s. According to Schenk, the RSA, being generally in surplus 
(after including the long-term capital account) with the NSA, was implicitly contributing 
to the reserves of the sterling area system, and so could only be improving the ratio of 
sterling balances/reserves.299 These different views of the sterling area’s balance of 
payments (Shonfield’s and Schenk’s) echo the dispute between Kamarck and Wright 
about countries’ contributions to the dollar pool. Scott presented the 1950s payment 
flows in a different way from Schenk and it is informative for the context to compare 
these figures (Table 5). Scott, who did not consider ‘necessarily deplorable’300 the fact 
that the sterling balances exceeded the reserves, and who deliberately chose not to 
                                               
293
 Schenk, Britain, p18 
294
 Schenk, Britain, p35 
295
 Schenk, Britain, p18 
296
 Schenk, The decline, pp86-7. Shonfield was aware of the equity portfolio (Shonfield, British economic 
policy, p284) 
297
 Collins and Eichengreen, reviewing Schenk, Britain, argued that the denial of confidence effects from 
the sterling balances was overdone: Eichengreen suggested that sterling area controls were preventing a 
run on the balances (Collins, ‘Reviewed work’, p412; Eichengreen, ‘Reviewed work’, p941) 
298
 Newton noted that £80m of RSA confidence-driven outflows from sterling in 1964 was ‘an 
unprecedented development’ (Newton, ‘The 1949 sterling crisis’, p92)  
299
 Schenk, Britain, pp28-9 
300
 Scott, ‘What should be done’, p218 
92 
 
present the RSA’s balance of payments only in relation to dollars and gold, also 
warned against the dangers of identifying accounting analyses with causal analyses.301   
 
£m RSA ‘overall’ 
surplus or deficit 
(Scott) 
RSA balance with 
NSA  
(Schenk) 
1950 +183 +466 
1951 -78 +242 
1952 -166 +182 
1953 +145 +297 
1954 -93 +174 
1955 -71 +143 
1956 -141 +159 
1957 -256 +125 
Table 5: RSA balance of payments – two alternative versions, 1950 – 1957 (£m) 
Source: Extracted from Schenk, Britain, p28, Table 2.2; and Scott, ‘What should be done’, p220, Table 2 
Note: RSA = Rest of the sterling area 
    
Schenk’s argument addressed contemporaries’ flawed focus on the sterling 
balances/reserves ratio as a direct source of weakness, but the key question for 
debate was the stability of the sterling balances and the effect of any volatility on the 
UK’s reserves: the kinetic forces affecting reserves rather than the potential risk from 
the stock of liabilities. Here Schenk concluded: 
 
‘The sterling balances were remarkably stable throughout the 1950s (and 
most of the 1960s) and this was not due to convenient coincidence but rather 
to the deliberate functioning of the sterling area itself. In this sense the 
conclusion that the balances were relatively stable is not merely an ex post 
observation’.302    
 
The argument was that, before and during the 1950s, wartime accumulations of 
sterling were passed into firmer hands. Moreover, the diversity of sterling area 
countries ensured that aggregate movements in balances were dampened, while many 
colonial (and other) balances were held in illiquid forms, such as currency boards. As 
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for the ISA, after the mid-1950s, ‘most countries held only minimal working 
balances’.303 The Shonfield and Schenk accounts are thus contradictory regarding the 
liquidity (and variation)304 of the sterling balances.  
 
3.3.3 Diversification from sterling into dollars and gold 
 
To summarise, reducing sterling reserves by spending them on goods and services 
(incurring overall balance-of-payments deficits) was not against the rules of the sterling 
area. In aggregate, some economy needed to be exercised in order to preserve the 
central reserves, but after 1952, the central reserves ceased to be a focus of policy co-
ordination for the RSA. By contrast, Fforde’s third dimension, selling sterling for dollars 
in order to hold those dollars, was a breach of the British pooling rule and was taken 
seriously by British policymakers. This is shown by Symons’s memorandum, which, 
when talking about the RSA official holdings in the 1950s-60s, addressed almost 
entirely the issue of these countries’ changing attitudes to independent gold and dollar 
reserves. He focused on 14 countries, a mixture of independents, and colonies which 
became independent during the period. The countries covered were: Australia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq, Burma, Ceylon, India, Libya, Malaysia, Kuwait, Nigeria, 
Jordan, Zambia and Jamaica. Ireland and South Africa, being ‘special cases’, were not 
discussed in detail.305 Of these, the largest cumulative additions to non-sterling 
reserves initially came from Australia, which stopped selling its gold production to the 
UK in 1951, and India, which from 1948 increased the dollars held at its Indian Supply 
Mission in Washington.306  
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Symons said that this diversification in the form of many ‘requests’ to the UK for more 
gold and dollar holdings was reflected in sterling’s share of each country’s reserves.307 
Understandably, the focus on ‘sterling’s share’ as a barometer of ‘diversification’ has 
been taken up by the historical literature. Schenk calculated sterling’s (declining) share 
for seven ISA countries in 1950-8 and observed: 
 
‘during the 1950s most independent members of the sterling area that had 
control of the denomination of their reserves did diversify from the high levels 
of sterling that they had held at the start of the decade, mainly by spending 
their sterling on British goods while they held their US dollar assets and gold 
constant’.308  
         
Schenk’s statement reveals that ‘sterling’s share’ as a statistic conflated two issues, 
one, the spending of sterling on goods and services, and two, switching from sterling 
into dollars or gold. The latter, though cumulative in effect, was not particularly large in 
the RSA in the 1950s, as Schenk highlighted. The former, though it could be large, 
was not necessarily irreversible or in the immediate control of policymakers, but 
reflected the cyclical balance of payments of a country. Indeed ‘diversification’ itself is 
an ambiguous term which could refer to the combined effect (as in the quotation 
above) or only to the switching out of sterling, as when Schenk wrote that 
‘diversification would disrupt the entire sterling system’.309 In analysing reserve 
management in the sterling area system, there is a need to separate out these 
different moving parts, which means largely abandoning ‘sterling’s share’ as an 
analytical tool.  
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‘Sterling’s share’ did, however, become the policy instrument by which the UK 
government stabilised the RSA’s official sterling holdings after the devaluation of 1967. 
The Basle and Sterling Agreements of 1968 combined NSA support to the UK, with 
RSA promises to hold minimum sterling proportions of their reserves, and a UK 
guarantee to the RSA of sterling’s dollar value, changing the whole nature of the 
sterling area.310 The bilateral Sterling Agreements, called Minimum Sterling Proportion 
(MSP) Agreements, continued until 1974. Schenk described their significance as 
follows: 
 
‘The reserve role of sterling thus became formalised and negotiated, rather 
than voluntary and based primarily on market portfolio decisions’.311 
 
 
One can also find the issues of switching and spending in the literature about post-war 
sterling crises (the crisis episodes in 1945-67 being 1947, 1949, 1951-2, 1955, 1956, 
1957, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967). Hirsch, a contemporary journalist trying to 
categorise these crises, highlighted three types of problem. One was British balance-
of-payments deficits. Another was straight speculation, which encompassed countries 
switching sterling into dollars for confidence reasons. A third was ‘conversion’: 
‘overseas sterling countries and others using their London funds to meet their own 
payment deficits’.312 But Conan combined RSA spending and switching: he 
distinguished ‘current balance’ crises (driven by the UK current account) from 
‘reserves’ crises (everything else).313 Although some crises were associated partly with 
British payments deficits, each author gave a large role to the speculative/reserves 
factors. Conan likened the UK’s problem to that of the USA as a reserve currency 
issuer: 
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‘For each country the problem is not merely to live within its income but to 
earn enough to meet commitments which are incurred largely on behalf of 
others’.314 
           
Interestingly, in Hirsch’s judgement, the problem of ‘conversion’ (RSA deficits) featured 
in only the 1947 and 1951-2 crises, alongside other factors.315 And in the more recent 
historical literature, the focus has tended to be either on British balance-of-payments 
deficits (or underlying domestic drivers such as fiscal deficits or wage inflation), or 
straight speculation. These two explanations correspond to the currency crisis 
literature,316 which has informed the work of economic historians. In ‘first generation’ 
models from the 1970s-80s, governments are on a doomed, inconsistent policy path, 
and the timing of speculative attack is predicted based on the level of a ‘shadow 
exchange rate’.317 In ‘second generation’ models of the 1990s, changes in government 
behaviour, switching between monetary regimes, and shifts in expectations, can result 
in multiple equilibria. In debating the 1964-7 crisis period, Newton defended British 
policy and blamed speculative international capital flows (a second generation model 
explanation) while Oliver highlighted British policy failure (a first generation model 
explanation).318 When turning to the specific role of the ISA countries in sterling crises, 
again the recent literature has focused almost wholly on confidence and speculation 
(response to Britain’s economic weakness), rather than ‘conversion’ and RSA deficits. 
Both Newton and Oliver largely addressed the former in their further debates about the 
1960s.319 Thus it seems that, despite Shonfield’s claims about RSA deficits, economic 
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ideas about confidence-driven switching, seen in the Triffin dilemma and the currency 
crisis literature, have dominated the thinking about crises in the post-war sterling area. 
 
Another related question is persistence, why RSA countries did not switch earlier from 
sterling into other reserve assets. Here there have been several arguments made. We 
may categorise them into collective interest, loyalty, self-interest and political 
negotiation. 
 
Firstly, Schenk argued that RSA countries were motivated by collective interest, 
characterising this as a form of network externality, ‘being part of the benefits of 
sticking with an established collective system’.320 There was 
 
‘a rational understanding that diversification would disrupt the entire sterling 
system of exchange rate stability and damage the British economy (and 
perhaps the global monetary system) in ways that were not in the interests of 
its trading partners’.321  
 
Secondly, Eichengreen, while agreeing that RSA countries had such a collective 
interest, broadly rejected the role of network externalities in the persistence of 
sterling’s role in the sterling area, and argued that countries were primarily acting 
under loyalty and colonial subservience.322  
 
Thirdly, where members of the sterling area held particularly large stakes in the sterling 
system, collective interest could be argued to spill over into undiluted individual self-
interest. This is the ‘currency trap’ argument, which has been applied to China’s 
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holdings of the dollar in recent years,323 and which, as earlier noted, Accominotti found 
in France’s sterling in 1931.324 In the case of Malaysia and Australia in the 1960s, it 
was argued that these countries were constrained from diversifying from sterling by the 
sheer scale of their sterling holdings.325 
  
Fourthly, Strange, following Shonfield’s notion of a ‘hard bargain’ between the UK and 
ISA, introduced political definitions of top, master and negotiated currencies.326 A top 
currency is one which is dominant internationally purely for economic reasons. A 
master currency is one which is effectively imposed by an issuing state on follower 
states (e.g. colonies). A negotiated currency is one in which the issuing state, explicitly 
or implicitly, offers inducements to follower states to hold the currency. Strange argued 
that sterling in the post-war era was no longer a top currency. It was a master currency 
for the British colonies and a negotiated currency for the ISA – in the case of the latter, 
the agreement to hold sterling thus came at an economic cost for Britain. 
 
These arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The interesting question 
about collective interest and self-interest, as practised by RSA countries, is whether 
and why self-disciplined concern about the effects of a country’s action on the sterling 
exchange rate would be limited to diversification (in the sense of switching) and not 
also to conversion (in the sense of spending sterling). As seen, writers such as Grey, 
Kamarck, Scott and Zupnick had argued that too much spending of sterling reserves 
could have negative consequences for sterling, and Hirsch had listed conversion as a 
cause of sterling crises. Even in the early post-war period, there had been a view that it 
was not just dollar spending that mattered: the constraints placed on India were not 
merely dollar rations but additional restrictions on releasing sterling.327 So, if RSA 
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countries were motivated by concern for sterling, why were they not concerned about 
spending sterling? By contrast, adherence to rules (switching being against the rules 
and spending sterling being within them) could explain why countries might be free 
with their spending but careful about their switching.     
   
3.3.4 Sterling balances – official and private holdings 
 
One aspect of the sterling balances has received limited discussion in the literature: 
the distinction between official and private holdings of sterling. In analysing sterling’s 
post-war decline, Schenk addressed both the reserve role and commercial/trading role 
of sterling as an international currency.328 Within the UK government, by the mid-
1960s, there was a suggestion to reduce sterling’s reserve role through long-term 
funding of excess sterling balances in the official RSA category, while maintaining its 
commercial and trading role, which was supposed to be reflected in the private 
holdings of both the RSA and NSA.329 Schenk observed that private holdings within the 
RSA seemed ‘more robust to confidence in sterling’ and connected this to sterling’s 
commercial use.330  
 
Symons also briefly addressed the trends in the RSA and NSA official and private 
holdings of sterling (see Table 6). NSA official holdings declined sharply (these were 
wartime accumulations such as those of Egypt); NSA private holdings were volatile 
and sensitive to relative interest rates and confidence; RSA official holdings, which 
formed the largest category, saw varied changes in country composition; RSA private 
holdings enjoyed strong growth.331    
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£m 1949 1959 1969 
Gross country holdings:    
RSA – official 1757 2165 2039 
RSA – private 419 687 1134 
NSA – official 720 326 107 
NSA – private  363 620 546 
Table 6: UK gross sterling liabilities as at end of December, 1949, 1959 and 1969 (£m) 
Source: Extracted from TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p100, Appendix 1, and p102, Appendix 2 
Note: Official holdings are ‘Official’ in 1949 and 1959 and ‘Central Monetary Institutions excluding Central 
Bank Assistance’ in 1969. Private holdings are ‘Other’ in 1949, 1959 and 1969 
 
 
Noting that RSA non-official sterling holdings trebled in 1945-67 and did not seem to 
reflect the fortunes of sterling, Symons explained them as follows: 
 
‘The reason why these holdings have proved less volatile seems to have 
been partly because they have been more subject to official influences 
(through exchange control); partly because some of the funds may have been 
in the hands of official bodies not classified as central monetary institutions; 
and partly because they include the balances of the overseas offices of 
London banks’.332 
 
The nature and meaning of the RSA non-official holdings therefore requires more 
definition. Sterling held as part of domestic monetary systems through currency boards 
and banks were a significant element of the sterling area system. Schenk made 
studies of such arrangements. Contrary to the arguments of some contemporaries that 
currency boards were exploitative,333 Schenk observed that they provided needed 
exchange rate stability, and central banks that replaced them were often no more 
independent.334  
 
To summarise the sterling area literature: the 1950s-60s saw great changes in the 
sterling area’s relative privileges and cohesion, and there is some doubt in the 
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literature about whether rules such as pegging, controls or pooling were even being 
followed in the 1960s. Although its 1940s interactions revealed negotiating strength, in 
the 1950s-60s the UK’s direct powers of enforcement seemed weak – there was 
limited use of exclusion, blocking was a last resort, and cancellation (default) was not 
countenanced. Pegging to sterling or maintaining exchange controls were not 
particularly onerous requirements for the RSA under Bretton Woods, and the pooled 
gains (or losses) from the sterling area were not evenly distributed. There were 
arguments about whether the RSA countries were in deficit or in surplus, and what role 
they played in the sterling area balance of payments and sterling crises. There were 
disputes about the variability and liquidity of the sterling balances and the effect on 
reserves. Political relations with the UK were varied and complex, from highly 
independent nations (e.g. South Africa) to dependent colonies; RSA countries looked 
for different things out of the sterling area. It was suggested that the ISA was relatively 
quick to diversify away from sterling in the 1950s. There was uncertainty about the 
nature of the non-official sterling holdings within the RSA. 
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Section 4: The three papers and their research questions    
             
The sterling area was a financial alliance of countries, with a core-periphery structure. 
In a world which is now becoming multipolar, with several large core units of population 
or geography (e.g. the USA, EU, China, India, Russia), and commitment to free trade 
seemingly on the wane, it is interesting to understand if financial alliances matter, and 
how they can make a difference to currencies and international reserves. In general 
terms, this makes the sterling area an interesting field for historical study.   
 
The primary motivation of this thesis is to build on the work of earlier writers about the 
sterling area as it existed in the 1950s-60s, which means to fill ‘study gaps’ in what is a 
broad subject with many varied contributions. The topics chosen, Australia, Ireland and 
sterling crises, present themselves naturally as study gaps. Among the top five RSA 
countries in the 1960s in terms of sterling holdings, Australia and Ireland were the 
largest which have not received detailed study across the 1950s-60s. Schenk has 
already made close studies of Hong Kong and Malaysia (and, with Singleton, Australia 
from 1965), while access to archival material poses a problem for Kuwait. There have 
been no detailed historical studies which have examined the role of the broad sterling 
area in the sterling crises of the 1950s-60s up to the devaluation of 1967, a key event 
which led to the transformation of the sterling area away from a voluntary system, 
under the 1968 MSP agreements. 
 
A secondary overarching motivation is to examine the institutional effects of the 
sterling area – in this case, on Australia, on Ireland and, via sterling crises, on the UK’s 
international reserves. This period is interesting because the wartime and immediate 
post-war emergency was over, sterling’s overvaluation had been corrected through the 
1949 devaluation, convertibility was returning, growth and development priorities were 
at the fore, the sterling area’s discriminatory cohesion seemed to be dissipating, and it 
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is unclear from the literature whether RSA countries were following, or disregarding, 
the supposed rules of sterling area membership. In these years, the sterling area was 
a voluntary system in which countries such as Australia and Ireland were in control of 
their destinies, even if policy was influenced by the environment in which they 
operated. 
 
The hunch behind this thesis is that, despite its apparent vagueness, the sterling area 
mattered as an institution. However this does not seem currently to be the conclusion 
of the literatures regarding Australia, Ireland and sterling crises. To summarise, in 
advance, the leading conclusions of these literatures in the crudest possible terms: 
Australia’s reserve management was that of a free portfolio manager, influenced 
primarily by economic – transactions and risk-return – considerations. Ireland’s central 
bank was a virtual currency board from 1927 to 1979, with a fixed link to sterling. The 
sterling area played little role in sterling crises in 1950-67. 
 
This is the point at which, in a paper-based thesis, the secondary overarching 
motivation drops away, and the topics themselves take over, and present their obvious 
priorities and research questions to the reader. In the case of Australia, the study is of 
central bank reserve management in the 1950s-60s in relation to sterling. The 
importance of sterling in Australia’s reserves was in gradual decline over this period, 
and it would be beneficial to understand when, why and how that happened, and how 
reserve management was operating in practice. Australia was also an important 
sterling area member. That membership is largely taken as a given – the net benefits 
Australia received, whether through pooling, capital flow or other factors, were the 
dominant policy consensus of that time. 
 
There is a tension in central bank reserve management between economic drivers – 
transaction needs and risk-return decisions – and the effects of sterling area 
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membership. This author does not seek to dispute the self-evident importance of the 
economic drivers. But, as a minimum, it would be good to know if Australia was 
following sterling area rules, i.e. acting under self-imposed constraints. If it was 
following rules when it had the power and opportunity to break them, it is probably too 
ambitious to untangle why it was doing so – the political or economic reasons. But the 
question whether it was doing so is of interest in itself. In some respects, sterling area 
rules and the economic drivers were perfectly aligned and it is impossible to distinguish 
between them. For instance, the sterling peg was both a sterling area rule and, as an 
economic driver, had significant reserve management effects. However, there was a 
potential conflict between the sterling area’s pooling rule and transactions and risk-
return factors. As we saw in the discussion of economic theory, the transactions motive 
seeks to minimise unnecessary FX transactions, while the pooling rule insists on FX 
transactions being made. Similarly, the risk-return motive encourages deliberate 
diversification, while the pooling rule refuses it. The study is not just about the pooling 
rule, however. It is also about the broader impacts of sterling area membership – 
sometimes operating indirectly via the economic drivers – and the organisational 
inheritance, and the balance-of-payments environment and the timing of decisions: the 
combined effect on Australian reserve management. Because it is considering change 
over time, the paper requires answers to two questions: Firstly, what influence did 
Australia’s sterling area membership have on its reserve management? Secondly, 
when, why and how did Australia diversify its reserves in 1950-68? 
 
The case of Australia is that of a supposed free agent, and the extent to which it was 
acting under self-imposed constraints. The Irish reserve management case is almost 
the reverse: a country acting under the constraints of the ‘sterling link’, where the 
transactional reasons for holding sterling seemed overwhelming. Nevertheless, during 
1968-74, a dramatic diversification in reserves, away from sterling, took place, even 
while the ‘sterling link’ and those transactional drivers remained intact. This was 
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principally a portfolio management risk-return decision, and the 1967 devaluation was 
the catalyst for it, but it is too simplistic to express the change only in those terms: 
currency boards do not normally make such a switch away from the base currency to 
which they are pegged. Rather, one needs to look at the domestic financial system and 
the changes that occurred after the devaluation of 1967, particularly the 1968-9 
centralisation of the commercial banks’ holdings of sterling into the central bank, which 
enabled such a large switch to be made. In order to understand this move, it is 
necessary to understand why it had been prevented earlier. So in the case of Ireland 
there are two ‘events’ being studied, reserve diversification and the centralisation of 
reserves within the central bank. And there are two questions that need to be 
answered. Firstly, why did centralisation and diversification not take place before 
1967? Secondly, how and why were centralisation and diversification achieved after 
1967? Ireland’s story here is really about the coming of age of its central bank. 
Ireland’s sterling link and currency board arrangements were part and parcel of its 
membership of the sterling area. The negotiations and events which led to Ireland’s 
centralisation and diversification were sterling area negotiations and events. The 
institutional effects in Ireland’s case were complex inertial forces to be overcome by its 
reserve portfolio managers. 
 
The third paper concerns sterling crises in 1950-67. The motivation of the paper is to 
engage with the fierce contemporary debate between defenders and critics of the 
sterling area system. The critics were, among other things, arguing that RSA balance-
of-payments deficits were contributing to sterling crises – an institutional effect of the 
sterling area system on the UK’s international reserves – and it would be useful to 
discover if they had good grounds for making this claim. One of the battlefields of the 
contemporary debate was the UK’s balance of payments, which by accounting 
definition included changes in the sterling area’s ‘sterling balances’ – changes in the 
UK’s net external liabilities to the sterling area. The protagonists in this debate were 
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looking at the balance of payments in different ways – the critics of the sterling area 
system were looking at the ‘overall’ balance of payments of the RSA (largely in deficit 
even after including long-term capital flows); the defenders were considering the RSA’s 
balance of payments with the NSA (largely in surplus after including long-term capital 
flows). The contemporary economist, Richard Kahn, employed the former approach in 
two important government reports, using, inter alia, the monthly sterling balances of 
the RSA and NSA, assistance to the UK from the NSA, and published reserves, to 
investigate the sterling crises of 1964-8. The second, defender, viewpoint is 
unfortunately not susceptible to such treatment, since changes in the sterling balances 
of a sterling area country largely reflect its overall balance of payments. Because this 
monthly data, for the sterling balances, NSA assistance, and published reserves, is 
recoverable for all the crises in 1950-67, it is possible to simulate Kahn’s methodology 
in order to make an investigation – in contemporary terms – of the sterling area’s role 
in all these crises. The questions being asked in this third paper are as follows. Firstly, 
according to Kahn’s methodology, what part did the sterling area’s sterling balances 
play in the crises of the years 1950-67? Secondly, how should we critique and 
evaluate this methodology, and what conclusions can we draw about the sterling 
area’s role in these sterling crises?          
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Chapter 2. Institutional effects: the case of Australia’s 
diversification from sterling, 1950-68335  
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
A source of concern in modern macroeconomic policy is the future of the US dollar as 
a world reserve asset.336 An historical precedent of this phenomenon is the evolution of 
sterling’s international use after the Second World War.337 Despite a number of crises 
of confidence for the pound in the 1950s-60s, sterling area338 countries continued to 
hold sterling and, hence, its demise as a world reserve asset was delayed. However, 
there have been few in-depth studies of the reserve management of independent 
sterling area countries.  If lessons about today’s reserve currencies are to be drawn 
from sterling’s past,339 we need to understand better the principal users of sterling in 
this period.  
 
The constraints that affected the holding of sterling have been debated. Eichengreen 
suggested that loyalty to the UK and a desire not to damage an important economic 
partner deterred independent sterling area countries from diversifying (that is, 
replacing sterling with US dollars and other reserves).340 Strange said that the 
continued holding of sterling by these countries was a negotiated outcome, requiring 
British concessions.341 And Schenk argued that holders of sterling refrained from 
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diversification because of the costs of switching, a form of ‘network externality’.342 The 
aim of this study is to offer a more complete explanation for the resilience of the 
sterling area, which focuses on what it meant to be a member of the sterling area, and 
why sterling area countries held so much sterling while others did not. Countries were 
also tied to the sterling area by the institutional arrangements created precisely to 
establish this reserve currency system.343  
 
This paper seeks to fill the research gap by examining the sterling reserve 
management policy of Australia from 1950 to 1968. In these years, Australia appeared 
to be a comparatively free agent with regard to sterling: the currency was not subject to 
the emergency sterling area co-operation of 1947-9,344 nor the formal agreements of 
1968-74.345 Australia is particularly interesting because it was the largest holder of 
sterling for much of the period,346 and arguably the most important external member of 
the sterling area. Loyalty and independence were themes of the relationship. 
Australians had fought in Britain’s wars. It had close political contacts and kinship 
relations with the UK.347 Yet it was also forging an independent path in the post-war 
world.348 
 
Australia’s holding of sterling appeared to be constrained in some way. According to 
the literature, it was an early diversifier and deliberately diversifying for a long time, 
throughout the 1950s-60s.349 Yet overall the diversification seemed moderate 
compared with some peers – at least in terms of sterling’s share of reserves:350 
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between 1950 and the 1967 devaluation of sterling, sterling’s percentage share of its 
gold and currency reserves declined from the low 90s to the low 60s.351 But what did 
this change in sterling’s share mean? Was it a little, or a lot? The puzzle to be explored 
is why Australia held onto sterling, even after its trade and debt orientation seemed to 
have shifted away from the UK. This leads to the question, When, why and how did 
Australia diversify its reserves in the years 1950-68? In order to answer this, we need 
the solution to another question, What influence did Australia’s sterling area 
membership have on its reserve management?  
 
Little has been written about the influence of the sterling area on Australia’s reserve 
management. Schenk cited the Australian Prime Minister, in the mid-1950s, saying 
that Australia needed to hold at least £200m sterling in its reserves, which suggests an 
institutional sterling area effect.352 As for diversification, the literature has indicated that 
Australia was engaging in this throughout the period.353 In the 1950s, the move away 
from sterling was interspersed with occasional episodes of support for the currency.354 
In the 1960s, diversification was more deliberate, in response to the changing forces of 
trade and capital source and the greater weakness of sterling.355 There has only been 
one thorough study of Australia’s reserve management, and this covered a later 
period, 1965-76.356 In that paper, Singleton and Schenk argued that, in the pre-1968 
period as well as later, the warranted movement away from sterling based on 
Australia’s changing trade and debt sources was constrained by three factors: the 
drawbacks of alternative assets, continued desire to access the London capital market, 
and collective interest in avoiding a collapse of the pound. Indeed, on the last of these 
points, Schenk argued that not just Australia but also Malaysia, two of the largest 
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holders of sterling in the mid-1960s, may have been constrained from selling by the 
sheer size of their holdings,357 a classic ‘currency trap’.358 
 
The evidence about Australia’s reserve management lies primarily359 in the Australian 
central bank and government archives, particularly those of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) in Sydney.360 Economic historians have looked carefully at RBA 
material, but the RBA’s records are extensive, and by examining more than a hundred 
files covering a broad period of nearly 20 years, this study has uncovered telling new 
evidence. The types of files viewed include board minutes, committee files,361 
departmental files, files covering communication with the London office, and personal 
and correspondence files for key RBA personnel. The most valuable evidence has 
been found in the internal contacts between the RBA’s Sydney and London offices, 
which reveal officials’ thinking about reserve management.362 
 
Based on the new archival research, this paper concludes that sterling area 
membership – its rules and institutional inheritance – had a profound effect on 
Australia’s reserve management, especially in determining how Australia diversified. 
Australian officials followed the reserve-pooling rule of the sterling area closely, 
because they valued membership of the area and were in turn influenced by it. In the 
context of sterling area rules, there was no deliberate diversification until 1962,363 and 
over the whole period Australia diversified by little more than its gold production. The 
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358
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findings are consistent with the institutional parts of Singleton and Schenk’s 
explanation i.e. the ‘London capital market’ and some of the ‘collective interest’, but not 
the ‘alternative assets’ constraints. The findings are also largely supportive of Schenk’s 
‘costs of switching’ argument, but through a different mechanism than the ‘sterling 
trap’, one which emphasises the value of sterling area membership to Australia. 
Transactional and risk-return motives mattered in Australia’s reserve management, but 
rules mattered too, and, as we will see, rules could have path-dependent effects.   
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the historical context, literature, 
data and sources. Section 3 reviews the RBA’s reserve data, revealing Australia’s true 
path of deliberate diversification from sterling. Section 4 analyses reserve 
management at a detailed level, in order to untangle transactional, risk-return and 
reserve-pooling drivers. Section 5 considers the macroeconomic policy benefits of 
sterling area membership, and identifies seven broad effects of sterling area 
membership on Australia, together with associated evidence. Section 6 traces changes 
in diversification policy and evaluates the constraint of sterling area membership 
against the constraints on diversification found in Singleton and Schenk’s paper. 
Section 7 concludes with a discussion about the implications of Australia’s case for the 
sterling area and reserve currencies today.                 
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Section 2: Historical context, literature, data and sources 
 
Overall, the 1950s-60s were ‘extraordinary years’ for Australia, ‘marked by full 
employment, low inflation and sustained economic growth’.364 There was continuity in 
government, the Australian Treasury and central bank.365 Policy reflected a strong 
development agenda, characterised by high levels of immigration,366 imports of capital 
and capital goods, government borrowing overseas, current account deficits and 
protection for Australian manufacturing industry.367 Due to its export reliance on 
commodities, particularly wool,368 together with increasing imports and some domestic 
macroeconomic policy problems (see below), Australia’s balance of payments was 
volatile, and there were several major downturns in international reserves (1951-2, 
1954-6, 1960-1, 1964-8).369 In 1952-60, the volatility was partially managed through 
general import controls, including against sterling area goods.370 In the 1960s the focus 
turned more to tariffs and fiscal/monetary policy, with non-discrimination and 
convertibility for Australia’s currency.371 
 
Australia faced some macroeconomic problems, particularly in 1950-61, as 
policymakers struggled to manage credit growth and inflation (see Figure 1 which 
compares Australia’s CPI inflation with that of the UK, and relative yield 
differentials).372 Australia’s experience in the Great Depression had been traumatic,373 
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consequently there was general antipathy towards ‘deflationist’ policies,374 and the 
authorities’ relevant priorities were, firstly, full employment375 and, secondly, low 
interest rates376 – even minor divergence from these policies was likely to be punished 
at the ballot box (which happened in 1961).377 Indeed, at the Bretton Woods 
negotiations in 1944, the Australian government had pushed strongly for a ‘positive 
approach’, requiring priority commitment to full employment among all member 
countries, and, not being satisfied (with this or the size of its own quota), declined to 
join at the outset.378 There was a unique system of centralised wage arbitration, with 
elements of inflation-linking, one of whose concerns was to protect labour’s share of 
income.379 Fiscal policy, although directed towards balanced budgets, and 
countercyclical to a degree, did not always compensate in a timely fashion for 
deficiencies in monetary control.380 The simultaneous attainment of full employment, 
price stability and external viability was arguably not feasible, as Beggs explained, 
citing the 1965 Vernon Report.381 The central bank initially struggled to control the 
financial sector.382 In this setting, fixed exchange rates were valued not only as a 
source of stability for trade and capital flow, but also as a disciplinary target for the 
control of inflation.383 However, this was not ‘gold standard’ thinking: devaluation (from 
£1 = A£1 to £1 = A£1.25) had been part of the solution in 1931,384 and 
farmers/exporters favoured a competitive exchange rate.385 The eight years of import 
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controls contributed to a prevailing ‘balance-of-payments pessimism’.386 Domestic 
production, exports and capital inflows387 were encouraged in order to feed, house and 
employ a growing population, and a stable competitive rate supported these goals: the 
policy preference was ‘fixed but flexible’.388 After the Labour government’s initial 
reluctance, Australian administrations in the 1950s became committed to the 
international financial system and found the World Bank and the IMF useful sources of 
capital, crisis support, and superstructure for stable exchange rates and convertible 
currencies.389  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Australia and UK inflation and government yield differentials, 1950 – 1968 
(%) 
Source: Taken or calculated from Norton and Kennedy, Australian economic statistics, pp194-5, 214-5. 
The authors cite a number of sources 
Note: Inflation = percentage change in annual averages for Consumer Price Index; government yield 
differentials = annual averages  
 
Under these circumstances (fixed exchange rates, full employment, low interest rates, 
problems in credit control and inflation, a small economy with a fast-growing 
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population, and commodity trade), the balance of payments became a major 
constraint: 
 
‘the short run was always bounded by a necessity to keep foreign currency 
from running out, and the long run involved projects of reshaping economic 
relations to lessen the cyclical tendency towards payments deficits’390 
 
A solution lay in monetary control. After the war, the central bank, having been in 
conflict with government in the 1930s,391 was now more under the government’s thumb 
as a result of new 1945 legislation.392 In the 1950s, it had a hard job convincing the 
Treasury to allow interest rates to rise.393 The financial system, divided largely into 
more active ‘trading banks’ and more passive domestic ‘savings banks’, was highly 
liquid, and a struggle ensued as the central bank tried to control the trading banks, 
while the latter resisted. This resistance was partly driven by the fact that the CBA also 
operated its own competitor trading and savings bank – it was only shorn of its private 
activities when it became the RBA in 1960. In 1947, there had even been an attempt, 
thwarted by the courts, by the then Labour government to nationalise the trading 
banks, after they had rejected transfer of public authority accounts to the CBA.394 In the 
1950s, the central bank, gradually persuading the Treasury, stepped back from the 
management of low government bond yields, and increased the permitted levels for 
commercial interest rates: by the mid-late 1950s, interest rates were more responsive 
to the CBA’s wishes (see Figure 2). It tried to use the principal monetary policy tool, 
compulsory deposits through special accounts, but this was a blunt instrument with 
uneven effects, and had to be amended with a more conventional and universally 
applied liquidity ratio.395 
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Figure 2: Selected Australian interest rates, government bond yields and trading 
banks’ maximum fixed deposit and overdraft advances rates, at end of June, 1950 – 
1968 (%) 
Source: Norton and Kennedy, Australian economic statistics, pp84, 87  
 
The three major crises of 1951-2, 1955-6 and 1960-1 illustrate how the domestic 
monetary situation fed through to deficits. The 1951-2 crisis – the most serious – was 
caused primarily by the Korean war wool boom, which increased export incomes and 
led to inflationary spending in the economy, followed by an equally savage bust.396 The 
1955-6 crisis was driven primarily by excess credit creation in the trading banks. While 
the changes in bank liquidity control addressed this, the 1960-1 crisis derived from 
excess credit creation in unregulated non-bank financial institutions, brought to an end 
by a deliberate credit squeeze. The 1960s saw greater use of relative interest rate 
signalling, and monetary policy was more successful, and the downturn in reserves to 
1968 was primarily caused by a drought and a mining boom as Australia sought to 
exploit its vast mineral resources.397     
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As a sterling area country, Australia followed informal rules: pooling reserves with the 
UK, operating exchange controls aligned with the UK, and pegging its currency to the 
pound.398 (For a summary of the rules, see Annex 1). Australia pegged its currency to 
sterling for 40 years (1931-71). There was a change in name (from the Australian 
pound to the Australian dollar, converted at A£1 = A$2) in 1966, and a change in rate 
in 1967, when Australia decided not to follow sterling’s devaluation (it had followed 
sterling in the 1949 devaluation).399 Australia’s external orientation altered significantly 
over the 1950-68 period, in terms of trade, debt and FDI. By the early 1960s only 
around a quarter of Australia’s trade was with the UK at a time when sterling was more 
than 90 per cent of its reserves.400 Trade with the USA and Japan increased 
particularly, and both overtook the UK as a trading partner by the mid-late 1960s.401 
The USA was contributing more FDI than the UK by the early 1960s.402 Around half of 
external government debt was sterling-denominated by the end of the period, but the 
declining share indicates a lower proportion of new issuance.403 Membership of the 
sterling area was regarded largely as a given during this period. The economist 
Perkins attempted a qualitative cost-benefit appraisal in 1962. He argued for a balance 
of historical benefits both for Australia and the UK; was inconclusive about the future 
while positive about the possibilities of mutual co-operation; and suggested that 
quantitative analysis was impossible due to the lack of an imaginable counterfactual.404   
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Despite the Treasury’s power and influence,405 the central bank was responsible for 
reserve management: it was the risk manager, and it employed a strict exchange 
control framework.406 All gold and foreign exchange in Australia, including sterling, was 
mobilised into the RBA’s balance sheet. The trading banks held foreign currencies in 
the course of mobilisation, but only a small proportion of the total, acting as the RBA’s 
agent.407 In 1947-51, as a temporary measure of support, Australia sold its gold 
production to the UK for sterling, but in 1951, the government ruled that henceforth all 
newly-mined gold (either the gold itself or its proceeds in US dollars from sales on the 
international ‘gold premium’ market) would be retained in the central bank.408  
 
The literature has described Australia’s diversification from sterling in terms of 
sterling’s share of its gold and currency reserves, and tended to attribute a declining 
sterling share to deliberate diversification policy.409 In answer to the question, ‘when 
did Australia diversify?’, the literature has followed sterling’s share and indicated that 
diversification was taking place in 1950-8 and 1964-68.410 In the middle period, to mid-
1964, sterling’s share increased again to a high level, but the literature has not 
addressed the reason for this. Authors have also tried to pinpoint when Australian 
policy or sentiment turned away from the UK. For Lee it was 1949 (the Menzies 
government), for Singleton and Robertson the mid-1950s (a growing mutual 
disenchantment), for Ward 1961 (the UK’s EEC application).411    
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Why did Australia diversify? Authors cite trade orientation and debt source, following 
studies showing that these, with anchor currency, influence the composition of 
reserves.412 Singleton and Schenk attributed diversification to ‘changing patterns of 
trade and debt and falling confidence in British economic policy’.413 They emphasised 
debt source.414 Schenk observed that the Australians started to accumulate dollars in 
the early 1950s in order ‘to meet their maturing dollar obligations’.415 However, Strange 
attributed Australia’s diversification in the 1960s to political considerations, e.g. the 
UK’s first EEC application.416  
 
Regarding constraints, some argued that diversification was limited by loyalty or 
support for the UK. Robertson wrote that the Menzies government was essentially pro-
British, evidenced by secret gifts of gold and foreign exchange to the UK between 
1956 and 1961.417 Schenk also noted that Australia in the 1950s ‘periodically 
responded to general sterling area requirements’, e.g. making contributions of dollars 
and gold in 1952 and 1956.418 Kirshner went so far as to describe Australia’s sale of 
£20m of gold to the UK during the Suez crisis as a minor example of successful 
protective currency manipulation.419 However, considering the 1960s, Singleton and 
Schenk rejected the loyalty argument, contending that Australia held sterling ‘for 
economically rational reasons’ and ‘based on calculation rather than sentiment or 
coercion’.420 Instead, they proposed three specific constraints on diversification – 
collective interest in avoiding a collapse in sterling, a sanguine view of sterling’s risk-
return prospects relative to the dollar, and a continued desire to access the London 
capital market. 
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The first of these includes the ‘sterling trap’421 argument: ‘the need to avert capital 
losses that might arise from rapid sales of sterling assets’.422 There was also a network 
effect among other holders of sterling: news of any Australian plan to diversify risked ‘a 
stampede that would devalue remaining reserves’.423 Evidence for the latter view was 
found in the RBA Governor’s reassurance to the Bank of England in July 1967 and an 
internal RBA paper in November 1967.424 Australia had ‘too much to lose to take the 
risk of… prompting a collapse of the sterling exchange rate’.425 
 
The second reason, the drawbacks of alternative assets, was a risk-return 
assessment. Sterling was not so unattractive to Australia because of ‘relatively high 
interest rates’ and the dollar’s ‘declining resilience’,426 ‘weakening during the Vietnam 
era’.427 Other countries such as West Germany and Japan were also reluctant for their 
currencies to be used as reserve assets.428 The authors presented the doubts about 
the dollar as a challenge to the literature where ‘the assumption is that the US dollar 
was all-conquering by the mid-1960s’.429 Their view thus contradicted the claim that 
sterling’s dollar peg was not ‘credible’, in the judgement of the market, in 1964-7.430 
However, the earliest evidence presented for this caution about the dollar was from a 
RBA board meeting in July 1968.431 Moreover, as they also observed, in July 1968, the 
RBA was seeking to reduce sterling and accumulate dollars, notwithstanding sterling’s 
high interest rates and the dollar’s problems.432   
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The third constraint was desire for continued access to the London capital market for 
government borrowing. In 1968, this was a ‘key priority’ for the Australian Treasury,433 
which wrote access into the 1968 MSP agreement.434 For Singleton and Schenk, 
capital markets were ‘driving factors’ in Australia’s distribution of reserves.435 Schenk 
noted that the RBA was keen to diversify further from sterling ‘in the years prior to the 
devaluation of 1967’, but was overruled by the government, whose policy was to keep 
the bulk of reserves in sterling.436 The continuing policy ‘“to hold our main overseas 
reserves in sterling”’ was referenced in a letter from the Australian Treasurer to the 
British Chancellor in July 1967.437      
 
There are two observations to make about these constraints. The first is that, while 
these arguments were about the 1960s as whole,438 the evidence presented was quite 
late, 1967-8. In fact the earliest cited evidence about the RBA’s preferred distribution of 
reserves (equal shares between sterling, dollars and gold) was in July 1968.439 
Singleton and Schenk also suggested that ‘the pace of change’ in reserve distribution 
policy ‘accelerated sharply after the 1967 devaluation’, due to exchange losses.440 This 
indicates a need to uncover earlier evidence about distribution intentions and so 
assess the pre-devaluation period. The second observation is that the first two 
constraints (avoiding a sterling collapse, and relative currency attractions) were about 
risk (relevant for the risk manager, the RBA), while the third was political, involving 
government borrowing (the domain of the Treasury). Given that the RBA wanted to 
diversify faster and was being overruled by the Treasury, this raises the question how 
strong the first two constraints were versus the third. 
                                               
433
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, p14 
434
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, p16 
435
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, p11 
436
 Schenk, The decline, p300 
437
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, p9 
438
 The citations are largely taken from the section about the 1960s up to the MSP agreements of 
Sep/1968 (Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, pp8-13) 
439
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, p14 
440
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’, p9 
131 
 
 
How did diversification take place? Authors acknowledged that it sometimes occurred 
through balance-of-payments deficits falling on the sterling holdings.441 Strange 
pointed to deliberate accumulation of gold, dollars and IMF credits in the 1960s.442 
Singleton and Schenk did not refer to IMF credits, but argued that new foreign 
borrowings led directly to the retention of the borrowed currencies in the RBA’s 
reserves.443 Explaining the decline in sterling’s share to 64 per cent by mid-1967, they 
also noted ‘a modest accumulation of dollars’ arising from premium gold sales and a 
decision in 1965 to retain, in dollars, dollar earnings from US investments.444 
 
The impact of sterling area membership on diversification has not received much focus 
from the literature. Schenk drew attention to Australia’s need for minimum ‘working 
balances’445 in the 1950s. Perkins guessed at a ‘bare minimum’ sterling reserve of 
£100-200m and target ‘average’ of £250-300m.446 Singleton and Schenk 
acknowledged that, due to the sterling peg, ‘sterling was needed for intervention and 
precautionary purposes’447 in the 1960s. However, generally, there has been a 
presumption that the bonds of the sterling area were weakening and that, after 1960, 
the sterling area was an ‘anachronism’.448 ‘After the restoration of convertibility and the 
termination of dollar pooling in 1958, the Sterling Area was of little significance’.449  
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The literature thus reveals conflicting arguments and many elements at work (e.g. 
balance-of-payments effects, minimum sterling needs, IMF credits, a newly-mined gold 
retention policy). But there is a need to understand how they all fitted together in terms 
of operational practice and strategic direction. 
 
Finally, some comments on data and sources are merited. The RBA’s files contain 
various reserves series on a roughly monthly basis, particularly those regularly 
presented to board meetings, 450 but due to variations in date and composition they are 
not consistent over the 1950-68 period. Thus these are used to analyse episodes and 
fill gaps, but for an overview the annual (end-June) reserves data from the RBA’s 
website has been used.451 The reserves there are divided into four components: US 
dollars, ‘Other’, the reserve position at the IMF, and gold. Comparison with the board 
series soon reveals that ‘Other’ was entirely sterling, until, just before the November 
1967 devaluation, a tiny amount of Deutschemarks was added. In June 1968 only 
A$4m of Deutschemarks was held. An annual series misses the intra-year highs and 
lows in reserves. Sterling holdings reached their minimum levels in September 1952, 
June 1956, March 1961 and September 1968. The principal low missed by the annual 
June data was that in 1961, because Australia drew from the IMF in April 1961. 
  
The RBA’s annual accounts show that its assets were held in two funds, the Central 
Banking Business and the Note Issue Department (NID). The international reserves in 
the Central Banking Business increased and declined with the balance of payments. 
The assets held in the NID matched and grew with the note issue. The archives reveal 
that sterling held in the Central Banking Business was managed in the RBA’s London 
office, with oversight from Sydney, and was called the ‘London funds’. The assets of 
the NID were managed from Sydney, with this department’s UK Treasury bill portfolio 
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being managed by the Bank of England.452 Periodically, currencies were sold from one 
fund to the other in order to meet shortages. The precise annual sterling holdings of 
the NID could not be isolated, but various archival references indicate changes in 
policy and share. There is a good run of ‘London funds’ data in 1953-62 contained in 
monthly reports from the London office.453 
 
The approach to the qualitative evidence (RBA and Treasury files) is to be sceptical 
about the diplomatic communication between Australia and the UK. There was an 
understandable incentive for the Australians to stress loyalty, support and caution to 
the British.454 This might even extend to providing reasons for decisions (e.g. the 
newly-mined gold retention policy, one-off sales of gold to the British) which were not 
the real ones. The RBA had scope for hidden action, both with respect to the Treasury, 
which was represented on the RBA’s board but not the committees below it (and so did 
not see the FX dealings, only their aggregate effect), and also the UK. The focus is on 
internal communications. Fortunately, due to the London outposts of the RBA and 
Treasury, these records exist.         
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Section 3: Australian reserves and diversification      
 
This Section interprets the aggregate reserves data. It is appropriate when looking at 
Australia’s aggregate reserves from a sterling perspective to focus on two assets, 
sterling and non-sterling.455 Because IMF credits are sometimes overlooked by the 
literature, these are shown separately as a third asset. It is clear from Figure 3 that 
gold and dollars increased gradually; sterling holdings fluctuated widely with aggregate 
reserves and the balance of payments (it played a transactional role); and the IMF 
reserve position, known as the ‘IMF gold tranche’, increased rapidly after 1961. The 
low in sterling holdings was around £200m (= A$500m). 
  
 
Figure 3: Australian central bank international reserves, divided into sterling, IMF gold 
tranche and other holdings, annually at 30 June, 1950 – 1968 (A$m) 
Source: RBA, http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/frequency/occ-paper-8.html, ‘Australian economic statistics 
1949-1950 to 1996-1997, Occasional paper no. 8’, ‘Section 1: Balance of Payments’, ‘1.18 [XLS] Official 
reserve assets and Reserve Bank foreign exchange transactions’ (accessed 15 Feb 2015). Other 
comprises gold, US dollars and Deutschemarks 
Note: The decline in sterling in 1968 is partly attributable to sterling’s devaluation against the Australian 
dollar in Nov/1967, from A$2.50 to A$2.14. The low of sterling reserves reached in Q1 1961 is hidden by 
subsequent actions in Q2 e.g. a large IMF drawing  
 
If confirmation were needed that Australia’s balance of payments was the principal 
influence behind the RBA’s sterling reserves, Figure 4 provides this. It shows changes 
in sterling reserves against the two principal elements in the Australian balance of 
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payments, the current account (volatile and in deficit) and the non-official capital 
account (in increasing surplus). Figure 4 also displays the current account’s 
percentage of GDP in three particularly negative years, to June 1952, 1961 and 1968. 
 
 
Figure 4: Annual change in Australian central bank’s sterling reserves, and Australia’s 
current and non-official capital account balances, years to 30 June, 1951 – 1968 (A$m) 
Source: RBA, http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/frequency/occ-paper-8.html, ‘Australian economic statistics 
1949-1950 to 1996-1997, Occasional paper no. 8’, ‘Section 1: Balance of Payments’, ‘1.1 Current account 
of the balance of payments’, ‘1.15 Capital account and balancing item of the balance of payments’,  
accessed 18/10/2017; Figure 3 for sterling reserves 
  
The IMF gold tranche needs explanation. When other countries drew Australian dollars 
from the IMF in the 1960s, with Australia’s encouragement, its gold tranche position 
was thereby increased. The gold tranche was liquidity at the IMF automatically 
available to Australia and considered by officials to be almost ‘as good as gold’. 
Moreover, the drawer then usually sold the Australian dollars back to Australia for 
sterling, or used them to pay for Australian goods rather than with sterling. So 
invariably the drawing had a direct substitution effect, allowing Australia to diversify its 
reserves.456 That the gold tranche should properly be included in reserves is confirmed 
                                               
456
 For background to Australia’s use of this technique, see RBA:BM-C-174, CBAC Memorandum, 
2/8/1962; RBA:GHK-65-1, Aide Memoire, 15/7/1965 
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by the fact that the British negotiators at the time of the MSP agreement insisted that 
the MSP calculation should include it.457  
 
From the data in Figure 3 it is possible to construct graph-lines of sterling’s share of 
reserves, shown in Figure 5. Three versions of sterling’s share are shown. The ‘simple’ 
share has been the measure used hitherto by the literature. It excludes the IMF gold 
tranche, and indicates gradual diversification, increasing slightly after 1964. Once the 
IMF gold tranche is included, as it should be, the second line shows an increased pace 
of diversification in the 1960s. The third version adds to this a thought experiment. It 
takes Schenk’s observation about a £200m ‘hard core’ minimum sterling requirement 
in the 1950s, assumes that it continued in the 1964-8 period, and strips £200m out of 
the calculation since this holding is a given.458 Here the diversification appears 
dramatic. This is because aggregate reserves were in sharp decline in 1964-8, and the 
losses of reserves were all falling on the sterling holdings. Seen in this light, by the late 
1960s, Australian officials were not showing much positive confidence in sterling’s role 
as a reserve asset, over and above a minimum balance.    
 
                                               
457
 RBA:GDB-73-1, ‘Definition of official reserves’, 24/7/1968. Not surprisingly, statements by Australian 
politicians about their intention to keep their main overseas reserves in sterling ignored the IMF gold 
tranche 
458
 This deduction only of minimum sterling is justified on the grounds that gold and dollars did not have a 
transactional role (and the NID distribution of reserves matched that of the Central Banking Business – 
see Section 5) 
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Figure 5: Sterling’s share in Australian central bank international reserves, annually at 
30 June, 1950 – 1968 (%) 
Source: See data underlying Figure 3, author’s calculations 
Note: The decline in sterling in 1968 is partly attributable to sterling’s devaluation against the Australian 
dollar in Nov/1967, from A$2.50 to A$2.14  
 
What, then, was Australia’s diversification policy? ‘Sterling’s share’ cannot capture it 
because balance-of-payments movements influenced sterling’s share. Sterling’s share 
in effect conflates the spending of sterling for balance-of-payments reasons, and the 
deliberate switching of sterling into other currencies. In theory, as an independent 
country, Australia had a completely free hand to choose its mix of reserves. But 
because of operational practice and the transactional use of sterling, some of the 
changes in sterling’s share may have been purely exogenous, e.g. due to an 
unplanned payments deficit (or surplus) falling on the sterling holdings, rather than an 
act of policy.  
 
It is easy to strip out this balance-of-payments effect from the diversification picture. 
Australia was a sterling area member, and according to the British pooling rule, all 
changes in the balance of payments should have been reflected only in the sterling 
holdings. Therefore, ignore sterling holdings and focus only on non-sterling holdings. 
Changes in the non-sterling holdings indicate a breach of the pooling rule, an act of 
deliberate diversification. 
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There was also a constant element in Australian diversification from 1951: the 
unvarying policy of retaining all new gold production either in gold or dollar form.459 The 
rate of new gold production was around A$30m per year. The policy was not 
welcomed by the British, from the pooling rule perspective it was a grey area, and it 
caused many diplomatic arguments, but ultimately it was accepted.460 It was part of 
operational normality. 
 
This means that additional pro-active diversification, breaching the pooling rule, over 
and above gold production, can be derived as the difference between actual non-
sterling reserves, and the path that non-sterling holdings would have taken if non-
sterling reserves had increased at the rate of gold production. This is shown in Figure 
6:  
 
 
 
           
                                               
459
 There is no reason to believe that the newly-mined gold retention policy was not followed to the letter, 
even if some of the accumulating pot of gold and dollars was later spent on specific items. For instance, 
the policy was referenced by an Australian Treasury officer in a memorandum in 1962: NAA:A571-
1961/1966PART2, ‘Distribution of international reserves’ and ‘Attachment: past policy…’, appended to 
note, Daniel to O’Donnell, ‘Financial implications…’, 28/2/1962 
460
 TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p61 
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Figure 6: Non-sterling holdings, actual and hypothetical, in Australian central bank 
international reserves, including IMF gold tranche, annually as at 30 June, 1950 – 
1968 (A$m) 
Source: Actual as for Figure 3, author’s calculations; hypothetical based on annual gold production in 
Mudd, ‘Gold mining in Australia’. The gold production is added from 30/6/1951 to the non-sterling holdings 
at that date. Gold production, presented in calendar year format in Mudd, is calculated as a two-year 
moving average for each June-June year and is converted into A$ using a value of US$35 per fine ounce 
and the US$/A$ exchange parity 
 
Figure 6 presents a surprising finding about Australia’s diversification. The dashed line 
can be interpreted as the course set by Australian policymakers when they made the 
deliberate decision in 1951 to retain all gold production in either gold or dollar form – 
on the assumption that Australia was in all other respects following the sterling area’s 
pooling rule (an assumption to which we shall return). But, if that was the policy 
direction, Australia’s actual reserves were blown significantly off that course. Actual 
non-sterling reserves were growing more slowly than the gold production rate until 
1961. Given official policy that the value of all newly-mined gold should be retained 
within the central bank in the form of gold and dollars, this meant that Australia was in 
addition deliberately spending some of this, or switching gold and dollars into sterling – 
the reverse of the continuous diversification story in the literature based on sterling’s 
simple share of reserves, and a puzzle that needs explaining.461 After 1961, the 
                                               
461
 Symons suggested how the divergence in the 1950s occurred. Some of the dollars from premium gold 
sales were being used to repay dollar maturities in this period. This was not surprising given that the 
publicly stated reason for the gold retention and premium gold sales policies had been dollar maturities, 
and given also the difficult discussions with the British over this issue. Australia also made additional 
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opposite was true. Actual non-sterling reserves were increasing faster than the gold 
production rate, and this was largely due to the IMF gold tranche (see the difference 
between the bold and dotted lines). Thus, from the perspective of the sterling area’s 
pooling rule, Australia was actively engaging in deliberate diversification after that year. 
Over the whole period 1950-68, Australia diversified by little more than its gold 
production. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
contributions of gold and dollars to the UK. The question is why Australia did not diversify more  (see 
TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, pp60-1) 
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Section 4: Reserve management drivers: transactions, risk-return and the pooling rule 
 
The aim of this Section is to try to untangle three different aspects of Australia’s 
reserve management in the 1950s-60s: two economic drivers (the transactions – 
related to trade, debt and anchor currency – and mean-variance – i.e. risk-return – 
theories of central bank reserve management)462 and the sterling area’s pooling rule. In 
previous studies, the economic drivers have been in the foreground and the sterling 
area in the background. The aim is not to dispute the role of the economic drivers, but, 
by bringing the pooling rule into the foreground, to see if the latter mattered or had 
effects on reserve management. One challenge is how to distinguish the pooling rule 
from the transactional use of sterling, given sterling’s role as an intervention currency 
arising from the sterling peg.  
 
Let us start by interpreting, by way of hypothesis, the reserve management picture in 
Figures 3 and 6. Naameh described central banks as often dividing reserves into 
different sub-portfolios: one for liquidity and intervention, held in money market 
instruments; one for investment, held in bonds; and a ‘rainy day’ portfolio – in his 
example this was invested in SDRs and gold. According to Naameh, the liquidity 
portfolio would be subject to large and unpredictable cash withdrawals and injections, 
while the stable investment portfolio would seek yield and could partially hedge 
external currency liabilities.463 Although the RBA did not operate similar sub-portfolios, 
I believe that this model fits its reserve management well in this period, with some 
differences. Firstly, its entire stock of gold, dollars and IMF gold tranche were its rainy 
day fund – these assets were to increase over time with gold production, and were 
ordinarily not intended for sale, and they reflected, from the outset, a lack of 
confidence in sterling. Secondly, there was a ‘minimum sterling’ hard core 
                                               
462
 For these economic drivers, see Soesmanto, Selvanathan and Selvanathan, ‘Analysis’; Papaioannou, 
Portes and Siourounis, ‘Optimal currency shares’; also the economic literature in Chapter 1 
463
 Naameh, ‘Reserve management’, pp149-50 
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transactional requirement of around £200m, most of which in time came to be invested 
in bonds, the equivalent of the investment portfolio. Thirdly, the rest of the sterling held 
was liquid and volatile, its de facto transactional currency, reflecting Australia’s variable 
balance of payments. (As already noted, there is a subsidiary question in relation to 
the liquid part, whether the 100 per cent transactional focus on sterling was due to a 
sterling area pooling rule, or a sterling peg/intervention transactional driver). However, 
in a crisis, the ‘minimum sterling’ requirement was more important than the desire not 
to sell parts of the rainy day fund, and this explains how the ‘rainy day’ fund was blown 
off the course set in 1951 (see Figure 6). 
 
Path dependence is where a pooling rule and the transactional use of sterling for 
sterling peg reasons can be distinguished. Following a crisis in which dollars have had 
to be sold to ensure minimum sterling holdings, and after the recovery of sterling 
reserves, the unconstrained reserve manager can quickly restore the assets in the 
rainy day fund by switching sterling back into dollars. But, under a pooling rule, that 
option is not available and the switch cannot be reversed quickly: non-sterling assets 
can only increase at the rate of gold production.  
 
Before we get to this, however, it is important to understand how the accrual of gold 
and dollars worked at the RBA. As a result of the 1951 policy decisions, in effect, gold 
miners - the Gold Producers Association (GPA) - were given an option to sell any new 
gold production, at a profit to themselves, for US dollars on the international gold 
premium market. Under Australia’s mobilisation controls, these dollars, and any 
residual unsold gold production, were retained by the RBA. Each month, the RBA’s 
gold holdings would fluctuate through gold receipts arising from production less gold 
delivered to and sold by the GPA (and a small amount sold to industry): its gold 
holdings could only increase through residual unsold gold production. Given that it was 
selling gold on the gold premium market, Australia could hardly expect to use its 
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sterling or dollars to buy gold internationally. The GPA sale arrangements were also 
hard to change due to domestic politics around the mining industry.464 The RBA had 
many other opportunities to acquire dollars – through borrowing or through retaining 
any dollars being acquired daily under mobilisation – but until the 1960s it did not start 
to take those opportunities: so its US holdings would only increase through GPA sales 
of gold. 
 
Where is the evidence? There were occasional references to the policy, e.g. in 1959 
and 1965.465 But to verify this mechanism in practice over time, the reader may study 
relevant extracts from the RBA’s board, over a two year period (1960-2) – see Annex 
3. This period is chosen because the new RBA board reports explained the use of 
proceeds in detail, and it is interesting because one can discern changes of policy 
taking place as a result of the balance-of-payments crisis of 1960-1. There were four 
policy phases. From the start of 1960 until June, the policy was normal, as described 
above: since there were no GPA gold sales taking place in these months, the value of 
US funds hardly moved, while gold holdings gradually increased through gold 
production. The second, crisis, phase lasted from July 1960 to March 1961: now, in 
order to preserve sterling holdings, the proceeds of all GPA sales and maturing US 
Treasury bills were spent on ‘current dollar requirements’; meanwhile part of the gold 
holding was sold to the Bank of England for sterling, and Australia also used its own 
gold to pay its IMF quota increase. As a result the US funds were diminished by 44 per 
cent and the gold holding by 23 per cent in this phase – a case of being ‘blown off 
course’ the normal policy direction. The third period, from April to August 1961, was 
one of post-crisis recuperation and restoration: there were heavy GPA sales, but the 
                                               
464
 These points were made in a RBA memorandum, which was considering how to increase gold holdings 
(RBA:BM-C-148, CBAC, ‘Bank’s Gold Holding’, 15/12/1961) 
465
 In Mar/1959, the London office head referred to the current policy of ‘drawing on the Sterling Area 
dollar pool for all our external currency requirements and still stockpiling our current gold production’ 
(RBA:GJP-74-1, Eyers-Phillips correspondence, 25/3/1959). Note that this was after the introduction of 
sterling convertibility in Dec/1958. Similarly, in Aug/1965, a note by Knight, Deputy Governor, described 
‘purchase of dollars for sterling’ as ‘the normal way of meeting current payments’ in US dollars (RBA:IT-a-
642-1, ‘Investments in New York’, Knight, 9/8/1965) 
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proceeds were largely directed to restoring the small ‘working balances overseas’. 
These were multi-currency balances, outside the central reserves, which the trading 
banks (acting as agents of the RBA), government and the RBA itself held.466 
Consequently, neither US funds nor gold holdings increased by much in this period. 
Finally, from September 1961 to January 1962, there was normality again: GPA sales 
proceeds augmented the US funds, and gold holdings increased through residual 
unsold gold production. These board reports showed that, under normal conditions, 
gold production and GPA sales wholly explained the increase in US funds and gold 
holdings. The divergence from normal post-1951 policy during the 1960-1 crisis (until 
August 1961) was noted in an RBA Investment Department memorandum in 
September 1962.467  
 
Over the following three years this normal pattern continued (with one small 
amendment), although by 1963, the board reports were becoming less explicit about 
the use of proceeds.468 The pattern is shown in Figure 7 which plots the US funds and 
gold holdings from the beginning of 1962 up to the middle of 1965. The amendment to 
policy, consulted with the UK, was the new (mid-1962) decision to retain US dollar loan 
proceeds, but only on a temporary basis pending use of the proceeds: the plan was 
that the proceeds should all be spent over nine months.469 This policy augmented US 
funds by A£12.9m in July 1962, and by A£10.9m in November 1962 (see the blips 
                                               
466
 At end-Mar/1961, total working balances overseas, including sterling, being outside the central 
reserves, stood at A£52m compared with A£336m for the central reserves (RBA:BM-C-165, CBAC, ‘Net 
Gold and Foreign Exchange Holdings’, 24/5/1962). Arndt in 1960 said that most of the trading banks’ 
working balances were items in transit or similar, and were thought to be no more than £10m at the core, 
while the RBA ‘meets all net dollar payments and receives all net dollar receipts arising from the trading 
banks’ business’ (Arndt, Australian trading banks, pp109-10). I could not find a figure for the amount of 
working balances overseas held in US dollars, but it is reasonable to assume that these had been 
depleted in the same way that the US funds were depleted during the crisis period, or that the transfers 
reflected uncertainty about the need for current spending requirements. That dollar working balances were 
small was confirmed by Arndt, idem, p110, Snape, ‘A foreign exchange market’, p301, and a board paper 
in Nov/1967: ‘the high proportion of present non-sterling trade is being comfortably handled on very small 
working balances’ (RBA:BM-Pe-87, ‘Overseas funds…November 1967’, ‘Points to make…’) 
467
 RBA:BM-C-181, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Premium Sales of Gold’, Investment Department, 20/9/1962 
468
 RBA:BM-Pe-23 to -62, Board Memoranda, ‘Investment of Overseas Funds’ 
469
 RBA:BM-C-177, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Central Bank Investments in U.S.A.’, Investment Department, 
29/8/1962. The memorandum said that less than six months would ‘perhaps appear undignified’ and more 
than a year would be ‘tending to take it beyond a temporary holding’, suggesting an artificiality about the 
selected run-down of nine months 
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upwards in Figure 7), but the ‘run-off’ of these ‘temporarily invested proceeds’ was 
‘virtually completed’ by April 1963. In May 1963, there was another dollar borrowing 
raising A£12.3m equivalent, less A£5.8m contributed by the RBA for an IMF 
repurchase by the government.470 But again, due to the spending of these proceeds, 
there was little net accumulation of dollars from the loans. 
 
 
                    
Figure 7: Holdings of US funds and gold, as reported to the RBA board, 10 January 
1962 – 16 June 1965 (A£m equivalent) 
Source: Extracted from RBA:BM-Pe-23 to -62, Board Memoranda, ‘Investment of Overseas Funds’ 
 
Gold production was thus dictating the increase in the RBA’s holdings of gold and 
dollars. Figure 8 verifies this by comparing the change in the latter against the former, 
between board meetings (the data stop at October 1964 because the gold production 
receipts information became less precise in subsequent reports). Apart from the three 
above-mentioned borrowing events and their spending effects, which are clearly 
visible, the co-movement between the two variables was almost exact. Thus under 
normal conditions, with this small variation around US dollar borrowing (all other 
currency borrowings still being converted to sterling), transactional needs such as 
‘current dollar requirements’ continued to be sourced from sterling holdings: the 
operation of a pooling rule.    
                                               
470
 These facts were in RBA:BM-Pe-23 to -62, Board Memoranda, ‘Investment of Overseas Funds’. The 
phrases cited are from the relevant report 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1
0
/0
1
/1
9
6
2
1
0
/0
4
/1
9
6
2
1
0
/0
7
/1
9
6
2
1
0
/1
0
/1
9
6
2
1
0
/0
1
/1
9
6
3
1
0
/0
4
/1
9
6
3
1
0
/0
7
/1
9
6
3
1
0
/1
0
/1
9
6
3
1
0
/0
1
/1
9
6
4
1
0
/0
4
/1
9
6
4
1
0
/0
7
/1
9
6
4
1
0
/1
0
/1
9
6
4
1
0
/0
1
/1
9
6
5
1
0
/0
4
/1
9
6
5
1
0
/0
7
/1
9
6
5
A
£
m
 
US Funds
Gold
146 
 
 
 
   
Figure 8: Comparison of gold receipts and additions to gold and US funds holdings, as 
reported at RBA board meetings, 14 February 1962 – 14 October 1964 (A£m) 
Source: Extracted from RBA:BM-Pe-23 to -54, Board Memoranda, ‘Investment of Overseas Funds’. Gold 
production converted into US dollars at US$35 per fine ounce, and then into Australian pounds at an 
exchange rate of A£1 = US$2.24 
  
All very well, but surely this pattern arose, not because of a pooling rule, but because 
of the sterling peg? The RBA simply had to intervene to stabilise the rate of Australian 
currency against sterling, and what was needed to do this was sterling, which 
consequently fluctuated with the balance of payments. Yes, gold and dollars were also 
held and accrued for precautionary risk-return reasons in the automatic fashion 
described, but this was because they could be converted into sterling, the intervention 
currency, which dominated everything. Was this not so? 
 
One cannot exclude this possibility, which one might call ‘rational intervention’ arising 
from the sterling peg. If the peg/intervention dominated everything while gold 
production was treated separately, the two patterns of reserve management behaviour 
(a pooling rule, or rational intervention) are indistinguishable. And there have been 
country examples where a commitment to a currency peg has wholly dominated 
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reserve holdings.471 But there are three problems with the argument. The first is that it 
offers no coherent reason why gold production was being treated separately: why 
currency borrowings were being converted into sterling, but the proceeds of GPA gold 
sales and residual gold production were not. The pooling rule does provide an 
explanation for this behaviour: it was a concession to the rule accepted by the UK. 
Secondly, this is not the way Australia’s diversification has been explained by 
economic historians. For example, Singleton and Schenk majored on other 
transactional factors – debt and trade – as drivers for diversification, and the three 
Australian constraints on diversification (by contrast, intervention was mentioned only 
briefly). The third problem is related to the second, and theoretical: if sterling 
intervention dominated everything, where does this leave trade and debt as widely 
acknowledged drivers of transactional holdings? In fact, when we try to apply this 
‘rational intervention’ argument to Australia’s case, we find examples where Australia’s 
behaviour was inconsistent with the transactions theory of reserve management (but 
not with the pooling rule). The whole point of the transactions theory is that central 
banks seek to avoid unnecessary or costly FX transactions.472 Given that Australia was 
a direct spender of dollars, a natural ‘transactions theory’ response ought to have been 
to retain, regularly, the proceeds of dollar borrowings or other gross dollar receipts and 
actually to use them to service the dollar spending.  
 
This can be shown by looking at the monthly reports from the central bank’s London 
office about the London funds. These reports, for a few years from 1954, gave a 
detailed monthly breakdown of the transactions in which sterling was involved, both 
within the ‘Central Bank’ and also within the CBA’s ‘Trading Bank’, which operated as 
a competitor to other Australian trading banks and was accounted separately from the 
‘Central Bank’ after 1953. Example photographs of these figures, kindly provided by 
staff at the RBA Archives, are in Annex 4. 
                                               
471
 Hansen, Olgaard and Jensen, ‘Risk management’ 
472
 For a statement of the theory, see Dooley, Lizondo and Mathieson, ‘Currency composition’, p398 
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It is important to understand that what was happening was no ordinary FX intervention. 
It was mobilisation. There was no foreign exchange market in Australia, nor was there 
an FX market in Australian currency in which the central bank could ‘intervene’ outside 
Australia. There was just the CBA’s fixed price for the Australian currency against 
sterling (which determined its price against other currencies) and the Australian trading 
banks’ fixed (and profitable) bid-offer rates, acting as agents around the central bank’s 
price.473 In the central bank’s case, the values given in Annex 4 are dominated by 
domestic Australian counterparties (trading banks and government entities) and 
represent FX transactions between Australian pounds and sterling. The only 
exceptions were specifically designated ‘currency transactions’, namely between 
sterling and US dollars (telegraphic transfers with New York), and between sterling and 
Canadian dollars (telegraphic transfers with Ottawa).474 The Trading Bank was also 
largely dealing with domestic counterparties. Figure 9 shows the monthly breakdown of 
net movements (receipts less payments) in some of the major flow categories affecting 
the central bank’s London funds up to the end of 1956. It is clear that the central bank 
at this time was immersed in sterling transactions, ‘currency transactions’ mainly 
involved net spending of sterling, and the London funds were largely driven by the 
transactions with the Australian trading banks. 
 
                                               
473
 Snape, ‘A foreign exchange market’. As late as 1970, overseas FX markets in Australian dollars, 
‘shadowing’ the trading banks’ wide fixed bid-offer rates, were described as ‘embryonic’ (p300) 
474
 Note from Annex 4 that in each month there were gross payments and receipts in these currency 
transactions – no obvious short run netting off and holding of US dollars or Canadian dollars by the central 
bank in order to economise on FX transactions  
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Figure 9: Monthly net movements in CBA’s London funds, selected components, from 
Monthly Reviews from London office, May 1954 – December 1956 (£m) 
Source: RBA:C.3.20.1.19-1, C.3.20.1.19-2, C.3.20.1.20-1, Tables, ‘Central bank’, ‘Movement in funds’, 
‘Principal transactions’ 
Note: No such table available in January 1956 Monthly Review. Transfer of sterling from Note Issue 
Department (NID) is discussed further in Section 5 
 
Given this pattern of spending dollars, converting dollar borrowings – indeed all 
borrowings – into sterling (a consistent policy until 1962 as discussed above) made 
little sense from the perspective of transactions theory. This can be seen by focusing 
on Canadian dollar transactions against sterling. Figure 10 shows the gross receipts 
and payments from these transactions until the end of 1956. 
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Figure 10: Currency transactions of CBA, gross payments and receipts of sterling 
against Canadian dollars, from Monthly Reviews from the London office, May 1954 – 
December 1956 (£m) 
Source: RBA:C.3.20.1.19-1, C.3.20.1.19-2, C.3.20.1.20-1, Tables, ‘Central bank’, ‘Movement in funds’, 
‘Principal transactions’, ‘Currency transactions’, ‘T.T. Ottawa’ 
Note: No such table available in January 1956 Monthly Review 
 
Canadian dollar-sterling transactions were predominantly gross payments to meet 
Canadian dollar spending needs. The outlier November 1955 receipt was the 
exchange of Canadian dollar borrowing proceeds for sterling. The London 
correspondent reported to Sydney how hard it was to transact this amount in Canadian 
dollars in London without moving the market, and how the Bank of England had 
assisted in the transaction.475 But, according to the transactions theory, this conversion 
was an unnecessary transaction: the Canadian dollars could have been retained to 
meet the Canadian dollar spending needs, in effect avoiding that and the ensuing FX 
transactions.476 Indeed, it might be asked: if sterling had been the only transactional 
currency for peg/intervention reasons, and Australia had not had access to the pool, 
how would it have funded the Canadian dollar payments, without retaining the 
Canadian dollar proceeds? In this sense, the ‘rational intervention’ argument relies on 
Australia’s access to the pool. The point is that, through mobilisation of all currencies 
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and gold into the central bank, the RBA had ample means, motive and opportunity to 
optimise its FX transactions, but (until the very limited measures taken in 1962) it 
refrained from doing so. It was only in August 1965, after the rejection of its request for 
a guarantee from the Bank of England, when the central bank began, occasionally, to 
break with its normal FX practices. In August 1965, when recent dollar loan proceeds 
began to be spent by the government according to the 1962 ‘temporarily invested 
proceeds’ formula, the RBA unusually topped back up its US funds by buying more US 
dollars with sterling.477 In September 1965, it bought US dollars from Australian trading 
banks, dollars which would normally be sold for sterling, and instead added US$7m to 
its US funds.478 But these unobtrusive transactions were the exception, not the rule.     
   
Let us return to the big picture. We need to see if the pooling rule, clearly evident in 
board reports and correspondence of 1960-5 and London office correspondence in the 
mid-1950s, was relevant for Australia across 1950-68 as a whole. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the actual path for non-sterling reserves seen in Figure 6 could be 
explained perfectly by a combination of transactions and risk-return factors. We begin 
with a review of these motives.  
 
It is in practice impossible to make anything other than a qualitative judgement about 
the RBA’s assessment of the risk in holding sterling in this period of fixed exchange 
rates. (Section 6 addresses this qualitative judgement, examining RBA papers). An 
interest rate differential of, say, 2 per cent per annum would offer minimal ex-ante 
protection against an imminent devaluation, so it is the perceived risk of devaluation 
that matters primarily, which presumably varied over time, becoming heightened during 
sterling crises. But it is clear from Annex 2 that smaller countries which were 
concerned about sterling – such as Burma in 1964 or Singapore in 1967 – could 
diversify from sterling rapidly. There were also certain assets that by definition must 
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 RBA:IT-a-642-1, ‘Investments in New York’, Knight, 9/9/1965 
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 RBA:IT-a-642-1, ‘Dollar dealings’, Banking Department, 2/9/1965 
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have been held for risk-return reasons, because they did not have a transactional role. 
The IMF gold tranche provided Australia with risk diversification but it was not a 
transactional holding: it could only be utilised by drawing from the IMF, which Australia 
only did in extremis during crises, e.g. in 1952 or 1961. Gold was probably also held 
more for risk-return than for transactional reasons. A paper for CBAC in December 
1961 argued:  
 
‘There have always been a number of reasons for our desire to hold gold, 
probably the most significant of which has been to provide our reserves with 
some protection in the event of a devaluation of the £ Stg. or U.S. dollar’479 
 
It is true that the official reason given in 1951 for retaining gold production, and then 
dollars from GPA sales, was to support or repay IMF drawings and dollar borrowings 
by Australia (a transactional explanation), but close study of the government files 
reveals that this was a polite fiction: in fact Australian officials were very concerned 
about what the British and Americans were then planning to do to Australia’s large 
sterling holdings in order to resolve the UK’s post-war debt problem. Retaining gold 
production was the policy response (the decision was driven by perceptions of risk).480 
 
Sensitivity to risk-return issues is sometimes associated with profit-driven commercial 
banking, rather than state-owned central bank, corporate arrangements. I could find no 
evidence of a change in attitude to risk and return arising from the transition from the 
CBA, with its combined commercial departments, to the RBA, a pure central bank, in 
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 RBA:BM-C-148, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Bank’s Gold Holding’, Dec/1961 
480
 ‘Approaching maturities of dollar loans’ had been a reason given by the Australians to the British for the 
decision to retain gold production from Mar/1951 (TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, pp60. See also Bury’s 
1953 similar remarks, including that it was too much to expect every sterling area country to rigorously 
observe the rules, cited in idem, p61 and Schenk, Britain, p31. Australia’s letter to Attlee can be found in 
TNA:T236/4648, Harrison-Attlee letter, 27/3/1951). However, Australia in reality made the decision 
because it feared British blocking or other action against its then large sterling balances 
(NAA:A9564,130/3,11527393, Wheeler-Fadden letter, and memorandum, ‘Australia’s international 
reserves’, 12/3/1951). ‘Sterling balances’, not dollar maturities, was also the principal reason for the 
change recorded by the BOE (TNA:T236/4648, Cobbold to Brittain, 28/3/1951). In any event, ‘approaching 
maturities’ should not have led to an accumulation of gold and dollars, as Symons observed 
(TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, pp60-1)      
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1960.481 This is because already, as a consequence of the 1930s depression, the 
Second World War, and the 1945 legislation, the state-owned CBA was not, in fact, a 
commercial bank with some central bank functions, but rather a central bank which 
was being encouraged to provide more commercial services on behalf of the state – a 
‘socialist competitor’, to cite Governor Coombs’ chapter heading.482 Even by the mid-
1930s, as Schedvin argued, ‘the Commonwealth Bank was beginning to resemble a 
central bank’,483 and in 1945, it was given a formal central banking mandate to pursue, 
on behalf of the Australian people, currency stability, full employment, economic 
prosperity and welfare, to work closely with the Treasury and to accept the 
government’s ultimate authority.484 The retained profits of its trading business in the 
1950s were small (a little over A$0.5m per annum), while there was little change in the 
profit accruals to reserves of the Central Banking Business over this transition (from 
average A$7.4m in 1957-9 to average A$5.5m in 1960-2).485 Moreover, the CBA’s 
Governor Coombs was first and foremost a public servant, whose ‘central concerns 
were about power and social justice… maintaining adequate control over an inherently 
unstable economic system’.486 This is confirmed by a reading of Coombs’ memoir and 
Schedvin’s central bank biography.487  
 
Both before and after 1960, I found references to risk and return. In the London office’s 
‘Monthly Review’ in the 1950s, the correspondent often reported the successful prices 
achieved by the office in executing the Governor’s cabled instructions, and also 
provided market information and gossip. In the August 1957 review, he gave 
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 The principal profit distribution change in 1960 was as follows. Since 1945, and also under 1953 
legislation, ‘Central Bank profits were divided equally between the Reserve Fund and the National Debt 
Sinking Fund’; under the 1959 legislation, ‘Central Bank profits, after payment to the Reserve Fund of an 
amount determined by the Treasurer after consultation with the Board, [also] go to the Commonwealth’. 
Profits of the NID went to the Commonwealth government under both regimes. Citations are from 
RBA:BM-Pe-3, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of assets…’, Mar/1960. See also White, Australian 
banking, pp13-18, 62-4   
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information about a simple FX arbitrage being promoted to them by an American bank 
in London – selling sterling spot against dollars and buying it forward. Despite the 
bank’s siren offer of ‘delectable profits that could be ours for the asking’, the 
correspondent’s purpose was solely to provide information. There was no suggestion 
that the trade should actually be undertaken, and indeed London’s reaction had been 
to contact, unofficially, a Bank of England officer, who had confirmed that ‘such swaps 
for quick profits were contrary to the spirit of the regulations’.488 In evaluating the 
relative attraction of gold, sterling and US dollars in March 1959 (a time when sterling 
looked strong on the exchanges against the dollar), Eyers, the London head, wrote to 
the head of the Investment Department, arguing that Australia should hold gold ‘to the 
maximum extent’. Based on five factors, transactions requirements, risk, return, 
transactions costs and, lastly, disclosure (the need, in the case of sterling, to ‘show our 
hand’ to the UK authorities), he gave a balanced view on the holding of sterling or 
dollars, ‘though the answer depends to some extent on the weight one would give to 
the last point’.489   
 
A board paper in January 1965 by the Investment Department described three 
attributes of the reserves: ‘a Reserve Fund’ (liquid holdings to support balance-of-
payments needs), ‘Security’ (risk) and ‘Earnings’ (returns). The case was being made 
for longer-term investment of the ‘hard core’ (minimum) sterling reserves in pursuit of 
higher yields.490 This was an elaboration of a proposal that was referenced at the 
September 1964 board, in which the Governor’s ‘aide memoire’ ended: ‘we will, of 
course, consult the Bank of England’.491 In the 1960s, risk-return sensitivity emanated 
particularly from the Investment Department, whose heads, first Phillips, then Knight, 
both future Governors, pushed strongly for diversification from sterling. Sensitivity in 
particular to risk may have been generated by the Governor’s difficult relationship with 
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Treasury Secretary Wilson, who fought his corner hard: Wilson was determined to 
ensure that the RBA should not earn profits which properly belonged to the 
government, but equally seemed reluctant to underwrite the Bank’s risks. This is 
illustrated by a Treasury-Bank negotiation in August-September 1961 over the profits 
arising from the 1961 IMF drawing, which was converted into sterling. Instead of 
explicitly replying ‘no profit – no loss’ in response to Wilson’s expectation that all the 
profits should be paid to the Treasury, the Governor’s diplomatic approach in this case 
was to continue the ‘Uniform Proportionate Distribution’ (UPD) of assets between the 
Central Banking Business and the Note Issue Department (the latter’s profit/loss was 
entirely for the government, and for technical reasons the UPD effectively directed 
more sterling there – of which more later).492 Loss aversion at the RBA was also 
reflected in a decision to apply annual FX profits towards a ‘currency fluctuation 
reserve’, which had reached A$96m by July 1967.493 (Sterling’s November devaluation 
reduced the value of reserves by about A$113m, against savings of about A$108m 
from Commonwealth and State debt denominated in sterling).494 In summary, it seems 
from correspondence and debates that both pre-1960 CBA and post-1960 RBA were 
primarily concerned with reducing portfolio risk and avoiding loss. 
      
Turning to transactions motives, which are mainly relevant to sterling and dollar 
holdings, these have been widely attributed in theory to the currency peg, currency 
orientation of trade, and currency denomination of debt.495 It is possible to create a 
basic ‘transactions index’ for Australia by assigning reasonable assumed weights to 
these three factors and comparing the implications of the index with actual holdings of 
dollars (or of dollars and gold, on the alternative, though less satisfactory, assumption 
that gold might have been held as some kind of transactional dollar-substitute). 
Papaioannou, Portes and Siourounis found that in a mean-variance framework, the 
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currency peg was substantially more important than transactions costs, the direction of 
trade and the currency composition of debt.496 Meanwhile other authors have broadly 
given equal billing to the trade and debt factors,497 and we need to address Singleton 
and Schenk’s debt and trade diversification argument. A weighting of 50-25-25 for peg-
trade-debt is therefore suggested. 
 
Figure 11 shows this transactions index and its component parts, expressed as 
sterling’s share of currency reserves, predicted by the assumed transaction factors. 
The calculations of the trade share index and debt share index are provided in Annex 
5. The 1968 values for these were obviously affected by sterling’s devaluation. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Australia transactions index and its component sub-indices, as at 30 June, 
1950 – 1968 (%) 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Annex 5 
 
It can be seen that this transactions index, declining from 93 per cent to 76 per cent, 
gives predicted sterling share values that are above the actual sterling shares (of 
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currencies and gold),498 which declined from 93 per cent to 59 per cent over the same 
period (see Figure 12). In making this comparison, however, allowance needs to be 
made in the actual sterling share line for the low sterling reserve years of 1952, 1956 
and 1968, so the lines are closer than they seem. Indeed the relatively high sterling 
currency trade share of Australia – Australia’s ‘immersion’ in sterling transactions, as 
already highlighted in the London funds data – is an important finding of this paper, 
with new evidence reviewed in Section 5 and Annex 5. The transaction index values 
are obviously sensitive to the weights apportioned to the peg, trade and debt, but 
changing the weights from 50-25-25 to 40-30-30 would only shift the 1968 value 
downwards from 76 per cent to 71 per cent, and there is broad consensus in the 
economic literature about the primacy of the currency peg as a transactions factor. 
Figure 12 suggests that, from a transactions perspective alone, the pooling rule was 
not a particular constraint – the transactions background may not have been changing 
as fast as Singleton and Schenk suggested, and gold production gave Australia ample 
opportunity to diversify.    
 
Figure 12: Sterling’s percentage share of Australian central bank’s international 
reserves, actual and transactions index, 30 June, 1950 to 1968 (%) 
Source: Figure 5 for actual, Figure 11 for transactions index  
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A higher transactions index than actual sterling share seems reasonable, since, as 
Singleton and Schenk argued, Australian officials were also concerned about the risks 
for sterling arising from British economic policies, meriting additional precautionary 
holdings of gold and dollars. However, if, instead, and more plausibly, dollars alone are 
treated as the alternative transactions currency, the results implied by the transactions 
index are far from satisfactory: actual dollar holdings were significantly lower than 
those predicted on transaction grounds, even before considering the need for extra 
precautionary dollar holdings. This is shown by Figure 13, which sets out the actual 
and predicted holdings of dollars. While the shape looks broadly consistent, the 
magnitude is not. Again, in looking at the dotted (predicted) line, one should discount 
the low years for reserves (1952, 1956, 1968) since sterling holdings were under 
pressure and affecting the appetite for dollar reserves.499    
 
Figure 13: US dollar international reserves, actual and predicted, using transactions 
index, as at 30 June, 1950 – 1968 (US$m) 
Source: Data underlying Figure 3 for actual; for predicted, calculated using the following formula: (holdings 
of sterling and US dollars) x (1-transactions index) 
  
Finally, we can make a simple comparison of the effectiveness of the pooling rule 
against transactional factors in 1950-68. Given Australia’s significantly underweight 
transactional position in dollars (Figure 13), it is better for the transactional argument to 
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assume that gold was also acting as a dollar-substitute. One can examine annual 
actual changes in gold and dollar holdings against those predicted by the pooling rule 
and by the transactions index. Here the pooling rule is a constraining factor: the annual 
increase in gold and dollars cannot be more than gold production. However, the 
reserve manager motivated by the transactions index is a free agent, and can make 
any size investment or divestment relative to last year’s actual holdings. The results 
are in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14: Annual increase in gold and US dollar reserve holdings, actual and 
predicted (by transactions index and pooling rule), years to 30 June, 1951 – 1968 
(A$m) 
Source: Actual increase: calculated from data in Figure 3. Predicted by transactions index: calculated 
(from data in Figure 3) according to the following formula, (sterling, gold and US dollar reserve holdings) x 
(1-transactions index) – (actual gold and US dollar holdings one year earlier). Predicted by pooling rule: 
annual gold production (data from Figure 6).    
 
The transactions index (triangles) under-predicted actual increases in gold and dollars 
(squares) by variable margins, even after ignoring the crisis years (to June 1952, 1956 
and 1961). If the difference was accounted for by precautionary risk-return holdings, 
one would have expected that difference to increase gradually over time in line with 
increasing concerns about sterling, not to fluctuate so much. By contrast, the pooling 
rule (crosses) explains the actual changes in gold and dollars (squares) remarkably 
well. There were years when the actual increase in gold and dollars was much less 
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than gold production – e.g. particularly the data points for the years to June 1954, 
1957, 1959 and 1961 in Figure 14. However, as will be seen in Section 6, the 
accounting years to June 1953, 1956, 1957, 1959 and 1961, saw sales of gold or 
dollars in order to shore up sterling holdings, so such shortfalls were to be expected. 
Moreover the years 1952-4 saw major dispute between the British and Australians 
over the latter’s gold retention policy,500 and in 1953-5 Australia also repurchased the 
dollars it had drawn from the IMF in 1952,501 so there was reason and opportunity to 
make one-off concessions to the British around that time. Overall, the process was 
path dependent: large shortfalls were not restored the following year. Interestingly, 
there were only two years (to June 1963 and 1967) in which the actual increase was 
significantly more than that predicted by the pooling rule. The June 1963 figure can 
largely be explained by the May 1963 dollar borrowing already mentioned in this 
Section. The heightened diversification in the 1965-8 period will be discussed in 
Section 6. In summary, apart from the IMF gold tranche and the leeway provided by 
gold production, the pooling rule looked like a consistent policy – a rule that was 
broadly followed – even into the 1965-8 crisis period. 
 
To summarise this Section: Australia closely followed a pooling rule. A pooling rule 
explains Australia’s reserve management better than other alternative explanations. 
Because of reserve pooling, its ‘transactional’ reserve holdings were almost entirely in 
sterling form; and all its sterling holdings were transactional (save for minimum sterling 
holdings, which, as we will see, were themselves motivated by the risk of adverse 
transactions). By the same token, its holdings of gold, dollars and IMF gold tranche 
were not transactional, but precautionary and mainly held for risk-return reasons.         
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Section 5: Peg, pool and other effects of the sterling area on Australia’s reserve 
management 
 
The previous Section provided evidence for the pooling rule that Australia was 
following. This Section does two things. Firstly, it demonstrates that Australia valued 
membership of the sterling area, and discusses the macroeconomic benefits of, and 
attitudes towards, the sterling peg and pooling arrangements. Secondly, it broadens 
the discussion of the effects of Australia’s sterling orientation on its reserve 
management, identifying seven specific effects.      
 
That Australian officials valued membership of the sterling area is not controversial. 
Even the RBA, arguing for diversification from sterling in July 1968, admitted in relation 
to past sterling area pooling and exchange controls:  
 
‘Despite the restraints on freedom of action entailed in these arrangements, 
membership of the sterling area may have allowed Australia to achieve levels 
of trade and capital inflow higher than would have been possible if we had 
followed a more independent line of action’502  
 
The pool had risk-sharing, trade-enhancing and cost efficiency benefits for Australia. 
This was recognised in the literature of the time.503 Specifically, Wright argued that 
Australia was a net drawer on the dollar pool in the years 1946-52 (except for 1950-
1)504 and Bhagat showed the same for 1948-58.505 Kamarck replied (to Wright) that 
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focusing only on drawings from the pool was incomplete analysis,506 a reasonable 
critique,507 and Bhagat also referenced Australia’s export surplus with continental 
Europe, which contributed gold to the UK through the EPU arrangements.508 Perkins 
similarly showed that, after the 1951-2 crisis, Australia’s regional pattern of payments 
in the 1950s was a consistent direct dollar payments deficit, combined with an even 
larger surplus with the non-dollar non-sterling area (NDNSA, comprising Western 
Europe, Japan, China etc), balanced by a large deficit with sterling area countries 
(principally the UK) – and a small deficit overall, reflected in the decline in reserves. 
Consequently, he argued that Australia was a net contributor to the sterling area’s gold 
and currency reserves by virtue of its net surplus with the NSA509 (although it could be 
argued that sterling’s widespread use in the NDNSA at least helped to enable this 
surplus). These trading trends and patterns established in the 1950s (deficits with the 
USA and UK, net surpluses elsewhere), continued into the 1960s.510 
 
The literature is thus not contradicted by the findings of the previous Section, in which 
it was seen that, at the microeconomic central bank level, Australia was a direct 
spender of dollars through the 1950s-60s, and only accumulated dollars through gold 
production/GPA gold sales (Figures 7-9 and Annex 3). Moreover, as pointed out by 
Zupnick, spending of sterling reserves permitted an accelerated pace of development 
in RSA countries like Australia, with inflationary consequences for the whole sterling 
area.511 As Copland explained, the importance of Australia’s development ambitions, 
which necessitated dollar imports of capital goods, inevitably had domestic inflationary 
consequences, so that spending sterling reserves, and borrowing dollars, was a 
‘sensible anti-inflationary device’.512 In resisting the UK’s call for widespread import 
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controls against the NSA in the 1951-2 crisis, the Australian Cabinet made clear that 
imports were a major plank of counter-inflationary policy.513 Similar counter-inflationary 
thinking underlay the decision to end import licensing in 1960.514  Under these 
circumstances, in the binary currency world of the 1950s, the pool also supported 
Australia in its exchange rate management, as Meyer argued: 
 
‘Australia cannot change her monetary standard without great 
cost…independent currencies would hardly be as widely acceptable in 
present-day conditions. As independent currencies, most R.S.A. currencies 
would have a lower value than at present’515  
 
Copland argued the same in Australia’s case,516 while adding that, ‘in the long run it is 
our relation to the dollar and to gold, and not to sterling, that matters most’. Copland 
was hoping that Australia could build up a separate dollar reserve, ‘so that she could 
eventually contract out of the sterling area dollar-pooling arrangements’,517 but Perkins 
argued that this both became impractical (because of the scale of dollar deficits) and 
was uneconomic because getting there would have involved self-imposed restrictions 
preventing Australia from buying dollar goods at the cheapest cost (as it could via the 
pool), and building reserves (sterling and dollar) that were larger than necessary.518 
 
Inevitably, pooling created conflicts between the UK and Australia, particularly in the 
crises of 1947 and the early 1950s.519 The UK Treasury was initially less concerned 
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the IMF instead, as it did in 1949 and 1952. (For 1949, see Andre, Documents, pp90-2, 102-3. For 1952, 
BOE:OV13/30, ‘Note of a telephone conversation…’, 17/4/1952; Telegram, Washington to Franks, 
‘Confidential – International Monetary Fund’, 26/4/1952). In 1950, it also began borrowing dollars, against 
the wishes of the British (Lee, Search for security, pp144-5)    
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about Australia keeping its own gold production from March 1951, but the retention of 
dollars from GPA gold sales, from December 1951, set a bad pooling precedent for 
other countries.520 When this was combined with the beginnings of an EPU deficit for 
the UK, ‘brought about largely by heavy Australian spending in Europe’,521 matters 
came to a head in early 1952. The British tried to impose dollar rations and balance-of-
payments targets on Australia and other sterling area countries. The Australian Prime 
Minister refused to accept these, arguing that they were against the team spirit of the 
sterling area.522 In March 1952, to address its balance-of-payments crisis, Australia 
imposed general import controls, including towards sterling area goods, against the 
wishes of the British.523 At a London meeting in May 1952, the UK Treasury tried 
unsuccessfully to convince Treasury Secretary Wilson to abandon the policy of GPA 
gold sales for dollars, and to spend at least half the previously accumulated dollars on 
dollar debt redemptions over the next four years.524 While Wilson did make 
commitments to spend some of the dollar ‘pot’ on financing Australia’s 1952 dollar 
deficit, and redeeming dollar maturities that could not be refinanced, his indication that 
the combined gold and dollar holdings would be no higher in three years’ time, was, as 
the previous Section showed, not fulfilled.525 In the later 1950s and 1960s, pooling, and 
the minor ad hoc divergences undertaken by Australia, did not seem to create such 
friction, but the retention of gold production remained a British grievance,526 and 
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521
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 Whitwell, ‘Economic policy’, p174. When the Chancellor tried to persuade the Treasurer to free the 
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(RBA:GJP-56-1, Randall to Coombs, 8/12/1954, enclosing letter, Crawford to Wilson, 22/11/1954; ‘Article 
XII…9
th
-20
th
 November’; ‘I was in Canberra yesterday…’, 14/9/1954). The general import controls of 1952-
60, which varied with the balance of payments, were more discriminatory against the dollar area, but only 
slightly so, since the US$400m proceeds of World Bank loans, and also imports of petroleum products, 
were outside the controls (Crawford, Australian trade policy, pp490-525; RBA:C.3.7.7.14, ‘How import 
licensing works’, Department of Trade, Feb/1957)  
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Australian officials were still well aware of British sensitivities. In considering 
diversification from sterling in July 1968, the RBA board paper warned: ‘the U.K. would 
dislike switches’ and suggested possible ways to meet British objections.527         
 
It is clear, therefore, that sterling area membership was valued by government officials. 
Membership was valuable in the 1940s, because the pool gave Australia a means to 
buy needed dollars.528 This was true of the 1950s, providing access to British capital 
and dollars, even after Australia became a ‘net contributor to the pool’ through its 
surplus with the NDNSA.529 And it was true of the 1960s, both for private capital and 
government borrowing on the London market, as Singleton and Schenk observed.530 
The private capital flow from the UK was especially important,531 as illustrated by 
Figure 15. 
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Whitwell, ‘Economic policy’, p179 
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Figure 15: Capital investment in Australian enterprises – by source, annually during 
year ended 30 June, 1950 – 1968 (A$m) 
Source: RBA, http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/frequency/occ-paper-8.html, ‘Australian economic statistics 
1949-1950 to 1996-1997, Occasional paper no. 8’, ‘Section 1: Balance of Payments’, ‘1.17 [XLS] Inflow of 
foreign investment in enterprises by country’ (accessed 15 Feb 2015) 
 
What about the sterling peg? Australia had two theoretical exchange rate pegging 
commitments: one to gold and the dollar under the IMF rules, and the other to sterling. 
Being a no-margins peg for the central bank, the latter dominated, but how committed 
was Australia to the sterling peg in the 1950s-60s? 
 
An indirect test of Australia’s commitment to sterling pegging is to consider times when 
Australian officials discussed changing the exchange parities. I found in the RBA and 
Government archives a number of occasions when such changes were considered, 
and these are referenced in Table 1. 
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 Australian government or central bank discussions:  
A£/A$ change: Following UK move: Independent move by Australia: 
Rise vs US$ 1951
532
, 1954
533
 1950
534
,1951
535
 
Decline vs US$ 1946-8
536
,1949
537
,1966
538
,1967
539
 1961
540
 
Float vs US$ 1952
541
, 1954
542
, 1955
543
, 1969
544
 1953
545
,1954
546
,1955
547
,1956
548
,1961
549
 
Table 1: Years in which Australian officials discussed changing Australia’s exchange 
parities, 1946 – 1969 
Source: See footnotes 
Note: Officials = government or central bank 
 
The important inference that can be drawn from these debates is that, while officials 
favoured the status quo of pegging to sterling at its current rate, Australia following the 
UK in exchange rate changes was not, at any time, a foregone conclusion. 
Interestingly, of these years, the only ones in which Australian officials were 
recommending following the UK in a mooted significant fixed rate move were 1949 and 
1966 (they were non-committal in 1951). Between April and July 1949, the policy view 
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changed from not following a sterling devaluation, to depreciating by 10 per cent only, 
to probably following the UK completely: electoral considerations weighed heavily in 
the Labour government’s decision to follow sterling. Between 1966 and 1967, the 
majority view changed from partially following a sterling devaluation, to not following it. 
In the 1950s, officials were prepared to follow the UK only in a limited, managed float, 
one which would not involve too much variation against the US dollar, and this 
theoretical acceptance of floating with sterling was for technical/practical reasons (see 
below) rather than because they liked the idea. At times of Australian weakness, an 
independent float or devaluation was also considered (but rejected).  
 
There is not space to cover all the details of these referenced debates, but the 
consistent reasons that emerge for these views are the macroeconomic policy 
objectives from Section 2. Australian officials valued a stable, competitive, fixed rate of 
exchange against major trading partners. Devaluation was opposed because of 
elasticity pessimism – the concern that it would not help export volumes or reduce 
imports sufficiently – and fear of inflationary effects and loss of confidence effects on 
capital inflow. Revaluation was opposed because of its deflationary effects, the risk of 
income loss for manufacturers and agricultural exporters, and because of fears that a 
higher exchange rate would deter capital inflow. The peg question was inextricably 
mixed up in the attraction of the pool to Australia, as Coombs noted,550 and was also 
affected by the lack of an FX market for the Australian currency (see below). In the 
decade or so after the war, there really was no alternative to staying with the sterling 
area, due to the UK’s exposed financial position, as Melville explained.551 Perhaps all 
that can be said is that, because devaluation and a competitive rate were more often 
part of the official discussion than revaluation, sterling, being intrinsically weaker than 
the dollar, was a more congenial pegging candidate.  
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Thus far we have discussed mainly the peg and the pool, but the feedback effects on 
reserve management from Australia’s sterling orientation went wider than these. 
Indeed one can isolate seven different effects, which are summarised in Table 2, and 
discussed in the paragraphs below. They derived both from rules, and from Australia’s 
institutional inheritance. Sometimes the effects were the direct consequence of a rule, 
as in the case of pooling, and sometimes they operated through the usual economic 
mechanisms of the transactions theory, such as the way in which sterling pegging led 
to a need for intervention reserves. In the latter case, we are talking about additional 
institutional factors that influenced those economic mechanisms, such as the effect of 
liberal London trade credit on Australia’s sterling trade with the NSA, the effect of the 
lack of an FX market in Australia on its ability to break with the sterling peg, or the 
effect of converting all borrowings to sterling on the traditional link between debt 
denomination and reserve holdings. In his political analysis of reserve currencies, 
Helleiner called such influences indirect, not to belittle them, but to distinguish them 
from more direct (in his case political, here institutional) mechanisms.552 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
552
 See Helleiner, ‘Political determinants’. The economic transactional forces (trade, debt and anchor 
currency) are those already referenced (Eichengreen and Mathieson, ‘Currency composition’) 
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Source: 
Institutional 
inheritance 
or rule? 
Name of 
effect 
Description and comment 
Both Sterling peg: 
anchor effect 
Under pegging rule, Australia should peg to sterling. The peg 
necessitates reserves for intervention, automatic due to 
mobilisation. But also the inherited lack of a foreign exchange 
market in Australia makes it hard to break from sterling peg 
Rule Pooling rule All balance-of-payments proceeds should be converted into 
sterling reserves. Due to rules about consultation, breaches of 
pooling rule easily observed by UK 
Rules (peg 
and pool) 
Minimum 
buffer 
Precautionary demand for minimum sterling buffer given 
balance-of-payments volatility 
Legal 
inheritance 
Note issue Demand for sterling assets in the note issue fund (US dollars 
were not eligible, and there were some practical constraints 
regarding holdings of gold and Australian domestic assets) 
UK rule Capital flight 
from UK 
Supply of sterling increases due to uncontrolled capital flight 
from UK at times of sterling crisis  
Both Currency of 
trade 
Sterling share of payments nearly three times greater than UK 
trade share in early 1960s. This is due to exchange control 
rules (making sterling dominant in intra-sterling area trade) 
and liberal supply of sterling trade credit from London (for 
trade with non-sterling area)  
Rule Pooling rule: 
debt 
Under pooling rule, all debt proceeds converted to sterling, 
and all debt payments and redemptions funded from sterling. 
Hence source of debt has less transactional influence on 
demand for reserves  
Table 2: Effects of sterling orientation on Australia’s reserve management, 1950 – 
1968 
Source: Author’s assessment (see argument)   
 
5.1 Sterling peg, and the lack of a foreign exchange market in Australia 
 
As we have discussed, the economic literature ascribes a leading role to anchor 
currency in determining reserve choice. Australian pegging to sterling had preceded 
the formal sterling area, in the 1930s, but there was no country during the 1950s-60s 
which pegged to sterling which was not a member of the sterling area. Pegging to 
sterling did not necessarily imply large sterling reserves: South Africa pegged its 
currency to sterling from January 1933553 to August 1971,554 but did not hold significant 
sterling reserves (see Annex 2). Pegging to sterling was a rule of the sterling area. 
This is an obvious point. But less obvious was the lack of an FX market in Australia, 
which made it hard for the Australian authorities to end the sterling peg. 
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As already mentioned, in Australia, international trading banks dealt in sterling as 
agents of the RBA at a fixed price and settled up by surrendering sterling to the RBA 
every month. Theoretically, the RBA’s close control over all FX transactions through its 
agent banks had advantages: it could protect monetary policy from speculative 
behaviour. But it was the central bank, not the trading banks, which tried to open up 
the system in the 1950s. Given trade volatility and widespread use of forward 
settlement, trading banks did not welcome the exchange risk of dealing on their own 
account. When in 1954 the CBA tried to introduce ‘at risk’ dealing margins around a 
sterling parity, as was practised in the UK, the trading banks prevented the move.555 
When the possibility of floating the Australian pound was debated in 1956 and 1961 
within the central bank, the difficulty of changing mobilisation and exchange control 
procedures and the transition for trading banks were raised as objections.556 As late as 
1969, the RBA’s International Committee was divided on how soon to break with 
sterling if sterling floated. ‘Some preferred to retain our link until an adequate foreign 
exchange market was established’.557 The preparatory work for such a change was a 
joint RBA-Bank of England study in 1969, aimed at the creation of an FX market in 
Australia.558 
 
5.2 The pooling rule 
 
As Section 4 showed, Australia was largely following the sterling area’s pooling rule 
throughout the period. This was acknowledged by officials, even in the mid-1960s.559 
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 Thus in 1965 the RBA’s head of investments could only look forward to the time when, ‘with changing 
international relationships’, the run-up and run-down of reserves might also be in dollars as well as in 
sterling (RBA:GHK-65-1, ‘Talking points: handling…’, 25/11/1965). As another example, RBA officials in 
1962 noted that Japan’s new dollar purchasing of wool was increasing the supply of dollars, creating an 
opportunity for diversification. But the proceeds were all being converted into sterling according to the 
pooling rule, and this policy did not change (RBA:BM-C-154, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Australia’s overseas 
reserves’, 18/1/1962; RBA:BM-C-172, CBAC Meeting, ‘Foreign exchange operations’, 19/7/1962) 
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Robertson and Singleton were thus mistaken, but not alone, when they referred to ‘the 
termination of dollar pooling in 1958’.560 The pool did not end in 1958. The technical 
changes accompanying sterling convertibility had little direct impact on sterling area 
countries.561 Of course, this rule could be breached through diversifying, and from 
1962, Australia did so to a limited degree. But breaking rules risked political conflict 
which might affect the capital flow that Australia valued so highly. As we have seen, 
Australian officials often consulted the UK on reserve management policies. The UK 
kept a close watch on Australian reserve movements.562 The RBA’s London office had 
an intimate relationship with the Bank of England’s Dealing and Accounts Office.563  
This was necessary, as the RBA had a privileged independent dealing status in the 
London market relative to other sterling area central banks,564 and it was expected to 
co-operate with the Bank e.g. by supporting UK Treasury bills and consulting in gold 
and FX dealings.565 
  
5.3 Minimum buffer 
 
Given the pooling rule and transactional use of sterling, it was the ‘London funds’ of the 
RBA’s Central Banking Business that bore the brunt of Australia’s balance-of-
payments movements. The need for minimum holdings of currencies required for 
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intervention (particularly from a currency peg, here arising from the combination of 
pegging and pooling) is well-known in central bank reserve management. But it is not 
something that has been acknowledged or analysed in the writings about Australia’s 
reserve management in this period, save for Schenk’s aforementioned citation of 
Menzies about a £200m minimum, or Perkins’ guess of a £100-200m minimum. For 
most of the period, officials regarded approximately £100m (= A$250m) as the 
minimum safe level for London funds. This emerges both from internal RBA papers 
about minimum reserves between 1952 and 1968, and through evidenced actions 
taken in episodes when this minimum was tested, in 1952, 1956 and 1961. It is 
noteworthy that, by November 1967, London funds had already decreased to less than 
the £100m level.566  
 
The findings from the relevant RBA papers are given in Table 3. The 1957 and 1968 
papers updated certain conclusions from the original September 1952 memorandum, 
which argued that the Central Banking Business needed to set a minimum level of 
reserves because of the risk of running out of money due to capital and trade flows 
outside the central bank’s control. The 1965 paper was used to justify an extension of 
the maturity of the A$300m of sterling holdings deemed ‘hard core’. It is clear from the 
papers that officials saw sterling as the transactional currency and wanted to hold gold 
and dollars for their own sake and for window-dressing rather than for use.567 
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 Since total sterling reserves were then less than £300m and the note issue accounted for two-thirds of 
this (RBA:BM-Pe-94, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of estimated profits…’, Attachments) 
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 For example, the 1965 paper argued that then non-sterling holdings should not be reduced at all 
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A$m ‘Minimum’ ‘Adequate’
568
 Actual Source  
 Stg Non-stg Total Total (end-June)  
1952 200
569
 60 260 1,000 700 CBA paper
570
 
1957 N/A N/A N/A 1,200
571
 1,021 CBA paper
572
 
1965 300 300 600 N/A 1,292 RBA paper
573
 
1968 N/A N/A 450 1,500 1,028 RBA paper
574
 
Table 3: Australian policymaker estimates for ‘minimum’ and ‘adequate’ reserves, 1952 
– 1968 (A$m) 
Source: For actual reserves, see Figure 3; for ‘minimum’ and ‘adequate’ estimates, see footnotes 
 
Secondly, there was practical evidence for a minimum of £100m London funds. In 
1952, 1956 and 1961, the London funds declined to £100m575 and would have fallen 
substantially further had it not been for mitigating action. In 1952 there was a transfer 
of sterling from the NID, followed later by an IMF drawing.576 The action in 1956 and 
1961 included further such transfers, gold and dollar sales for sterling, conversion of 
new loans to sterling and in 1961 a large drawing from the IMF (A$156m), all 
converted into sterling.577 Figure 16 shows the monthly level of London funds between 
1953 and 1962. 
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19/9/1952 
571
 In 1957, permanent removal of import controls would have required A$1,600m of reserves, according 
to the RBA paper 
572
 RBA:C.3.7.7.7.19, ‘The level of international reserves’, Economic Department, 9/2/1957 
573
 RBA:BM-Pe-56, Board Memorandum, ‘Investment of overseas funds’, Attachment, Investment 
Department, 21/1/1965 
574
 RBA:GDB-73-1, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Possible action to protect…’, International Committee, 9/2/1968 
575
 For 1952, RBA:IT-h-351, extract from Bryson-Rusden letter, 3/6/1952. The funds reached £100m in 
Feb/1952. A Feb/1952 document also talked of the need for ‘conservation of sterling funds’ in light of ‘the 
uncertainty of our London position’ (RBA:B.1.1.1.C.3.2, ‘Capital transfers’, Exchange Control, 22/2/1952). 
For 1956 and 1961, Figure 16 
576
 £30m (RBA:IT-h-351, extract from Bryson-Rusden letter, 3/6/1952). £55m of gilts were sold in Mar-
Apr/1952 in order to liquefy the sterling holdings (BOE:C40/174, ‘Commonwealth Bank – sales…’, 
2/5/1952). Australia also drew US$30m from the IMF in Aug/1952, but the drawing had been negotiated in 
March and approved in April (BOE:OV13/30, ‘Note of a telephone conversation…’, 17/4/1952; Washington 
to Franks, ‘Confidential – International Monetary Fund…’, 26/4/1952; TNA:T236/4648, ‘The use of 
Australia’s gold…’, Flett to Brittain and Rowan, 24/5/1952) 
577
 RBA:GJP-57-1, Bryson-Rusden letter,with attachment ‘Overseas Assets’, 9/2/1956; RBA:S-L-236, 
‘Monthly review’, Jan-Mar/1961; RBA:BM-Pe-1 to -23 and -26, Board Memoranda, ‘Investment of 
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Figure 16: Australian central bank total London funds recorded in monthly reports from 
London office, at end-month, December 1953 to October 1962 (£m) 
Source: RBA:C.3.20.1.19-1,C.3.20.1.19-2,C.3.20.1.20-1,C.3.20.1.20-2,S-L-232,S-L-233,S-L-236,S-L-
237,S-L-238,S-L-239, ‘Monthly Review’ 
 
The minimum figure of around £100m for London funds is also supported by 
consideration of its components. In March 1961, the London office’s money at call was 
around £25m, UK Treasury bills £57m, British government securities £15m and 
Australian government sterling securities less than £1m, giving a total of £98m.578 The 
guidance from Sydney was that money at call should not fall below £20m.579 There 
was a broad rule of thumb that UK Treasury bills should be around twice money at call 
when funds were tight, and the Bank of England had also suggested that a minimum 
figure of £40-60m should be kept in UK Treasury bills in the London funds.580 Finally 
British government securities were usually allowed to run to maturity and it was 
expensive to sell them.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
overseas funds’, Jan/1960-Jan/1962 and Apr/1962. As discussed in Section 4 and shown in Annex 3, the 
board papers reveal that, in the 1960-1 crisis, the RBA even began spending dollar capital reserves on 
current dollar purchases 
578
 RBA:S-L-236,‘Monthly Review’, Mar/1961 
579
 RBA:GJP-57-1, Phillips to Hawley, 8/2/1957 
580
 RBA:IT-h-351, Rusden to Bryson, 10/9/1953 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
3
1
/1
2
/5
3
3
0
/6
/5
4
3
1
/1
2
/5
4
3
0
/6
/5
5
3
1
/1
2
/5
5
3
0
/6
/5
6
3
1
/1
2
/5
6
3
0
/6
/5
7
3
1
/1
2
/5
7
3
0
/6
/5
8
3
1
/1
2
/5
8
3
0
/6
/5
9
3
1
/1
2
/5
9
3
0
/6
/6
0
3
1
/1
2
/6
0
3
0
/6
/6
1
3
1
/1
2
/6
1
3
0
/6
/6
2
£m 
176 
 
5.4 Note issue 
 
As explained earlier, the RBA’s reserves were divided between the Central Banking 
Business and the Note Issue Department (NID). From 1945, the NID had freedom to 
hold all its assets in Australian securities,581 but in practice the central bank’s policy 
was to hold a large proportion of the fund in external assets.582 In this respect, the fund 
had an inherited bias supporting the holding of sterling reserves relative to dollars, 
since, by law, US dollar assets were not authorised investments for the NID.583 The 
unequal treatment of sterling and dollars caused a major shift in March 1960 when a 
new asset composition policy, the aforementioned Uniform Proportionate Distribution 
(UPD), was adopted. The new policy was that the asset category proportions of the 
NID should match those of the Central Banking Business. Since so much of the 
Central Banking Business assets was invested in ‘overseas money markets’ (sterling 
and dollars), the NID was forced to hold an equal proportion of its assets in UK 
Treasury bills (the only overseas money market asset permitted to it), necessitating a 
large internal transfer of UK Treasury bills. The new policy increased sterling’s share of 
the NID from 32 per cent to 46 per cent.584 
 
The note issue’s share of sterling holdings increased over time.  Between June 1951 
and June 1967, the note issue increased from A$550m to A$930m.585 In December 
1955, the Central Banking Business held about two-thirds of the central bank’s sterling, 
                                               
581
 Schedvin, In reserve, p66. Before 1945, according to Schedvin, at least 25% of the note issue had to 
be held in the form of gold and sterling. When the note issue was originally legislated in 1910, there were 
strict requirements for gold holdings against the note issue, along the lines of the BOE’s own rules, as well 
as provision for sterling holdings. I am grateful to Selwyn Cornish for explaining to me the original 1910 
statutory background  
582
 See Annex 6 and also RBA:BM-Pe-3, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of assets…’, Mar/1960. The 
latter referred to a prior 1957 policy dividing asset increases in the note issue as to 20% in gold and 
balances abroad, 40% in Commonwealth Treasury bills and debentures, and 40% in other Commonwealth 
government securities. But this policy was disrupted by recent ‘consistent selling’ by the RBA of Australian 
government bonds, ‘in line with our open market policy and associated with our portfolio problems’ which 
had required withdrawing such bonds from the fund and replacing them with gold, UK Treasury bills and 
Australian Treasury bills. Hence the need for a new distribution policy in 1960    
583
 RBA:BM-Pe-3, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of assets…’, Mar/1960 
584
 RBA:BM-Pe-3, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of assets…’, Mar/1960 
585
 RBA:BM-Pe-6, Draft Annual Report, ‘Note Issue Department’, Jun/1960; RBA:BM-Pe-94, Draft Annual 
Report, ‘…Note issue’, Jul/1968 
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while the NID held about one-third. By November 1967, the NID held about two-thirds 
of the RBA’s sterling reserves and the Central Banking Business one-third.586 At the 
latter date, sterling still constituted around half of the assets in the NID.587 
 
As we have seen, there were occasional flows of sterling between the Central Banking 
Business and the NID, and it would be useful to clarify how this division of reserves 
between the two departments worked. Unfortunately, apart from occasional crisis 
transfers of sterling from the NID to support the London funds in 1952-60, which are 
described variously in this paper and which suggest management autonomy and 
freedom to transfer assets, and the March 1960 board memorandum accompanying 
the UPD policy (which is discussed here and in Annex 6), I did not, while in Australia, 
find documents which can enlighten us on these mechanisms. The balance sheets of 
the two funds were published annually, but the categories of assets – e.g. ‘gold and 
balances abroad’, ‘other overseas securities’ – do not permit analysis of the sterling 
holdings. Annex 6 shows the two balance sheets over time, divided into principal 
categories of assets, and provides circumstantial evidence that the UPD policy 
continued to be followed after 1960.  
 
It is important to clarify that the increasing concentration of sterling holdings in the NID 
arose because of the combination of the growth in the note issue and the UPD policy, 
together with the single relevant ‘institutional inheritance’ aspect, that US dollar 
investments were not eligible assets for the NID. Annex 6 explains how the 
combination of policies and circumstances might technically have constrained an RBA 
determined to minimise sterling exposures. However, the 1945 legislation was clearly 
                                               
586
 For Dec/1955, RBA:GJP-57-1, Bryson-Rusden letter, with attachment ‘Overseas Assets’, 9/2/1956; 
data extracted from tables in attachment and converted from A£ to A$. For Nov/1967, RBA:BM-Pe-94, 
Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of estimated profits…’, with attachments, 3/7/1968 
587
 This figure is estimated by comparing two-thirds of the RBA’s sterling reserves in that month (£187m 
out of £280m, the latter figure extracted from RBA:BM-Pe-94, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of 
estimated profits…’, with attachments, 3/7/1968) against the value of the note issue fund interpolated from 
the RBA’s Annual Reports (the Jun/1967 figure being A$930m = £372m)  
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aimed at removing note issue constraints.588 So we do not know enough to make 
strong claims in this respect.  
 
Perhaps the more interesting question is why the UPD was adopted. The March 1960 
board paper seemed to suggest that the UPD addressed the different profit 
distributions of the NID (all to government) and the Central Banking Business (partly to 
central bank reserves and partly to government).589 The dispute over the profits and 
losses arising from the 1961 IMF drawing, and their resolution through the UPD, also 
indicated the importance of the profit distribution question. On the one hand, the UPD 
was a simple mechanism acceptable to Treasury that seemed to resolve profit dispute 
between the RBA and Treasury. But on the other hand, because of the no-dollar rules 
of the note issue, the UPD was not in fact proportionate: it had the subtle effect of 
skewing sterling holdings into the NID. This diversion of sterling to the government’s 
account might have suited a central bank concerned about the risk of losses from 
sterling holdings.590      
    
In summary, there is not enough evidence about the NID and monetary policies to 
determine precisely how much the NID ‘needed’ to hold this high sterling share.591 In 
practice, though, it seems clear that Australia’s total sterling (the London funds plus the 
sterling in the NID) was not allowed to fall below £200m (= A$500m) without external 
mitigating action. The lows for Australia’s sterling holdings reached in September 1952 
and March 1961 were around £200m, and the low in 1956 only a little below this figure 
and rapidly rectified.592 These findings support and justify the citation, highlighted by 
Schenk, about £200m being a minimum sterling reserves figure for Australia in the 
                                               
588
 See Annex 6 
589
 RBA:BM-Pe-3, Board Memorandum , ‘Distribution of assets…’, Mar/1960 
590
 RBA:BM-Pe-94, Board Memorandum, ‘Distribution of estimated profits…’, with attachments, 3/7/1968 
591
 Although the separate NID was only abolished in 1989 with the deletion of Section 33 of the Reserve 
Bank Act, this was something that the RBA had pressed the Treasury for several times in 1967, and, 
according to people at the RBA, it seems that for some years prior to the 1989 abolition, all the RBA’s 
external assets were considered holistically. I am grateful to Selwyn Cornish for this information 
592
 See Table 5 
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1950s. By September 1968, sterling holdings were again down to £237m,593 
suggesting pressure against minimum requirements given the growth in the note issue. 
But by then the MSP agreements were ushering in a new contract with the UK. 
 
5.5 Capital flight from UK 
 
The combined minimum buffer and note issue effects increased Australia’s demand for 
sterling. Free capital movement from the UK to Australia,594 at times of sterling crisis, 
increased the supply of sterling to the RBA. The flows are hard to quantify but the 
increased amount of private capital flow from the UK in the year to June 1968 
(A$393m)595 suggests their importance.   
 
Capital flight from the UK at times of crisis had long been a feature of the UK-Australia 
relationship e.g. between 1947 and 1951, when Australia’s reserves increased from 
A$400m to A$1,600m.596 In April-May 1966, speculation about the pending imposition 
of UK capital controls led to a surge of anticipatory UK investment into Australia.597 The 
UK’s subsequent 1966 ‘Voluntary Programme’ limited FDI flows,598 but in late 1967 
and early 1968, there was a wave of portfolio investment from the UK to Australia, with 
the RBA’s research department expressing concern about the scale of the January 
1968 figure.599 
 
 
 
                                               
593
 From £280m at the time of devaluation (RBA:BM-Pe-50 to -90, Board Memorandum, ‘Overseas 
Funds’) 
594
 Freedom of capital movement from the UK was the essence of the sterling area contract, reflecting the 
UK’s Exchange Control Act 1947 and its exemption for ‘scheduled territories’ (sterling area members) 
595
 See Figure 15 
596
 Pre-1950 reserve figures are taken from NAA:A571,1944/1660PART8,5116536, ‘Sterling balances’, 
‘Appendix D’, 28/6/1950. 1950-68 reserve figures are in Figure 3. For the speculative capital inflow of this 
period, see Copland and Barback, The conflict, pp360-91 
597
 NAA:A1838,792/1/6,247231, cutting from Australian Financial Review, ‘Surge of UK capital yet to make 
full impact’, 5/5/1966  
598
 See Figure 15 
599
 RBA:GDB-73-1, ‘…Capital inflow’, Research Department, 29/2/1968 
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5.6 Currency of trade 
 
Sterling area membership had a big impact on Australia’s immersion in sterling trade. 
Singleton and Schenk noted the low UK share of Australia’s trade (c. 25 per cent in the 
early 1960s). Sterling’s share of payments was nearly three times higher, according to 
new evidence from this study. The RBA files reveal that sterling’s share of Australian 
payments declined from 85 per cent in 1953-4 to 70 per cent in 1963-4.600  
 
Why was sterling’s share of Australian payments so high relative to the UK’s share of 
Australian trade? There were two reasons, one hard and one soft. The hard element 
was the exchange control rule applying to all intra-sterling area trade: all such trade 
had to be settled in sterling area currencies, among which sterling was usually the 
obvious choice.601 The soft factor was the liberal availability of sterling credit from 
London to support Australia’s trade with countries outside the sterling area.602 Although 
Japan bought wool from Australia with dollars after 1960,603 sterling credit supported 
many of Australia’s export markets throughout the 1960s.604 
 
Australia’s immersion in sterling transactions – a transactional effect – therefore arose 
not just in the obvious sense from reserve pooling, but from the wider workings of the 
sterling area. This can be seen by considering the trade settlement of private agents in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Table 4 shows the trade settlement currency choices available 
                                               
600
 RBA:BM-Pe-56, Board Memorandum attachment, ‘Investment of overseas funds’, Investment 
Department, 21/1/1965. For comparison, Schenk estimated that the sterling share of New Zealand’s trade 
was around two-thirds in 1968 (Schenk, The decline, pp208-9). Increasing use of Australian dollars in 
trade (idem, p209) might have further reduced the sterling share for Australia by 1968. For sterling’s share 
generally, see idem, pp207-12 
601
 TNA:T295/792, Hay to Thorpe, with draft, ‘The use of sterling…’, 7/5/1970. The citation adds that all 
sterling area trade with the UK was required to be in sterling. The rules were taken seriously by Australia 
(RBA:B.1.1.1.M.187, ‘Hong Kong, Settlements…’, Exchange Control, 29/6/1967)     
602
 Schenk, The decline, pp212-24 
603
 RBA:BM-C-154, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Australia’s overseas reserves’, 18/1/1962; RBA:BM-C-172, 
CBAC Memorandum, ‘Foreign exchange operations’, 19/7/1962 
604
 e.g. in 1966, the Australian Wheat Board expressed concern about its sales exposure to sterling. This 
exposure then amounted to around A$140m, and in particular sales to China, India and [South] Korea (of 
these countries, India was the only sterling area member) were on longer than normal credit terms 
(RBA:BM-C-334, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Forward exchange, Commodity Marketing Boards’, Banking 
Department, 13/9/1966) 
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to one agent in a possible location (column) with a second agent in a possible location 
(row). It is assumed that the two agents are in different countries.   
 
Permitted currency of 
trade settlement 
Agent 2 location: 
Agent 1 location: UK  RSA NSA 
UK  X Sterling only Indeterminate. Sterling 
finance available from 
London 
RSA Sterling only Sterling area currency 
only (likely to be 
sterling) 
Indeterminate. Sterling 
finance available from 
London 
NSA Indeterminate. 
Sterling finance 
available from 
London 
Indeterminate. Sterling 
finance available from 
London 
Indeterminate. Sterling 
finance available from 
London except in 
period 1957-63 and 
after Oct 1968
605
 
Table 4: Trade settlement currencies available to agents in two locations, 1945 – 1972 
Source: See evidence and argument in this Section 
Note: RSA = Rest of the sterling area ; NSA = Non-sterling area  
 
Table 4 shows that trading within the sterling area was constrained by the exchange 
control rules of each member, ensuring that sterling formed 90-100 per cent of the 
trade settlement within the area.606 Moreover, trade with the NSA was affected by the 
availability of sterling trade finance from London. That this sterling finance was readily 
available (except temporarily in intra-NSA trade as indicated in the bottom right hand 
box) is evidenced by Bank of England figures suggesting that sterling still accounted 
for 70 per cent of trade between sterling area and NSA countries in 1964, declining to 
around 60 per cent by 1967.607 The UK’s willingness to allow sterling trade finance on 
such a scale in a period of exchange controls, despite frequent sterling crises, was 
ultimately a political decision.608 Schenk argued that sterling trade finance was 
contested ground between the UK government and central bank during the 1950s and 
1960s. However, the zone of conflict only related to the issue of sterling finance for 
                                               
605
 Schenk, The decline, pp216-8 
606
 Schenk, The decline, p209 
607
 Cited in Schenk, The decline, p209 
608
 This has precedents. Eichengreen and Flandreau showed that political support, both by the Federal 
Reserve and the BOE, played a major part in the development of the dollar and sterling markets for 
bankers’ acceptances in the inter-war period (Eichengreen and Flandreau, ‘The Federal Reserve’) 
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third party trade between NSA countries (the bottom right hand box). There was no 
attempt to control trade finance between sterling area and NSA countries until 1970.609   
 
5.7 Pooling rule: debt 
 
In line with the pooling rule, it was Australia’s normal practice to convert the proceeds 
of all foreign currency loans to sterling, and to use its sterling to buy the currencies 
required for loan service and redemption.610 Although foreign currency debt other than 
sterling left Australia exposed to loss in the event of a sterling devaluation, this was a 
confidence rationale for diversification, not a transactions argument. Pooling practice 
logically should have weakened the debt denomination influence on reserve currency 
choice. 
 
Singleton and Schenk argued that foreign currency debt proceeds automatically 
diversified Australia’s reserves, but the evidence does not support this claim. The 
board reserves series show that borrowings in Deutschemarks and Swiss francs and 
other currencies in the 1950s-60s did not lead to accumulation of those currencies, 
because they were converted into sterling. True, the government and central bank 
made a policy choice in May 1962 to begin retaining, temporarily, the proceeds of New 
York loans in dollars, but as we saw in Section 4, the net effect on reserves was small. 
The RBA reviewed the cumulative effect of all its diversification measures between 
June 1964 and June 1967. The cumulative addition to non-sterling reserves from all 
‘retention of loan proceeds’ was a mere A$6m.611  
 
These seven effects of sterling area membership on Australia’s reserve management 
were of varying importance, and they are obviously hard to quantify. Together, they 
                                               
609
 Schenk, The decline, p223 
610
 There were some exceptions (TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p60-1)  
611
 Data extracted from RBA:BM-Pe-87, Board Memorandum, ‘Overseas funds’, ‘Appendix… international 
reserves’, Nov/1967 
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were substantial. Arguably the most important effects were the combination of the 
pooling rule, intermixed with sterling pegging, and the need for minimum sterling 
holdings (of at least £200m), because, in tandem, they directly affected Australia’s 
ability to diversify, as the next Section shows. Australia’s immersion in sterling 
transactions was also greater than the literature has appreciated. 
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Section 6: Explaining Australia’s diversification policy over the 1950s-60s 
   
The last Section developed Schenk’s early institutional themes and observations about 
minimum sterling reserves in the 1950s into a full review of the effects of sterling area 
membership on Australian reserve management. This Section uses those insights and 
archival evidence, firstly, to explain the when, why and how of Australia’s 
diversification policy over the 1950-68 years.  Secondly, it integrates this explanation 
with the recent arguments of Singleton and Schenk. 
 
Australia’s diversification can be divided into three time periods. For the first period to 
1962, apart from the retention of new gold production, it seems that Australia followed 
the pooling rules of the sterling area faithfully. This was acknowledged by an Australian 
Treasury officer in February 1962, when proposing a change in the policy. He stated 
that Australia had not, ‘as far as we are aware, ever made a deliberate purchase of 
non-sterling currencies with sterling to put them in the United States or elsewhere’.612 
 
As Figure 6 showed, Australia went further than this, and purchased significant 
additional amounts of sterling, spending gold and dollar reserves between 1952 and 
1961. However, the sterling was not bought out of loyalty or to meet the requirements 
of the UK or the sterling area, and the dollars and gold spent were certainly not ‘gifts’, 
as Robertson called these transfers, or ‘protective’ towards the UK, as the 1956 gold 
sale motivation was described by Kirshner.613 These were purchases arising from 
Australia’s orientation towards sterling, the volatility of its balance of payments, the 
pegging and pooling rules and its need for minimum sterling holdings. This is readily 
verified by examining each of these gold and dollar sales, see Table 5. 
 
                                               
612
 NAA:A571,1961/1966PART2, ‘Distribution of international reserves’ and ‘Attachment: past policy…’, 
appended to Daniel-O’Donnell note, ‘Financial implications…’, 28/2/1962 
613
 Robertson, ‘The decline?’, p113; Kirshner, Currency and coercion, pp67,109 
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Month Sale A$m Commentary 
Sep 1952 US$ 18 1952 crisis, lowest month for sterling reserves (below £200m)
614
 
Apr 1956 US$ 14 1956 crisis, London funds around £100m
615
  
Sep 1956 Gold 50 1956 crisis, lowest year for sterling reserves (below £200m)
616
 
Feb 1959 Gold 6 Anticipating sterling run-down in 1959
617
  
Nov 1960 Gold 10 1960-1 crisis, London funds below £100m
618
 
Table 5: Australian sales of gold and US dollars for sterling, 1952 – 1968 (A$m) 
Source: See footnotes to Table 
Note: All sales were made through the Bank of England 
 
Table 5 shows that all the sales of gold and US dollars were associated either with 
sterling holdings at their lows or anticipated to be run down, and the archival evidence 
noted indicates that restoration of sterling holdings was the deliberate aim in each 
case. Sometimes the sales were dressed up to look like loyalty. In the September 1956 
gold sale, referenced in the literature about the Suez crisis,619 Australian officials 
skilfully used their personal contacts with UK counterparts to plant the idea that the 
British Chancellor should ask Australia for gold as an act of support.620 But close 
                                               
614
 For this episode, see NAA:AA1967/392/1BOX6, Board Memorandum, ‘Dollars… premium gold sales’, 
Secretary’s Department, 22/9/1952; BOE:OV13/15, ‘Australia’, 3/11/1952; BOE:OV13/31, ‘Australia’, Hall, 
15/9/1955; TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p61; TNA:T236/4648, ‘Message from…Fadden’, 22/9/1952; 
‘…Fadden’s message’, Flett to Brittain, 24/9/1952; Flett to Snelling, 27/9/1952 
615
 For this episode, see RBA:GJP-57-1, Rusden to Phillips, 18/5/1956; RBA:C.3.20.1.20-1, ‘Monthly 
review…’, ‘Central bank: movement of funds’, 9/5/1956; BOE:OV13/18, ‘Gold – Australian borrowing…’, 
Haslam to Jenkins, 1/8/1956 (Symons gave a similar description, TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p61); 
RBA:BM-Pe-87, Board Memorandum, ‘Overseas funds…Suggested points…’, Investment Department, 
6/11/1967. As confirmation of these numbers, note that the sum of the Sep/1952 and Apr/1956 dollar 
sales, US$35m, equates to a figure of A£16m mentioned as having been sold out of US investments in 
the 1950s according to a 1962 Australian Treasury document, NAA:A571,1961/1966PART2, ‘Distribution 
of international reserves’ and ‘Attachment: past policy…’, appended to Daniel-O’Donnell note, ‘Financial 
implications…’, 28/2/1962 
616
 The purchase, just over £20m of gold from Perth No.1 Account, on 20/9/1956, is recorded in the BOE’s 
gold ledgers (BOE:2A141/10). For Australian thinking behind the gold sale, see RBA:GJP-57-1, Bryson-
Rusden letter, with attachment ‘Overseas Assets’, 9/2/1956; RBA:GJP-57-1, Rusden to Phillips, 
18/5/1956. See Figure 3 for sterling reserves at end-Jun/1956 (A$435m = £174m). See Annex 7 
617
 An A$200m run-down of sterling in 1959 was anticipated. See RBA:GJP-74-1, Phillips-Eyers 
correspondence, 9/12/1958-25/3/1959. There is a purchase of just under £2.5m of gold from Perth No.1 
account on 2/2/1959 in the BOE’s gold ledgers (BOE:2A141/10) 
618
 See Section 4 and Annex 3. For the background and other measures to support sterling, see Cornish, 
The evolution, pp54-5; Figure 16 and its sources, especially RBA:S-L-236, ‘Monthly review’, Jan-
Mar/1961; RBA:BM-Pe-1 to -23 and -26, Board Memoranda, ‘Investment of overseas funds’, Jan/1960-
Jan/1962 and Apr/1962 
619
 Boughton, ‘Northwest of Suez’, p437; Klug and Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, p193; Kunz, The economic 
diplomacy, pp100-1, 146; Kirshner, Currency and coercion, pp67,109 
620
 RBA:GJP-57-1, Rusden to Phillips, 18/5/1956; TNA:T236/4649, ‘The third quarter dollar drain’, Butt to 
France,12/6/1956; Jenkins to France, 14/6/1956. It looks like the UK official, Butt, who on 12/6/1956 had 
the bright idea of asking Australia for gold, may have received the idea from Woodrow, the Australian 
Treasury’s officer in London – they were old personal friends and Woodrow had confided in Butt before 
(TNA:T236/4649, ‘Australian gold and dollars’, Butt to Armstrong and Rickett, 2/12/1955). For a detailed 
timeline of this fascinating episode, see Annex 7 
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analysis of the RBA’s files reveals that the sale was being internally debated in early 
1956, long before the Suez crisis and sterling’s problems of that year.621 
 
The second phase, from January 1962 to July 1965, was characterised by debate 
about reserves (both within the RBA and Treasury), and limited opportunistic 
diversification. The impetus for change came from Australian misgivings about the 
UK’s EEC application and a dispute with the British over guarantees provided to its 
partners in the European Monetary Agreement (EMA).622 The Q4 1964 sterling crisis 
then prompted serious concern about sterling among Australian officials,623 leading to 
the request in July 1965 to the Bank of England to provide a dollar guarantee for part 
(A$400-500m) of Australia’s sterling holdings.624  
 
The third phase, from July 1965 to September 1968, followed the British rejection of 
Australia’s request for a dollar guarantee. Now the RBA planned diversification in 
earnest.625 The first item on the RBA’s list of de-risking measures was the anticipated 
run-down of sterling through the balance of payments. The second was to build up 
Australia’s IMF gold tranche.626 The full programme of diversification is summarised in 
Table 6, including the contribution of different measures in 1964-7. Table 6 shows that 
the reduction in sterling holdings through the balance of payments significantly 
                                               
621
 RBA:GJP-57-1, Bryson-Rusden letter, with attachment ‘Overseas Assets’, 9/2/1956 
622
 NAA:A571,1961/1966PART2, ‘Distribution of international reserves’ and ‘Attachment: past policy…’, 
appended to Daniel-O’Donnell note, ‘Financial implications…’, 28/2/1962; RBA:BM-C-181, CBAC 
Memorandum, ‘Protection of reserves…’, 25/9/1962. Symons of the UK Treasury highlighted the dispute 
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1/4/1955) 
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exceeded the acts of diversification.627 Apart from gold production and IMF credits, the 
diversification measures were limited in their aggregate effect (at most A$46m). 
 
Diversification measure, increasing aggregate non-
sterling holdings 
When 
considered 
or adopted 
Cumulative impact, 
Jun 64–Jun 67 
A$m
628
 
IMF gold tranche: others’ drawings of A$ at IMF Aug 1962
629
 67 
IMF gold tranche: sterling funding of IMF quota Aug 1965
630
 7 
Retention of loan proceeds May 1962
631
 6* 
Earnings on US investments May 1965
632
 14 
Transfers from FX deals Aug 1965
633
 24 
Retention of forward dollar contracts from trading banks Aug 1965
634
 0* 
Gold production: retained as gold Mar 1951
635
 16
636
 
Gold production: retained as dollar proceeds Dec 1951
637
 69 
Other including rounding  2 
Total of above measures  205 
For comparison, reduction of sterling holdings  590
638
 
Table 6: Cumulative impact of principal measures to diversify from sterling, 30 June 
1964 – 30 June 1967 (A$m) 
Source: Author’s calculations from RBA data (see footnotes to Table) 
*Note: While these items had a small net cumulative impact over 1964-7, the intervening temporary 
amounts raised were larger. The retention of forward dollar contracts reached a peak of A$13m cover in 
Nov/1965 and was later discontinued.
639
 The temporary amounts raised through loan proceeds, pending 
investment, reflected the size of the loans  
 
The above findings do not, of course, negate the role of powerful underlying forces 
such as changing trade and debt relations in the background thinking of Australian 
officials about diversification. The point is that these forces only mattered if they 
resulted in acts of diversification. Apart from newly-mined gold retention, such acts 
were infrequent, irregular and discrete, not continuous. They were either limited 
                                               
627
 The balance-of-payments effect is shown by the difference between the total reduction in sterling 
holdings and the total diversification measures. While the Australian Treasury was aware of most of the 
diversification measures listed, there is no evidence that it was informed about the FX contracts 
628
 Data extracted and calculated from RBA:BM-Pe-87, Board Memorandum, ‘Overseas funds’, 
‘Appendix… international reserves’, Nov/1967 
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 RBA:BM-C-174, CBAC Memorandum, ‘International Monetary Fund…’, 2/8/1962 
630
 RBA:IT-a-642-1,‘Maintaining the value…’, 11/8/1965; ‘Purchases of forward dollars’, Phillips, 20/8/1965 
631
 RBA:BM-C-177, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Central bank investments in USA’, Investment Department, 
29/8/1962; RBA:GHK-65-1, Knight to Hinde, 22/9/1965 
632
 RBA:BM-Pe-60, Board Memorandum, ‘Overseas funds’, ‘US funds’, Investment Department, 19/5/1965 
633
 RBA:IT-a-642-1, ‘Maintaining the value…’, 11/8/1965 
634
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 TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p60 
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A$9m) plus gold subscribed for IMF quota (A$7m) 
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 TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, p61 
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 Calculated from Figure 3 
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variations to the pooling rule, discussed with the UK (such as retaining earnings on US 
investments), outside the pooling rule (such as building up the IMF gold tranche, which 
was covered by IMF rules) or unobtrusive, hidden measures (such as transfers from 
FX deals).  Officials were not continually targeting a particular sterling share of 
reserves, which in fact was being driven by the balance of payments. Rather, RBA 
officials had a normal modus operandi which was to follow the pooling rule, while 
retaining the value of gold production, and any divergence from this established path 
was a form of ‘diversification’. The catalysts for such divergences, in both directions, 
included: sterling reserves falling below a minimum level at times of balance-of-
payments crisis in 1952-61, concern about the UK’s 1961 EEC application and the 
EMA guarantee dispute, and fluctuating worries about the risks of sterling in the 1964-
8 years. 
         
Having established when, why and how diversification was put into effect, we can 
integrate these findings with Singleton and Schenk’s account of the constraints on 
diversification. Their first constraint was ‘continued access to the London capital 
market for government borrowing’. This was particularly important for the Treasury, 
which, as the authors described, reined back the RBA’s diversification demands in the 
mid-late 1960s. Access to the London debt market was one of the important benefits of 
sterling area membership, which in turn was the reason why officials followed sterling 
area pooling rules, so this part of Singleton and Schenk’s argument is entirely 
consistent with the findings of this paper. This paper would only seek to bring into the 
equation the other benefits of sterling area membership, such as investment of British 
private capital. 
  
The second constraint on diversification in Singleton and Schenk’s paper was ‘the 
drawbacks of alternative assets’, a consideration for the RBA as the risk manager. At 
this time, there were few currency alternatives to the dollar and sterling. However, IMF 
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credits were an important and available alternative to sterling, and so were US dollars. 
The argument that officials had a balanced view about sterling relative to the dollar 
seems more valid for after devaluation than it does for 1962-7. Moreover, the archival 
record shows a consistent desire on the part of the RBA to get out of sterling. In 1962, 
the preference of acquiring more gold was not feasible,640 and the RBA’s first proposal 
was to increase dollars at the expense of sterling. 641 In August 1962, the risk of 
sterling devaluation was highlighted, the aim ‘re-deploying reserves to reduce loss’.642 
In July 1965, the RBA’s preferred ratio of sterling, gold and dollars was stated to be (in 
A£m) 250:150:250, compared with the actual disposition 500:100:50. Significantly, this 
was generally agreed by the Treasury Secretary and even discussed with the Bank of 
England.643 (Note that the preferred figure for sterling – £200m – was the same as the 
minimum reserve holding discussed in Section 5).644 Between 1965 and devaluation in 
1967, various papers revealed the RBA’s views on sterling (see Table 7). Even in July 
1968, the Research Department’s view was negative towards sterling and it regarded a 
2 per cent interest premium as insufficient compensation for the risks: 
 
‘sterling is not very attractive as a reserve asset… There is a case for holding 
some sterling, but not too much. That case rests largely on desires for access 
to capital markets and on political associations… Moreover, in view of its 
basic position, assurances by the U.K. about access to capital may prove 
unreliable’645 
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 RBA:BM-C-148, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Bank’s gold holding’, Investment Department, 12/12/1961. This 
paper acknowledged risks for the dollar, and preferred gold, but recognised that additions to gold reserves 
would need to come from Australian mines, due to UK and USA resistance to gold purchases 
641
 RBA:BM-C-154, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Australia’s overseas reserves’, 18/1/1962 
642
 RBA:BM-C-181, CBAC Memorandum, ‘Protection of reserves…’, 25/9/1962 
643
 RBA:GJP-74-1, Phillips to Longmuir, 6/7/1965 
644
 The roughly equal split of reserves was justified to the Treasurer using estimates of trade and capital 
commitments (RBA:IT-a-642-1, ‘Aide Memoire…Protection against sterling devaluation’, 7/7/1965) 
645
 RBA:BM-Pe-95, Board Memorandum, ‘Australia’s international reserves’, Research Department, 
26/7/1968 
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In short, the RBA’s risk assessment on sterling was negative, and the constraint on 
diversification lay elsewhere. 
 
Date RBA location Comment 
Aug 65 Investment 
Department 
memo 
Assuming sterling is devalued in mid-September, we have five 
weeks to achieve a A$324m desired switch from sterling into US 
dollars.
646
 
Oct 65 Board. Aide 
memoire for 
Governor 
‘the immediate prospect for sterling has improved and we are 
proposing to reduce the extent of our “hedging”’.
647
 
Jul 66 Investment 
Department 
memo 
Attraction of gold. Diversify from sterling: ‘the pattern of action be 
strengthened where possible without bringing the disposition of our 
reserves into open discussion in overseas forums’. Deficits should 
fall on sterling funds, whereas any surpluses should be reflected in 
increased US funds. Encourage ‘further use of Australian currency 
in IMF drawings and where possible have drawings utilised 
through sterling’. Consider placing ‘an upper limit on our holdings 
of sterling, say, the level of outstanding official debt in that 
currency’.
648
 
Sep 66 Advisory 
Committee 
(CBAC) 
Governor will write to the Treasurer requesting equal split of 
sterling, gold and dollars (implies A$450m switch out of sterling 
and another approach to the UK).
649
 
Sep 67 International 
Committee 
memo 
‘press on with rearrangement of our reserves as far and as fast as 
we are reasonably able to do’ ‘we have made it clear to the UK 
authorities that we cannot give any guarantees as to the future 
movement of our sterling balances’ ‘the crunch could come in a 
major deterioration in our reserves’.
650
 
Nov 67 Advisory 
Committee 
(CBAC) 
The forward hedging programme could be re-instituted, non-
sterling currencies retained from government borrowings, and 
recent press comment about Australia’s diversification might 
provide cover for more actual diversification.
651
 
Table 7: Selected Australian central bank papers about diversifying from sterling, 
August 1965 – November 1967 
Source: RBA (see footnotes to Table)  
 
The third proposed constraint on diversification was ‘collective interest in avoiding a 
collapse in the pound’. There can be no doubt that this was an Australian concern, as 
Singleton and Schenk pointed out, using evidence from 1967. The phrase is, however, 
a catch-all, and would include the perceived responsibilities of sterling area 
membership. It is hard to distinguish ‘collective interest’ from the sterling area 
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647
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sentiment, expressed by the RBA’s London manager in response to the August 1965 
diversification plan, ‘we have some responsibilities in that broad organisation’.652  
 
On the other hand, it is doubtful that Australia was majorly constrained by a ‘sterling 
trap’. The essence of a currency trap is that diversification is deterred by the 
consequences for the reserve currency. The RBA’s documents suggest that the central 
bank was concerned more about the visibility of diversification than its consequences 
for sterling. The aim was, as the RBA’s Governor told the Treasurer and Treasury 
Secretary, ‘reducing our sterling risk without attracting attention’.653   
 
The main evidence for the lack of a sterling trap is the scale of Australia’s absolute 
spending of sterling in the 1964-7 years, largely through the balance of payments.654 
The reduction in sterling holdings was greater than that of any other country, and it 
was large in relation to the UK’s free reserves.655 The comparative decline in sterling 
holdings is shown in Figures 17 and 18. Unlike switching sterling holdings into dollars, 
spending sterling through the balance of payments was not a breach of the British 
pooling rule. But if, instead of the pooling rule, we examine the psychology of the 
‘sterling trap’, it does not seem plausible that sophisticated officials who had 
experienced previous sterling crises – in which the spending of sterling through the 
balance of payments had been controversial (e.g. 1951-2) – should on the one hand 
consider switching comparatively small amounts out of sterling too risky for sterling’s 
stability, but on the other hand regard spending sterling in the hundreds of millions as 
something that had no potential consequences or secondary effects. Yet the RBA was 
indeed relaxed about the spending of sterling at this time: ‘A further heavy reduction in 
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 RBA:IT-a-642-1, Phillips to Longmuir, 25/8/1965; Longmuir to Phillips, 2/9/1965  
653
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654
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reserves seems inevitable’, read one of the November/December 1965 board papers, 
but due to the level of reserves ‘…Australia can clearly afford to face a further run 
down of funds with comparative equanimity’.656 It was only natural and right that 
Australian officials should focus on the Australian reserves position. But, from the 
perspective of the ‘sterling trap’ argument, the total reduction in sterling holdings from 
1964-7, given also the flight capital to Australia from the UK at the time, can, 
reasonably, only have contributed to devaluation. This again suggests that officials’ 
thinking primarily reflected the modus operandi – the sterling area’s pooling rule, rather 
than a ‘sterling trap’. 
     
 
Figure 17: Decline in sterling reserves, the ten countries which showed the largest 
declines, 30 September 1964 to 31 October 1967 (£m) 
Source: Data extracted from monthly reports of the Bank of England’s Committee for Overseas Figures. 
These reports are found in BOE:EID10/1-10 and EID1A129/2-4 
Note: Members of the sterling area are shown in black, and other countries with a pattern fill 
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Figure 18: Australia’s sterling reserves and half UK’s ‘free reserves’, at various dates 
from June 1964 – November 1967 (£m) 
Source: For UK free reserves, Capie, Bank of England, pp230-1, Table 5.1, column (7) (these figures 
have been converted to sterling at £1=US$2.8, and divided by two, to show on the same scale as 
Australia’s sterling reserves). For Australian sterling reserves, RBA:BM-Pe-50 to -90, Board Memoranda, 
‘Overseas Funds’ 
  
The dynamics of the reduction in sterling holdings were also inconsistent with a sterling 
trap, as Figure 18 shows. The direction of the UK’s free reserves indicates pressure on 
sterling. At times of greater pressure (e.g. October 1964-April 1965, June-August 
1965, June–August 1966), Australia’s holdings were decreasing rapidly. When 
pressure was less (e.g. September 1965-January 1966), Australia’s holdings were 
stable. There were two occasions when the expected ‘currency trap’ pattern occurred, 
with Australia’s holdings rising (April-May 1966 and September-November 1967). But 
this was probably the flight capital from the UK in these months. Table 7 also shows 
that, at times of greatest pressure (e.g. August 1965 and July 1966), the RBA was 
calling for more diversification, and when market speculation about devaluation 
reduced (e.g. October 1965), hedging measures stopped. 
 
In summary, apart from the 1951 gold retention policy, Australia only began actively 
diversifying from 1962, for reasons that were both political (the UK’s EEC application, 
EMA guarantees) and economic (changing trade and debt relationships, fear of sterling 
devaluation when the UK joined the EEC). In 1962-7, the RBA was constrained from 
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diversifying by the government. But there is nothing to suggest that confidence in 
sterling or the consequences of spending sterling underlay that restriction. The 
constraint derived primarily from Australia’s sterling orientation and membership of the 
sterling area, which was valuable to Australia. The RBA’s preferred holding of sterling 
was around the minimum operational amount consistent with its sterling orientation 
through pooling and pegging. In 1952-60 such minimum requirements had at times 
made Australia a forced buyer of sterling. By 1967-8, Australia’s sterling holdings were 
again close to minimum levels for transactional purposes.    
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Section 7: Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to solve a long-standing puzzle – the persistence of sterling in 
Australia’s reserves in the 1950s and 1960s, despite changing trade and debt 
relationships and an apparent diversification policy dating from the early 1950s. 
Contrary to such appearances, I argue that Australia largely followed the pooling rule 
of the sterling area, which did not allow diversification (the substitution of other assets 
for sterling in a country’s reserves). True, in 1951 Australia began to retain newly-
mined gold (sometimes converted into dollars through GPA gold sales) rather than sell 
it to the UK, but this was just a return to pre-1947 policy, and was accepted grudgingly 
by the British. Apart from this, in 1950-61 Australia followed the pooling rule faithfully, 
and was even forced by adverse circumstances to sell its valued store of dollars and 
gold for sterling on several occasions. Given its direct dollar deficit, the pooling 
arrangements suited Australia. Australia broadly followed the pooling rule even in 
1962-8, when it also started to build up its IMF gold tranche and introduced smaller, 
sometimes hidden, policy adjustments as part of a deliberate diversification strategy. In 
aggregate, Australia’s net addition to non-sterling reserves (i.e. diversification) was 
little more than its total gold production over the 1951-68 years. 
 
Why then did the literature suggest that Australia was deliberately diversifying from the 
early 1950s? It is easy to infer this policy from the combination of three factors: firstly, 
clear indications that Australian policymakers had early concerns about sterling 
holdings relative to dollars and gold, and were generally pivoting policies away from 
the UK, as shown by Lee;657 secondly, the gold retention policy, which was a genuine 
risk-driven reaction to these worries (and not in fact motivated by the cited 
transactional considerations); and thirdly and above all, the decline in sterling’s 
percentage share of Australian reserves during the 1950s. But this last was simply an 
                                               
657
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automatic by-product of balance-of-payments movements, the effect of declining 
aggregate reserves against a gradually rising non-sterling holding. ‘Diversification’ 
measured in terms of sterling’s share of reserves is a misleading term when it is used 
to imply deliberate policy. It could of course be argued that permitting aggregate (and 
hence sterling) reserves to decline was itself an act of deliberate diversification. Such 
an interpretation is questionable. Most of the time, the Australian central bank thought 
its aggregate reserves inadequate. It bought more sterling when reserves became low. 
The decline in reserves in the 1950s was the result of a government development 
agenda, monetary conditions and volatile commodity markets.    
 
That Australia followed the pooling rule so closely, even in the 1960s, is an important 
new finding, particularly given that some authors thought the pooling arrangements 
ended in 1958, with sterling convertibility. This restraint shown by Australia in 
diversifying was, primarily, motivated by the value Australia attached to sterling area 
membership – the macroeconomic advantages of the sterling peg and pooling 
arrangements and capital inflow, which provided a stable base for trade and permitted 
deficit development spending, particularly on imports of capital goods from the United 
States, and at the same time helped to keep a lid on inflation.  
 
In the mid-late 1960s, the government, prioritising access to capital, played a role in 
restraint by holding back the central bank from risk-driven diversification. This 
diversification pressure from the central bank was caused by fear of capital losses, but 
in fact Australia’s sterling borrowings (the separate domain of the Treasury) hedged 
the reserve assets pretty well. This suggests that the pressure for diversification – 
evident in a series of central bank papers from 1965 onwards – derived from central 
bank investment portfolio, not wider economic, considerations. But central bank and 
government papers from across the whole period, starting in 1951, do not reveal a high 
degree of confidence in sterling as a reserve currency. If the central bank had not had 
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to sell dollars and gold in order to shore up minimum sterling holdings during the crises 
of 1951-2, 1955-6 and 1960-1 – sales which have been misinterpreted as motivated by 
support for the UK – it is doubtful that it would have had other cause to do so. But once 
the dollars and gold had been sold, the path dependence implicit in the sterling area’s 
pooling rule ensured that they would not be bought back: the slow process of 
accumulation of gold and dollar holdings through gold production would have to begin 
again. In this sense, Australia’s diversification was institutionally constrained: it was 
‘blown off course’ the policy direction set in 1951. 
 
There were thus secondary feedback effects of its sterling orientation and institutional 
set-up on Australia’s reserve management. These effects included: a need for large 
minimum sterling holdings due to the volatility of its balance of payments and 
practices/asset limitations of its note issue fund; immersion in sterling trade 
transactions due to the widespread impact of sterling area exchange controls; areas of 
financial dependence on the UK, such as FX dealing and liberal sterling trade credit; 
and the impact of UK capital flight to Australia. 
 
Singleton and Schenk’s paper on Australian reserve management was largely directed 
at the years from 1968 and the MSP agreements. Its earliest cited evidence for the 
constraints on diversification is from 1967-8. A major contribution of this paper has 
been to extend the reserve management evidence to the earlier period of 1950-68. 
Apart from its focus on the pooling rule and sterling peg, its conclusions differ 
significantly from those of Singleton and Schenk with regard to the ‘how’ part of 
diversification in the 1950s-60s: this occurred largely through gold production and the 
IMF gold tranche, not through retention of loan proceeds. By focusing on the pooling 
rule as a modus operandi, this paper also alters the nature of the ‘when’ question too, 
moving the question away from changes in ‘sterling’s share’, and showing how the 
UK’s EEC application in 1961 marked a turning point towards greater deliberate 
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diversification by Australia. As regards the ‘why’ question, Singleton and Schenk 
focused on debt and trade drivers for diversification, but due to Australia’s immersion 
in sterling trading relationships, these drivers may not have been so strong as 
previously thought, and in any event, the pooling rule took trade and debt 
considerations out of the foreground of policy. Sterling was in effect Australia’s sole 
transactional currency, while gold, dollars and the IMF gold tranche were its ‘rainy day 
fund’. This paper does not address the years from 1968, when doubts about the dollar 
relative to sterling would have increased following the devaluation of sterling. But its 
conclusions may help to explain some of the phenomena observed in the later period. 
For example, Singleton and Schenk’s finding that the MSP contracts were rarely 
binding on Australia658 could reflect the need for a minimum sterling buffer above the 
contracted MSP, a margin of safety given Australia’s balance-of-payments volatility. 
 
When talking about feedback effects and restraints, one should not go too far. In the 
background, if not the foreground, the changing trade and debt picture for Australia 
was not so different from its actual diversification through gold production. And while 
central bank concerns about sterling were particularly strong from 1965, the build-up of 
the IMF gold tranche provided a partial and timely response. So it would be wrong to 
argue that the policies followed were somehow directly enforced by the British, or 
costly and uncongenial to Australian policymakers in a macroeconomic sense. They 
were rational. The paper’s contribution is rather in establishing accurate facts around 
the microeconomics of Australia’s reserve management. The effects of the 
microeconomics were not mere details, however. It is telling that the methods 
Australian officials chose to diversify – gold production, the IMF gold tranche, careful 
marginal variations of policies discussed with the British, or hidden, unobtrusive FX 
transactions with Australian counterparties – did not majorly confront or challenge the 
sterling area’s pooling rule. It is telling that Australian policymakers in 1965 were 
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careful about switching, but relatively relaxed about spending, sterling reserves. This 
suggests that the rules of the sterling area mattered. The sterling area system had 
significant effects on its members in the 1960s, just as it had in the 1950s. It may have 
been an anachronism, but it was far from irrelevant. Australia was arguably the most 
important member of the sterling area outside the UK, and the various elements of its 
reserve management experience are likely to have been found in other members.               
    
This explanation of Australia’s policy can be considered alongside the three competing 
claims about why independent sterling area countries persisted with sterling in the 
1950s-60s. Firstly, Australia’s following of sterling area rules might be judged a kind of 
loyalty (Eichengreen’s argument). Loyalty seems the wrong word, though, and 
supposed acts of loyalty, such as the 1956 Suez gold sale, turned out to have been 
driven by Australia’s need for sterling. I agree with Singleton and Schenk’s assessment 
that the policy was driven by rational self-interest. Australia benefited from membership 
of the sterling area and so it was natural to want to be seen to be following the rules.  
 
Secondly, might Australia’s sterling area behaviour and retention of sterling be 
described as a negotiated outcome, secured by British concessions (Strange’s 
argument)? The implied bilateral contract of sterling area membership could be 
characterised as a negotiation, yet here too it feels like the wrong word. Year by year, 
there was little that needed negotiation. These were the established sterling area rules, 
and Australia largely followed them. This paper has looked only at the Australian 
perspective and so, while it argues that Australian officials saw clear benefits, it cannot 
comment on the costs or benefits of the arrangement for the UK.659 It could be argued 
that the UK set the rules and through them secured as much sterling area co-operation 
as it could muster. 
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Thirdly, Australia’s sterling area behaviour was in large measure consistent with being 
restrained by the costs of switching (Schenk’s argument). The sterling area offered 
benefits. Access to the London capital market and a sense of collective interest 
(Singleton and Schenk’s institutional arguments) were also part of the sterling area 
network package. Some of Singleton and Schenk’s conclusions are not supported. 
There was little confidence in sterling in 1962-7, and a clear policy statement in 1965 
that the disposition of reserves was too heavily weighted towards sterling – not where 
the RBA or Treasury wanted them to be. Officials were only partly, not overly 
restrained by fear of harming sterling (a ‘sterling trap’), because Australia spent large 
volumes of sterling in 1964-8, mainly through the balance of payments, but also 
through deliberate diversification, ‘reducing our sterling risk without attracting 
attention’. In not diversifying more aggressively, Australian officials were taking a 
holistic view of transaction needs, the benefits of sterling area membership, the risk of 
devaluation and the UK relationship.  
 
The starting point of this paper was the lessons to be derived from sterling’s past. 
What insights for reserve currencies emerge from Australia’s case? Firstly, there is the 
idea that sterling’s historic persistence means continued leadership for the US dollar, 
supported by inertia. Here this paper’s conclusion is negative. It confirms the 
scepticism of Eichengreen and Schenk about the current power of inertia based on this 
historical precedent: it casts doubt on the applicability of sterling’s persistence in the 
1950s and 1960s to the US dollar today.660 Sterling’s persistence within the sterling 
area derived from a unique institutional context of sterling area rules which no longer 
exists. Because sterling’s international role relied on the holdings of sterling area 
countries, it was a somewhat artificial world currency and had nothing like the current 
market-based position of the dollar. 
                                               
660
 Schenk’s arguments, about the mitigating role that major external support can provide to a currency in 
decline, still hold (Schenk, The decline). But Schenk was clear that this was a carefully managed process 
and a product of its time (Schenk, ‘The retirement’) 
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Secondly, Australia’s case does suggest the subtle power of the institutional 
arrangements underlying informal alliances. There was no written agreement between 
the UK and Australia before the MSP contracts, only national laws. Yet dollar 
settlement in intra-sterling area trade was forbidden, despite the non-discrimination 
rules of Bretton Woods. Australia’s reserve management was significantly influenced 
by its membership of the sterling area. The world may now be moving away from 
multilateralism in the direction of a new ‘minilateralism’ of regional alliances and soft 
law,661 so it is important to study these phenomena. Informal alliances may – even 
today – have the power to skew the disposition of reserves, as was the case in the 
sterling area. 
 
Thirdly, we saw that it was not just the sterling area that affected Australia; Australia 
arguably also had an impact on sterling, through changes in its sterling holdings. 
Commentary on the prospects for international currencies today usually focuses on 
their risk and return characteristics. But large changes in aggregate reserves are not 
typically driven by considerations of relative risk and return. In recent years, emerging 
market countries have significantly increased their aggregate reserves for reasons 
both precautionary and mercantilist.662 These changes may have a sound rationale, 
but the accumulation and in turn spending of such reserve piles have consequences 
for the reserve currencies concerned. The case of Australia’s sterling is a reminder, to 
today’s reserve currency issuers – despite trust in currency traps – that ultimately the 
fate of their currency rests, unpredictably, in the hands of others. 
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The rules of the sterling area, 1950-68 
 
The rules for each sterling area member were unwritten, ill-defined and subject to 
negotiation and change over time. They were clearly bilateral between each country 
and the UK: the UK’s implicit agreement with Australia was different from that made 
with, say, Burma, Hong Kong, Kuwait or South Africa. Membership of the sterling area 
was the UK’s sole decision. The rules can be broadly categorised into five areas, as 
set out in the Table: 
Rule Description and comment 
The ‘peg’ Exchange rate pegged to sterling. Since it was possible to devalue or revalue 
against sterling, and exchange rates were generally fixed rate in the Bretton 
Woods system (1946-71), this was not a particularly onerous additional 
requirement in practice, but would have become much more so if sterling had 
floated 
The ‘pool’ All receipts of dollars, gold etc should be sold in exchange for sterling. In 
return the Bank of England should not refuse requests for dollars and gold 
when sterling was presented to it. Note that the pool was a concept rather 
than a physical thing. The currency exchanges did not have to be executed 
directly with the Bank of England: sometimes the Bank encouraged dealings 
through authorised banks in London. An exception to the rule of the pool was 
that, subject to negotiation, some countries were allowed to retain limited and 
usually static ‘pots’ of gold and dollars for specific purposes (e.g. to back the 
local currency). South Africa was not part of the pooling arrangements. 
Australia was unusual in retaining a growing pot of gold and dollars, a source 
of friction with UK officials 
The controls Each country should maintain exchange controls against the non-sterling 
area well-aligned with those operating in the UK. There were some 
troublesome weak control points in the sterling system (Hong Kong, Kuwait, 
British West Indies), but Australia’s controls were tight. Meanwhile the UK’s 
own rules allowed unrestricted capital movement from the UK to sterling area 
members 
Consultation Close consultation in a number of areas: usually weekly statistical information 
on sterling holdings provided by central banks to the Bank of England; a 
committee of Commonwealth representatives in London meeting a number of 
times a year; regular, usually annual, gatherings of Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers, officials and statisticians  
Co-operation There had been some concerted macroeconomic and import restraint co-
operation in the late 1940s with the aim of protecting sterling, but by the early 
1950s this had effectively broken down and never revived 
Table A1: The rules of the sterling area, 1950 – 1968 
Source: Author’s assessment, based on numerous sources. For example, for the peg, see Perkins, Britain 
and Australia, pp148-9. For the pool and controls, see Schenk, Britain, p26. For consultation and co-
operation, see RBA:B.1.1.1.A.65.2, Extract, Commonwealth Liaison Committee minutes, ‘The Sterling 
Area system’, 12/12/1951. For general detail, e.g. the view on co-operation, see TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling 
balances’. Records of meetings of the Commonwealth Liaison Committee and meetings of 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers are widely spread in TNA e.g. in the DO35/ and CAB133/  series and 
elsewhere  
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The above were the principal sterling area rules considered by this paper. But it should 
be said that this customary formulation has drawbacks. As already noted, the sterling 
peg already lay within the fixed exchange rate framework of Bretton Woods, and in 
1962 Perkins was arguing that changes in sterling’s parity might not have to be 
matched in full by Australia as a sterling area member, even if sterling were to float.663 
With respect to the pool, RSA countries diversified their reserves to varying degrees 
(see Annex 2), and South Africa was not part of the pool arrangements at all. And 
there were significant lacunae – e.g. free exchange markets in Hong Kong, Kuwait – in 
the exchange control framework: these were also tolerated by the British. 
 
This suggests that the UK was prevented from enforcing rules (e.g. breaches of the 
pool rule), as it had an interest in maximising the scale of the sterling area and its 
reputation as a voluntary organisation of countries holding sterling on the currency’s 
own merits. Expelling members (Burma, Southern Rhodesia) or blocking sterling 
balances (Egypt, Southern Rhodesia) risked frightening others about the sterling 
area’s viability. An internal 1957 debate within the Bank of England and Treasury 
about whether to expel India given its diversification plans produced the realisation that 
it was better, for the sake of sterling, to keep India inside the tent: India’s diversification 
from sterling would be more constrained.664  
 
Certain rules seem to have been applied without exception, indicating a hard core to 
the system. One was the rule of intra-sterling area trade settlement (see Table 4 in this 
paper). As also discussed in this paper, the UK consistently refused all requests for 
gold or dollar guarantees from RSA countries, even while granting such guarantees to 
NSA countries, until the general MSP agreements of 1968.665 Another rule concerned 
speculating against sterling. A UK official document in 1966 stated: ‘it is against the 
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 Perkins, Britain and Australia, pp148-9 
664
 BOE:OV56/92, documents, 30/1-4/2/1957 
665
 Schenk, The decline, pp273-316 discusses the MSP agreements 
208 
 
rules of the “Sterling Area Club” for OSA central banks to take forward cover’.666 In 
short, the UK expected RSA countries to earn their membership by trusting in sterling. 
From the British perspective, trust in sterling was arguably the guiding principle of the 
sterling area.  
                                               
666
 BOE:EID10/25, ‘The Sterling Balances’, 9/12/1966, sent by the Foreign Office and Commonwealth 
Office to ‘certain overseas missions’ 
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% Dec 
1950 
Dec 
1951 
Dec 
1952 
Dec 
1953 
Dec 
1954 
Dec 
1955 
Dec 
1956 
Dec 
1957 
Dec 
1958 
Source 
Australia 93 88 84 87 83 73 79 84 77 (1) 
Australia      73 80 84 78 (2) 
NZealand 83 83 82 88 86 81 88 83 86 (1) 
NZealand         80 (2) 
S Africa 48 46 45 20 39 18 29 -5 5 (1) 
S Africa      25 35 8 19 (2) 
India 88 87 86 85 85 86 78 68 57 (1) 
India      84 79 69 59 (2) 
Pakistan 96 91 80 79 80 79 76 74 69 (1) 
Pakistan      66 65 59 47 (2) 
Ceylon 96 92 91 85 88 85 80 79 76 (1) 
Ceylon      83 77 75 66 (2) 
Iraq 98 92 92 94 97 93 92 87 84 (1) 
Burma      55 88 76 74 (2) 
Ireland      74 81 78 77 (2) 
Kuwait      96 97 97 95 (2) 
Libya      75 83 88 89 (2) 
 
% Dec 
1959 
Dec 
1960 
Dec 
1961 
Dec 
1962 
Dec 
1963 
Dec 
1964 
Dec 
1965 
Dec 
1966 
Oct 
1967 
Source 
Australia 79 74 84 76 80 79 70   (2) 
Australia      79 70 69 60 (3) 
NZealand 79 72 96 96 95 96 95   (2) 
NZealand      98 97 97 85 (3) 
S Africa 28 2 8 8 5 3 6   (2) 
S Africa      5 9 4 7 (3) 
India 56 47 43 40 45 43 39   (2) 
India      44 40 20 21 (3) 
Pakistan 59 68 63 61 66 59 56   (2) 
Pakistan      60 56 46 32 (3) 
Ceylon 56 84 81 80 85 83 85   (2) 
Ceylon      94 88 87 90 (3) 
Burma 76 87 70 61 69 29 10 2  (2) 
Ireland 71 73 75 77 76 88 88   (2) 
Ireland      83 83 87 85 (3) 
Kuwait 95 95 86 77 73 67 67   (2) 
Kuwait      67 67 62 74 (3) 
Libya 44 60 80 67 43 28 30   (2) 
Libya      22 24 28 18 (3) 
Malaysia      99 95   (2) 
Malaysia      96 96 90 82 (3) 
Singapore      100 98 93 50 (3) 
H Kong      100 100 100 100 (3) 
Ghana  96 93 93 91 91 91   (2) 
Ghana      91 91 91 90 (3) 
Nigeria   90 88 83 84 84   (2) 
Nigeria      88 85 79 66 (3) 
Table A2: Sterling’s share of reserves in selected sterling area countries, end-month, 
December 1950 – October 1967 (%) 
Source: (1) Calculated from data in Schenk, Britain, Appendix, pp50-1, and Table 2.5, p30, using an 
exchange rate of £1 = US$2.80 (2) Extracted from BOE:OV44/115 (3) Extracted from BOE:OV44/116. All 
were based on BOE sterling data and IMF non-sterling data  
Note: In the case of (1) I did not use the percentage share figures calculated by Schenk and published in 
Britain, Table 2.4, p30, and The decline, Table 3.1, p89, as they looked on the low side and appeared to 
employ a different exchange rate, but did use the underlying data presented by Schenk. Caution is 
advised for all sources: for instance, the sterling data in (1) included non-official reserves, while (3) 
referenced official reserves  
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Monthly reports to RBA board on US dollar and gold investments, 1960-2 
 
 
 
Date NY 
Funds 
(US$m) 
 
Gold 
Holding 
(US$m) 
Combined 
Holding 
(US$m) 
Commentary at RBA board 
(to save space, this does not include monthly 
comment on RBA acquiring gold production) 
10/1/60 85.4 153.1 238.5 USA: little change 
15/2/60 85.7 158.0 243.7 USA: little change 
7/3/60 85.7 159.6 245.3 USA: unchanged 
8/4/60 85.7 164.2 249.9 USA: unchanged 
13/5/60 85.8 167.5 253.3 USA: virtually unchanged. NY loan proceeds 
$23.9m of which $20m sold for £, balance 
retained in NY to cover current dollar 
requirements 
20/6/60 85.8 171.4 257.2 USA: unchanged 
18/7/60 81.6 149.8 231.4 USA: $4m Treasury bills run off, proceeds used 
for current dollar requirements. Gold: $25m 
equivalent delivered to IMF to cover the gold 
element (25%) of IMF quota increase 
15/8/60 74.6 152.7 227.3 USA: $7m Treasury bills run off, proceeds used 
for current dollar requirements 
19/9/60 71.1 158.0 229.1 USA: $3.5m Treasury bills run off, proceeds 
used for current dollar requirements 
17/10/60 66.8 158.1 229.1 USA: $4.5m Treasury bills run off, proceeds 
used for current dollar requirements. Gold: first 
GPA sale for $ since Sep 1959, proceeds 
$1.1m used for current dollar requirements 
14/11/60 59.8 147.9 207.7 USA: $7m Treasury bills run off, proceeds used 
for current dollar requirements. Gold: GPA sale 
(206k oz) for $. Proceeds $7.3m used for 
current dollar requirements. Gold sale via Bank 
of England ‘as part of the programme to meet 
the rundown in overseas funds’: 300k oz sale 
order of which 214k sold this month 
16/1/61 48.5 146.2 194.7 USA: $11.3m Treasury bills run off, proceeds 
used for current dollar requirements. Gold: GPA 
sale for $. Proceeds $2.9m used for current 
dollar requirements. Gold sale via BOE: 88k oz 
13/2/61 48.5 146.8 195.3 Gold: GPA sale (121k oz) for $. [No comment 
made about use of $4.3m proceeds, but it 
would be consistent with the static US$ 
holdings and the prior and following month use 
of proceeds that these would be for current 
dollar requirements] 
13/3/61 48.4 148.9 197.3 USA: virtually unchanged. Gold: GPA sale for $. 
Proceeds $1.1m used for current dollar 
requirements. CHF60m loan: proceeds 
converted into sterling, £5.8m 
17/4/61 48.4 151.6 200.0 USA: unchanged. Gold: GPA sale for $. 
Proceeds $3.4m taken into working balances 
overseas  
15/5/61 48.4 
A£21.6 
[152.5] 
A£68.1 
[200.9] USA: unchanged. Gold: GPA sale for $. 
Proceeds $2.2m taken into working balances 
overseas 
16/6/61 [49.7] 
A£22.2 
[153.7] 
A£68.6 
[203.4] USA: increase reflects GPA sale proceeds. 
Gold: GPA sale for $. Proceeds $2.2m: $1.1m 
taken into working balances overseas and 
$1.1m invested in US Treasury bills 
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Continuation of Table 
 
Date NY 
Funds 
(US$m) 
 
Gold 
Holding 
(US$m) 
Combined 
Holding 
(US$m) 
Commentary at RBA board 
(to save space, this does not include monthly 
comment on RBA acquiring gold production) 
12/7/61 [49.7] 
A£22.2 
[152.1] 
A£67.9 
[201.8] USA: unchanged. Gold: GPA sale for $. 
Proceeds [$4.7m] A£2.1m taken into working 
balances overseas. NY Loan: proceeds 
$23.6m, $2.5m to Commonwealth Australia, 
$21.1m to RBA (of which $19m sold for sterling 
and $2.1m retained against current dollar 
expenditure) 
9/8/61 [49.7] 
A£22.2 
[151.6] 
A£67.7 
[201.3] Gold: GPA sale for $. Proceeds [$3.4m] 
A£1.5m taken into working balances overseas 
6/9/61 [53.3] 
A£23.8 
[151.4] 
A£67.6 
[204.7] USA: increase reflects GPA sale proceeds. 
Gold: GPA sale for $. Proceeds [$3.4m] 
A£1.6m added to US investments 
11/10/61 [55.6] 
A£24.8 
[152.5] 
A£68.1 
[208.1] USA: increase reflects GPA sale proceeds. 
Gold: GPA sale for $. Proceeds [$2.2m] 
A£1.0m added to US investments 
15/11/61 [55.6] 
A£24.8 
[157.5] 
A£70.3 
[213.1] USA: unchanged 
10/1/62 [56.7] 
A£25.3 
[160.6] 
A£71.7 
[217.3] USA: increase reflects GPA sale proceeds. 
Gold: GPA sale for $. Proceeds [$1.1m] 
A£0.5m added to US invested funds. 
Netherlands NLG loan (first for Australia): 
proceeds of NLG38.1m converted into sterling, 
£3.8m  
Table A3: Monthly reports to RBA board on US dollar and gold investments, selected 
details, 10 Jan 1960 to 10 Jan 1962 (US$m unless otherwise indicated) 
Source: RBA:BM-Pe-1 to -23, extracted from Board Memorandum, ‘Investment of Overseas Funds’ 
Note: items in square brackets [ ] are author’s calculations, using exchange rate of A£1 = US$2.24, and 
other observations. All references to $ in this Table are to US$ 
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Example scanned documents: contributory changes to sterling holdings of Central 
Bank and Trading Bank, monthly report from London 
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Source: Scans from RBA:C.3.20.1.19.1-1, ‘Monthly review’, File 1, 1954-5 
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Calculation of a transactions index for Australia: trade share and debt share indices 
 
The aim of the transactions index is to provide a very approximate indication of 
Australia’s transactions orientation towards sterling. Therefore the methods of 
construction have been kept simple.  
 
Trade share index (25 per cent weight in transactions index) 
 
The IMF Historical Direction of trade statistics provide a picture of Australia’s trade 
orientation in terms of different countries, UK, USA and others. These country trade 
data have regularly informed reserve management studies such as that of Singleton 
and Schenk. But, as a new contribution, this study has unearthed valuable currency 
share of payments data in two accounting years, 1953-4 and 1963-4. These are 
assumed from the context to be trade payments – to the extent that they included debt 
payments, the trade payments would have been even more oriented towards sterling. 
Figure A1 shows the different share figures. 
 
 
Figure A1: Relative shares of UK in Australia’s trade and imports, and of sterling in 
Australia’s payments, 1950 – 1968 (%) 
Source: For sterling’s share of payments, RBA:BM-Pe-56, Board Memorandum attachment, ‘Investment of 
overseas funds’, Investment Department, 21/1/1965. For all other shares, calculated from IMF Historic 
Direction of Trade Statistics (data extracted on 4 Aug 2017 10.08 GMT from UKDS.Stat)  
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Since the currency payments share is more relevant for the transactions theory, I 
decided that the trade share index should be derived from the more extensive data for 
the UK’s overall trade share, but should be consistent with (pass through) the two data 
points for sterling’s payments share. The main uncertainty was how to treat the 
currency denomination of Australia’s trade with other countries than the UK or USA. 
From this study, it was clear that much trade with Europe and Japan and other regions 
was sterling-denominated in the 1950s, but became more US dollar-oriented towards 
and in the 1960s. A simple mechanism was required to express this. By setting a 95 
per cent sterling weight (5 per cent for dollars) for trade with other countries in 1950, 
and multiplying this declining sterling weight each subsequent year by 0.985, the 
resulting trade share index was consistent with (passed through) the sterling payments 
share data points. It is possible that this trade share index may understate the decline 
in sterling’s share around the time of Japan’s switch from sterling to dollars around 
1960, and also in the latter years (1965-8) when Australia was substituting Australian 
dollar trade for sterling trade e.g. with New Zealand, but there was not enough 
information to finesse all these aspects, or the rate of attrition before they happened, 
and a simple rule seemed adequate for these purposes.   
 
Debt share index (25 per cent share in transactions index) 
 
I am indebted to the Australian Office of Financial Management for data about the 
currency of Australia’s overseas debt, from 1950. Singleton and Schenk also used this 
data, in order to calculate sterling’s share of debt for Australia, but it is instructive to 
look at the gross debt figures first. This is set out below in Figure A2. 
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Figure A2: Australia’s securities domiciled overseas, by currency, as at 30 June, 1950 
– 1968 (A$m) 
Source: Australian government, 1974-75 Budget Paper No.6, Table No.6 (Thanks to Australian Office of 
Financial Management) 
 
In the sterling crisis period of 1964-8, there was a sharp decline in the volume of 
sterling debt outstanding. From the point of view of theory, this is counterintuitive. 
Dooley, Lizondo and Mathieson (DLM) argued that it was rational for countries to issue 
more debt in order to reduce their net exposure to a currency at risk.667 I did not 
specifically investigate the reasons for this decline, but noted that (a) there were likely 
to have been (sterling crisis-driven) constraints on debt issuance in sterling by 
Australia in this period – a board paper in July 1968 stated: 
 
‘The U.K. has already heavily restricted our access to its capital markets and 
our official sterling debt outstanding has fallen by $193 million (excluding the 
effects of devaluation) since 1964’668 
 
 I also formed the strong impression that (b) the reserve management by the RBA (in 
Sydney) and the debt management by the government (in Canberra) were separate 
                                               
667
 Dooley, Lizondo and Mathieson, ‘Currency composition’ 
668
 RBA:BM-Pe-95, Board Memorandum, ‘Australia’s international reserves’, 31/7/1968 
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and uncoordinated, and the debt management was driven more by access 
considerations than exchange rate risk factors. 
 
DLM looked at the cost of servicing outstanding currency debt, but for these purposes 
a simple debt share approach seems adequate. If we had used the cost of servicing, 
due to higher interest rates in the UK, the debt share index and transactions index 
would have been even more oriented towards sterling. Again the key question is how 
to treat other (non-sterling, non-dollar) debt: should one regard it as sterling-equivalent, 
dollar-equivalent, or neither? Singleton and Schenk showed sterling’s share in overall 
debt in their paper, in order to demonstrate Australia’s overall commitment to sterling. 
But, for this debt share index, in a binary sterling-dollar transactions currency 
comparison, that approach (the bold line in Figure A3) implicitly treats the other debt as 
dollar-equivalent. I decided to take the neutral approach and focus only on the dollar 
and sterling debt (the dashed line) to form the debt share index.  
 
    
Figure A3: Sterling’s share of Australia’s securities domiciled overseas, as at 30 June, 
1950 – 1968 (%) 
Source: calculated from data in Figure A2 
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Balance sheets of the Central Banking Business and Note Issue Department 
 
Figures A4 and A5 show the balance sheets of the Central Banking Business and the 
Note Issue Department, in terms of composition of assets. In the case of the Central 
Banking Business, ‘Other’ was a broad category dominated by ‘Loans, Advances, Bills 
Discounted and All Other Assets’, while in the case of the Note Issue Department, 
‘Other’ was negligible. The remaining principal asset categories for each fund were 
‘Gold and Balances Held Abroad (including Money at Short Call)’ (shorter-term), ‘Other 
Overseas Securities’ (longer-term investments)669 and ‘Australian Government 
Securities (including Treasury Bills and Treasury Notes)’. The Figures use the same 
vertical scale so that they can be compared in terms of magnitude.  
 
   
Figure A4: Composition of assets in Australian central bank’s Central Banking 
Business, as at 30 June, 1950 – 1968 (A$m) 
Source: White, Australian banking, p57 
Note: Other = Total Assets less all other categories listed; Australian Govt Securities includes Treasury 
Bills and Treasury Notes; Gold and balances held abroad includes money at short call  
                                               
669
 White, Australian banking, p17  
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Figure A5: Composition of assets in Australian central bank’s Note Issue Department, 
as at 30 June, 1950 – 1968 (A$m) 
Source: White, Australian banking, p57 
Note: Other = Total Assets less all other categories listed; Australian Govt Securities includes Treasury 
Bills and Treasury Notes; Gold and balances held abroad includes money at short call  
 
In Figure A5, the temporary dip in the note issue assets at June 1966 presumably 
reflects the February 1966 re-monetisation from the Australian pound to the Australian 
dollar. The A$50.8m balance with the central bank arose after the November 1967 
devaluation of sterling, which would have left a hole in the Note Issue Department, 
which held no reserve capital.670 The effect of the UPD policy in March 1960 is also 
clearly visible with the growth of external assets at the expense of Australian assets. 
We saw in Figure 3 that by 1964, with balance-of-payments inflows, sterling assets 
had reached a high level across the central bank as a whole. The UPD consequently 
raised the proportion of external assets (i.e. gold and sterling) in the Note Issue 
Department. Also visible from 1964 is the aforementioned investment in British 
government securities (contained in ‘Other overseas securities’), lengthening the 
maturity of assets backing the ‘hard core’ minimum sterling reserves.  
 
If the UPD policy was operating consistently from 1960, one would expect the ratio of 
{Gold and balances held abroad plus Other overseas securities} to {Australian 
                                               
670
 See White, Australian banking, pp15, 17 
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government securities} to be the same across the two funds. Figure A6 shows this in 
fact to be the case. The only minor discrepancy is in June 1961. However, the April 
1961 IMF drawing, held in sterling, was part of the assets of the Central Banking 
Business and did not then form part of the UPD calculation, so this divergence is 
explained. This is circumstantial evidence, therefore, that the UPD policy was being 
consistently followed after 1960. 
 
     
Figure A6: Ratio of gold and overseas assets to Australian government securities in 
Australian central bank’s Central Banking Business and Note Issue Department, as at 
30 June, 1950 – 1968 (multiple) 
Source: Calculated from relevant asset categories in Figures A4 and A5  
 
It is possible to show, by way of numerical example, how the combination of the UPD 
and the no-dollar rule of the note issue fund, together with other constraints, might 
have constrained an RBA seeking to minimise sterling holdings. The ‘Other’ assets 
were not part of the UPD policy. So it is necessary to consider the balance sheet of the 
two funds, excluding the ‘Other’ assets, so as to give Total gold and investments (TGI) 
as at the end of June 1967, and assume that the UPD policy was operating. Gold 
holdings were limited by gold production: let us assume that gold holdings were 
constrained to 10 per cent of the combined external holdings and Australian 
government securities holdings (TGI). Australian government securities holdings 
(short- and long-dated) were also affected by monetary policy: let us assume that 
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these were constrained to 40 per cent of the combined external and Australian 
government securities holdings. Finally the rest of the holdings were in the form of 
external money markets and external government securities holdings – 50 per cent of 
the total. These rough proportions are not far from those actually prevailing, based on 
the RBA data underlying Figure 3. 
 
Now assume that the RBA was seeking to minimise sterling holdings and maximise 
dollar holdings, but was constrained to hold a minimum of A$250m equivalent of 
sterling in the London funds (in line with the minimum buffer findings), with all the other 
external holdings in US dollars. On these assumptions, the sterling holdings of the note 
issue fund are in effect determined (and consequently sterling’s share of gold and 
currency reserves is determined) by the respective sizes of the Central Banking 
Business and the note issue fund. The results are displayed in Table A4.  
 
A$m CBB NID Total CB 
 
Total assets (actual at 30 June 1967) 1489 962 2451 
 
Less 'Other' assets (actual) 503 1 504 
 
Equals TGI (Total gold and investments) 986 961 1947 
 
 
Assumptions 
  
Predicted Actual CB 
Gold Constrained to equal 10% of TGI 99 96 195 204 
Sterling Minimise holding A$250m in CBB 250 481 731 723 
US dollars Maximise holdings in CBB 243 0 243 209 
Australian govt secs Constrained to equal 40% of TGI 395 384 779 812 
Sterling's share of gold and currency reserves 63% 64% 
Table A4: Effect of Uniform Proportionate Distribution policy on the assets of the RBA’s 
Central Banking Business and Note Issue Department, as predicted by assumptions; 
and actual holdings, as at 30 June 1967 (A$m) 
Source: Total assets and ‘Other’ assets calculated from White, Australian banking, p57; all other figures 
derived from assumptions. ‘Actual CB’ assets from data underlying Figure 3 
Note: CBB = Central Banking Business; NID = Note Issue Department; CB = central bank; TGI = total gold 
and investments, being Total assets less ‘Other’ assets.  
   
That the predicted holdings and the actual holdings of gold, sterling and US dollars are 
similar in this numerical example is not surprising, since this arises from the convenient 
assumptions made about gold and Australian government securities. However, the 
point about this mechanism is that, if the Central Banking Business assets had been 
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A$200m less, perhaps because of a different balance-of-payments outcome, and the 
assets of the Note Issue Department A$200m more, perhaps because of differences in 
the public’s demand for money, there would have been an impact on predicted sterling 
holdings, despite no change in gold or Australian government securities holdings 
occurring: sterling reserves would have been A$831m, not A$731m, and sterling’s 
share of gold and currency reserves would have been 71 per cent, not 63 per cent. 
Thus even a central bank determined to maximise dollar holdings might have been 
constrained by the Note Issue Department arrangements, or would have been 
compelled to change these arrangements. Indeed, in the year to June 1969, the note 
issue’s balances with the central bank were significantly increased to A$303.6m. White 
described the reason for this as follows:  
 
‘Limitation on the types of assets the Note Issue Department can hold, 
imposed by Section 38 of the Reserve Bank Act, and changes in the 
disposition of the Bank’s overseas investments combined to increase the 
difficulty in maintaining a suitable distribution of investments between the 
central bank and the Note Issue Department… The Note Issue Department 
deposit is maintained at a level which is related to the proportion of overseas 
funds which lies outside the scope of authorised Note Issue investments’671 
 
This citation, while outside the period of this study, suggests that the RBA found a 
solution to the legal asset limitations of the Note Issue Department. 
 
It should also be noted that the 1945 central bank legislation and successive legislation 
had not been intended to constrain the central bank, rather, in fact, to release it from 
constraints. This point was made by the then Governor in his report on the legislation 
in 1945. He wrote: 
                                               
671
 White, Australian banking, p17 
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‘The abolition of the Note Issue Reserve, and power to mobilise gold and 
foreign exchange means that, should pressure on overseas funds arise, 
Australia will be in a much stronger position to meet her overseas 
payments’672 
 
Therefore, to the extent that the RBA had faced the ‘difficulty’ referred to in the 
preceding citation from White, and resolved in 1968-9, this was arguably just a 
fortuitous consequence of the adoption of the 1960 UPD policy. So we should be 
cautious in attributing too much significance to the contribution of the Note Issue 
Department to the sterling orientation of the reserves.  
             
                                               
672
 RBA:Annual Report, Governor’s Report, pp14-5, 5/9/1945. I am grateful to Selwyn Cornish for bringing 
this citation to my attention 
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Background to Australia’s September 1956 gold sale 
 
 
1956 Form People Content 
9 Feb Letter Bryson (head of 
investments, CBA 
Sydney) to Rusden 
(head, CBA London) 
Predicts a precipitous decline in London funds from 
£130m (end-December 1955) to £59m by end-
September 1956. To shore up sterling liquidity, 
possibilities are sales of British government securities, 
transfer of Treasury bills from Note Issue Department, 
or sales of dollars or gold.
673
 
18 May Letter Rusden (head, CBA 
London) to Phillips 
(acting head of 
investments, CBA 
Sydney) 
After successful April sale of dollars, responds to a 
Sydney query on possible sale of gold. I have 
deliberately not consulted Bank of England but 'I think it 
most likely that it would suit the Bank of England to buy 
gold from you and hold it ear-marked in Australia'.
674
 
12 Jun Memo UK Treasury. Butt to 
Jenkyns, copied to 
France 
(Short memo seemingly out of the blue). 'A bright idea 
for what it is worth'. Some of Australia's gold and dollars 
might help us with a difficult third quarter.
675
 
14 Jun Memo UK Treasury. 
Jenkyns to France, 
copied to Armstrong 
Response to Butt's memo: notes that, in Canberra 
recently, Randall (Australian Treasury) told me 
'Australia would sell us gold if we were in difficulty'.
676
 
1 Aug Letter Haslam (Bank of 
England) to Jenkyns 
(UK Treasury) 
Response to Jenkyns’ request for advice. Says asking 
Australia for gold would be 'most unwise'. Better timing 
would be a proper sterling crisis.
677
 
10 Aug N/A UK Treasury. Rowan 
(Head of Overseas 
Finance), Macmillan 
(Chancellor) 
By this date, Rowan has proposed idea of request for 
Australian gold sale to Chancellor Macmillan, ahead of 
a forthcoming meeting with the Australian Prime 
Minister Menzies.
678
 
20 Aug Meet London: Macmillan 
(UK Chancellor), 
Menzies (Australian 
Prime Minister) 
Macmillan asks Menzies for gold and at the meeting 
Menzies reacts 'very favourably'. Figure of £20m 
mentioned.
679
 
20 Sep Ledger Bank of England £20m gold sale recorded in Bank of England ledger 
(held ear-marked in Australia).
680
 
Table A5: Documentary timeline for Australia’s September 1956 gold sale, February – 
September 1956 
Source: See footnotes to Table 
 
                                               
673
 RBA:GJP-57-1, Bryson to Rusden, with attachment ‘Overseas Assets’, 9/2/1956 
674
 RBA:GJP-57-1, Rusden to Phillips, 18/5/1956 
675
 TNA:T236/4649, ‘The third quarter dollar drain’, Butt to France, copied to Jenkyns, 12/6/1956 
676
 TNA:T236/4649, ‘The third quarter dollar drain’, Jenkyns to France, copied to Armstrong, 14/6/1956 
677
 BOE:OV13/18, ‘Gold – Australian borrowing in London’, Haslam to Jenkyns, 1/8/1956 
678
 TNA:T236/4649, ‘Australia’, Rickett to Petch, 10/8/1956 
679
 BOE:OV13/18, ‘Australia – gold’, Bailey to Parsons, Chief Cashier, Governor, 20 Aug 1956  
680
 The purchase, just over £20m of gold from Perth No.1 Account, on 20/9/1956, is recorded in the Bank 
of England’s gold ledgers (BOE:2A141/10). RBA:GJP-74-1, Phillips to Mutton, 18/8/1960, shows that 
periodic sales of gold to the Bank of England were held in this form. In 1960, as the Bank of England 
moved the gold out of Australia, some of the Australian press wrongly interpreted the move as gold losses 
by Australia (the topic of the letter) 
ANNEX 7 
225 
 
 
226 
 
Chapter 3. Escape from ‘tranquillity’? How TK Whitaker 
centralised and diversified Ireland’s currency reserves after the 
1967 devaluation of sterling681 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s there have been debates about the merits of currency boards. A 
currency board is a rule-based institution, which solidly fixes the country’s exchange 
rate against a selected reserve currency, and ensures that its monetary base of notes 
and coins is backed by such external reserves. Advocates of currency boards prize 
their stabilising discipline relative to central banks.682 Critics regard them as inflexible 
and more appropriate to colonial times.683 Some see a possible role for them in small, 
open economies, or as a transitory confidence-building device after political change.684 
Exit from a currency board can be traumatic, as in the case of Argentina in 2002,685 
while sometimes the transition from currency board to central bank goes smoothly.686 
 
One often-cited example of a country that successfully transitioned from a currency 
board to a central banking system is Ireland in the late 1970s. Ireland’s central bank in 
the 1950s-70s has been called the ‘tranquil currency board’.687 Starting as a post-
independence currency board in 1928, it had been granted central bank powers in the 
Central Bank Act 1942, but in practice little discretion was exercised and currency 
board rules were followed virtually until 1979, when the Irish pound’s one-for-one 
‘sterling link’ with the British pound ended upon the former’s entry into the European 
                                               
681
 I am grateful for the assistance of staff at the Central Bank of Ireland Archive, the National Archives of 
Ireland, National Library of Ireland, UCD Archives, Bank of Ireland Archive, RBS Archive, The National 
Archives of the UK and Bank of England Archive. Anne Chambers provided helpful answers to questions 
about TK Whitaker and his time. Eoin Drea provided guidance on sources. Duncan Farquhar gave helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. During drafting, Olivier Accominotti and Joan Rosés provided helpful 
feedback. All errors are my own. TK Whitaker died in early 2017, at the age of 100. This article records an 
aspect of his public service to Ireland 
682
 Hanke, ‘Currency boards’; Schuler, ‘Currency boards’ 
683
 Schwartz, ‘Currency boards’; Williamson, What role 
684
 Balino and Enoch, Currency board arrangements 
685
 De La Torre et al, ‘Living and dying’ 
686
 Malaysia, Singapore and Ireland are referenced in Balino and Enoch, Currency board arrangements, 
pp26-7 
687
 Wolf et al, Currency boards, p. 11 
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Monetary System. Ireland’s monetary arrangement of 1950-1979 has been described 
as a successful transitory system for an economy with conservative financial traditions 
and close cultural and economic integration with the UK.688 A number of authors have 
described how the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) progressively acquired more powers 
over decades689 so that, ‘the almost orthodox currency board gradually morphed into 
an active central bank’.690    
 
This chapter revisits Ireland’s experience with a currency board in the 1950s-70s and 
explores why the country eventually escaped this monetary arrangement. I first show 
that Ireland’s tripartite ‘currency board system’ did not really meet the orthodoxy 
requirements of the currency board advocates, differing from the ideal in several ways, 
such as monetary financing of public sector deficits. While one of the usual goals of 
this type of arrangement is to release monetary policy from political pressures, 
Ireland’s currency board did not prevent the government from monetising its debts in 
the 1950s-70s. 
 
Second, I revisit the timing of Ireland’s move from a currency board to a central 
banking system and argue that this move took place much more abruptly than usually 
described in historical accounts. Most of the significant changes in the transition from 
currency board to central bank occurred in the years 1968-72 after, and partly as a 
result of, the 1967 devaluation of sterling. Ireland’s transition to a central bank was 
made possible through two decisive and inter-related events: the centralisation of the 
sterling reserves of the commercial banks into the central bank, in 1968-9; and the 
diversification of Ireland’s external reserves away from sterling, which began in earnest 
in 1968 and took sterling’s share of Irish reserves from 90 per cent in 1967 to less than 
20 per cent in 1975.  
                                               
688
 Honohan, ‘Currency board’ 
689
 Moynihan, Currency and central banking; Moynihan, ‘The central bank’; Honohan, ‘Currency board’ 
690
 Wolf et al, Currency boards, p. 11 
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Why did reserve centralisation and diversification occur at that specific time and not 
sooner? Sterling’s devaluation of 1967 played a critical role in these events. Before the 
devaluation, Irish policymakers had avoided diversifying their reserves away from 
sterling because they remained faithful to their sterling area commitments. However, 
the UK decision to devalue the pound sterling in 1967 was a game-changer in that it 
was perceived in Ireland as a breach of the UK’s obligation towards members of the 
area. Released from their sense of duty, Irish monetary authorities could now freely 
and massively diversify their reserves into other currencies. At the same time, in an 
effort to appease sterling area members, the UK government offered a dollar 
guarantee to official holders of sterling, and this provided incentives for a centralisation 
of the commercial banks’ sterling reserves into the CBI. Therefore, Ireland’s switch to a 
modern central banking system, which was delayed for a long time by its adherence to 
the sterling area system, was suddenly precipitated by external events and another 
crisis affecting its traditional anchor currency.   
 
The chapter relies on evidence from three types of sources: published financial data, 
original material from the central bank and government archives, in both Ireland and 
the UK, and the historical records of two out of the four Irish commercial banks 
(‘Associated Banks’),691 namely Bank of Ireland and Ulster Bank. These sources allow 
me to provide a detailed account of the centralisation and diversification events 
following the 1967 sterling crisis. Although access to commercial bank archives was 
limited, evidence from two of these banks confirms the general story emerging from 
the data and the documents in the central bank.  
                                               
691
 The Associated Banks (i.e. commercial banks associated with the CBI as former shareholders of its 
predecessor, the Currency Commission) were Bank of Ireland, with Hibernian Bank and National Bank of 
Ireland, both of which it had absorbed by 1965; Provincial Bank of Ireland, Royal Bank of Ireland and the 
Munster & Leinster Bank, which all merged to form Allied Irish Banks in 1966; Ulster Bank and Northern 
Bank. The latter two banks, each with substantial Irish business, were headquartered in Belfast and 
owned by British banks, Westminster Bank (now RBS) and Midland Bank (now HSBC) respectively. By 
the late 1960s, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks were clearly the dominant players in Irish 
commercial banking   
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The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys historical context, literature, data 
and sources. Section 3 reviews the orthodoxy of the tripartite Irish financial system, 
extending the scope of Honohan’s currency board study. Section 4 provides an 
account of the centralisation of reserves at the CBI, placing it in the context of the 
broader evolution from currency board to central bank. Section 5 considers 
diversification from sterling, before and after 1967. Section 6 sets out conclusions. 
230 
 
Section 2  Historical context, literature, data and sources 
 
In 1927, a few years after independence, Ireland established a national currency, the 
‘Irish Saorstat pound’, fully convertible into sterling on a no-margins one-for-one basis, 
supported by a Currency Commission. Commercial banknotes were to be gradually 
phased out.692 Unlike, say, Australia, holdings of foreign currency were not mobilised 
by the state, and sterling circulated widely.693 The country emerged from neutrality in 
the Second World War with, on the one hand, a mature private banking system averse 
to state interference, and, on the other, governments which became focused on full 
employment and growth, primed through credit-funded state spending. The CBI had 
been created in 1943 as a compromise and interlocutor between these conflicting 
interests. A state-owned organisation, it had potentially wider powers than its 
predecessor the Currency Commission, but, as will be seen, its limited resources and 
constitution constrained the exercise of those powers. Ireland’s ‘official external 
reserves’ were divided between banks, government and CBI. Each was responsible for 
the management of its own patch.694 For this paper, it is important to understand the 
Irish tripartite financial system, which collectively controlled credit in Ireland.695 Each 
element (banks, government and CBI) is discussed below.  
 
There were initially eight ‘Associated Banks’, formerly the shareholders of the Currency 
Commission. By 1966, they had effectively been reduced to four in number, dominated 
by Bank of Ireland (BOI) and Allied Irish Banks (AIB), which each emerged from a 
three-bank consolidation. The Associated Banks were older than the Irish state, and, 
partly also through business in Northern Ireland, had close links with the UK banking 
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system. They had resisted the establishment of the central bank.696 They deposited 
their excess liquidity in London because of the lack of an Irish money market. They 
were organised through a cartel, the Irish Banks Standing Committee (IBSC). Bank of 
Ireland, once a contender to have been Ireland’s central bank, and still holder of the 
government’s Exchequer account, was the acknowledged leader of the group and 
chaired the IBSC.697 The ‘official external reserves’ managed by the banks were taken 
to be the ‘net external assets’ of the Associated Banks.698 While the Associated Banks 
could deploy their assets in foreign currencies other than sterling, they were also 
tasked with policing exchange control through their monitoring of exchange 
transactions. Exchange controls were supposed to prevent transfers of capital outside 
the sterling area.  
 
The government’s ‘official external reserves’ were held in a variety of funds, known as 
‘Departmental Funds’, and were dominated by the assets of the Post Office Savings 
Bank (POSB), initially held largely in sterling. Responsibility for the management of 
these assets rested with the Department of Finance (DF) and its powerful Secretary 
(TK Whitaker,699 from 1956 to 1969), reporting to the Minister for Finance. Until 1972, 
the government maintained a policy of balancing its current budget, but from 1950 
there was also a capital budget financed both through spending of the Departmental 
Funds, and also borrowing from banks, the non-bank sector, the CBI and abroad.700 
Most borrowing was conducted through scheduled issuance of Exchequer bills to the 
banks, and longer-term National Loans701 to the public. Ireland was a creditor nation 
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and, apart from a brief external foray in 1966 (the first in around 40 years) did not 
borrow overseas until the 1970s.702  
 
Under the Central Bank Act 1942, the CBI’s general function and duty consisted of 
‘safeguarding the integrity of the currency and ensuring that, in what pertains to the 
control of credit, the constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people 
as a whole’.703 However, until the granting of its licensing704 and supervisory powers in 
the Central Bank Act 1971, it had no tools with which to restrict credit.705 ‘The integrity 
of the currency’ also was a vague phrase. Whitaker said it simply meant defending the 
parity with sterling.706 The CBI’s assets were divided between two funds, a Legal 
Tender Note Fund (LTNF), a continuation of the Currency Commission’s function, and 
a smaller General Fund (GF) which was supposed to support other central bank roles 
such as acting as lender of last resort (LLR) to the banks. The CBI’s board, ruled by 
consensus, was inherently conservative. Although the Governor and membership were 
formally appointed by the Minister for Finance, the eight-man board had to include at 
least three Associated Bank-sponsored ‘banking Directors’ and no more than two 
‘service Directors’ employed by the state, of whom one was typically the Secretary of 
the DF. 
 
Meenan wrote that the balance of payments, not emigration, was the ‘true problem of 
the Irish economy’ in the 1950s-60s, indicating that increased exports were needed to 
support living standards, employment and development.707 Though the 1950s were 
troubled by stagnant growth, resulting in a ‘critical juncture’708 in policy around 1958 
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(from import substitution to encouragement of FDI and export-led growth), there were 
only short periods of external reserve loss during which the sterling parity seemed 
under special pressure, when interest rates or credit conditions were out of kilter with 
those in the UK (e.g. 1955-6 or 1965-6). In most years after 1956 the country’s current 
account deficit was at least matched by capital inflows. Total official external reserves 
were more under pressure in the 1950s (especially 1950-1 and 1955-6), and stable to 
increasing in the 1960s, as Figure 1 shows. Against average total official external 
reserves in the 1950s-60s of just over £240m, these were not severe fluctuations. Irish 
retail prices closely tracked those in the UK, even though running slightly ahead of the 
UK in the 1960s, and despite faster growth/lower velocity in wider money.709  
 
 
Figure 1: Ireland’s current account, long-term capital account, and change in total 
foreign exchange reserves, annually during year ended 31 December, 1950 - 1970 
(£m) 
Source: Current account: Bielenberg and Ryan, An economic history, ‘Statistical appendix, Table 4’; 
Change in total foreign exchange reserves: calculated from Moynihan, Currency, pp538-9; Long-term 
capital account: from Mitchell, International historical statistics 
Note: Current account deficit as percentage of GNP shown in figures for 1951, 1955, 1965 and 1969 
          
The debate about the merits of currency boards has principally revolved around the 
more recent (‘new’) operators of currency board systems, such as Hong Kong, 
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Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.710 For instance, in 
the case of Hong Kong, there have been opposing views about whether Hong Kong 
would have been better served by its currency board or the more flexible ‘monitoring 
band’ operated by Singapore.711 The Argentina debate concerns the extent to which 
the currency board contributed to the 2001-2 crisis, with complexity arising from 
differing views about what the currency board’s job was – simply to bear down on 
inflation or to instil wider macroeconomic discipline and stability. Reviewing the debate, 
Wolf et al concluded that it succeeded in the former but failed in the latter.712 The Baltic 
countries were assessed according to the appropriateness and credibility of their 
currency boards relative to independent central banks and flexible exchange rates – on 
the whole, these boards were considered to be appropriate (particularly Estonia’s), the 
main negatives being the weak LLR function and an increasing misalignment of the 
real exchange rate.713 Key issues in analysis of the merits of currency boards therefore 
include their motivation (e.g. credibility after hyperinflation – Argentina and Bulgaria – 
or credibility and stability after independence – the Baltic countries, Bosnia-
Herzegovina: Ireland would also be in this latter category). Other issues include 
whether they are intended as foreseeably permanent (e.g. small, open countries, 
which might even include a larger open economy responding to financial crisis, like 
Hong Kong in 1983) or as transitory, aimed at a further objective (e.g. joining the euro, 
for the European countries). For the transitory boards, it is argued, there should be an 
exit plan.714  
 
For Ireland, it is clear that the Central Bank Act 1942 intended a transition to full central 
bank status in conjunction with an indefinite fixed exchange rate to sterling, and 
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probably an indefinite sterling exchange standard.715 In other words, the relevant 
choice was not (viz the Hong Kong, or Baltic states literature) between a currency 
board and a floating rate of exchange, but between a currency board and a standard 
peg managed by a central bank (on the 1844 Bank of England ‘issue department’ 
model).716 Chang and Velasco’s theoretical framework suggested that, while a floating 
exchange rate with LLR is more beneficial, a standard peg, with limited central bank 
lending to commercial banks, should provide higher welfare than an orthodox currency 
board, but is more prone to bank runs than the currency board. Bank runs can be 
reduced by a ‘war chest’ approach of high bank reserves, but this comes at a high 
social opportunity cost.717 So there were theoretical welfare reasons for making the 
transition towards a softer peg. However, what the CBI lacked at the outset was 
resources, and certain functions which impinged on the Associated Banks (to act as 
banker to the banks and government, to restrict credit, or to engage in open market 
operations given the lack of a domestic money market).718 A currency board’s 
operation does not encourage, and possibly discourages, independent central bank 
policy capacity.719 That it took 30 years to start to make this transition suggests that the 
intended transition lacked a viable exit plan, and faced some countervailing resistance.    
 
Perhaps reflecting the blurred line between currency board and central bank, Schuler, 
an advocate of currency boards, did not initially recognise Ireland in 1943-79 as a 
currency board system,720 while describing Malaysia in 1959-67 as ‘a currency board 
system with a dormant central bank’721 (a phrase which might have applied equally well 
to the CBI in its early years). Indeed Ireland’s currency board has usually been 
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grouped among the ‘old’ (colonial) currency board systems,722 even though its original 
1927 set-up came after independence and so was similarly motivated to that of 
Estonia. It was Honohan who pointed out that the CBI was operating a currency board 
system at least until the early 1970s, so that the years afterwards until 1979 formed the 
‘true transition’ from currency board to central bank.723 Referencing Honohan, Wolf et 
al said the change began with the resumption of modest lending (1955-6) and 
culminated in the abandonment of legislative approval for parity changes (1971).724 
Also referencing Honohan’s article, Balino and Enoch’s gradual change story 
mentioned a dilution in the reserve backing rule (1961), modest lending to banks and 
government (1965), the parity rule change (1971) and the abandonment of the sterling 
link (1979).725 Meenan highlighted as key events the rediscounting of Exchequer bills 
(1956), the CBI’s issuance of credit advice to banks (moral suasion – 1965), and the 
transfer to the CBI of the Associated Banks’ net external assets (1968-9) and the 
government’s Exchequer account (1972).726      
 
A definition of an orthodox currency board was provided by Hanke, a currency board 
advocate:  
 
‘An orthodox currency board issues notes and coins convertible on demand 
into a foreign anchor currency at a fixed rate of exchange. As reserves, it 
holds low-risk, interest-bearing bonds denominated in the anchor currency 
and typically some gold. The reserve levels are set by law and are equal to 
100 percent, or slightly more, of its monetary liabilities (notes, coins, and if 
permitted, deposits)… Its operations are passive and automatic. The sole 
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function of a currency board is to exchange the domestic currency it issues 
for an anchor currency at a fixed rate.’727 
 
The main difference between the balance sheet of a central bank and an orthodox 
currency board is that a central bank holds some domestic assets (typically 
government debt) while a currency board does not.728 Because it has no domestic 
assets, an orthodox currency board operates a hard exchange rate peg, fixed usually 
by statute, with no ability to conduct monetary policy or to act as LLR to the banking 
system.729 Balino and Enoch argued that the credibility of a currency board 
arrangement (CBA) depends on three rules: the reserve backing and hard exchange 
rate rules listed above, and a third unwritten rule: 
 
‘While large excess reserves can strengthen a CBA, they must be used in a 
way that clearly subordinates concerns over monetary and banking sector 
developments to the objective of preserving the parity… their credibility 
depends as much on attitudes as on rules and institutions’730 
 
This unwritten rule is a particularly interesting question in Ireland’s case. Did the 
currency board foster fiscal discipline? Jao highlighted Hong Kong’s fiscal surplus,731 
but some authors claimed that the Argentinian currency board failed to encourage 
fiscal discipline.732 The same complaint was raised against that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where credit growth was effectively uncontrolled because it was endogenously 
financed by foreign currency deposits made by the commercial banks’ foreign owners. 
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Gedeon argued that, because of the money creation flaw, this orthodox currency board 
was ‘called to active duty’ to control bank liquidity and reserve requirements.733     
 
So long as its assets were only sterling and (a little) gold, the CBI’s LTNF met Hanke’s 
technical definition precisely. Its liabilities were the Irish note issue alone and, dealing 
with the banks, it exchanged Irish notes for sterling and vice versa without margin or 
commission. Asset cover was 100 per cent. The parity with sterling could only be 
changed by statute. The LTNF was therefore certainly a currency board. Under the 
Central Bank Act 1942, a unanimous CBI board decision supported by Ministerial order 
could widen the LTNF’s eligible assets without needing the approval of the Irish 
parliament. But these orders were rare. In 1956, US dollars were added as eligible 
assets. Irish government securities were permitted in 1959, but only for external on-
lending to the IMF or World Bank (arising from Ireland’s accession to the Bretton 
Woods institutions in 1957). An asset in the CBI’s GF was added in 1961. This was a 
way of adding to the resources of the GF, but would only make a difference to the 
extent that the GF itself engaged in domestic activity. In 1969, a reserve with the IMF 
was added. The reserve was Ireland’s gold payment to the IMF plus any loans of Irish 
currency to IMF members: again, an external asset.734 
 
Ireland’s central banking currency board system merits brief comparison with the ‘old’ 
currency board systems of other important sterling area countries in the 1960s, notably 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Honohan’s finding that Ireland’s new central 
bank operated like the previous formal currency board was mirrored by similar 
arguments Schenk made about the new central banks in Malaya, Ghana and 
Nigeria.735 Schwartz and Schenk in separate ways showed how the varied currency 
board systems of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore then departed significantly from 
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orthodoxy during 1967-73. In essence, the sterling peg proved not so important for 
them, after the 1967 devaluation of sterling, and the subsequent stresses created by 
exchange rate volatility required domestic interventions by the monetary authorities.736 
Balino and Enoch argued that the transition from currency board to central bank in 
Malaysia, Singapore and Ireland were part of a ‘normal evolutionary pattern’, the two 
former countries switching into a float, without disruption, from a position of strength, 
and Ireland undergoing a graduated and smooth exit.737   
 
Ireland’s situation was different from the entrepot economies of Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Its geography and trade orientation towards the UK, labour market linkages 
and reliance on London’s financial market, made the fixed sterling link an obvious 
choice.738 The UK’s share of Ireland’s imports and exports is shown in Figure 2. 
O’Grada suggested Irish monetary policy was ‘not very exciting before the 1970s’,739 
for Ireland was essentially monetarily dependent on the UK.740 Bourke and Kinsella 
portrayed the Irish financial system as wholly reliant on London during the sterling link 
years.741 When the UK imposed exchange controls against the rest of the sterling area 
in 1972, Ireland alone was exempted.742 In short, Ireland in this period was much more 
closely integrated with the UK than was Estonia with Germany in the 1990s.743 
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Figure 2: UK’s share of Irish merchandise trade, annually during year ended 31 
December, 1950 – 1976 (%) 
Source: Bielenberg and Ryan, An economic history of Ireland, pp129, 134, 139 
          
The accounts of the centralisation and diversification events in the literature have been 
brief. McGowan regarded the centralisation as important, changing the manner in 
which bank liquidity had been managed for at least 150 years, and preparing the way 
for the break with sterling in 1979 – but did not go into details.744  
 
The leading account of the diversification was Whitaker’s.745 According to Whitaker, 
Irish officials were concerned about sterling’s weakness in the years prior to its 1967 
devaluation but did not wish to add to sterling’s problems by diversifying. After the 
devaluation, he took the view that sterling’s international role was dying and no longer 
likely to be supported by the UK, and so he negotiated an amicable withdrawal.746 
From the perspective of currency board theory, however, the resulting currency 
mismatch, which was achieved before first thoughts about breaking the sterling link,747 
was unusual.748 Currency boards are not supposed to court insolvency by taking such 
exchange rate risk.749 
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The diversification would have come as a surprise to contemporaries such as Strange, 
writing in 1968, who described Ireland as economically and monetarily dependent on 
the UK, seen as ‘the one firm anchor-man among the uncertain official holders of 
sterling balances’.750 She alluded further to loyalty, saying that Ireland drew funds from 
the IMF in 1966 ‘in preference to drawing down funds from the sterling balances which 
would have added to British difficulties’, and that the offer of a dollar guarantee to 
Ireland in 1968 as an inducement to keep its sterling balances may have been ‘hardly 
necessary’.751 
 
A final important aspect of Ireland’s tripartite financial system was the power relations 
between central bank, government and commercial banks, and their counterparts in 
the UK. In Hong Kong, Schenk’s study revealed an intimate, occasionally challenging, 
relation between the government and powerful note-issuing banks, brought together in 
the management of the colony’s Exchange Fund.752 In Malaysia and Singapore, 
banking was dominated by foreign, particularly British banks. This was not the case in 
Ireland, given the preponderance of Bank of Ireland and AIB (they accounted for about 
90 per cent of the Associated Banks’ capital resources, as discussed below). In the 
1960s, the Malaysian central bank had limited resources for market operations, but 
considerable statutory power over the commercial banks’ liquidity, lending and interest 
rates.753 By contrast, until 1969-71, the CBI lacked both resources and statutory 
powers. O’Grada thought the CBI was dominated by the government, and too gentle 
on the Associated Banks.754 However, central bank insiders were more forgiving. 
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Meenan said it exercised an important restraining influence on both.755 Moynihan and 
Whitaker testified to its independent, restraining role, albeit with limited tools.756  
 
The CBI’s board structure reveals the independent power of the Associated Banks. But 
the government had legislative power, which it had used before (the Central Bank Act 
1942) and would use again (the Central Bank Act 1971). Various authors noted that 
developments around the latter legislation were an important boost to the CBI’s (and 
implicitly the government’s) authority over the banks.757 Banking was also a nationalist 
political issue, and the Associated Banks, the CBI and the DF itself were variously 
accused of being under the sway of their UK counterparts. Taking the period from the 
1920s to 1960, Drea emphasised the continuity of strong Anglo-Irish financial relations 
despite political and trade conflict.758 Academic studies have generally found that these 
relations were not subservient, however. The DF, led by patriots such as Whitaker, 
responded to the political concerns.759 Overall, the writings on these issues suggest 
balanced relations, between banks and government, between Ireland and the UK. With 
its painful history of civil war, remembered in the form of Ireland’s two leading political 
parties (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael), there was a need to get by through consensus.        
 
The data for the paper consists of a descriptive annual run of external reserve data 
(and other relevant metrics for comparison) from published sources, together with 
qualitative material from primary archival sources, indicating debates and motivations. 
Interviews were considered but not pursued. Whitaker was not available and the 
survivors of these times are very old. The archives consulted were the National 
Archives of Ireland (NAI), National Library of Ireland (NLI), UCD Archives (UCDA), 
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Central Bank of Ireland (CBI), Bank of Ireland (BOI), Ulster Bank (RBS), The National 
Archives of the UK (TNA) and Bank of England Archive (BOE).  
 
The annual run of data on Ireland’s official external reserves has been taken from 
various published sources, due to the changing ownership of the reserves.760 Access 
to Irish primary financial sources for the post-war period is not straightforward. The 
NAI, NLI and UCDA761 records have been well-studied by historians, but not through 
this particular lens. For new qualitative insights, the NAI’s files (Department of Finance, 
Department of the Taoiseach (DT), Department of External Affairs, Cabinet Minutes) 
were informative. The most important qualitative source was that of the CBI, whose 
archive was in the course of being opened up to external researchers, and was 
therefore only partly accessible due to archival preparation. The files viewed revealed 
the conflicts and priorities of the tripartite organisations in the 1960s. Further access 
may reveal more. The most difficult sources were those of the Associated Banks. The 
records of AIB were not available, and only the Court records of BOI were able to be 
viewed. The larger of the two smaller banks, Ulster Bank, was chosen to deepen the 
picture. Finally, the TNA and BOE files revealed Anglo-Irish negotiations and British 
perceptions, especially from the late 1960s. 
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Section 3 The currency board orthodoxy of Ireland’s financial system 
 
In order to explain and set the scene for the centralisation and diversification events, 
this Section uses a mixture of published data and some archival records to examine 
the currency board orthodoxy of Ireland’s financial system. The question of orthodoxy 
can be considered on three levels. The first level was the LTNF. We saw in the last 
Section that the LTNF was, clearly, an orthodox currency board, with the only 
exceptions being the asset in the GF (which, as will be shown, was not large, in the 
range of £20-30m, and was not a sufficient condition for loss of orthodoxy, which 
depended on the behaviour of the GF) and its diversification from sterling in the 1970s. 
The second level was that of the CBI, being the GF and LTNF together. This was the 
holistic question considered in Honohan’s article: he argued that the CBI was behaving 
like a currency board.762 The third level was the tripartite financial system as a whole: 
did it reflect the expectations of the currency board advocates? After briefly providing 
further detail in support of Honohan’s argument about the CBI’s role, the Section 
focuses mainly on the third, wider level.     
 
Whether the CBI was a de facto currency board depends on three things. Firstly, the 
relative sizes and resources of the GF and LTNF; secondly, the extent to which the GF 
was acting like a central bank (investing in domestic assets, acting as LLR); thirdly, the 
extent to which the LTNF was acting like a currency board (we have argued already 
that it was).  
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Figure 3: Assets of Legal Tender Note Fund and General Fund, CBI, end-month, 
March 1955 – December 1975 (£m) 
Source: CBI annual statements of account, 1955-75 
 
Although the nominal values in Figure 3 are affected by inflation, particularly in the 
1970s, it is clear that by March 1968, the GF, with a balance sheet value of £98m – 
albeit more resourced than in the 1950s (it did not exceed £20m until 1961) – had not 
progressed far. It had received some deposits in the 1960s, from the Associated Banks 
and the government (described later), but the changes in 1968-72 were altogether 
more significant. If we turn now to the breakdown of the assets of the GF, addressing 
the changing scale by expressing the categories as percentages of the whole, it is 
possible to identify the key domestic activity. This breakdown is shown in Figure 4. The 
GF’s domestic central bank activity is captured in the category ‘bills rediscounted and 
Irish government’. Most of the ‘short money’ (cash, bank balances and money at call) 
was external, as was the category, ‘gold, IMF and other investments’. Not surprisingly, 
this domestic central bank activity cropped up in the Irish crises of 1955-6 and 1965-6, 
events which are described further below.  
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Figure 4: Percentage composition of assets of General Fund, CBI, end-month, March 
1955 – December 1975 (%) 
Source: CBI annual statements of account, 1955-75 
Note: It is not possible to separate all domestic holdings from ‘Short money’ (e.g. Irish currency) and 
‘Gold, IMF and other’ (other investments included shares in the BIS) but the vast majority of these 
categories were external holdings, so that ‘Bills rediscounted and Irish government’ was the principal 
domestic asset 
 
The same breakdown can be made for the LTNF, see Figure 5. Here, all assets were 
effectively external other than the ‘asset in the General Fund’. As one might expect, 
the LTNF retained its sterling holdings longer than the GF did, but by December 1974, 
sterling was less than 40 per cent of the LTNF assets, and by December 1975 less 
than 20 per cent, an unusual orientation for a currency board given the sterling link, 
even allowing for a currency board’s capacity for unused and illiquid investment 
holdings. This was before thoughts of breaking the link: indeed, Barry argued that 
Ireland parted company with sterling in 1979 more for political than economic reasons, 
and because the UK’s late decision not to join the EMS forced Ireland to choose.763 In 
summary, the GF and LTNF each held a high proportion of external assets, which 
supports Honohan’s conclusion about the currency board approach – the principal 
unorthodox aspect being the diversification from sterling.    
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Figure 5: Percentage composition of assets of Legal Tender Note Fund, CBI, end-
month, March 1955 – December 1975 (%) 
Source: CBI annual statements of account, 1955-75 
 
We turn now to the wider financial system. There were several aspects in which 
Ireland’s financial system did not fit the traditional currency board fact pattern. One 
was the maturity of its banking system. If we compare the ratio of M2 (which includes 
savings and term bank deposits) to notes in circulation across other sterling area 
countries, which either operated or had emerged from currency board systems, its ratio 
was higher than that of Malaysia, Singapore or Nigeria, and in line with central bank-
run New Zealand (see Figure 6). 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
r-
5
5
M
a
r-
5
6
M
a
r-
5
7
M
a
r-
5
8
M
a
r-
5
9
M
a
r-
6
0
M
a
r-
6
1
M
a
r-
6
2
M
a
r-
6
3
M
a
r-
6
4
M
a
r-
6
5
M
a
r-
6
6
M
a
r-
6
7
M
a
r-
6
8
M
a
r-
6
9
M
a
r-
7
0
M
a
r-
7
1
M
a
r-
7
2
M
a
r-
7
3
M
a
r-
7
4
D
e
c
-7
4
D
e
c
-7
5
Asset in General
Fund
Irish Government
(Bretton Woods
advances)
US dollars
Gold
Sterling
248 
 
 
Figure 6: Ratio of M2 to notes in circulation for Ireland and selected sterling area 
countries, 1950 – 1970 (ratio) 
Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics. For definitions and ultimate sources, see Mitchell 
Note: Mitchell’s 1964 figure for note circulation in Ireland looks suspect relative to Moynihan, Currency, 
pp512-3 and has been excluded. The 1968-9 data for Nigeria excluded three eastern regions and so have 
also been excluded 
 
This ratio is important because it has become an area of dispute between currency 
board advocates and critics. The advocates suggest that it is sufficient for external 
assets to cover the monetary base, while the latter argue that wider money ought also 
to be addressed, which makes a currency board too costly when the ratio is high. In 
the case of Mexico in 1995, the argument was about figures of US$11 billion and 
US$50 billion in foreign reserves being required to set up a currency board, not 
dissimilar from Ireland’s ratio.764 Ireland’s ratio was also increasing during the 1960s. 
 
What did this mean for Ireland’s financial system? It meant that, more than otherwise, 
the commercial banks, rather than the LTNF, were likely to be the principal absorber of 
shocks. This can be seen in Figure 7, which compares changes in total official external 
reserves with changes in the net external assets of the Associated Banks. 
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Figure 7: Annual change in Ireland’s official external reserves and Associated Banks’ 
net external assets, years to 31 December, 1950 – 1972 (£m)  
Source: Calculated from Moynihan, Currency, pp530-1 
Note: Position with CBI = deposits with CBI less bills rediscounted with CBI; AB = Associated Banks 
 
Figure 7 shows that the Associated Banks’ net external assets absorbed much of the 
variation in Ireland’s FX reserves until they were centralised into the CBI in 1968-9. 
The dashed line shows the underlying change in the Associated Banks’ combined net 
external assets and net central bank position (their deposits with the CBI less bill 
rediscounts by the CBI), which might be considered a better reflection of their available 
reserves position. Due to increasing liquidity pressures on the banks in 1965, the CBI 
stepped in to assist with financing in that crisis year, as will be discussed, and so 
absorbed the 1965 downturn in total reserves. 
 
Why were the Associated Banks under liquidity pressure in the mid-late 1960s? This 
brings us to the second unorthodox aspect of Ireland’s financial system, which might 
not appeal to the currency board advocates, namely domestic credit, and monetary 
financing of the public sector. The advocates favour currency boards because they 
help to achieve fiscal discipline: the critics disagree that currency boards alone can 
instil fiscal discipline.765 Williamson called this the ‘central question’.766 
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Monetary financing of the public sector principally comprises borrowing from domestic 
banks, borrowing from the central bank, and borrowing from external sources. By 
1980, this was becoming a problem in Ireland. Murphy observed that, in that year, 70 
per cent of the UK’s Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) was financed in a 
non-monetary way, while ‘over 75 per cent of the Irish PSBR came through monetary 
financing’,767 principally external borrowing. Bradley et al’s macroeconomic study of 
Irish fiscal policy in 1967-80 found that, although ‘not very active’768 in 1967-71, 
discretionary fiscal policy across the whole period led to a ‘massive deterioration in 
both the balance of payments and the borrowing requirement’,769 the inheritance of ‘a 
public authorities deficit of almost 16 per cent of GNP’770 in the 1980s, and a ‘huge 
debt which must be repaid in future periods’.771 While the scale of monetary financing 
was much less in the 1950s-60s, it was taking place throughout these years, 
particularly in the form of borrowing from domestic banks. 
 
One can see this financing of government spending taking place in various ways. 
Firstly, the government spent most of its Departmental Funds in the 1950s, eventually 
depositing its remaining sterling (£11m) with the CBI in 1964. The increasing Irish 
deposits in the POSB were invested in domestic government and other Irish assets. 
This is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Composition of Irish Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) assets, by currency 
and type, annually at 31 December, 1950 – 1972 (£m) 
Source: POSB statements of account, 1950-72 
 
Then there was Associated Bank lending to the public sector. This took two forms, 
short-term Exchequer bills, and other investments. The Exchequer bills were not like 
UK Treasury bills. They were illiquid, since there was no Irish money market, and they 
tended to be rolled over into new Exchequer bills when they came to maturity. Some 
Exchequer bills could be rediscounted at the CBI if necessary, in a limited way (as will 
be discussed). Irish government bonds were also illiquid. The scale and composition of 
Associated Bank lending is shown in Figure 9. Government investments constituted 10 
per cent of all Associated Bank credit at the end of 1964, 20 per cent at end-1966, and 
27 per cent at end-1969. 
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Figure 9: Composition of Associated Bank credit to government and non-government 
sectors, as at 31 December, 1949 – 1972 
Source: Moynihan, Currency, pp532-3 
Note: No data for 1970 due to bank dispute           
    
Finally, if public sector needs could not be met by the banks, the government could 
resort to external borrowing. This happened during the crisis of 1965-6. The borrowing 
programme was prompted by balance-of-payments pressures, the government’s 
capital budget, and the Irish banks’ refusal to extend more funds. Details of the 
programme (a principal sum of £25m) are in Annex 2. It was little short of a disaster. 
The first, planned, dollar bond issue had to be withdrawn due to lack of demand. 
Ireland then drew from the IMF. It borrowed expensively through a Deutschemark 
bond. There was a curious sterling loan from the Dublin branch of a Canadian bank – it 
is not clear if the UK authorities were aware of this transaction, since they had been 
refusing to allow a sterling bond in London – and the same branch later received an 
Irish pounds deposit from the POSB. Finally a sterling bond issue was permitted under 
Bank of England sponsorship: it was significantly undersubscribed, 88 per cent 
apparently being left with the underwriters. A government spokesman concluded that 
external borrowing was ‘difficult and dear’,772 and Ireland did not return to the external 
markets until the 1970s, when it borrowed heavily.   
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 NAI:TSCH/96/6/384, Dáil report, 27/9/1966. Details in Annex 2 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
1
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
7
1
9
5
8
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
£
m
 
Credit non-government
Other credit to
Government
Exchequer bills
253 
 
A third area of divergence from the currency board ideal was interest rates. Honohan 
and O’Grada argued that the crisis of 1955-6 was a major interest rate policy blunder, 
as the Irish government persuaded the Associated Banks not to increase interest rates 
after a rise in UK rates early in 1955. This resulted in an expansion of domestic credit 
in Ireland and capital outflows, and capitulation by the government at the end of 
1955.773 But although rising UK interest rates were not generally matched fully by Irish 
rates over this period, the authors argued that subsequent narrowing of the differential 
at times of high UK rates did not have such drastic effects after 1955. They thought 
that the Associated Banks could have been simply absorbing narrower differentials, 
since rising British interest rates were generating higher profits overall, or rationing 
credit when differentials were under pressure.774 A comparison of the UK-Irish interest 
differential using the CBI’s minimum rediscount rate suggested that the 1955-6 period 
was the most extreme divergence during this period.775 In compiling a long-run interest 
rate time series for Ireland, Gerlach and Stuart even used sterling bill discount rates for 
1933-62, arguing the difficulty of establishing an Irish interest rate and that market 
rates probably diverged from official ones.776 
 
Nevertheless, since the Associated Banks set lending rates in Ireland, it is interesting 
to see how the cartel’s ordinary overdraft rate compared with the British rates. The UK 
Treasury bill rate is not, however, a good comparator, as, in the 1960s, the Bank of 
England was intervening in an attempt to manage forward exchange rates for sterling, 
so deposit rates for UK local authorities, finance houses and eurosterling have 
sometimes been used as a better indicator of British market interest rate conditions. 
Figure 10 shows interest rates in Ireland (the CBI’s minimum rediscount rate, and 
Associated Banks’ large deposit and ordinary overdraft rates) and the UK (3 month 
Treasury bills and local authority deposit rates) quarterly over the period. 
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Figure 10: Selected interest rates in the UK and Ireland, quarterly at end of quarter, 
December 1951 – December 1969 (%) 
Source: Moynihan, Currency, pp524-7; TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’, pp109-23 
Note: ABs = Associated Banks. Local authority ‘temporary loans’ is a deposit rate. The British figures are 3 
month rates 
 
Figure 10 indicates a narrowing in the 1960s of the (wide) margin between the 
Associated Banks’ deposit and overdraft rates, and this probably reflected competitive 
pressure from the non-Associated Banks, which were not governed by the cartel rates 
and were expanding rapidly during this period. To see more clearly the effects on 
Ireland of rising UK interest rates, Figure 11 shows two differentials. The first 
differential, between the CBI’s minimum rediscount rate and the UK Treasury bill rate, 
mirrors the picture in Honohan’s article,777 and gives the impression that relative 
orthodoxy was established in the 1960s. But the second differential, between the 
Associated Banks’ overdraft rate and UK local authority deposit rates, continued to 
fluctuate in the 1960s. In 1961 and 1965 and 1969 (when UK rates were pushed up 
due to pressure on sterling) there was even a technical arbitrage (negative differential) 
based on these rates. The second differential is the more realistic picture, and accords 
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with Meenan’s admission that interest rate changes were heavily negotiated with 
government, which ‘leaned in favour of low rates’.778     
 
 
Figure 11: Selected Ireland-UK interest rate differentials, quarterly as at end of quarter, 
December 1951 – December 1969 (%) 
Source: calculated from underlying data in Figure 10 
Note: ABs = Associated Banks 
 
The fourth area of Irish divergence might not be considered as a violation of currency 
board principles by currency board advocates. This was the CBI acting as a lender to 
the commercial banks or government at times of stress, which was notable in 1955-6 
and 1965-6. Jao argued that LLR activity in Hong Kong in the 1980s was orthodox 
because it came not out of the Exchange Fund itself but from the colony’s fiscal 
funds.779 Similarly the CBI’s GF, not the LTNF, was the source of lending support in 
Ireland. Also, the amounts were not large, as discussed below. This was not 
conventional bill rediscounting or LLR activity, however. The CBI was in effect stepping 
in, when the Associated Banks were resisting the government’s regular request for 
credit. The CBI was thus acting as a lender of second resort, rather than last resort.  
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Balino and Enoch wrote that the Irish banks ‘resorted to banks in London for liquidity 
support’,780 a claim that is sometimes seen in the literature, but I could find no evidence 
(for instance, in the Bank of Ireland Court records) to support it, nor any rationale for it 
(in 1939, the Bank of England explicitly made clear that it would not support Irish 
banks).781 Obviously the two smaller UK-owned Associated Banks enjoyed parental 
support. Irish banks had UK banking contacts which acted as ‘London agents’ for 
them, but these were agents, not principals. Balino and Enoch cited Honohan as the 
source for their statement, but in fact Honohan said something different: that the Irish 
banking system, with its large net external assets, had no need of a central bank to act 
as LLR – and he was only referring to the position in 1943.782  
    
Honohan suggested that the CBI’s first bill rediscounting was a market reaction to the 
policy blunder of low Irish interest rates: he said it was no surprise that 1955-6 ‘saw the 
first use of the rediscount facility, with bills both of a state-owned enterprise and of the 
Exchequer being refinanced at rates considerably more favourable than obtainable in 
London’.783 However, my impression is that the recourse to bill rediscounting was 
based on perception of need, rather than market opportunism. These Irish bills had no 
market, the banks were concerned by the loss of external liquidity,784 and Moynihan’s 
CBI history revealed that the first Exchequer bill rediscounting (in January 1956) arose 
to resolve a £7.5m gap between what the Irish Exchequer wanted and the Associated 
Banks were prepared to provide. Moreover, it took place after the increase in the 
published rediscount rate from 3 per cent to 4 per cent on 19 December 1955.785 From 
1956 to 1961, there was a CBI understanding with the banks that bill rediscounting 
would only be made in case of need, up to an aggregate limit of £9-10m 
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outstanding.786 The GF, with total assets of only £12.5m in March 1956, did not have 
such liquid sterling resources at its command. It was this need for sterling in the GF, 
and not a particular desire to diversify from sterling, that prompted the CBI to make US 
dollars eligible investments for the sterling-rich LTNF in August 1956. The GF already 
held dollars, and more dollars could be acquired from Irish citizens’ legacies and 
remittances from the USA. By March 1958, the LTNF had accumulated £10.5m of 
dollar investments, but there was little momentum for change thereafter: its dollar 
holdings remained in a range of £10-12m until 1969.787       
 
CBI support was a similar story in 1965-6. Although, until 1972, the government at 
least aimed at current fiscal balance, the 1965-6788 capital budget, part of the 
government’s 1964-70 Second Programme for Economic Expansion, focused on 
schools and hospitals, was then running at around £100m per annum (about 10 per 
cent of GNP), nearly half of which would need to be funded from the banking system 
and the aforementioned external borrowing programme. The Associated Banks, 
concerned about their liquidity position, which came close to breaching new CBI 
guidance in this year (of which more in the next Section), refused to provide new 
funding in September 1965. In response, the CBI gave £20m of special assistance to 
the government, taking up a new 6 per cent four year National Loan indirectly via the 
banks.789 Meenan wrote that Ireland’s public finances were ‘in disorder’ in 1965-6.790  
  
This Section has shown that Ireland’s currency board, the LTNF, was not necessarily 
the most important part of its financial system, which hinged on the relationship 
between the government and the Associated Banks. If Ireland could run a fiscal deficit 
of around 10 per cent of GNP in the mid-1960s, half through monetary financing, how 
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much fiscal discipline was the currency board itself imposing? The key issue was that 
the CBI was often not consulted on decisions or discussions, or its advice not heeded. 
This led to the resignation of its first Governor, Brennan, in 1953.791 Meenan suggested 
that the CBI was not consulted about the Second Programme in 1963-4.792 The 
archival record indicates that the CBI Governor was not even consulted in the days 
and hours before the Cabinet’s decision to maintain parity with sterling when the latter 
devalued in 1967.793   
 
One should not exaggerate these divergences from the currency board advocates’ 
ideal. Whether through Associated Banks resistance, lack of appetite internationally for 
Ireland’s bond issues, or conservative advice from Whitaker at the DF, and ultimately 
the effect on reserves of the fixed exchange rate policy, market disciplines were being 
felt by the Irish government during this period. It meant that the Second Programme 
had to be abandoned early, and replaced with a Third Programme. There was 
confidence in the sterling link, and fear that the Irish pound would be devalued if the 
link were broken.794 When, in August 1965, the Taoiseach, Lemass, wrote to the 
Minister for Finance asking if Ireland should abandon the sterling parity and float the 
Irish pound, the firm advice he received was no.795 The issue is whether the discipline 
was being imposed by the fixed exchange rate policy, or by the currency board 
mechanism: there was no 1960s non-currency board counterfactual with which to 
compare the situation. But the longer-term principles of monetary financing, interest 
rate management, and central bank lending were present, and it did not seem to take 
much adverse change to bring them into play. The Irish tripartite financial system 
involved a continuous credit dialogue and relationship between the banking cartel and 
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the Irish government, with the CBI often, but not always, acting as interlocutor. In the 
next Section, it will be shown how these conditions led to the centralisation of the 
Associated Banks’ net external assets in 1968-9.  
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Section 4 Centralisation of the Associated Banks’ net external assets, 1968-9 
 
Centralisation of the banks’ sterling reserves was not a new issue. There had been 
nationalist criticism of the banks’ sterling holdings since the 1920s,796 typically 
expressed as the need to ‘repatriate’ the sterling in order to invest it in the Irish state.  
The banks held sterling for liquidity reasons. The CBI’s Report of the Money Market 
Committee (MMC), published in 1969, found that the Associated Banks’ government 
securities investments in June 1968 were indeed disproportionately in the UK,797 but 
also noted that turnover in the Irish gilt market was less than one per cent that of the 
British gilt market, and that the £75m of Irish Exchequer bills then outstanding were 
largely held by the banks themselves and had no liquidity.798 In order to understand the 
1968-9 timing of the centralisation, it is necessary to appreciate the earlier debates as 
well as the particular circumstances of those years.  
 
4.1 Slow progress in the 1950s 
 
Whitaker himself had a nuanced position about these sterling assets. He was critical of 
them, and of the lack of CBI initiative towards full exercise of its functions in the 
1950s,799 but he thought new legislation was politically risky, and wanted unanimous 
decisions from the CBI’s board in order to allay concerns: ‘functions must be exercised 
if they are not to become atrophied’.800 This ‘policy atrophy’ problem mirrors Kopcke’s 
aforementioned critique of currency boards.801 
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In 1957, after the 1955-6 crisis, there were external appeals for a strong central bank 
directing monetary policy.802 One academic paper, passed to Whitaker by the Minister 
for Finance, called for centralisation of all net external assets within the CBI, which 
should also take over the government’s account from BOI, start to pay interest on 
deposits, abolish the LTNF and the automatic link between Irish notes and sterling, 
and so take control of credit policy.803 Whitaker corresponded with three leading 
economists who wanted to see central control of external assets because they 
regarded the banks’ holdings as too vulnerable, to adverse movements in trade, credit 
creation, and confidence in the sterling parity and the banking system. Whitaker replied 
that it was a question of priorities and timing: better to solve the fundamental problem 
of productive investment first and work with the current financial system, than to reform 
the financial system before the investment problem had been solved.804      
 
Whitaker did act quickly, however, in July 1957, after receiving a more cautious paper, 
‘The powers of the central bank’, written by CH Murray, then of the DT,805 at the 
Taoiseach’s request. The paper was balanced about the practicalities of transferring 
the banks’ net external reserves, but prioritised a role for the CBI in clearing inter-bank 
liabilities, taking on the government’s account, and introducing a fiduciary element to 
the note issue. Murray’s view was that the CBI should only take on responsibilities 
such as acting as LLR if it were given the resources and powers to do so.806 Whitaker 
urged the CBI Governor, McElligott, to proceed with the central clearing idea, one 
which they had discussed before,807  which would involve paying interest on clearance 
deposits (the Central Bank Act 1942 generally precluded payment of interest by the 
CBI). The difficulty of implementing change is evidenced by the fact that it was not until 
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November 1958, after much tripartite negotiation, that the CBI began to participate in 
central clearing.808 
 
4.2 Conflict at the CBI’s board and with the banks, 1961-4 
 
After Moynihan809 replaced the conservative McElligott as Governor of the CBI in 1961, 
the CBI’s staff made proposals for banking system reform. The central bank’s 
economist, Oslizlok, authored a memorandum on central banking powers which 
impressed Whitaker.810 After consultation between the two, this was circulated at the 
CBI board meeting on 26 October 1961.811 By then, the ‘asset in the General Fund’, 
creating a quasi-fiduciary element within the LTNF, had already been introduced, in 
August 1961 (the timing of this coinciding with another sterling crisis).  
 
Oslizlok’s memorandum was based on seven characteristic functions of a central bank. 
The central bank should regulate the currency; act as banker and agent to the 
government; be a depositary for banks; manage international reserves; act as LLR for 
banks; settle inter-bank clearances; and control credit. Major recommendations were 
to transfer assets from the LTNF to the GF, and for the CBI to take on the customary 
government and bank depositary roles. 
 
There were strong reactions at the board. McElligott warned against ‘totalitarianism’ on 
the part of the state’s central bank; Glenavy, the banking director from BOI, whose 
government account role was under threat, called it an ‘amputation’. There were five 
parts to the memorandum, and in subsequent board meetings, Moynihan tried to steer 
the board to an agreed statement on each part. By 3 January 1962, there were agreed 
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minutes about parts 1 and 2 (relating to general principles and the external assets). 
Ensuring parity with sterling remained the CBI’s ‘most essential’ function, but in a nod 
to the memorandum, it was agreed that the external assets served not only note 
redemption but the ‘general needs of the economy’, and the CBI’s role included 
influencing ‘factors determining the total liquidity position of the economy’. However, 
after the board meeting on 10 January, a further minute was issued stressing the need 
to retain adequate external assets in the LTNF to meet its traditional convertibility and 
other Currency Commission functions.812 These contradictory minutes indicate a board 
that was not in unity.  
 
Part 3 of the memorandum related to the CBI’s functions with respect to the 
government. Here board discussion began in earnest at the meeting on 10 January 
1962. Despite all Moynihan’s attempts to find a modified form of words acceptable to 
Whitaker and Glenavy, and despite correspondence and meetings over each of the 
following months, no agreement was reached. Whitaker was in no particular hurry to 
transfer the Exchequer account, but he did not want to abandon the principle he was 
demanding that the CBI should be able to provide credit direct to the government and 
be entitled to act as its fiscal agent. The focus turned to other matters such as the 
practice of commercial bank lending to the government and the transfer of the 
remaining external assets of the Departmental Funds to the CBI. By 10 July 1962, 
Moynihan informed Whitaker that ‘further consideration of Part 3… has been 
postponed and the item has been dropped from the agenda’.813 Moynihan did not 
abandon the transfer of the government account, and held another informal meeting 
with the Governor and Deputy Governor of BOI, and Whitaker, on 11 March 1963, but 
the two sides could only agree to disagree.814 Transfers of government functions were 
limited to matters such as the CBI agreeing, in July 1964, to take on the performance 
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of exchange control,815 and discussions with the DF about the merits of possible new 
legislation conferring bank licensing powers on the CBI.816  
 
Part 4 of the memorandum concerned bank deposits at the CBI. It was decided to 
introduce a new Central Bank Act in 1964 permitting the payment of interest on 
general deposits as well as clearing balances (on which interest had been offered, at 
Whitaker’s urging, at 0.125 per cent below the UK Treasury bill rate since 1960). A CBI 
board meeting on 24 April 1963 asked Moynihan and Whitaker to consult with the 
cartel about the banks holding substantially larger balances with the CBI.817 Moynihan 
wrote to the IBSC Chairman (BOI’s Governor) on 22 July setting out the board’s views. 
In the first six months of that year, banks’ clearing balances at the CBI had averaged 
less than £5m and the board was envisaging that the amount should be voluntarily 
raised to £20m.818 It took time, but this eventually was achieved: by end-1964, 
Associated Bank total balances with the CBI had reached £19.4m (compared with net 
external assets of £93.4m).819 
 
Thus, while some progress was made, the above debates in 1961-4 demonstrated the 
difficulty of making progress, on a voluntary basis, with the evolution of the Irish 
financial system. The ideas for developing the CBI’s role had long been present, but 
the basis of agreement was not.  
 
4.3 The Associated Banks’ worsening liquidity problem 
 
Part 5 of the Oslizlok memorandum concerned liquidity and acting as LLR, which was 
becoming a more important issue. With the growth in the Irish economy, the 
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Associated Banks faced a looming liquidity problem. In the crisis year of 1955, 
Associated Bank net external assets declined by 30 per cent, demonstrating their 
vulnerability to balance-of-payments deficits. At end-1955, the assets stood at around 
30 per cent of the banks’ current and deposit accounts, and the CBI used this figure as 
a prudential yardstick for commentary in the following years.820 From 1965, the CBI 
began to issue credit guidance to the banks and advised a minimum ‘central bank 
ratio’ of 20 per cent or more, for the Associated Banks as a whole.821 The central bank 
ratio was now defined as net external assets plus deposits at the central bank less any 
rediscounts of Exchequer bills with the CBI, all expressed as a ratio of domestic 
current and deposit accounts.822 The banks came close to breaching this ratio in 1965; 
at end-1968, the ratio stood at only 20.4 per cent.823 Liquidity was to undergo further 
pressure in 1969, as will be discussed.  
 
The problem was that the net external assets of the Associated Banks had a dual role: 
they were both a front line buffer for international flows and a backing for the banks’ 
current and deposit accounts at a time of credit expansion. The looming concern is 
shown in Figure 12, in which their net external assets are graphed against two relevant 
reserve benchmarks (three months of imports and 20 per cent of bank deposits). 
Deposits with the CBI, the only other form of liquidity available, are also shown: the 
increase from £22m to £40m in 1966 was a technical issue due to the CBI’s crisis 
action, and reversed in 1967, so the normal deposits at the CBI remained modest at 
around £20m. The values in Figure 12 do not reflect the centralisation which began in 
November 1968. 
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Figure 12: Associated Banks’ net external assets, balances with the CBI, and 20 per 
cent of current and deposit accounts; and three months Irish imports, annually as at 31 
December, 1945 – 1968 (£m) 
Source: Moynihan, Currency, pp530-1; Irish imports from Eurostat, average of preceding and succeeding 
year divided by four and converted to Irish pounds at £1 = Euro1.265 
 
The records of BOI and Ulster Bank also illustrate liquidity stresses and exposure to 
illiquid Exchequer bills. Whitaker as Secretary of the DF wrote to Bank of Ireland on 3 
March 1967 informing it that, of £40.8m Exchequer bills held by it and maturing at the 
end of the month, only £5.8m would be repaid at that time.824 In July 1967, internal 
procedures for selling British gilts were eased.825 Ulster Bank (where the records 
available to be viewed were more extensive) reported its ‘liquidity’ to the board in the 
form of four items, UK Treasury bills (£), Irish Exchequer bills (I£), deposits with its 
British parent Westminster Bank (£), and deposits with the CBI (I£). As shown in 
Annex 1, its illiquid Exchequer bill holdings underwent sticky secular growth over the 
1960s, while its liquid UK Treasury bill holdings were reduced to zero by 1964. Its true 
liquidity consisted of seasonally fluctuating deposits with its parent Westminster Bank 
and deposits with the CBI.826 Ulster Bank’s internal prudential benchmark was the 
gross lending ratio (gross lending advances as a percentage of deposits) which should 
                                               
824
 BOI:Court minutes, 9/3/1967 
825
 BOI:Court minutes, 20/7/1967 
826
 See graphs in Annex 1 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1
9
4
5
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
7
1
9
4
8
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
1
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
7
1
9
5
8
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
£
m
 
Associated Banks'
net external assets
Associated Banks'
balances with CBI
20% of deposits
3 months imports
267 
 
not exceed 60 per cent. By July 1969, this measure stood at an ‘all-time high’ (61.9 per 
cent).827  
  
4.4 Plans for a Dublin money market 
 
For the banks, a liquid domestic market was thought to be needed before they would 
consider abandoning sterling. This had been discussed inconclusively at the CBI board 
in December 1964. In 1966, Moynihan had talks with Bank of Ireland about its new 
merchant bank subsidiary, which planned to deal in bills, and with merchant bank 
Guiness Mahon about a possible Dublin discount house, and in November 1966, 
money markets in Canada and South Africa were reviewed at the CBI’s board. 
Moynihan had constructive discussions about the topic with DSA Carroll, BOI’s 
Governor, in January 1967. On 8 March, the latter handed Moynihan a draft 
memorandum, ‘Banking and the further development of the Irish economy’. The 
memorandum indicated that Bank of Ireland was taking this topic very seriously.  
 
The paper started with an observation that the tripartite financial system had been 
characterised by uneasy relationships and confrontations and an ‘absence of common 
ground’. It summarised the aims of the three parties. The government wanted 
maximum growth consistent with ‘preservation of the net external assets of the banking 
system’. The banks were each concerned with liquidity, not net external assets, and 
were worried about public demands for credit greater than bank resources, and a 
central bank reluctant to extend yet further its liquidity support to the banks. The CBI 
was concerned with inflation and credit, and was treating private credit as a residual to 
be controlled after the government’s needs had been filled. A liquid money market 
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could resolve the objectives of the parties, and new discount houses could help to 
create a money market. It called for a working party to examine the issue.828        
 
After consulting with Whitaker and the Bank of England, Carroll returned with the 
General Manager of the AIB, and held another meeting with Moynihan in April 1967.829 
From these beginnings the CBI’s Money Market Committee, with tripartite 
representation, was initiated in May 1967. The joint ownership of the Associated Banks 
in this project is shown by the fact that the Secretary of the IBSC was one of the two 
Secretaries to the Committee. It is clear that the primary initiative for the Committee 
was Carroll’s.830 The MMC Report in October 1968, published in April 1969, was 
important in building confidence and support among banks for placing liquidity 
domestically, an essential step in accepting the repatriation of their sterling assets. 
 
The CBI was the least enthusiastic of the tripartite organisations about the Report, 
which highlighted a complete lack of domestic liquidity, and recommended that the CBI 
support simultaneous development of new money market institutions and changes in 
the operation and liquidity of the Exchequer bill and Irish government bond markets. 
For Moynihan and Oslizlok, such recommendations might have suited the 
government’s borrowing requirements and the banks’ liquidity needs; but they were 
placing too great a burden on the CBI without granting it the resources and discretion 
required of a central bank. Implicitly this risked the Irish currency’s external parity, 
which was the CBI’s core mission.831 
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4.5 The UK’s exchange guarantee and the 1968-9 centralisation 
 
The British offer, in June 1968, of an exchange guarantee for the CBI’s sterling 
holdings was the catalyst for change. This emerged as follows. The Anglo-Irish 
diversification negotiations of March-May 1968 (see the next Section), which followed 
sterling’s devaluation in 1967, led Whitaker to discuss openly the possible advantages 
of bringing the Associated Banks’ sterling assets into the CBI. Then, in June, to 
stabilise the sterling area, the UK announced a dollar exchange guarantee for official 
holdings of sterling in the sterling area, in return for a commitment on the part of those 
countries to hold a Minimum Sterling Proportion (MSP) of their reserves in sterling, to 
be negotiated bilaterally.832 At the negotiation meeting with the British on 31 July, 
Whitaker alluded to the possibility of centralisation, since the British refused to accept 
that the Associated Banks’ net external assets were ‘official’ reserves covered by the 
guarantee.833  
 
In Hong Kong, the banks were themselves offered an exchange guarantee by the 
Hong Kong authorities.834 But the CBI’s GF was hardly in a strong enough position to 
offer the same to the Associated Banks, which after all had been resisting 
centralisation – given the sterling link, the Irish pound was unlikely to be revalued 
against sterling anyway. At a meeting with the British on 21 August, Whitaker’s 
assistant SF Murray reported that the Associated Banks were only prepared to transfer 
£40m to the CBI, representing the shorter part of their gilt portfolio. Moreover the 
transfer was problematic, being conditional on ‘a substantial and complicated quid pro 
quo (in the form of an imaginary portfolio of Irish securities which would replace the 
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gilt-edged sold to the Central Bank and which could continue to be traded in at London 
market prices)’.835     
 
The CBI’s negotiations were conducted during September with DSA Carroll as 
Chairman of the IBSC. In the end, a simple, albeit artificial, solution was reached for 
this £40m tranche, similar in some ways to Hong Kong, under which the banks 
continued to hold their British gilts, but each bank opened an Irish pound deposit with 
the CBI, which held a matching sterling deposit with each bank. There was no mention 
of exchange guarantees for the banks. Politically, it would have been hard for the 
Associated Banks to refuse the CBI’s request completely, given that their sterling 
holdings were ‘official external reserves’ in Ireland, and an exchange guarantee for 
centralised holdings was on offer from the British. It is notable too that Bank of Ireland 
underwrote the whole transfer, with a £40m exchange with the CBI on 15 November 
1968, prior to the final agreement of the Associated Banks. The division of the £40m 
among the banks was confirmed on 25 November. The division was made pro rata to 
each bank’s capital resources, so the BOI group shouldered 49 per cent, the AIB group 
42 per cent, Ulster Bank 6 per cent and Northern Bank 3 per cent of the total £40m.836 
 
Similarly, the wholesale transfer of the remaining Associated Bank net external assets 
in August 1969 was a reaction to events rather than the result of long-term planning. 
Whitaker had moved to head the CBI in February 1969. A CBI paper circulated at the 
board on 9 May reviewed credit proposals for the 1969-70 year. A difficult year was in 
prospect for the Associated Banks, with net external assets expected to decline from 
£105m (a total figure which did not reflect the £40m transfer arrangement) to £80m 
due to the balance of payments. The long-term aim, the paper stated, was for all net 
external assets to be repatriated, but for the year in question the proposal was that the 
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Associated Banks be asked to transfer a further £15m from British gilts into Irish 
investments, reducing the net external assets to £65m by the end of the year.837  
 
On 14 May, Whitaker wrote to CH Murray, his replacement as Secretary at the DF, 
after returning from a week at the BIS in Basle. He reported being apprehensive about 
another sterling devaluation. He said there was little they could do to guard against 
devaluation, ‘except to arrange to have more sterling guaranteed in terms of dollars by 
being transferred from the Associated Banks to the Central Bank (as I hope to do)’.838 
 
Under the perceived threat of more devaluation, a permanent solution to the transfer of 
sterling was required. Here the groundwork on the creation of an Irish money market 
proved important. The CBI had been studying the behaviour of the Associated Banks 
towards liquidity and had observed that the Associated Banks kept 11-15 per cent of 
their deposits in ‘primary’ liquidity form (being cash and near-cash) and treated illiquid 
Exchequer bills, and British gilts, as a form of ‘secondary’ liquidity which was 
reduced839 or topped up if the primary liquidity ratio moved outside those ranges. The 
CBI’s long-term aim was that the banks’ secondary liquidity should be filled by 
Exchequer bills and Irish government securities. In recognition of the fact that such 
Irish investments were currently illiquid, a target, as a proportion of domestic deposits, 
of 15 per cent primary liquidity and 25 per cent secondary liquidity, should be the 
aim.840                        
               
Whitaker was able to persuade the Associated Banks with carrot and stick. The stick 
was the approaching new central bank legislation, giving the CBI greater powers over 
licensing and control of bank liquidity. The carrot was attractive interest rates and 
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assurances that liquidity deposited by the banks with the CBI would be invested in real 
liquid assets. For the purposes of the transfer, the CBI proposed that the Associated 
Banks maintain a primary liquidity ratio of 12 per cent of deposits. This should be made 
up of four tranches, one of sterling cash and near-cash, one of Irish notes and coin, 
and two being composed of deposits of different terms with the CBI. The 28 July CBI 
offer is shown in Table 1.  The CBI hoped ‘that this facility will result in all the sterling 
now held by the banks against their Irish liabilities, apart from reasonable working 
balances, being merged with the official external reserves of the Central Bank’.841  
 
This was not the end of the negotiation. There were bilateral discussions during the 
month of August, but by mid-August, Whitaker, on holiday, received notice that 
‘progress is being made’, with £16m having been received from Bank of Ireland, with 
more to follow, and £20m on its way from AIB. The interest rates on the 4 per cent 
tranche were temporarily tweaked to just below UK Local Authority rates: ‘these have 
been accepted and by and large should work’.842 The £40m counter-deposit 
arrangement was cancelled on 29 August.843 The centralisation of effectively all the 
Associated Banks’ net external assets was achieved. I did not find the exact number 
for the net external assets transferred by end-August 1969, but, based on the figure of 
£105m in the May memorandum, the size of this second transfer can be estimated at 
£65m (after deducting the original £40m transfer). .      
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Share of banks’ Irish 
deposits: 
Banks’ assets to be 
held in: 
Interest rate offered: CBI’s matching 
investment: 
3% Sterling cash or near-
cash (i.e. not with 
CBI) 
Market rates NA 
3% Call or short-notice 
deposit with CBI 
1/8% below the UK 
Treasury bill discount 
rate 
‘the most liquid and 
realisable assets’ e.g. 
UK Treasury bills 
4% Short-term (i.e. < 91 
days) deposit with 
CBI (to include 
provision for an Irish 
money market) 
From 3/8% above (i.e. 1 
day+ deposit) to 1-1/8% 
above (i.e. 90 day 
deposit) the UK Treasury 
bill discount rate  
‘wider range of 
investment 
possibilities’, thus 
interest rates reflect 
wider London rates 
2% Till money (Irish notes 
and coin) 
None NA 
Amounts transferred by 
banks to CBI in excess 
of 12% of deposits 
Certificates of deposit 
with CBI 
Yields and terms 
corresponding to those 
on UK gilts transferred  
NA 
Additional secondary 
liquidity 
Irish Exchequer bills Recently agreed formula 
equal to 1.075% of UK 
Treasury bill rate 
NA 
Additional secondary 
liquidity 
Irish government 
bonds 
‘Rates higher than for 90 
day Exchequer bills 
depending on period and 
current yields on 
comparable assets’ 
NA 
Table 1: CBI proposal for Associated Banks’ liquidity and transfer of assets, 28 July 
1969      
Source: CBI:F0610949, ‘Interest rates…’, CBI, 28/7/1969 
Note: CBI = Central Bank of Ireland   
 
4.6 The Central Bank Act 1971 and other changes, 1968-72 
 
The balance of power in the tripartite financial system was also altered by the Central 
Bank Act 1971. In the 1970s the opening of a new branch required CBI approval.844 
The main justification for the 1971 legislation was to give the CBI responsibility for the 
licensing of all banks in Ireland. As discussed earlier, this had been a mooted topic for 
legislation since 1964, and in some ways it suited the Associated Banks, which were 
facing competition from the unregulated non-Associated Banks. As late as 1967, 
licensing was the only substantial element of the proposed legislation, whose 
motivation was ‘mainly to safeguard the interests of depositors and to enable the 
Central Bank to control the growth of external participation in Irish banking’.845 
However, a year later, the envisaged legislation now included revision to the link with 
sterling (allowing exchange rate changes by government order rather than statute, and 
                                               
844
 Davy Kelleher McCarthy, The control, p44 
845
 NAI:2005/159/62, ‘Proposed legislation…1927 to 1966’ 
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thus resolving a conflict, inherent in the sterling link, with IMF rules about consultation 
regarding parity changes).846 There were also provisions for mergers of banks and the 
eventual transfer of the Exchequer account to the CBI.847 The BOI Court noted on 6 
June 1968 a letter from Whitaker regarding the government account.848 
 
Money market reforms also began to be implemented. Soon after Whitaker’s 
succession as Governor, the CBI took over responsibility for Exchequer bill 
administration and providing liquidity to short-dated Irish government securities.849  
Meanwhile the creation of a discount house was debated within the CBI but quietly 
postponed in favour of imposing liquidity ratios and the banks building up a portfolio of 
domestic assets.850 By November 1969, the Minister for Finance, Haughey, was able 
to confirm in the Dáil that ‘agreement has been reached between the Central Bank and 
the Associated Banks for the adoption of liquidity ratios’.851 In 1973, the CBI enhanced 
liquidity ratios. For the Associated Banks, these requirements were 13 per cent of 
domestic deposits for primary liquidity (cash and deposits with the CBI) and 31 per 
cent for secondary liquidity (Exchequer bills and Irish government securities).852 Such 
rules secured a large element of bank funding for the state.    
 
Finally, the Central Bank Act 1971 reduced the representation of the Associated Banks 
on the CBI board from three to two.853 Even before this date, Haughey had been 
selective in appointments, e.g. bringing in WJL Ryan (one of the economists proposing 
repatriation of external assets in 1957 and soon to be chairman of the MMC) in 
1967.854 Conflict in the tripartite system did not end with the Central Bank Act 1971, 
                                               
846
 This had been announced in the Dáil by Haughey on 5/12/1967, and Moynihan spoke to him on 
8/12/1967 about ensuring that the CBI be consulted in any decision to alter the exchange rate, 
CBI:F0611131, ‘External parity…’, Moynihan, 21/12/1967 
847
 NAI:TSCH/99/1/397,‘Proposed legislation…1927-1964’, 21/3/1968 
848
 BOI:Court minute 6/6/1968 
849
 CBI:Chronology, Apr/ and Jul/1969 
850
 CBI:F0609234, ‘Towards the establishment…’, McGowan 
851
 CBI:F0609234, ‘Parliamentary question…13
th
 November, 1969’, circulated to directors 
852
 Davy Kelleher McCarthy, The control, p57 
853
 CBI:Chronology, Sep/1971 
854
 NAI:TSCH/98/6/151, ‘Central bank: membership…’, 14/3/1967 
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but, owing to new licensing and monetary powers, and the deposits of the government 
and the banks, the CBI was in a stronger position than in 1967, when Carroll, as 
chairman of the IBSC, had told Moynihan that there were circumstances in which ‘the 
Banks might feel themselves obliged to decline to follow the advice given by the 
Central Bank’.855 
 
In summary, the significance of these events can be seen in the extent of the change 
in the liabilities of the CBI (LTNF and GF together) from March 1968 to March 1973. 
This is shown in both proportionate and actual scale in Figures 13 and 14 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage composition of liabilities of Legal Tender Note Fund and 
General Fund, CBI, by share of total856 liabilities, at end-months shown, March 1955 – 
December 1975 (%) 
Source: CBI annual statements of account, 1955-75 
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 CBI:F0609233,36/66, Note, Moynihan, 10/3/1967 
856
 Calculated using gross liabilities. One could exclude the GF’s liability to the LTNF as a matched inter-
fund item 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
ar
-5
5
M
ar
-5
6
M
ar
-5
7
M
ar
-5
8
M
ar
-5
9
M
ar
-6
0
M
ar
-6
1
M
ar
-6
2
M
ar
-6
3
M
ar
-6
4
M
ar
-6
5
M
ar
-6
6
M
ar
-6
7
M
ar
-6
8
M
ar
-6
9
M
ar
-7
0
M
ar
-7
1
M
ar
-7
2
M
ar
-7
3
M
ar
-7
4
D
e
c-
7
4
D
e
c-
7
5
Other liabilities and
reserves (GF)
Agency, government and
other accounts (GF)
Bankers accounts (GF)
GF liability to LTNF (GF)
Notes outstanding (LTNF)
276 
 
 
Figure 14: Absolute composition of liabilities of Legal Tender Note Fund and General 
Fund, CBI, total857 liabilities, at end-months shown, March 1955 – December 1975 
(£m) 
Source: CBI annual statements of account, 1955-75 
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Section 5 Ireland’s diversification from sterling  
 
This Section explains the diversification of Ireland’s ‘official external reserves’, from 
sterling into other reserve assets. There were also unofficial, private holdings of 
sterling in Ireland. In 1949 Whitaker estimated these at £163m (mainly in equities, 
corporate bonds and gilts) compared with the tripartite official sterling holdings of 
£237m.858 By 1968, the British Treasury was estimating private sterling investments 
held within Ireland of around £750m.859 There is not enough information about private 
holdings to include them in the analysis. 
 
One can calculate sterling’s share of official external reserves from three published 
sources, Whitaker, Moynihan and the POSB statements of account. These calculations 
are brought together in Figure 15, which draws two lines – one excluding the 
Associated Banks, based on Moynihan and the POSB, and one covering all official 
reserves, from Whitaker. Figure 15 shows that Ireland’s diversification was rapid 
between the end of 1967, when sterling was around 90 per cent of reserves, and the 
end of 1975, when sterling was less than 20 per cent of the total. It is important also to 
understand that the changing MSP agreements between Ireland and the UK, which 
constrained sterling’s share, applied from September 1968 to December 1974: without 
the MSP agreements, diversification would probably have been even more rapid. Our 
interest lies in the start of this diversification (and the reasons for it) rather than the 
end, which has been well-covered by Whitaker. By the end, there were fewer 
constraints on the CBI’s action, and the UK’s high inflation was at last beginning to call 
the sterling link into question. 
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 Whitaker, ‘Ireland’s external assets’ 
859
 TNA:T312/1932, ‘Draft (3
rd
 revise)…Ireland’. Exchange controls were meant to limit transfers of capital 
outside the sterling area, but financial scandals (e.g. the ‘Irish leak’ or ‘Ansbacher deposits’) suggest some 
doubt about their effectiveness. For the ‘Irish leak’ see Capie, Bank of England, pp434-5; for a lively 
popular account regarding the Ansbacher deposits, Keena, Haughey’s millions 
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Figure 15: Sterling’s share in Irish official external reserves, annually at 31 December, 
1950 – 1976 (%) 
Source: Calculated from Whitaker, Interests, p139, Moynihan, Currency, pp538-9, POSB statements of 
account, 1950-68 
  
Let us begin with the government’s and Associated Banks’ position. The underlying 
numbers show that the POSB external holdings other than sterling were small (not 
more than £2m equivalent). The Associated Banks’ non-sterling external holdings were 
hard to isolate, but can be inferred at two data points where the two sets of sources 
overlap, end-1967 (£13m) and end-1968 (£0m).860 At first the Associated Banks’ low 
non-sterling holdings seem surprising – why were they not speculating or protecting 
themselves at a time of sterling weakness? However, a look at their balance sheets at 
the end of 1967 (see Annex 3) confirms that external non-sterling holdings could only 
fall into the categories, ‘cash and bank balances’ or ‘money at call at short notice’,861 
which together amounted to £154m. Ulster Bank’s ‘currency balances’ were 
specifically highlighted at only £0.1m. The BOI Court documents did suggest some 
possible diversification. In March 1967, it opened new bank accounts with two large 
American banks, each with a maximum limit of £10m equivalent,862 ‘in order that the 
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 Calculated from Whitaker, Interests, p139 and Moynihan, Currency, p539 and POSB, 1967-8 annual 
statements of account. The calculation in 1967 is £265.8m (Total sterling, Whitaker) minus (£147.3m + 
£0.8m) (CBI and DF sterling, Moynihan, POSB) = £117.7m (Associated Banks’ sterling), which was £13m 
less than Associated Banks’ net external assets of £130.7m (Moynihan)   
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 See CBI:MMC Report, p13. In 1967, according to this Report, around one third of Associated Bank 
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bank’s call money could be placed to better advantage’.863 This may help to explain the 
£13m figure. The limited overall diversification by the Associated Banks may owe 
something to their exchange control policing role, and also to the fact that, with liquidity 
under pressure, such liquidity needed to be held in the transactional form underlying 
the sterling link, namely sterling. 
 
5.1 Why the CBI did not diversify, 1965-7 
 
This leaves the CBI as the main focus of attention. Why did the CBI not act earlier to 
protect itself and diversify its reserves away from sterling, as other leading sterling 
area countries did?864 To some the answer may seem obvious: the CBI was a de facto 
sterling currency board, and the sterling link, and transactional reliance on the UK, 
dictated that the CBI should hold predominantly sterling assets. This response is too 
simplistic: when the diversification began in earnest in 1968, these conditions also still 
prevailed. 
 
I would contend that two factors constrained the CBI before the 1967 devaluation of 
sterling. One was the fact that its reserves, before the centralisation of 1968-9, were 
considered too low to risk holding them significantly in forms other than the currency – 
sterling – in which its transactional needs were denominated (such as the need to act 
as LLR to the banks). In other words, the decentralisation of official sterling holdings 
among CBI and different commercial banks, each feeling liquidity or reserves pressure, 
                                               
863
 BOI:Court minutes, 30/3/1967. The context of these account openings can be explained. BOI’s foreign 
manager periodically approached the Court for permission to open a new currency account with a non-UK 
bank not currently on the books. The requests were rare: in 1964, there was only one case initiated by 
BOI (BOI:Court minutes, 1964). In 1965-7, by contrast, there were 13 such records in the Court minutes, 
most in US dollars, and their timings seemed to coincide with pressure on sterling (e.g. Jan/ and Jul/1965, 
Sep/1966 and summer-autumn 1967) (BOI:Court minutes, 14/1/1965, 15/7/1965, 14/10/1965, 9/12/1965, 
8/9/1966, 30/3/1967, 9/8/1967, 30/8/1967). 1967 was a proactive year for the Court, with Investment Bank 
of Ireland, the new merchant banking subsidiary, recently appointed investment counsellor to BOI 
(BOI:Court minutes, 1/12/1966), recommending a new investment policy (BOI:Court minutes, 26/5/1967) 
and taking oversight over investment, formerly subject to a monthly report from Mullens, the UK 
government broker and sterling securities specialist (BOI:Court minutes, 20/7/1967) 
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 Kuwait requested a guarantee from the British in 1961, 1964 and 1966 (TNA:T267/29 ‘Sterling 
balances’, p82); Australia did so in 1965 (Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’); Malaysia in 1966 (Schenk, 
‘Malaysia’) 
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set them up in competition for sterling and increased their aggregate demand for 
sterling assets. Thus centralisation was the precondition for the full diversification 
undertaken by Ireland in 1969-75. The other factor is that Irish officials saw in the 
sterling area an implicit contract with the UK, and so felt constrained by the rules of the 
sterling area, which did not welcome diversification from sterling, so long as the UK 
authorities kept their end of the bargain and maintained sterling’s parity with the dollar. 
 
Irish officials were concerned about sterling’s risks in 1965-7. On 4 January 1965, the 
Taoiseach (Lemass) wrote to the Minister for Finance (Ryan) requesting views on 
action ‘to minimise the consequences for this country’ in the event of sterling being 
devalued. The latter confirmed that the DF and CBI had already been considering the 
matter.865 In June 1965, the Cabinet decided not to diversify (for reasons discussed 
below), but to consider the feasibility of diversification if uncertainty continued.866  
 
Later, Whitaker was proactive in writing to the Governor of the CBI, Moynihan, warning 
about sterling’s risks. In July 1966, he told him that the summer looked like a period of 
strain for sterling.867 In October 1966, Whitaker wrote to him again about sterling’s 
doubtful prospects and the diversification of other countries.868 In his brief for 
negotiations with the British in March 1968, Whitaker wrote that Ireland had been 
‘acutely conscious’ of sterling risk in the years prior to devaluation. It had been slow ‘to 
the point of being blameworthy’ in diversifying, but this was ‘out of consideration for the 
weakness of sterling’.869 
 
Whitaker’s personal concerns about devaluation risk can be inferred from the 
government’s external borrowing programme in 1966. Whitaker’s preference was to 
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 NAI:TSCH/96/6/533, Lemass-Ryan correspondence, 4-5/1/1965 
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borrow in sterling: ‘the terms are expensive but there is no exchange risk’.870 But the 
UK Treasury was initially reluctant to give consent to a sterling bond issue and 
encouraged the Irish to accept the merchant bank SG Warburg’s proposal for a 15-
year DM bond issue instead. The UK Treasury ‘would not regard the terms expensive 
or the exchange risk undue’, the DF delegation reported.871 This view was not shared 
by Whitaker, who had serious misgivings about both aspects.872 He was proved right 
by subsequent revaluations of the Deutschemark.  
 
That was Whitaker: what about the CBI? Below the Governor, views within the CBI 
about diversification and the widening of its powers could be radical. In response to the 
government’s request for advice in the event of a sterling devaluation, a CBI staff 
memorandum was issued in April 1965. ‘Effects of currency devaluation’ 
recommended retaining parity with sterling (advice that was followed in November 
1967), but in other respects the proposals were challenging. The exchange rate should 
be expressed in terms of gold, not sterling, and changes in the rate should be possible 
by government order rather than new legislation.873 The rules of the LTNF should allow 
Irish notes to be issued against currencies other than sterling, and the note issue 
managed on a discretionary basis (abolishing unlimited convertibility) so that the CBI 
could control the money supply. It also warned against the risks of non-sterling foreign 
borrowing, asking that the CBI be consulted on any such issuance, and added, ‘steps 
should be taken to accelerate the diversification of the country’s external monetary 
reserves’.874 
 
The CBI did not act on this advice in 1965-7. In June 1966, Governor Moynihan 
indicated to his Bank of England counterpart that Ireland was ‘considering some 
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diversification of reserves involving a moderate movement out of sterling’, citing ‘the 
need to meet liabilities in respect of foreign borrowing’.875 But, as Whitaker later wrote, 
after the British July 1966 measures to defend the pound, ‘we judged it inopportune to 
follow up this indication with any definite plans’.876 A CBI memorandum, ‘A look at 
sterling’ was circulated to the directors on 13 November 1967. It was negative on 
sterling’s prospects, but too late for action: the devaluation came five days later.877 
 
Moynihan himself was cautious about diversifying from sterling. He did not wish to 
overstretch the scarce sterling resources of the CBI given the sterling link. This comes 
out in several episodes. In December 1966, he told Whitaker it was not the time to put 
any of the April 1965 memorandum’s recommendations into legislative proposals. 
Whitaker, although agreeing, ‘reserved the right to press the matter’ at another time.878 
Moynihan also told the heads of AIB and Bank of Ireland in April 1967 that 
‘preservation of the parity link with sterling was a primary responsibility of the Central 
Bank under the existing law; and this required the Central Bank to maintain a strong 
external, and particularly a strong sterling, position’.879 Finally, Moynihan caused 
Whitaker to scale back his initial diversification demands in March 1968, saying it 
would be operationally impractical for the CBI to allow its sterling holdings to fall so 
low.880 Moynihan’s concern about insufficient sterling holdings shows the effect of the 
decentralisation of sterling holdings in Ireland. 
 
The constraints of sterling area membership were the second factor preventing 
diversification. Meenan argued that Ireland at this time neither gained nor lost from 
association with the sterling area. Ireland had had a direct dollar deficit after the war, 
but since 1955 had enjoyed a surplus. It had a natural interest in sterling, given the 
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sterling link, but had been disconnected from sterling area meetings because it was no 
longer a Commonwealth country, and had not had much cause to borrow in the 
London market.881 Whitaker’s negotiating brief in March 1968 argued that Ireland had a 
payments surplus with both sterling and dollar areas, but a large deficit with continental 
Europe. The latter deficit was his justification for increasing the CBI’s non-sterling 
reserves.882    
 
By converting its dollar payments surplus into sterling, Ireland was following the 
sterling area’s ‘pooling rule’, maintaining sterling as its reserve currency, converting 
non-sterling proceeds into sterling, and converting its sterling reserves when it needed 
to make non-sterling payments. Following the pooling rule was different from being 
deliberately loyal or supportive to the British: it involved payments flows in both 
directions. When the CBI wrote to the Bank of England in December 1964 asking it for 
agreement to supply the gold for a selective increase in Ireland’s quota at the IMF, the 
request was not coming at a good time for sterling. But an affirmative answer was 
expected and indeed given.883   
 
When, in June 1965, the Irish Cabinet decided not to diversify, it was argued that 
diversification would be incompatible with the obligations of sterling area membership, 
from which Ireland had gained much benefit; it would signal Ireland’s lack of 
confidence in sterling and be seen as an unfriendly act.884 Moynihan later told the 
British that the decision not to diversify reflected, ‘among other things, the interests of 
the sterling area as a whole’.885 But the UK was also expected to perform its sterling 
area role by avoiding devaluation. In July 1965, in answer to a question in the Dáil 
about sterling devaluation, the Minister for Finance referenced the statutory link with 
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sterling, and said, regarding offsetting actions, ‘it would be injudicious to take action 
before the event’.886 By implication, after the event was a different matter. Ireland 
faithfully followed the sterling area’s pooling rule until devaluation, after which all bets 
were off.     
  
5.2 Ireland’s 1968 diversification negotiations, February-June 1968 
 
In 1983 Whitaker described the 1967 sterling devaluation as ringing ‘the death-knell of 
sterling as an international currency’.887 His account of Ireland’s decision to diversify is 
repeated here: 
 
‘Towards the end of 1967 agreement was reached between the Department 
of Finance (where I was Secretary) and the Central Bank (Dr Moynihan being 
Governor) on a policy of diversifying the external reserves. I explained our 
position to the UK Treasury: they did not welcome our intentions but could not 
resist the logic of our argument. It was agreed that, to avoid any undue 
repercussions on sterling, we would proceed quietly and by stages from 
March 1968 onwards towards our objective which, as then defined with 
deliberate modesty and sensitivity, was to change about half the Bank’s own 
sterling into other reserve assets’.888 
 
A review of the Irish and British archival evidence suggests a more complicated and 
stormy story, however. The diversification plan was greater than that later stated by 
Whitaker, but he was negotiated down. There seems to have been a significant 
change in the intensity of the programme between February and March 1968. There 
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were other, including political, factors behind the Irish decision to diversify. And the 
British did not accept Ireland’s plan. 
 
The negotiations are detailed below, and a summary provided in Annex 4. The timing 
may be addressed first. Whitaker’s opposite number at the British Treasury was 
William Armstrong. On 14 February, on a visit to the UK with the Taoiseach, Whitaker 
tried to see Armstrong at short notice and in his absence spoke to Arthur Snelling of 
the Commonwealth Office. According to the British report of this meeting, Whitaker 
remarked that ‘a certain amount of pressure was developing upon him now to 
undertake a measure of diversification’. This was to cover past foreign borrowings with 
additional diversification on top, but ‘he was not in any hurry’, ‘gradualism was his 
watchword’, and before doing anything he would wish to discuss the matter with the 
UK Treasury and the Bank of England after the UK Budget on 19 March – ‘probably 
well after it’. According to Snelling, Whitaker ‘seemed quite relaxed about it’.889 
 
This gradualist approach was confirmed by Whitaker’s own record of the 14 February 
meeting. After telling Snelling that any diversification would be the subject of prior 
discussion with the Treasury and Bank of England, he went on to add that ‘the 
Governor of the Central Bank would have the opportunity of broaching the subject 
again with the Bank of England in May or June next’.890 
 
The Irish position changed suddenly after the UK Budget on 19 March. By 21 March, 
an appointment for Whitaker to see Armstrong had been set up for 28 March.891 The 
British embassy in Dublin reported to London that Whitaker had recently told them that 
the Chancellor’s decision in the 1968 Budget to extend the May 1966 ‘Voluntary 
Programme’ was one factor which had made the Irish determined to diversify. Another 
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factor was pressure from the Opposition in the Dáil.892 This was also the time of the 
March 1968 gold crisis.893 The UK’s Voluntary Programme sought to prevent direct 
investment by British companies in Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. 
This limit on capital flow had always vexed the Irish authorities894 and had formed a 
significant part of Whitaker’s discussion with Snelling in February.895 
 
The planned scale of diversification was also greater than Whitaker later suggested. 
The CBI’s sterling assets towards the end of February 1968 stood at around £150m, 
so ‘half the Bank’s own sterling’ would have implied a switch of about £75m. In reality, 
the brief accompanying Whitaker’s meeting with Armstrong talked about reaching 40-
50 per cent of total monetary reserves in non-sterling form, quantified in the paper as 
‘a total fresh acquisition of gold, IMF credits, and selected currencies of about £100m 
over [the next year or so]’.896 The holding preference for Ireland was, in declining order: 
gold, IMF credits,897 Swiss francs and Deutschemarks, dollars, sterling. The immediate 
priority was to buy gold, where an increase in the dollar price was likely. The brief 
argued that Ireland’s reserve needs were for European currencies, not dollars or 
sterling. It also highlighted the lack of confidence and loyalty shown by other sterling 
area countries, and noted that Zambia, Malaysia, Malta and Hong Kong all planned to 
reduce their sterling holdings. In terms of how to increase non-sterling holdings by 
£100m, the brief suggested continuing ‘the arrangement made in mid-March under 
which part of the current commercial banking intake of US dollars is being bought by 
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the Central Bank and converted into gold’ (normally according to sterling area rules 
such dollar accruals would have been sold for sterling by the banks), which could 
produce £25m in a full year ‘without notice being focussed upon it’, and more if 
desired; and the balance by selling sterling for other assets in stages.898  
 
According to Whitaker’s report of the meeting on 28 March, he told Armstrong and 
Snelling that the target for non-sterling reserves was 40 per cent of £300m (i.e. 
£120m), and that Ireland intended to increase non-sterling holdings by £90m by the 
end of the year. (Moynihan had recently told him that a CBI sterling reserve as low as 
£40m would be operationally impractical, so he scaled down his demand). Among 
other reasons for diversification, he cited recent signals and statements that the British 
planned to reduce sterling’s role as a reserve currency. Armstrong said he understood, 
but the pace was too fast. Snelling countered with a proposal for 1968 of £25-30m 
currency acquired from Irish commercial banks, with additional building up of credits at 
the IMF i.e. no switching of sterling. Whitaker said this was not enough.899 According to 
their report, the British interpreted £90m as the final target and that in the current year 
Whitaker only wanted to move as far along as possible towards the target, meaning, 
they thought, perhaps £50m in 1968, of which £10m would come from an increase in 
Ireland’s credit position with the IMF (a misinterpretation of Whitaker’s position which in 
fact proved fairly accurate – see below). The British Treasury said they would consult 
with the Bank of England and revert to Whitaker by end-April.900 
 
On 29 March, Whitaker telephoned the UK Treasury to agree that in the meantime 
Ireland would continue to accumulate currencies from the Irish commercial banks, and 
additionally switch sterling at the rate of £1.5m per week.901 The British heard this as 
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only accumulating currencies at the rate of £1-1.5m per week.902 The Bank of England 
Governor O’Brien replied to Armstrong on 4 April with a firm negative to Whitaker’s 
proposal. 40 per cent was inappropriate given Ireland’s close UK links; such a share, if 
accepted, should only apply to the CBI’s reserves; and Ireland should stop diversifying 
in the meantime. The Treasury then tried to arrange a meeting in short order with 
Whitaker, but due to the Irish Budget this had to be fixed for 26 April. The British asked 
Whitaker to refrain from diversifying ahead of an agreement but he firmly resisted the 
suggestion.903 
 
At the pre-meeting held by the UK Treasury and Bank of England, the instructions for 
Douglas Allen (Armstrong’s successor) were strongly worded. Ireland’s target for 
further diversification should be £20m only, with only £5m in 1968.904 The Bank had 
been monitoring Irish transactions: having bought £5m gold in March, Ireland had been 
buying dollars throughout April at the rate of $5m a week, the dollar proceeds being 
used to buy gold in New York.905 If Whitaker reacted badly to the British proposal, he 
could be warned that the Irish plans called into question ‘the whole structure of Anglo-
Irish relations’.906 That was the first draft. It was amended to a hint that exchange 
controls might be imposed on Ireland.907 
 
At the meeting on 26 April, Whitaker suggested that Ireland could limit further 
diversification to £45m in 1968, but the British would not countenance more than about 
£15-20m and proposed that the Chancellor should now write formally to the Irish 
Minister for Finance.908 Whitaker, presumably concerned about the likely outcome from 
a political row between two tough personalities (Jenkins and Haughey), went to some 
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lengths to persuade the British to keep the Anglo-Irish dialogue at the official level.909 
He also tried to explain that the net external assets of the Irish commercial banks were, 
in fact, part of Irish official reserves.910 Allen’s letter to Whitaker of 9 May, which now 
requested that Ireland limit diversification to £15m in 1968, included a message from 
the Chancellor that Irish plans caused him grave concern, and set out the difficulties 
for Britain. Allen said that sterling’s reserve currency role might not expand but, if it 
were to be reduced, this could only happen gradually and with external support. Of the 
Irish plan, the letter stated, ‘No sterling area country has moved so far so fast’.911 
 
Whitaker was in Sweden until 20 May, so the letter was hand-delivered to him by the 
British ambassador on his return.912 He was unimpressed.913 He wrote back on 23 
May, reiterating that £90m diversification was Ireland’s reasonable desire, and it was in 
recognition of the UK’s transitional difficulties that he had proposed £45m. He had 
now, as a compromise, secured the agreement of the CBI and Minister for Finance 
that the central bank would, towards Ireland’s aim, continue the buying of the 
Associated Banks’ FX accruals, which was unlikely to reach £25m by end-1968. He 
added that the net external assets of the Associated Banks were quite properly official 
reserves, and if it would help avoid adverse comment and publicity about Ireland’s 
diversification, he could arrange to have some of those sterling assets transferred to 
the central bank to enhance the CBI’s sterling proportion. If external support for sterling 
in the form of a guarantee were to become forthcoming, say, in 1969, Ireland could 
look at its policy again.914 This was, the British ambassador advised, Ireland’s last 
word.915 
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Still there was no agreement. Allen considered Whitaker’s reply unsatisfactory,916 and 
the initial UK Treasury response was to prepare a strongly worded letter from Jenkins 
to Haughey, noting that Ireland had already diversified £14m during the negotiations 
and demanding that further diversification be limited to £15m.917 But after some 
discussion within the Treasury, wiser heads prevailed.918 By 13 June, thoughts had 
turned to the possibility of introducing into the Irish negotiations the mooted guarantee 
for sterling area balances which was to be proposed next month in Basle.919 
Eventually, on 25 June, Allen wrote to Whitaker, noting with gratitude that a £7m IMF 
drawing of Irish pounds by France (draining British reserves when France redeemed 
the Irish pounds) would be included within the £25m target, and highlighting the 
general message Jenkins had already sent to Haughey about the Basle guarantee 
negotiations.920 On 28 June, Whitaker confirmed to the British ambassador that Ireland 
would continue diversification as planned until support proposals became clear.921 On 
8 July, outline details of the scheme were sent from Jenkins to Haughey.922 On 22 July, 
the Basle negotiations with Ireland began in Dublin.923 
 
The significance of these negotiations is that Ireland, having been slow to diversify up 
to 1967, was now prepared to diversify at a considerable pace. While Whitaker wanted 
to proceed by consultation and agreement, he was not deterred by loyalty; or the sheer 
scale of Ireland’s holdings; or its monetary or trade dependence on the UK. The UK 
officials used all these arguments, but they no longer carried weight with Whitaker and 
his colleagues in Dublin. These were not particularly amicable negotiations. 
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Who was driving Ireland’s diversification? It was not Moynihan, and Whitaker himself 
seemed cautious about the brief he was negotiating, while his messages to the British 
in February and March were inconsistent with each other, suggesting a new external 
impetus for change. The answer to the question is not known, but a reasonable guess 
would be intervention by Haughey himself. There had been political criticism that 
Ireland had not anticipated the devaluation,924 and the extension of the Voluntary 
Programme in the UK Budget seemed to be the final straw. The economic and 
institutional constraints which had upheld sterling holdings in the tripartite financial 
system were being dismissed, in political fashion, following the devaluation.  
 
Another curious aspect of the negotiations was how far Whitaker was persuaded to 
move from his opening gambit of £90m diversification in 1968. In effect he 
compromised to £39m (£14m already executed plus £25m in his final offer). The 
reasons for this concession are not known. In his letter of 23 May, he mentioned the 
possibility of a UK guarantee emerging in 1969: perhaps he sensed that the game was 
about to change anyway. Or perhaps he felt it was not so much of a concession. It was 
May, he was only binding himself until the end of the year, and the figure of £25 million 
had originally only been an estimate. Most likely, to switch £90m out of £150m was an 
ambitious target in the first place. The LTNF’s note issue liabilities, which underlay the 
convertible sterling exchange standard, stood at £122m at end-March 1968.925 The 
rediscounting of Exchequer bills at any one time had reached £15m in 1966.926 The 
CBI had also had to invest £20m in a government loan in 1965. Total official external 
reserves were also in decline after 1967, falling by £9m in 1968 (with a seasonal low 
being reached in June – see below), and a further £14m in 1969. These aggregate 
movements naturally fell on the sterling holdings. There were thus still significant 
reasons for holding sterling in the CBI’s reserves. In the event, the actual increase of 
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non-sterling reserves during 1968 was £52.6m, made up of £23.0m in gold, £15.3m in 
IMF gold tranche, and £14.3m in other foreign exchange.927            
    
5.3 The MSP negotiations, July-September 1968, and subsequently 
 
Schenk described the Basle Agreement negotiations of other large holders of sterling 
in 1968.928 Ireland’s negotiations were not as difficult and protracted as those of 
Australia, Kuwait and Malaysia. Agreement had largely been secured by early 
September. But negotiations were not easy. The biggest area of dispute, as for most 
countries, was over the MSP, the minimum percentage of official929 reserves which 
was to be maintained in sterling under the guarantee agreement. The end-June 1968 
position was taken as the basis for negotiations. The British estimated that the share of 
sterling in Irish official reserves at the end of May was 68 per cent.930 However the 
sterling share as finally reported by Ireland at end-June was less than 63 per cent.931 
The decline was attributable partly to continuing diversification and partly to a seasonal 
low-point in reserves, which had fallen on the sterling holdings.932 
 
How did these negotiations compare with those of other countries in terms of the end 
result? For a broader perspective, one can contrast the percentage share of official 
reserves in sterling just before the devaluation, at end-October 1967, with the 
published MSPs agreed by other countries in September 1968. These numbers are 
shown in Table 2. 
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 Sterling’s percentage share of 
official reserves, 31 Oct 1967 
Minimum Sterling Proportion (MSP) 
published, September 1968 
Ireland 85% 55% 
Australia 60% 40% 
Hong Kong 100% 99% 
India 21% 13% 
Kuwait 74% 25% 
Malaysia 82% 40% 
New Zealand 85% 70% 
Singapore 50% 40% 
Table 2: Sterling’s share of official external reserves in Ireland and selected countries, 
actual, as at end of October 1967 and agreed Minimum Sterling Proportion in 
September 1968 (%) 
Source: Column 1: BOE:OV44/116; Column 2: Schenk, The decline, Table 8.6, p295 
  
It looks from these headline figures as though Whitaker did not negotiate as 
successfully as Australia, Kuwait and Malaysia. However, his hands were somewhat 
tied by his concessions in the earlier negotiations, and 55 per cent was a significant 
improvement on his final offer in May.933 The Irish did push hard on certain issues, and, 
with other countries, secured concessions on a charge for the guarantee (no charge), 
the scale of the guarantee (90 per cent, not 80 per cent, of official sterling holdings) 
and the length of the agreement (three years, not seven years).934 Moreover, Ireland’s 
closest peer among these countries, in terms of economic and trade dependence on 
the UK, was probably New Zealand. Indeed, the outcome was closer to New Zealand’s 
than it seemed, because it was agreed with the British that, if the Associated Banks’ 
sterling assets were centralised, the MSP would automatically increase according to a 
formula (which, in part, implicitly treated the Associated Banks’ net external assets as 
100 per cent sterling). The first transfer of £40m increased the MSP to 65 per cent, and 
the full transfer (more forcefully negotiated by Whitaker) increased the MSP to 68 per 
cent, not far from New Zealand’s 70 per cent MSP outcome. 
 
Once it was clear that the British would not guarantee the Associated Banks’ holdings, 
Whitaker tried to negotiate that sterling brought into the CBI from the Associated Banks 
would not affect the agreed MSP. But the British firmly resisted, despite discussions 
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during the month of August, arguing that they would be encouraging further Irish 
diversification and affecting negotiations elsewhere. In fact, however, the British did 
agree to guarantee the Australian trading banks’ holdings, on the grounds that they 
held currencies as agents of the Australian central bank. The British did not include 
these trading bank holdings when calculating the Australian MSP.935  
 
Why did Whitaker concede on this issue and the 55 per cent MSP? He laid particular 
stress on Ireland receiving ‘Most Favoured Nation’ treatment in the wider negotiations, 
securing benefits achieved by others, and his reliance on this British assurance 
resulted in an early agreement.936 However, when the MSP of Australia (40 per cent) 
later became public, he reacted with immediate concern, which no doubt reflected 
Ministerial criticism, on the grounds that Australia’s MSP would be significantly lower 
than its end-September position. He was not satisfied with the British response about 
Australia, but sought reassurance that there were no other such cases, and this was 
given. He was mollified in the short term but given the negotiated MSPs of Malaysia 
(40 per cent) and Kuwait (25 per cent), he would have been justified in later feeling 
deceived by the British reassurance.937 Perhaps for this reason, Whitaker was to take 
much tougher positions in subsequent MSP negotiations. Who knows if the perception 
of a weak negotiation, against the background of a difficult relationship with Haughey, 
contributed to his leaving the DF in early 1969? 
 
The agreement also reflected Irish concerns about further restriction on UK capital 
investment in Ireland. Eventually, the British, in a side letter, promised prior 
consultation if they contemplated such measures, and immediate review of the Basle 
agreement if they implemented them.938 This was stronger language than had been 
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conceded to Australia and New Zealand, which proposed consultation following any 
such action.939 
 
As it turned out, there were ambiguities in the MSP agreement, which became a 
source of conflict in the succeeding years. The agreement specified that the MSP 
should be increased to reflect ‘block transfers’ of sterling from the Associated Banks, 
but would not be increased in the event of ‘other transfers’. The November 1968 
transfer was uncontentious (it was a block transfer).940 However, in August 1969, 
Whitaker, now CBI Governor, wrote to the Bank of England about the agreed 
remaining transfers by the Associated Banks, arguing that some of these were in the 
‘other’ category.941 He also, in 1970, claimed that non-sterling foreign borrowings by 
Ireland should not be included as reserves when calculating sterling’s share. The onus 
was on the British to negotiate an increase in the MSP given these developments, and 
prolonged negotiations were conducted between the central banks. Among other 
arguments, Whitaker referred to the more favourable MSPs of countries such as 
Australia and Zambia. Eventually, in September 1970 (more than a year after the 
August 1969 transfer) an increase in the MSP to 68 per cent was agreed. This figure 
was lower than the British calculation of 73 per cent. Moreover the Irish continued to 
claim that future non-sterling borrowings should not count towards reserves in the 
calculation.942 
 
The subsequent negotiations over the MSP agreements (1970-4) take us too far out of 
our chosen time period. They are summarised, however, in Annex 5. The original 
Agreement was extended by two years in September 1971, now with an MSP of 61 per 
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cent (the MSP of all countries was reduced by one-tenth).943 By 1972, Whitaker was 
arguing against continuing the agreement at all, and an attempted re-negotiation by 
the British in that year, due to sterling’s float, had to be abandoned as the two sides 
were too far apart.944 However, the agreements continued until the end of 1974. The 
MSP agreements were the effective constraint against Ireland’s further diversification. 
Singleton and Schenk, in the case of Australia, found that sterling’s share was always 
well above the minimum level.945 This was not the case in Ireland, where Ireland’s 
sterling share tracked its MSP closely. See Figure 16 which shows the sterling share 
outcome against the MSP from February 1969 to June 1972. The brief divergence 
from the MSP in August 1969 reflected the transfer of the remaining net external 
assets of the Associated Banks. 
 
 
Figure 16: UK-Ireland MSP agreement: sterling’s calculated share of external reserves 
compared to Minimum Sterling Proportion, end-month, February 1969 – June 1972 (%) 
Source: CBI:F0706322, ‘Central bank: total liabilities and external reserves’ ‘Meeting on 5
th
 July 1972’; 
TNA:T312/2291 and T312/2808, monthly MSP notifications 
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Section 6 Conclusion 
 
This paper seeks to understand and locate the transition of Ireland’s central bank, the 
CBI, from a de facto currency board to a central bank. It focuses in particular on the 
centralisation of the Associated Banks’ net external assets into deposits with the CBI, 
which took place in 1968-9, and the diversification of the CBI’s reserves away from 
sterling, which began in 1968. 
 
Sterling’s devaluation in 1967 was the catalyst that led to both events. The UK’s 
implicit breach of promise released Irish policymakers from their sense of sterling area 
obligation, and Irish politicians seem to have intervened to press for diversification, 
overruling any reluctance. The active diversification of Ireland and other countries led 
the UK to try to stabilise the situation by offering a dollar guarantee to official holders of 
sterling in the sterling area. The guarantee then created an incentive for the 
centralisation of reserves in the CBI, enhanced by Whitaker’s fears about further 
sterling devaluation. The centralisation in turn allowed more diversification to take 
place. 
 
This rapid turn of events – perhaps even a ‘critical juncture’ marked by crisis and policy 
response – contrasted with the situation before the devaluation. Irish officials 
considered diversification, but they were constrained not only by the sense of implicit 
contract in the sterling area, but also by a feeling, held by the CBI’s Governor, that the 
central bank’s sterling assets were only just sufficient to fulfil its functions. The 
Associated Banks were also concerned by their worsening external liquidity (i.e. 
sterling) position. In other words the decentralisation of sterling assets in Ireland put 
the holders of sterling into competition with each other, increased the aggregate 
demand for sterling, and so constrained diversification. At the heart of this impasse 
was the sterling link and Ireland’s currency board system.  
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There had also been an impasse over centralisation. Government and CBI had long 
sought centralisation of the Associated Banks’ sterling holdings (and the transfer of the 
government’s Exchequer account from Bank of Ireland to the CBI), but the banks had 
long resisted, as seen in 1961-4, and had blocking power at the CBI’s board. Nor were 
the banks likely to benefit from the UK’s offer of an exchange guarantee to the CBI. 
Among the factors that finally convinced the banks were their individual liquidity 
problems and declining net external assets, which could be resolved by pooling 
liquidity risk at the CBI, the promise of a Dublin money market (a process which they 
had themselves initiated), generous switch terms, and the approach of a new 
supervisory and liquidity regime. The centralisation does seem, therefore, to have 
been part of a natural evolutionary process arising partly from liquidity and asset trends 
in the commercial banking sector – one that proceeded not smoothly but through the 
mechanism of a tipping point.        
 
Putting the pre-devaluation deadlock into perspective, it can be seen how the sterling 
area system had self-reinforcing institutional effects on a financially dependent country 
like Ireland. In 1927, Ireland fitted the category of a small open economy ‘wishing to 
preserve the benefits of belonging to a broader currency area’,946 after political change, 
and set up a currency board. In 1942, Ireland established a central bank but retained a 
currency board system, a transitional arrangement for a country wishing to ‘delay the 
introduction of a full-fledged central bank until they build up central banking expertise 
or develop financial markets’.947 But, as Honohan argued, the currency board 
arrangement, and use by the banks of the London market for their liquidity needs, 
deterred financial development in Ireland.948 It also, as we have seen, weakened the 
CBI’s GF, consequently delaying central bank activity and hence the acquisition of 
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central banking expertise (policy atrophy), and increasing the aggregate appetite for 
sterling through the decentralised tripartite financial system. Although Ireland was 
politically independent, the institutional, inertial constraints it experienced in the 1960s 
were not unlike those highlighted by Schenk for the British colonies in the 1950s.949     
  
This paper places the main events in the transition from currency board to central bank 
into a relatively short period, 1968-72. There were earlier developments, such as the 
acquisition of dollars into the LTNF (£10m, 1956-8), participation in central clearing 
(£3m, 1958), an asset in the GF (£20m, 1961), interest on deposits at the CBI (£15m, 
1964), deposit of the DF funds (£11m, 1964), and rediscounting of Exchequer bills (up 
to £15m, 1956-67). But the period 1968-72 saw the centralisation of the banks’ net 
external assets (£105m), the transfer of the Exchequer account (£60m?),950 the 
change in the statutory parity rule, the beginnings of a Dublin money market, new 
supervisory legislation and liquidity ratios, requiring the Associated Banks to invest at 
least a quarter of their deposits into Irish government securities, and a major 
diversification of the CBI’s sterling holdings (£148m).951 There was dramatic change in 
the liabilities of the central bank. 
 
This paper’s account of Ireland’s diversification also differs from those seen in the 
secondary literature. Strange’s claims about Ireland’s unswerving loyalty leading it to 
draw from the IMF rather than spend sterling assets,952 and its transactional reliance 
on the UK, making the MSP agreement ‘hardly necessary’,953 were well off the mark. 
Ireland’s undoubted transactional dependence on the UK, and the sterling link, did not, 
in fact, prevent it from diversifying when political pressure was applied after the 1967 
                                               
949
 Schenk, Britain, pp22-5 
950
 The GF’s liability to government increased by £60m in the year to Mar/1972 (CBI annual statements of 
account) 
951
 £148m is the amount of non-sterling assets added in 1968-72 (calculated from Whitaker, Interests, 
p139) 
952
 Strange, Sterling, p117. We saw that the borrowing was to fund the capital programme, and sterling 
was the preferred currency for borrowing, but the British limited Irish access to the sterling bond market 
953
 Strange, Sterling, p118 
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devaluation; the MSP agreements became the short-term constraint on diversification. 
Whitaker’s informative but brief account of the diversification only focused on a change 
in confidence, and, with characteristic diplomacy, glossed over the diversification’s 
political drivers (such as the UK’s Voluntary Programme) and stormy negotiations with 
the UK. A contribution to the literature has been to nuance and amplify Whitaker’s 
memoir using archival evidence.954 There is more to be discovered, particularly from 
the CBI and commercial bank archives, but there is enough evidence to understand 
what happened. 
 
Ireland is also an unusual case of a currency board arrangement. Currency boards are 
rare, so each individual case has value in considering their possible efficacy. Although 
an ‘old’ currency board, its motivations were modern, like Estonia’s, which sets it apart 
from the colonial currency boards. The economic case for a fixed sterling link was very 
strong, stronger than Estonia’s Deutschemark connections. With this decided, the 
choice was between a standard peg/central bank (the original intended outcome after 
a period of transition) and a hard peg/currency board (the de facto outcome). Without a 
standard peg counterfactual for the 1950s-60s,955 it has been judged that Ireland’s 
currency board system was successful, but it is interesting to observe that the currency 
board advocates have not rushed to embrace the Irish case. Both currency board 
critics and advocates agree that a fiscal discipline effect would be the main reason for 
preferring a currency board to a standard peg.956 For the system to work, fiscal 
authorities must abandon discretion and accept a subservient role.957 As in Argentina 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, this did not happen in Ireland. The ‘tranquil currency board’ 
                                               
954
 The active role of Whitaker in the changes described is clear from the archival record. The CBI became 
more proactive towards diversification and centralisation under his governorship. While the CBI was 
unable to constrain the government’s fiscal policy in the 1970s, he expressed satisfaction about his 
contribution in diversifying its reserves and widening its responsibilities (Whitaker, Interests, pp141, 185)  
955
 Honohan argued that the 1970s sterling link exhibited more credibility than the later (non-currency 
board) EMS peg (Honohan, ‘Currency board’, p54) but it is hard to compare different time periods when a 
fiscal/debt position is deteriorating over time. In any event, he believed that the sterling link would probably 
not have survived sterling strength in 1981 (p62)  
956
 Balino and Enoch, Currency board arrangements; Hanke, ‘Currency boards’ 
957
 Schwartz, ‘Currency boards’; Williamson, What role 
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was both an orthodox currency board, at the level of the Legal Tender Note Fund, and 
quite unorthodox, at the level of the wider tripartite financial system, where much 
heterodox activity (discretionary fiscal policy, monetary financing of the public sector) 
was taking place outside the control of the CBI, with the government borrowing from 
the banks, or, in 1966 and the 1970s, from overseas. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
resulting pressures on bank liquidity and domestic monetary growth had the effect of 
calling the CBI to active supervisory duty.  
 
In summary, between 1950 and 1980, Ireland transitioned from a creditor to a debtor 
nation; and this was not a journey that began only in 1973. The Irish tripartite financial 
system consisted of a powerful government, entrenched commercial banks, and a 
weak or constrained central bank. Shocks were absorbed by the banks’ excess 
reserves in the creditor years, but such short-term credibility did not make Ireland’s 
currency board system time-consistent, or necessarily appropriate or more fiscally 
disciplined relative to a standard peg and less constrained central bank. Organisational 
constraints and weaknesses may even persist over the long run: in the financial crisis 
of 2007-9, the CBI was accused of ‘excessive deference’.958 Perhaps, then, the 
‘tranquillity’ of the 1950s-60s Irish currency board was just a form of irrelevance.    
 
 
 
                                               
958
 Barry, ‘Diversifying external linkages’, p221 
302 
 
Footnote references 
Primary sources and journals 
BOE  Bank of England Archive, London 
BOI  Bank of Ireland Archive, Dublin 
CBI  Central Bank of Ireland Archives, Dublin 
NAI  National Archives of Ireland, Dublin 
NLI  National Library of Ireland, Dublin 
RBS  Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh 
UCDA  UCD Archives, Dublin 
TNA  The National Archives of the UK, London 
 
CBI, Report of the Money Market Committee, ‘Committee on the functions, operation 
and development of a money market in Ireland’ (CBI, 1969) in NLI. 
CBI, Annual Statements of Account, in NLI. 
CBI, Chronology, ‘The history of the central bank 1943-2013’, in CBI. (Available from 
CBI website: http://www.centralbank.ie/about-
us/Documents/The%20History%20of%20the%20Central%20Bank%201943-2013.pdf, 
downloaded 00:30 20/02/16) 
POSB, Post Office Savings Bank, Annual Statements of Account, Department of 
Finance, in NLI. 
 
 
Secondary sources 
Balino, J.T. and Enoch, C., Currency board arrangements: issues and experiences, 
Occasional Paper 151 (IMF, 1997). 
Barry, F., ‘Diversifying economic linkages: the exercise of Irish economic sovereignty 
in long-term perspective’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2014, 30(2), pp208-22. 
Bielenberg, A. and Ryan, R., An economic history of Ireland since independence 
(Routledge, 2013). 
Bourke, P. and Kinsella, R.P., The financial services revolution: an Irish perspective 
(Gill and Macmillan, 1988). 
Bradley, J., Fanning, C., Prendergast, C. and Wynne, M., Medium-term analysis of 
fiscal policy in Ireland: a macroeconometric study of the period 1967-1980 (Economic 
and Social Research Institute, 1985). 
Capie, F., The Bank of England: 1950s to 1979 (Cambridge, 2010). 
Chambers, A., T.K. Whitaker (Doubleday Ireland, 2014). 
Chang, R. and Velasco, A., ‘Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime’ Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 97-16, 1997. 
Cornish, S., The evolution of central banking in Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia, 
2010).  
Davy Kelleher McCarthy Economic Consultants, The control of banking in the Republic 
of Ireland: a study prepared on behalf of the Irish Banks Standing Committee (Davy 
Kelleher McCarthy, 1983), in NLI. 
De Haan, J., Berger, H. and Van Fraassen, E., ‘How to reduce inflation: an 
independent central bank or a currency board? The experience of the Baltic 
countries’ LICOS Discussion Paper 96, 2001. 
De La Torre, A., Levy Yeyati, E., Schmukler, S.L., Ades, A. and Kaminsky, G., ‘Living 
and dying with hard pegs: the rise and fall of Argentina’s currency board’ Economia, 
2003, 3(2), pp43-107. 
De Vries, M.G., The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971: the system under stress 
(IMF, 1976). 
303 
 
Donnelly, P. and Hogan, J., ‘Understanding policy change using a critical junctures 
theory in comparative context: the cases of Ireland and Sweden’ Policy Studies 
Journal, 2012, 40(2), pp324-50.  
Drea, E., ‘The Bank of England, Montagu Norman and the internationalisation of 
Anglo-Irish monetary relations, 1922-1943’ Financial History Review, 2014, 21(1), 
pp59-76. 
Fanning, R., The Irish Department of Finance 1922-58 (Institute of Public 
Administration, 1978). 
Gedeon, S.J., ‘Money supply endogeneity under a currency board regime: the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2009, 32(1), pp97-
113.  
Gerlach, S. and Stuart, R., ‘Money, interest rates and prices in Ireland, 1933-2012’ 
Irish Economic and Social History, 2015, 42, pp1-32. 
Hanke, S.H., ‘Currency boards’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 2002, 579, pp87-105 
Honohan, P., ‘Currency board or central bank? Lessons from the Irish pound’s link with 
sterling, 1928-79’ Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 1997, 200, pp39-
67. 
Honohan, P., ‘Using other people’s money: farewell to the Irish pound’ History Ireland, 
2002, 10(1), pp34-7. 
Honohan, P. and Murphy, G., ‘Breaking the sterling link: Ireland’s decision to enter the 
EMS’ Institute for International Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No. 317 (Trinity 
College Dublin, 2010). 
Honohan, P. and O’Grada, C., ‘The Irish macroeconomic crisis of 1955-56: how much 
was due to monetary policy?’ Irish Economic and Social History, 1998, 25, pp52-80. 
Jao, Y.C., ‘The working of the currency board: the experience of Hong Kong 1935-
1997’ Pacific Economic Review, 1998, 3(3), pp219-41. 
Kavanagh, E., ‘Irish macroeconomic performance under different exchange rate 
regimes’ Journal of Economic Studies, 1997, 24(1/2), pp10-42. 
Keena, C., Haughey’s millions: Charlie’s money trail (Gill and Macmillan, 2001). 
Kwan, Y.K. and Lui, F.T., ‘Hong Kong’s currency board and changing monetary 
regimes’ NBER Working Paper 5723, 1996. 
McCarthy, J.F., ed, Planning Ireland’s future: the legacy of T.K. Whitaker (Glendale, 
1990). 
McGowan, P., Money and banking in Ireland: origins, development and future (Institute 
of Public Administration, 1990). 
Meenan, J., The Irish economy since 1922 (Liverpool University Press, 1970). 
Meenan, J., ‘The evolution of the modern bank’, pp173-93 in Lyons, E.S.L. (ed), 
Bicentenary essays: Bank of Ireland 1783-1983 (Gill and Macmillan, 1983). 
Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
Moynihan, M., ‘The Central Bank of Ireland’ (John Busteed Memorial Lecture, 1969), in 
NLI.  
Moynihan, M., Currency and central banking in Ireland 1922-60 (Gill and Macmillan, 
with Central Bank of Ireland, 1975). 
Murphy, A.E., ‘Inflation and government policy’, pp15-24 in McAleese, D. and Ryan, L., 
eds, Inflation in the Irish economy: a contemporary perspective (Helicon, 1982). 
O’Broin, L., No man’s man (Institute of Public Administration, 1982). 
O’Grada, C., A rocky road: the Irish economy since the 1920s (Manchester, 1997). 
Rajan, R.S. and Siregar, R., ‘Choice of exchange rate regime: currency board (Hong 
Kong) or monitoring band (Singapore)?’ Australian Economic Papers, 2002, Dec, 
pp538-556. 
Schenk, C.R., Britain and the sterling area: from devaluation to convertibility in the 
1950s (Routledge, 1994). 
Schenk, C.R., ‘Monetary institutions in newly independent countries: the experience of 
Malaya, Ghana and Nigeria in the 1950s’ Financial History Review, 1997, 4, pp181-
98.  
304 
 
Schenk, C.R., ‘Malaysia and the end of the Bretton Woods system, 1965-72: 
disentangling from sterling’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2008, 
36(2), pp197-220.  
Schenk, C.R., ‘The evolution of the Hong Kong currency board during global exchange 
rate instability, 1967-1973’ Financial History Review, 2009, 16(2), pp129-56. 
Schenk, C.R., The decline of sterling: managing the retreat of an international 
currency, 1945-1992 (Cambridge, 2010). 
Schuler, K.A., ‘Currency boards’, Ph.D. thesis (George Mason University, 1992). 
Schwartz, A.J., ‘Currency boards: their past, present, and possible future role’ 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1993, 39, pp147-87. 
Singleton, J., Central banking in the twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
Singleton, J. and Schenk, C.R., ‘The shift from sterling to the dollar, 1965-76: evidence 
from Australia and New Zealand’, Economic History Review, 2015, 68(4), pp1154-76. 
Strange, S., Sterling and British policy: a political study of an international currency in 
decline (Oxford, 1971). 
Tam, K.P., ‘A new comparative study on the free-floating and currency board regimes 
in Hong Kong’ Bulletin of Economic Research, 2016, 68(3), pp218-38. 
Whitaker, T.K., ‘Ireland’s external assets’ Statistical Society of Ireland, 1949. 
Whitaker, T.K., ‘The changing face of Irish banking’ Manchester Statistical Society, 
1971, in NLI. 
Whitaker, T.K., Interests (Institute of Public Administration, 1983). 
Williams, D., ‘South and East Asia’, pp143-85 in Crick, W.F., ed, Commonwealth 
Banking Systems (Clarendon, 1965). 
Williamson, J., What role for currency boards? (Institute for International Economics, 
1995). 
Wolf, H.C., Ghosh, A.R., Berger, H. and Gulde, A.-M., Currency boards in retrospect 
and prospect (MIT, 2008). 
 
305 
 
Ulster Bank’s liquidity deposits and government bill holdings, 1961-9 
 
 
Figure A1: Ulster Bank deposits with CBI and Westminster Bank, as recorded at board 
meetings, 12 May 1961 – 23 October 1969 (£m) 
Source: RBS:ULS/455/19 
 
  
Figure A2: Ulster Bank holdings of Irish Exchequer bills and UK Treasury bills, as 
recorded at board meetings, 12 May 1961 – 23 October 1969 (£m) 
Source: RBS:ULS/455/19 
 
Note: only liquidity for Ulster Bank is shown because of the limited access to the 
Associated Banks’ records. Of the two major Associated Banks (representing around 
90 per cent of the total capital of the Associated Banks), the Court records of Bank of 
Ireland (which I viewed) did not give liquidity figures, and AIB’s records were not 
accessible. Ulster Bank, the larger of the two smaller banks, was therefore chosen. 
Given its small size and UK ownership, it may not be representative of the larger 
institutions, however.   
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Ireland’s foreign borrowing programme, 1965-6 
 
Issue 
month 
Amount 
(£m) 
Currency Coupon Price (%) Maturity 
(years) 
Comments 
Dec 1965 7.1 US$ 6% 99 20 SEC registered, eurodollar 
bond. Aborted Nov 1965 
Jan 1966 8.0 £:C$:DM NA 100 3-5 IMF drawing of US$22.5m 
equiv. in ratio 10.5:6:6 
Mar 1966 7.0 DM 7% 97.75 15 European bond, also payable 
in £ 
Jun 1966 5.0 £ 7% NA 10 Amortising loan from Bank of 
Nova Scotia (Dublin) 
Aug 1966 5.0 £ 7.5% 97 17 Offer for sale via Bank of 
England/Mullens 
Table A1: Ireland’s 1965-6 foreign borrowing programme, commercial details, 
December 1965 – August 1966 
Source: 
External borrowing plan: NAI:TSCH/2/2/25, Cabinet minutes, ‘Capital finance’, 25/6/1965; ‘External 
borrowing’, 31/8/1965  
Eurodollar bond: NAI:TSCH/2002/8/148, Memorandum,’External borrowing’, 17/11/1965; handwritten 
note, 27/11/1965, Secretary, DT; NAI:TSCH/96/6/384, ‘Present condition of Harriman Ripley & Co Inc’, 
Department of Finance, 12/5/1966 
IMF drawing: NAI:DFA/2006/44/192, correspondence, Dec/1965-Feb/1966 
European bond: NAI:TSCH/2002/8/148, ‘Inquiries in London on foreign borrowing’, SF Murray, 14/1/1966; 
Whitaker to Lemass, 27/1/1966; NAI:TSCH/2002/8/148, tombstone from The Irish Times, 7/3/1966 
Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) loan: NAI:TSCH/96/6/384, Dáil reports, 5/7/1966, 27/9/1966; 
NAI:TSCH/2002/8/148, ‘Public capital programme 1966-7: loan from Canadian bank’, 26/4/1966. Note: 
BNS subsequently appeared as an Irish deposit made by the POSB over the next ten years, in amounts 
ranging from £1.5-2.5m (POSB annual statements of account, 1966-76) 
Sterling bond: NAI:TSCH/96/6/384, Dáil report, 27/9/1966. Note: to proceed with this bond, the 
government had to sign an undertaking that every effort would be made to give British firms an opportunity 
to supply the import requirements of the Irish public sector (NAI:TSCH/2002/8/148, Memorandum, 
‘External borrowing’, 23/6/1966)   
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Associated Banks’ balance sheets, selected items, 31 December 1967  
 
Selected items at 31 Dec 1967 
(£m) 
Currencies 
held 
Bank of 
Ireland 
Allied 
Irish 
Banks 
Ulster 
Bank 
Northern 
Bank 
Cash and bank balances Any 26.6 31.0 19.6* 18.8 
Money at call and short notice Any 29.5 27.7 0.0 1.2 
Irish Exchequer bills Irish 30.6 20.1 2.9 ** 
British Treasury bills UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 ** 
Quoted securities, Irish and 
British government 
Irish+UK 77.2 53.3 28.1 22.8*** 
Total assets  376.3 318.1 106.9 98.5 
Table A2: Assets of Associated Banks, selected items, 31 December 1967 (£m) 
Source: Banks’ annual statements of accounts, 1967 
Notes:  *of which £0.1m were ‘currency balances’ 
 **total ‘bills discounted’ of £1.6m 
 ***British government securities only. In addition there were £3.2m other quoted securities 
 
Note: Consolidated values. The Associated Bank statements of accounts were not 
particularly informative. For example, Irish and British government securities were 
combined together in the accounts presentation – it was not possible to separate these 
two items. It is also not possible to identify the currencies underlying ‘cash and bank 
balances’ and ‘money at call and short notice’ (although Ulster Bank declared 
‘currency balances’, meaning external non-sterling, to be only £0.1m). The categories 
in the Table match those in the statements of accounts. Due to the creation of Bank of 
Ireland group in 1965, and Allied Irish Banks group in 1966, the consolidated group 
figures for these two institutions, rather than their underlying pre-merger banks, are 
shown in the Table. Displaying the balance sheets of the underlying banks (the legal 
completion of the mergers had not yet occurred) would not serve a relevant purpose. 
The balance sheets only for 31 December 1967 are shown because the aim is to show 
the balance sheet position of the Associated Banks on the eve of the 1968 
centralisation and diversification events being studied in this paper. The liquidity trends 
over time of the Associated Banks are already visible in Figure 12, and the discussion 
of the ‘central bank ratio’ in the paper, with accompanying sources. The 1967 year end 
could be reasonably assumed to be a high point for concern about sterling assets 
among the Associated Banks, given the recent devaluation and continuing concerns 
about sterling’s prospects. The balance sheets show that the extent of any 
diversification into non-sterling external currencies was contained within cash and bank 
balances (some of which were Irish anyway) and money at call and short notice. The 
two smaller banks had limited money at call because they could place liquidity with 
their UK parent banks.    
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Timeline of events during the diversification negotiations, February – July 1968 
1968 Form Key people Content 
14 
Feb 
Meeting in 
London 
Whitaker, DF 
and Snelling, 
CRO 
Gradual diversification flagged. Before taking any diversifying 
action, further discussions to be held both with UKT and BOE 
‘probably well after’ the UK Budget (19 Mar).
959
 CBI 
Governor to broach subject with BOE ‘in May or June’
960
 
15 
Mar 
Crisis  UK bank holiday declared at height of March gold crisis 
19 
Mar 
UK Budget  UK’s Voluntary Programme extended 
21 
Mar 
Phone call DF to UKT Irish set up meeting for Whitaker and Armstrong on 28 Mar in 
London
961
 
27 
Mar 
Memo Whitaker, DF Whitaker’s briefing document. Approximate £100m 
diversification planned, with focus on  gold
962
 and IMF 
credits
963
 
28 
Mar 
Meeting in 
London 
Whitaker, DF, 
Armstrong, UKT, 
Snelling, CRO 
Whitaker targets £90m diversification in 1968. Final target for 
non-sterling is 40% of total reserves = £120m.
964
 British, 
resisting, wrongly interpret £90m as ultimate diversification, 
of which £50m in 1968. BOE to be consulted
965
 
29 
Mar 
Phone call Whitaker to UKT Whitaker informs British that weekly diversification, already 
begun in mid-March, will continue
966
 
4 
Apr 
Not known O’Brien, BOE, to 
Armstrong, UKT 
Irish plan ‘inappropriate’. Maximum in non-sterling should be 
40% of CBI reserves (= £70m). Ireland should stop 
diversifying until agreement reached
967
 
By 9 
Apr 
Phone call UKT to DF UKT try to organise meeting in short order and stop 
diversification but Whitaker cannot meet until 26 Apr and 
Irish decline request to stop diversifying
968
 
26 
Apr 
Meeting in 
London
969
 
Whitaker, DF, 
Allen, UKT, 
Snelling, CRO 
Whitaker offers to limit further diversification in 1968 to £45m. 
Allen counters with no more than £15-20m, and, given no 
agreement, proposes formal letter from UK Chancellor to 
Minister for Finance.
970
 Later Whitaker asks Snelling to try to 
keep dialogue at official level, fearing adverse 
consequences
971
  
9 
May 
Letter Allen, UKT, to 
Whitaker, DF 
Ireland should limit further diversification in 1968 to £15m. 
Chancellor expressing grave concern. ‘No sterling area 
country has moved so far so fast’
972
 
23 
May 
Letter Whitaker, DF, to 
Allen, UKT 
Whitaker, unimpressed, proposes approximate limit of £25m 
further diversification in 1968 as final compromise
973
 
                                               
959
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish republic’, Snelling, 14/2/1968; ‘Dr Whitaker’s call on Sir W Armstrong’, Norton to 
Ryrie, 26/3/1968, with accompanying memorandum, ‘Diversification’ 
960
 NAI:TSCH/96/6/135, Memorandum, Whitaker, 19/2/1968 
961
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Visit of Dr TK Whitaker’, Hawtin to Ryrie, 21/3/1968 
962
 NAI:FIN/2002/19/530, ‘Diversification of reserves’, Whitaker, 27/3/1968. The memorandum proposed 
£100m diversification over the next year or so. It also stated that monetary reserves at 20/2/1968 stood at 
£297m, of which only £25.5m (£28m by 20/3/1968) was in non-sterling form. To achieve 40-50% in non-
sterling form (also a target in the memorandum) would require a switch relative to 20/3/1968 of £91-121m 
963
 Ireland could acquire a gold-linked IMF credit (super-gold tranche) by encouraging the drawing of Irish 
pounds. In fact Ireland used this facility to its full capacity (75% of its IMF quota) in the ensuing years (De 
Vries, International Monetary Fund 1966-1971, pp331, 337) 
964
 NAI:FIN/2002/19/530, ‘Diversification of reserves’, Whitaker, 29/3/1968 
965
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish sterling holdings’, Ryrie, 29/3/1968 
966
 NAI:FIN/2002/19/530, ‘Diversification of reserves’, Whitaker, 29/3/1968; TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish 
diversification’, Hawtin, 29/3/1968; ‘Irish diversification’, Ryrie, 5/4/1968  
967
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Diversification by Ireland’, Goldman to Allen, 9/4/1968 
968
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Diversification by Ireland’, Goldman to Allen, 9/4/1968 
969
 Ahead of this meeting, Bank and UK Treasury officials urged a strong line, including threatening the 
imposition of exchange controls against Ireland (TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish Republic: diversification’, Norton to 
Hubback, 19/4/1968; Norton to Hawtin, 22/4/1968; Norton to Hawtin, 24/4/1968) 
970
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish Republic: diversification’, Ryrie, 26/4/1968 
971
 TNA:T312/1931, Snelling to Allen, 26/4/1968. Whitaker also subsequently wrote to Allen, explaining 
that the Associated Banks’ reserves were part of official reserves (TNA:T312/1931, Whitaker to Allen, 
29/4/1968) 
972
 TNA:T312/1931, Allen to Whitaker, 9/5/1968 
973
 TNA:T312/1931, Snelling to Allen, 10/5/1968; Gilchrist to Snelling, 20/5/1968; Whitaker to Allen, 
23/5/1968; Gilchrist to Snelling, 24/5/1968 
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1968 Form Key people Content 
11 
Jun 
Draft letter Within UKT. As 
from Chancellor 
to Minister for 
Finance 
UKT drafts letter from Chancellor noting that Ireland has 
already diversified £14m during negotiations and demanding 
that it limit further diversification in 1968 to £15m.
974
 Letter 
not sent as UKT decide to bring the Basle guarantee into the 
negotiation
975
 
25 
Jun 
Letter Allen, UKT, to 
Whitaker, DF 
Allen implies acceptance of £25m limit and refers to 
guarantee negotiations in Basle
976
  
22 
Jul 
Meeting in 
Dublin 
Goldman, UKT, 
Hollom, BOE, 
Whitaker, DF, 
Moynihan, CBI 
First meeting held in order to negotiate guarantee/MSP 
agreement
977
 
Table A3: Timeline of negotiations between Ireland and the UK regarding Irish 
diversification from sterling, 14 February 1968 – 22 July 1968 
Source: See notes to Table 
 
 
                                               
974
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish Republic: diversification of reserves’, Allen to Chancellor’s Principal Private 
Secretary, 24/6/1968; ‘Irish Republic: diversification’, Norton to Ryrie, 11/6/1968 
975
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Irish Republic: diversification’, Ryrie to Figgures, 12/6/1968; Figgures to Goldman, 
12/6/1968; Goldman to Allen, 13/6/1968 
976
 TNA:T312/1931, Allen to Whitaker, 25/6/1968 
977
 TNA:T312/1931, ‘Sterling balances plan; Ireland’, Goldman, 23/7/1968. The Chancellor sent an outline 
of the scheme on 8/7/1968 (NAI:FIN/2002/19/530, Piper to Haughey, 8/7/1968)  
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Timeline of Ireland-UK MSP agreements, September 1968 – December 1974 
 
Month Events in the evolution of the MSP agreements 
Sep 1968 Broad agreement reached on 4 Sep.
978
 Three year term.
979
 Initial MSP set at 55%. Side 
letter promises consultation if UK contemplates further restriction on capital investment 
and immediate review of the agreement if it implements such further restriction.
980
 
Whitaker later expresses concern about news of Australia’s lower (40%) MSP and seeks 
reassurance about Ireland’s relative treatment
981
  
Dec 1968 Following £40m ‘block transfer’ from Associated Banks to CBI in Nov 1968, MSP 
increased to 65% in line with agreed formula
982
 
Sep 1970 MSP increased to 68% as a result of Aug 1969 transfers from Associated Banks to CBI. 
This follows prolonged negotiations in which sides dispute whether transfers are ‘block 
transfers’ or ‘other transfers’.
983
 Also disputed: Ireland argues that non-sterling foreign 
borrowings by Ireland should be excluded from reserves when applying MSP. MSP result 
is concession by UK, which calculates MSP should be 73%
984
 
Sep 1971 Following negotiations since early 1971, MSP reduced to 61% (UK reduces all sterling 
area MSPs by one-tenth) and agreement extended for further two years
985
  
Jun 1972 Following UK decision to float sterling, UK seeks to agree new MSP, extending 
agreement until Sep 1975. UK (proposing MSP 61%, then 57%) and Ireland (proposing 
40%, then 50%) cannot agree. UK abandons attempt in Sep 1972. Disagreements also 
over compensation arrangements now that sterling is floating
986
 
Jan 1973 UK pays Ireland £3.8m in compensation for sterling-dollar exchange rate falling below 
minimum level for 30 days to 23 Nov 1972. CBI claims late payment and interest due
987
 
Sep 1973 Further renewal until Mar 1974
988
 
Mar 1974 Further renewal until Dec 1974, now guaranteed against currency basket. Final MSP 
54%
989
 
Dec 1974 Agreement ends. Total guarantee payments aggregate £11.1m
990
 
Table A4: Timeline of events, the MSP agreements, September 1968 – December 
1974 
Source: See notes to Table 
Note: MSP = Minimum Sterling Proportion 
 
 
 
                                               
978
 TNA:T312/1932, Goldman to Whitaker, 4/9/1968 
979
 TNA:T312/2291, Gilchrist to Irish Minister of External Affairs, 23/9/1968 
980
 TNA:T312/1933, Dublin embassy to Commonwealth Office, 18/9/1968; TNA:T312/2291, Jenkins to 
Haughey, 23/9/1968 
981
 TNA:T312/1933, Gilchrist, Dublin embassy to Commonwealth Office, 16/9/1968; Dublin embassy to 
Commonwealth Office, 16/9/1968; Gilchrist to Commonwealth Office, 17/9/1968; Note, Goldman, 
18/9/1968 
982
 TNA:T312/2291, Murray to Goldman, 29/11/1968; Bell to Murray, 18/12/1968 
983
 TNA:T312/2291, Whitaker to Hollom, 22/8/1968 
984
 TNA:T312/2808, ‘Ireland: sterling agreement’, BOE, 24/6/1968; Murray to Figgures, 4/9/1970; Figgures 
to Murray, 15/9/1970 
985
 NAI:PRES/2002/8/119, ‘Renewal of sterling guarantee agreement’, 13/9/1971 
986
 NAI:FIN/2004/4/47, ‘Sterling guarantee agreement’, 24/7/1972; also NAI:FIN/2004/4/313 
987
 NAI:FIN/2004/4/47, Circulated to directors, ‘Basle sterling agreement’, CBI, 20/12/1972; 
NAI:FIN/2004/4/47, ‘Sterling (Basle) guarantee agreement’, 14/6/1973. Ireland finally dropped the interest 
claim in July 1973 (NAI:FIN/2004/4/47, Murray to Secretary, CBI, 3/7/1973) 
988
 Whitaker, Interests, pp136-8 
989
 Whitaker, Interests, pp136-8 
990
 Whitaker, Interests, pp136-8 
ANNEX 5 
311 
 
 
312 
 
Chapter 4. A co-operative system? Kahn, sterling crises and 
the sterling area, 1950-67991 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Economic historians often assume that a fixed exchange rate, international monetary 
system requires a high degree of co-operation among countries in order to avoid 
frequent currency crises.992 However, documented historical cases of large-scale and 
sustained international financial co-operation are relatively rare. Whereas historians 
still debate about the extent of international co-operation during the eras of the 
classical gold standard (1880-1914) and Bretton Woods (1946-73),993 the sterling 
area994 of the 1950s-60s is often cited as a prominent example of a co-operative 
international monetary system.995  
 
The 1950s and 1960s were however marked by frequent currency crises in the United 
Kingdom. Between 1950 and 1967, the pound sterling experienced nine crisis 
episodes and finally devaluation in November 1967. Contemporaries disagreed about 
the role of the sterling area during these crises. While critics argued that the system 
was exacerbating sterling crises – specifically through changes in the net liquid 
external sterling liabilities of the UK, known as the ‘sterling balances’ –  incumbent 
governmental defenders of the system in the Bank of England and UK Treasury 
claimed that sterling balances were remarkably stable, and that the ‘rest of the sterling 
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area’ (RSA) was consistently contributing to the UK’s reserves and even providing 
assistance to the UK during crises.996  
 
This paper explores the role of co-operation within the sterling area during these nine 
episodes of sterling crisis. I provide an assessment of the scale and timing of these 
crises and rely on a mixture of published and original, archival data in order to quantify 
the types and amounts of assistance received by the UK from RSA and ‘non-sterling 
area’ (NSA) countries during these episodes. I adopt a contemporary methodology 
which was used by the British economist, Richard Kahn, to analyse the crises of the 
1964-8 period in two government reports,997 and extend this methodology to earlier 
crises. This allows me to explain what was happening to the sterling balances during 
these crises and shine a light on the balance-of-payments debates of the time. 
 
My main finding is that the crises of the 1950s saw large negative movements in the 
RSA’s sterling balances. This contradicts the defenders’ public claim that the sterling 
balances of the RSA were remarkably stable. These movements were also a regular 
private concern of the UK authorities. Such changes in member countries’ sterling 
holdings could originate from fundamental balance-of-payments deficits of the RSA 
countries themselves or from a loss of confidence in sterling during crisis times. I show 
that changes in the RSA’s sterling balances were for the most part (at least until 1964) 
not confidence movements, but were driven by the RSA’s balance of payments, to 
which (in Kahn’s methodology) the movement in the UK’s free reserves was a 
financing counterpart. Therefore, the scope of international co-operation within the 
sterling area was limited by the area’s collective balance-of-payments problem. Co-
operation only consisted in a narrow range of measures such as the RSA’s pooling of 
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reserves (using sterling as their reserve currency). This suggests that, in order to be 
successful, a co-operative, international monetary system must address the problem of 
external imbalances.   
 
By contrast, I find that changes in NSA countries’ sterling holdings during these crises 
were primarily due to changes in confidence and international assistance. However, 
reserves holdings induced by international assistance were a relatively large part of the 
total NSA sterling holdings. This finding first suggests that the sterling area did benefit 
from international co-operation, but co-operation mostly came from the NSA rather 
than RSA countries. The finding also indicates that sterling holdings outside the 
sterling area would have been limited – if not for the assistance of foreign 
governments. This suggests that sterling’s international role was already severely 
undermined in the 1950s-60s and derived from its reserve currency use by members 
of the sterling area, as well as NSA governments’ assistance holdings.                  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses historical context, literature, 
methodology, sources and data. Section 3 reviews a ‘defender’ position – the Bank of 
England’s public and private views on the sterling balances. Section 4 examines data 
on assistance, showing the true scale of the crises. Section 5 looks at the sterling 
balances and their role during the crises. Section 6 discusses confidence and 
assistance within the RSA, and the nature of sterling area co-operation. Section 7 
concludes the paper.        
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Section 2: Historical context, literature, sources, data and methodology 
 
2.1 Historical context 
 
The sterling area system998 had its origins in nineteenth century UK trading 
relationships and the British Empire. The sterling bloc started in 1931, when the UK 
abandoned the inter-war gold exchange standard, and countries had to choose which 
reserve asset to follow. In 1939, the system was redefined by UK exchange controls. It 
formally ended in 1972, when the UK terminated the exchange control exemptions 
which had been granted to sterling area countries. In 1939-72, countries operating 
within the ring of controls were expected, in return for the system’s privileges,999 to 
follow broad rules, essentially pegging their currencies to sterling, maintaining 
exchange controls well-aligned with those of the UK, and pooling their reserves by 
using sterling as their principal reserve currency.1000 For this study, it is the pooling rule 
that is important. 
 
Because of reserve pooling, the reserve management behaviour of RSA and NSA 
countries was completely different.1001 The sterling holdings of RSA countries 
fluctuated with their aggregate reserves. Sterling was their transactional reserve 
currency, the movements in reserves largely reflecting these countries’ fundamental 
balance of payments on current and long-term capital account. By contrast the sterling 
holdings of NSA countries did not fluctuate with their aggregate reserves. Their 
holdings mainly reflected changing confidence in sterling, and, in the case of a few 
leading countries, assistance provided to the UK. This paper seeks to identify 
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fundamental (autonomous), confidence (reactive, exacerbating) and assistance 
(reactive, mitigating) flows during the sterling crises.  
 
These sterling holdings were generally known to contemporaries as the ‘sterling 
balances’. More precisely, they were the net external short- and medium-term liabilities 
of entities in the UK, which were denominated in sterling. ‘Net’ means after deducting 
all external claims (e.g. acceptances and trade credit) of the UK denominated in 
sterling. The information about the balances was largely supplied to the Bank of 
England by its network of reporting banks. The holders of the sterling balances were in 
turn both official bodies (governments and central monetary institutions (CMIs)) and 
private organisations and individuals. 
     
This study examines sterling crises in the comparatively stable period between the 
sterling devaluations of 1949 and 1967. In general, the 1950s-60s was ‘one of the 
most fruitful periods of international economic cooperation’.1002 In the late 1940s, the 
sterling area had been engaged in post-war reconstruction, and sterling’s more than 30 
per cent devaluation against the US dollar in September 1949 provided a fundamental 
readjustment. By the 1950s, it has been argued, the RSA’s sterling balances had 
transitioned from a post-war debt inheritance to a working voluntary regional currency 
system.1003 
 
 2.2 Literature review – co-operation 
 
International monetary co-operation is a contested field1004 and some do not regard it 
as beneficial.1005 Examples of international monetary co-operation over the last two 
centuries include the pre-1914 gold standard, central bank relationships between the 
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UK, USA, France and Germany in the 1920s, the Bretton Woods institutional 
framework of 1946-73, the EPU of 1950-8, central banks’ ad hoc efforts to preserve 
the international monetary system in the 1960s, the Plaza and Louvre Accords of the 
1980s, and European monetary co-operation, culminating in European Monetary 
Union.1006 
 
Among such examples, the sterling area receives prominent mention as a co-operative 
system. For Cooper: 
 
‘the Sterling Area was a cooperative system, with the aim of protecting and 
ultimately strengthening the position of sterling in international markets while 
preserving a high degree of commercial and financial freedom within the 
Sterling Area.’1007 
 
And for Singleton, the sterling area’s 
 
‘functioning required close cooperation between central bankers, especially in 
their capacities as government advisors and overseers of exchange control 
regulations’1008 
 
and 
 
‘The management of the sterling area was the main objective of central bank 
and intergovernmental cooperation in the Commonwealth. Member states 
and their central banks were expected to collaborate to preserve the dollar 
pool and protect the external value of sterling. Communication between 
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Commonwealth central banks was often conducted through the Bank of 
England. By the 1960s, however, interest in the sterling area relationship was 
waning.’1009 
 
If the co-operative aim of the sterling area was to protect and strengthen sterling in 
international markets, how was this aim to be achieved? Cooper highlighted multiple 
possible channels of co-operation, the hardest of which to implement are ‘generic rules 
of behavior’, ‘mutual financial support’ and co-ordinated actions.1010 Across the 
literature, a distinction is made between co-operation that is shallow (broadly, 
information-sharing) and deep (‘policy adjustments that differ from those that would 
have been taken unilaterally’).1011 Another is the division between informal co-operation 
(‘rules of the game’) and formal co-operation (‘ad hoc actions’). It is argued that formal 
co-operation is needed to address financial crises, while informal co-operation can 
help support longer run international financial stability.1012 Most historical cases 
involved deep, formal co-operation. For instance, the efforts of leading central banks to 
protect the international monetary system in the 1960s consisted of clear ad hoc policy 
adjustments in the form of short-term support from creditors to debtors.1013    
 
The exception is the pre-1914 gold standard, where the literature’s focus on implicit 
rules and credibility reveals a predominantly informal system.1014 There has been 
controversy about the extent of international monetary co-operation during this era, 
with Eichengreen arguing that the system’s stability relied on co-operation among 
central banks,1015 while Flandreau, taking a ‘sceptical view’ of co-operation in the 
nineteenth century, countered that the relatively rare ad hoc actions by central banks 
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were self-interested and not motivated by a spirit of co-operation.1016 The importance of 
rules suggests some superficial similarities between the sterling area and the gold 
standard, although the gold standard debate, like that recently surrounding the euro, 
was about the system’s internal stability, whereas sterling’s problem in the 1950s and 
1960s was its external stability. Nevertheless the formal-informal differentiation, as well 
as the question about whether co-operation took place, provides a framework for 
examining the sterling area.     
 
2.3 Literature review – sterling crises 
 
The historical literature has found it hard to categorise the sterling crises of the 1950s 
and 1960s, and this has resulted in debate e.g. about the causes of crisis and 
devaluation in the 1964-7 period.1017 Kaminsky describes six classes of currency 
crisis.1018 Of these, three did not appear to apply to sterling in these decades. There 
was little evidence of market-based ‘financial excesses’. ‘Sudden stops’ and ‘self-
fulfilling crises’ implied no inherent UK vulnerability. Although Newton highlighted such 
elements,1019 the vulnerability of the British economy was the overriding theme of the 
Kahn Reports.1020 However, this still leaves a choice whether to allocate the crises to 
problems of the ‘current account’ (only the real exchange rate), ‘sovereign debt’ or 
‘fiscal deficits’.1021 Gilbert emphasised the first of these, whereas Thirlwall and Gibson 
did not agree that the UK was in ‘fundamental disequilibrium’.1022 Indeed, the UK’s 
problem was more with its capital account than its current account, which was usually 
in surplus in these years.1023 The sterling balances represented high levels of external 
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debt1024 but they were in time matched by (admittedly less liquid) external assets.1025 
Some authors have favoured a fiscal deficit explanation, combined with monetary 
accommodation.1026 
 
Some contemporaries (Kahn included) thought that sterling’s problems were not 
entirely domestic in origin.1027 Such views contrast with the more recent historical 
literature, which has focused on balance-of-payments problems associated with the 
UK. Thus Schenk highlighted the UK’s 
 
‘relatively slow growth in output, productivity and the deteriorating 
competitiveness that manifested itself in recurring balance of payments crises 
in the 1950s’.1028 
 
Schenk was arguing, as Cairncross had done,1029 that UK domestic weaknesses 
caused the balance-of-payments problems, whereas Shonfield had claimed that 
causation ran in the opposite direction, from external policy priorities and sterling crises 
to domestic production and productivity.1030 
  
Schenk put forward various reasons why the RSA’s sterling balances were not the 
threat they seemed to pose contemporaries. Sterling area pooling diversified risk. RSA 
countries spending their sterling reserves were matched by others accumulating them. 
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A large part of the RSA’s sterling balances was illiquid.1031 Schenk argued that ‘the 
sterling balances did not have a directly destabilising impact on the British economy in 
the 1950s’.1032 This was because the RSA had a balance-of-payments surplus, on 
current and long-term capital account, with the NSA, and so was implicitly contributing 
gold and dollars to the UK reserves: this surplus was ‘a main determinant of the 
stability of the system’.1033 Although highlighting the general stability of the RSA’s 
sterling balances in the 1950s, Schenk did not examine currency crises in detail, 
arguing that occasional declines in sterling balances motivated by weak confidence in 
sterling could have been based on the UK’s poor fundamentals rather than concerns 
about the balances.1034 Schenk also discussed co-operative behaviour (in the sense of 
co-ordinated action) in the sterling area and found that it was waning from the early 
1950s.1035 Schenk’s overall conclusion about the 1950s was unequivocal: ‘The balance 
of payments problems that were the focus of British economic policy in this period 
cannot be attributed to the existence of the sterling area’.1036  
 
For the individual crises themselves, confidence and speculation have been the main 
features highlighted by the literature. Hirsch identified each of the crises and named 
speculation as a factor in them all, attributing those of 1956 and 1957 to ‘pure 
speculation’.1037 Boughton described the 1956 Suez crisis as ‘almost purely a 
speculative attack on a stable currency’.1038 Klug and Smith also emphasised the pace 
and scale of the speculative flows during the Suez crisis.1039 Kahn’s investigation of the 
1964-8 crises took a particularly close interest in confidence and speculative flows.  
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The RSA’s sterling balances have generally not been considered relevant factors 
behind these crises. In 1971 Brittan wrote that ‘running down of the sterling area’s 
balances contributed in a major way to only one British crisis, that of 1957, and even 
here it was not the decisive factor’.1040 Both Fforde and Robbins analysed the 1957 
crisis without mentioning the sterling area’s balances, highlighting instead the UK’s 
inflationary tendencies, and currency speculation prompted by devaluation of the 
French franc.1041 Where speculation and confidence were not behind the crisis, the 
UK’s balance of payments was thought to be the cause. Thus Schenk found that ‘the 
major culprit in the payments crisis of 1952 was the UK itself’1042 and ‘the adverse 
balance of 1955 was due much more to British deficits than to drains in the RSA’.1043 In 
their debate about the 1960s, Newton and Oliver both mentioned the sterling balances, 
but largely one aspect: loss of confidence in sterling and the risk of diversification into 
other reserve assets by sterling area countries.1044 Relatively little attention has been 
paid to the fundamental balance of payments of the RSA, as reflected in the sterling 
balances.  
     
In summary, there are three regional actors potentially held responsible for sterling 
crises of this period: the UK (its balance of payments), the NSA (external confidence), 
and the sterling area. While some contemporaries considered the sterling area partially 
accountable for sterling’s problems, more recently such a view has been discounted. 
 
2.4 The sterling balances and the international balance of payments 
 
The critics and defenders of the sterling area system had fundamentally different 
mental models of how the international balance of payments, the sterling balances and 
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the UK’s reserves interacted. In order to understand this, it is necessary to consider 
the international balance of payments in terms of three regional groups, the UK, the 
RSA and the NSA. 
 
A modern authority on the balance of payments is the IMF’s Balance of Payments 
Textbook.1045 This describes how the balance of payments of any country or region 
sums to zero and consists of the current account (goods and services, income and 
current transfers) and the capital and financial account. The financial account relates to 
changes in the external financial assets and liabilities of an economy and covers direct 
investment, portfolio investment, other investment and reserve assets. In balance-of-
payments analysis, some items of the balance of payments (e.g. the current account) 
are usually treated as autonomous, while others (e.g. reserves in a fixed exchange 
rate system) are passive, financing those autonomous flows in a compensatory 
fashion. In a simple, fixed exchange rate world in which there were no other short-term 
capital flows, the autonomous movements might be taken to be the current account 
and long-term capital account,1046 and they would be financed by changes in a 
country’s reserves.  
  
Figure 1 sets out a typical payment flow, on current and long-term capital account, 
between the UK, RSA and NSA. The figures are indicative, for illustrative purposes, 
but broadly match those prevailing in the late 1950s.1047 
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Figure 1: Illustrative annual balance-of-payments flows between UK, RSA and NSA, 
late 1950s (£m) 
Source: Author’s illustrative assumptions. See Annex 5 for historical figures 
Note: RSA = Rest of the sterling area; NSA = Non-sterling area 
 
These figures show the sterling area (RSA + UK) in overall payments balance with the 
NSA, with the resulting net positions given in Table 1. 
 
£m RSA UK NSA 
Overall current account position  
-400 
 
+100 
 
+300 
Overall long-term capital account position  
+450 
 
-150 
 
-300 
Overall balance-of-payments position on current 
and long-term capital account  
 
+50 
 
-50 
 
0 
Table 1: Illustrative annual balance-of-payments statistics for the UK, RSA and NSA in 
late 1950s (£m) 
Source: Calculated from balance-of-payments flows in Figure 1 
Note: RSA = Rest of the sterling area; NSA = Non-sterling area 
   
The contemporary critics and defenders of the sterling area system looked at such 
figures in different ways. Shonfield, a critic, cited the overall current account, and 
concluded that the UK’s sustainable current account surplus (£100m here) was being 
undermined by outward capital flows (£150m) and the RSA’s large current account 
deficit (£400m).1048 By contrast, defenders of the system tended to look at the balance 
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RSA 
UK 
NSA 
£50m 
£250m 
Bold arrows represent current account payment flow 
Dashed arrows represent long-term capital account payment flow 
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of payments only with the NSA on current and long-term capital account.1049 The latter 
approach shows the UK in large deficit (£200m) and the RSA in large surplus (£200m). 
 
The next stage in understanding is to consider how these balance-of-payments flows 
affected reserves. Again, it is useful initially to make simplifying assumptions, which 
are, as will be seen, approximations of reality. Here, it can be assumed that the 
reserves of the UK and NSA consisted entirely of gold and US dollars, while the 
reserves of the RSA consisted entirely of sterling. Under these assumptions, changes 
in the RSA’s sterling balances (reserves) reflected and financed the RSA’s overall 
balance of payments on current and long-term capital account. 
 
How would a change in the RSA’s sterling balances during a sterling crisis affect the 
UK’s own reserves? One must consider all the possible flows of sterling from the RSA 
to the rest of the world. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Flows of sterling associated with a change in the sterling balances of the 
RSA 
Source: Author’s illustration 
Note: RSA = Rest of the sterling area; NSA = Non-sterling area 
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The black arrows in Figure 2 are potential net sterling flows associated with a decline 
in the RSA’s sterling balances over a given time period.1050 The primary flows are 
named a, b and c. The second-order flows are labelled d, e and f. If the RSA’s 
collective reserves (sterling balances) were to decline during a crisis by a given 
amount, that change would equal a + b + c. Some of this sterling would be spent 
acquiring US dollars for imports, also known as ‘drawing on the sterling area’s dollar 
pool’ (arrow a). The sterling would be sold to the Bank of England or the London FX 
market: here, there was likely to be an immediate and direct negative impact on the 
UK’s reserves. Arrows b and c, however, represent payments of sterling for goods, 
services or assets, so there is no immediate impact on the UK’s reserves: rather, the 
impact depends on how that sterling is subsequently spent. 
 
In the case of the NSA, it is reasonable to assume that actors in this group of countries 
would not hold onto new sterling acquired from the RSA: they did not treat sterling as 
their reserve currency, and in a sterling crisis they might wish to dispose of new 
sterling acquired and buy gold and US dollars. Most if not all flows of sterling (arising 
from the decline in the RSA’s sterling balances) which were coming in to the NSA 
(arrows b and e) would thus go out along arrow d, with a consequent negative impact 
on the UK’s reserves, as the Bank of England acted as sterling’s buyer of last resort in 
the foreign exchange market. In some NSA countries, this FX settlement of sterling 
received was automatic, either through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which 
acted as FX agent of the Bank of England, or through the mechanism of the EPU in 
the 1950s. 
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 The RSA here is a closed group of countries: sterling spent by Australia in New Zealand (both RSA 
countries) would not alter the RSA’s overall sterling balances 
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The key residual uncertainty is the extent to which net flows of sterling from the RSA to 
the UK (arrow c) resulted in knock-on flows of sterling out of the UK (arrows e and f), 
bearing in mind that the UK was in very full employment in the 1950s-60s. For 
instance, sterling received in the UK for manufactured exports to the RSA might be 
partially spent on raw materials imports from the NSA. Or, less directly, it could be 
spent on wages fulfilling those export orders, and those wages in turn would be spent 
and in turn the incomes from those transactions might cumulatively leak out of the UK. 
It is worth recalling that the source of the UK’s balance-of-payments problems of the 
1950s-60s is thought to have been an excess of absorption over production, 
insufficient saving leading to inflationary pressure.1051 The flows through arrow c would 
only not lead to some knock-on flow through arrows e and f if all the sterling so 
received was saved in the UK.                 
 
The data in this paper does not provide information about the relative sizes of a, b, c, 
d, e and f. (Obtaining such monthly data would require a complex multi-country 
study).1052 The variables that are observable in this paper are the aggregate change in 
the RSA’s sterling balances, and the simultaneous change in the UK’s reserves. 
However, the different mental models of the critics and defenders of the sterling area 
system were evident in their different approaches to the flows. Defenders of the 
system, by focusing only on the RSA’s balance of payments with the NSA, were 
concerned only with arrows a and b. There was an implicit assumption that all sterling 
received through arrow c was being saved in the UK, even while the crisis was being 
caused domestically by insufficient saving (an excess of absorption over production). 
As they argued, across the period as a whole (as opposed to crises), the combined 
flows a and b tended to be negative (the RSA was in surplus with the NSA).1053 By 
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 Sinclair, ‘The balance of payments’, pp193-201; Paish, ‘The sterling area crisis’ 
1052
 IMF direction of trade statistics provide countries’ annual visible imports and exports with other 
countries but this data does not have the balance-of-payments breadth or monthly granularity for a study 
of sterling crises  
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 See Section 3 
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contrast, the critics were concerned about crisis periods, the overall balance of 
payments and knock-on effects such as inflation, sometimes assuming that the 
aggregate effect on UK reserves was a + b + c (i.e. making no allowance for the 
possibility of any saving in the UK). The true effect on UK reserves lay, of course, 
somewhere between these two extremes, in the (unobservable) a + d + f. Which view 
was closer to the truth depended largely on how much sterling income (arising from the 
part of RSA outflows that went to the UK) was ultimately being saved.  
 
In the literature of the 1950s and 1960s, one can observe the academic focus change 
from a singular concern with the dollar pool and the dollar area (arrow a),1054 to (after 
the 1951-2 crisis) a broader consideration of the balance of payments with the NSA 
(arrows a and b),1055 to the broadest emphasis on countries’ overall balance of 
payments and knock-on effects (all the flows represented in Figure 2).1056 The merits of 
the different accounting analyses for the 1950s were summarised by Scott in an article 
‘The balance of payments crises’. He discussed three different measures of the RSA’s 
‘contribution’ to the UK’s ‘overall’ surplus or deficit requiring financing: (1) the RSA’s 
surplus or deficit with the NSA (he said this implicitly assumed that ‘bilateral surpluses 
or deficits between members of the sterling area do not affect the balance between the 
area and the rest of the world’), (2) the first measure plus the RSA’s current deficit with 
the UK (he said this recognised that ‘the United Kingdom’s exports or imports from the 
R.S.A. substitute for exports to or imports from the non-sterling area’), and (3) the 
changes in the RSA’s sterling balances (he said this reflected a ‘responsibility of each 
member of the sterling area to ensure that its current and capital transactions with all 
other countries are kept in balance’). He argued that the appropriate measure might 
have progressed from the first to the second to the third during the 1950s, as the 
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 Stevens, ‘Some notes’; Bhagat, ‘Working’ 
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 See Kamarck, ‘Pooling: comment’; Zupnick, ‘The sterling area’s’; Scott, ‘What should be done’ 
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systems of international settlements altered.1057 We return to Scott’s analysis in 
Section 6.        
 
2.5 Kahn and the Kahn Reports 
 
Richard Kahn (1905-89) was an eminent British economist based at Cambridge 
University, who worked closely with John Maynard Keynes. In 1994, a whole issue of 
the Cambridge Journal of Economics reviewed his lifetime contributions to economics. 
A self-styled ‘disciple of Keynes’, he was, according to some, a ‘co-author’ of Keynes’s 
1936 General Theory by virtue of his commentaries on Keynes’s drafts and his own 
early (1931) exposition of the ‘multiplier’ which became a part of Keynesian analysis. 
The multiplier is a dynamic process through which autonomous exogenous 
expenditure (e.g. investment, or net foreign balance) successively feeds through 
endogenous spending iterations to a larger cumulative effect on aggregate demand.1058 
The knock-on flows involved in Figure 2 are one representation of such an effect. 
 
Kahn also believed that economics should be applied to practical problems, and he 
worked as a consultant to the UK government. The 1964-70 Labour government asked 
him to review the causes of the sterling crises that engulfed their administration from 
their first days in office in 1964, and he completed this work, with help from the Bank of 
England, in the two aforementioned Kahn Reports published in 1966 and 1971.  
    
What were Kahn’s conclusions about these crises? He expressed the UK’s 
vulnerability as follows: 
 
‘the imbalance between the short-term assets and the short-term liabilities 
(and in particular from the use of sterling as a key currency) combined with a 
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 Scott, ‘The balance of payments’, pp211-2 
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 See Passinetti, ‘Richard Kahn’, Goodwin, ‘Kahn’ and other articles in the same journal issue 
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strong propensity to run into balance of payments deficit on current and long-
term capital accounts taken together’.1059 
 
Kahn’s principal recommendation was that the UK needed to address its balance of 
payments on current and long-term capital account.1060 His reference to the capital 
account was a significant departure in UK official policy advice (which had previously 
focused on the need for a large current account surplus),1061 and it was relevant for the 
sterling area, which received the bulk of the UK’s long-term capital flow.1062 Kahn’s 
concern was not with the existence of the sterling balances themselves but with the 
fact that this borrowing was short-term. ‘The vulnerability of the economy dictates a 
short-term view about overseas investment’.1063 Kahn also highlighted exchange 
control weaknesses in the sterling area, and the need for some co-operation among 
sterling area countries at least during times of trouble.1064 
 
2.6 Kahn’s methodology 
 
Kahn’s methodological approach in the Kahn Reports was to dissect, on a monthly 
basis, the UK’s balance of payments into ‘above the line’ items (flows requiring 
financing) and ‘below the line’ items (flows providing the financing). Each crisis was 
characterised and precipitated by the actual loss of reserves to dangerously low levels. 
The UK government enjoyed some external support from the NSA, however, which 
mitigated the loss of reserves. The ‘below the line’ items were simply the change in 
reserves net of assistance received. Everything else was ‘above the line’. 
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current account surplus. The freedom of capital flow to the sterling area was untouched. For instance, it 
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In taking this approach, Kahn was diverging from the official presentation of the UK 
accounts and following more closely the precepts of the IMF, with its focus on 
autonomous flows and compensatory financing. The UK official ‘standard’ presentation 
consisted of the current account, the long-term capital account, the balance of 
monetary movements (which included reserves and assistance and was intended to 
represent changes in the net external liquidity position of the UK)1065 and the balancing 
item (which represented residual unrecorded differences between the current and 
long-term account and the balance of monetary movements given their different 
sources – the balancing item ensured that the UK balance of payments summed to 
zero).1066 Kahn was dealing with categories from the standard presentation (e.g. 
different components of the balance of monetary movements) but reordering them into 
reserves and assistance below the line, and other components above the line. 
 
There are some obvious limitations to Kahn’s simple methodological approach. There 
is, for instance, the problem referenced in the discussion around Figure 2: changes in 
the UK’s net external sterling liabilities might not translate fully into changes in the UK’s 
free reserves given the possibility of some saving in the UK. 
        
There is another problem: what is autonomous and what is financing is much more 
nuanced in reality, across many components of the balance of payments.1067 Thus a 
UK long-term capital outflow to the RSA, other things being equal, would result in a 
rise in the sterling balances of the RSA: the latter would finance the former. In Kahn’s 
methodology, changes in the UK’s net external sterling liabilities were autonomous 
(above the line) rather than financing (below the line). In the modern parlance of the 
IMF Balance of Payments Textbook, the sterling balances were ‘liabilities constituting 
foreign authorities’ reserves’ (LCFARs), which are included (along with ‘exceptional 
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financing transactions’ i.e. assistance) in ‘Selected Supplementary Information’, 
reflecting their potential financing role.1068 In the 1960s, when considering how to apply 
the IMF’s compensatory financing approach to the UK’s balance of payments, the 
Bank of England argued that changes to the UK’s net external sterling liabilities were 
financing (below the line), while admitting that this interpretation was open to 
debate.1069  
 
An example shows why the presentation mattered. If the focus was only on explaining 
changes in free reserves, the analysis might ignore periods in which a major problem 
in the UK current account was masked by short-term capital inflows. The year 1960 
was a case in point. The UK’s ‘standard’ approach revealed the 1960 problem, 
whereas the ‘compensatory financing’ approach focused on 1961 as the problem year, 
the year in which a reserve crisis occurred.1070 The Bank of England argued that, due 
to the uncertainty of whether the movements were autonomous or financing, it was in 
fact ‘impossible’ to determine to what extent a change in the sterling balances might 
have led to a change in the UK’s reserves.1071  
   
On the other hand, it can be argued that Kahn’s approach was appropriate to his task 
as a ‘crisis detective’, which was to hold all items of the balance of payments, other 
than those which were definitively financing, open to suspicion and analysis. The crisis 
was defined by reserves (the UK authorities did not optimise the UK’s net external 
liquidity position, but they did monitor and seek to protect the gross reserves, as 
explained below). Assistance too clearly played a reactive, financing role. Thus it was 
in line with the IMF compensatory financing approach that the balancing item, which 
probably reflected statistical deficiencies in the compilation of the ‘current and long-
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term capital account’ or ‘miscellaneous capital’ (e.g. trade credit), should be above the 
line.1072  
 
Finally, while it was true that some part of the change in the RSA’s sterling balances 
might be financing some autonomous changes in the UK’s balance of payments, it was 
also true that, ultimately, net changes in the RSA’s sterling balances were 
autonomous, to the extent that they were themselves the financing (reserves) 
counterpart of the autonomous flows in the RSA’s balance of payments. Kahn’s 
approach was therefore arguably consistent with the modern IMF approach to the 
balance of payments. In the modern approach, LCFARs can be ‘grouped together with 
reserve assets and exceptional financing as below-the-line items’, but ‘their 
relationship to reserve assets is not always clear’.1073 The crucial test of such ‘reserve-
related liabilities’ is that they are ‘liabilities substituting for reserve assets’.1074 
Exceptional financing (assistance) certainly substituted for reserve assets, but 
movements in the sterling balances were neither controllable nor predictable, being 
autonomously driven by the RSA’s balance of payments, and so practically could not 
substitute for UK reserves.              
 
In order to illustrate his methodology, Table 2 summarises Kahn’s calculation of the 
influences on UK reserves in the period October 1964-September 1965. Those items 
marked with an asterisk are the monthly data inputs used in this paper: 
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Movement over period: £m £m 
Balance of current and long-term capital transactions -521  
Balancing item -12  
Net external liabilities in sterling to RSA countries* -184  
Net external liabilities in sterling to NSA countries (excluding assistance)* -437  
Net external liabilities in NSA currencies (excluding assistance) -82  
Other monetary movements -25  
Total spot financing requirement  -1261 
   
Assistance etc* -1277  
Reserves* +16  
Total spot financing  -1261 
   
Support of forward market by the Exchange Equalisation Account  -838 
Total spot financing and forward support  -2099 
Table 2: UK balance-of-payments items, extracted from first Kahn Report, October 
1964 – September 1965, (£m) 
Source: Extracted from BOE, EID1/20, Kahn, ‘Enquiry into the position of sterling 1964-65’, 1 Jun 1966, 
Table 1 p29. Asterisks are author’s additions, see text 
Note: Kahn estimated that the UK’s identified balance of current and long-term capital transactions may 
have been £100-150m worse than otherwise due to confidence movements (UK capital flight), and the 
balancing item may have been £50m worse than otherwise due to leads and lags (idem, p31); and net 
external liabilities in sterling to RSA countries were lower than otherwise by £80m due to confidence 
movements (idem, p30)  
 
2.7 Methodology of this paper 
 
Before discussing Table 2 in more detail, it is necessary to consider the aims and 
methodology of this paper. The aim here is to explore the potential connections 
between changes in the sterling balances of the NSA and the RSA, and adverse 
changes in the UK’s free reserves (reserves net of assistance), which defined the 
crises of the 1950s-60s. The investigation involves a simulation of Kahn’s methodology 
outside his sample period of 1964-8, but, given the different aim, it does not need to 
consider individually, as Kahn did, the unasterisked items in Table 2, which can be 
lumped together as a residual. This is fortunate, because such monthly data is not 
readily available, so the residual is calculated using the knowledge that the UK’s 
balance of payments (the known asterisked items plus the residual unasterisked items) 
sums to zero. Whenever a residual is mentioned, economists naturally become 
suspicious, but it must be emphasised that the asterisked items of Table 2 were by far 
the most precise and certain elements of the UK balance of payments1075 – the items in 
                                               
1075
 BEQB:1962Q1, pp19-20; 1968Q1, pp34-5 
335 
 
which the Bank of England had confidence – so it is indeed appropriate to calculate 
‘everything else’ as a residual in the balance-of-payments accounting identity. 
 
Where care must be exercised, however, is in trying to interpret the residual. In 
addition to fundamental factors within the UK’s balance of current and long-term capital 
transactions, it contains significant confidence movements, as is indicated by the 
Notes to Table 2, such as capital flight out of the UK (especially to the RSA given the 
lack of exchange control on such movement)1076 and leads and lags.1077 
 
Since we are, in effect, extending Kahn’s methodology to the crises of 1951-61, it 
should also be noted that some of the items Kahn was concerned with were 
quantitatively not so important in these earlier years. One of these was the authorities’ 
activity in the forward markets (see Table 2). Only the spot financing position is 
considered in this paper. This is appropriate since the focus of this study is more on 
fundamental than confidence factors, and the connection between forward intervention 
and spot losses of reserves is uncertain.1078 Another such item was net external 
liabilities in NSA currencies (see Table 2), which arose from the increased activity in 
the eurocurrency markets in the 1960s. This item was also affected by confidence 
influences and relative interest rates. It was quantitatively much smaller in the 1950s 
and is here subsumed within the residual.1079  
 
To summarise, we are taking as inputs observable monthly data (published reserves, 
sterling balances and assistance given to the UK by the NSA). The methodology relies 
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on the fact that all these inputs are components of the UK balance of payments, and, 
moreover, the UK balance of payments automatically sums to zero.1080 It is thus 
possible to re-order the monthly data as follows: 
       
Despite the Bank of England’s aforementioned public reluctance to assign causal 
connections from the sterling balances to reserves, this reordering is at least broadly 
consistent with its own evaluation of the influences on reserves in this period: 
 
‘what, in fact, finally determines movements in the reserves is the balance of 
all transactions on current and long-term capital account, taken in conjunction 
with the willingness, or otherwise, of overseas residents to hold part of their 
short-term external assets in sterling.’1081   
 
 
The top two boxes taken together constitute the scale of the crisis, which is the 
variable that has to be explained. The duration of each crisis is defined by continuous 
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 See BEQB:1968Q1, pp34-40; also for an explanation of the UK balance of payments, Thirlwall and 
Gibson, Balance-of-payments theory, pp38-50 and in particular Table 2.1, ‘Transactions in external 
liabilities’ on p39 
1081
 BEQB:1968Q1, p37 
Change in the UK's published gold and convertible currency reserves 
• less 
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Change in sterling balances attributable to the rest of the world (non-sterling area), less 
all such change associated with assistance provided to the UK by the non-sterling area 
•plus 
Residual: all other elements of the UK balance of payments e.g. UK balance of payments 
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monthly declines in this variable, a downward peak-to-trough movement in published 
reserves after deducting net assistance to the UK from the NSA. (For shorthand, 
published reserves so adjusted are now called ‘adjusted reserves’. The change in 
adjusted reserves over the duration of the crisis is the scale of the crisis).1082 It must be 
acknowledged that focus only on crisis periods is incomplete analysis as it misses the 
non-crisis periods. Nevertheless, many past economic studies have looked at crisis 
periods in isolation, and these crises were a large part of the UK’s perceived balance-
of-payments problem.  
 
The bottom three boxes represent the three regional contributors to the scale of each 
crisis, namely the wider sterling area, the rest of the world, and the UK. The concern, 
given all the many autonomous and financing flows in various directions, is whether 
these three quantities truly reflected these regions’ respective fundamental contribution 
to the loss of adjusted reserves during crises.    
 
The penultimate box, the rest of the world’s contribution to crisis, is assumed to be 
largely a confidence movement. Why so? Firstly, assistance by the NSA to the UK has 
been deducted. Secondly, as will be shown,1083 countries in the NSA were not typically 
using sterling as a transactional reserve that moved with their fundamental balance of 
payments. This would have been particularly true during crises, when the NSA’s 
sterling balances were declining in response to the crisis. What remains, therefore, is 
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 The rationale for this approach to crisis duration is as follows. As already noted, sterling crises in 
these years consisted of a rapid decline in UK reserves culminating in a major policy reversal. The trigger 
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around US$2 billion (= £714m at £1 = US$2.80) (see Boughton, ‘Northwest of Suez’, p445; Klug and 
Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, pp192-3). It makes sense to focus on a continuous downward move in the 
adjusted reserves, since the crisis was not over until the adjusted reserves had stopped declining. The 
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surveyed by Kahn. For example, the incoming Labour government’s brief for Kahn’s first report dictated 
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confidence, and confidence movements are usually a response to vulnerability rather 
than a cause.1084  
 
The key issue is whether the change in the RSA’s sterling balances (the third box) can 
be argued to have had a full contributory effect on the change in the UK’s adjusted 
reserves. In two ways, the effect can be said to be exaggerated. Firstly, there was the 
analysis of Figure 2 – some part of the associated sterling flow to the UK (which was 
one of three possible flows arising from a decline in RSA sterling balances) might have 
been saved in the UK rather than leading to knock-on external spending. Secondly, the 
change in the RSA’s sterling balances may have been affected by RSA diversification 
of reserves (selling sterling to retain gold and dollars instead) if we now drop the 
assumption that the RSA only used sterling as its reserves. Such diversification can be 
interpreted as a confidence-driven reaction to crisis. However, anticipating the findings 
of Section 6, such diversification by the RSA was very limited prior to 1964: unlike for 
the NSA, the RSA’s sterling balances movement before 1964 was fundamental rather 
than confidence-driven. 
 
Against this theoretical overstatement of the reserves effect of a change in the RSA’s 
sterling balances, however, there is a significant argument for understatement. It 
should be borne in mind that the residual in the bottom box includes a large annual 
long-term capital flow from the UK to the RSA,1085 it includes significant confidence 
movements out of the UK during crises, such as leads and lags and other forms of 
capital flight, and it excludes all assistance to the UK from the NSA. On the other hand, 
the changes in the sterling balances of the wider sterling area include a large annual 
long-term capital flow to the RSA from the UK, they include significant confidence 
movements from the UK to the RSA during crises, and they include all assistance to 
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the RSA from the NSA.1086 Since the aim is to isolate fundamental drivers of a decline 
in adjusted reserves, this constitutes a bias towards positive movement in sterling 
balances in the wider sterling area (and negative movement in the residual) during 
sterling crises.1087 A (qualitative) evaluation of the components of any change in the 
RSA’s sterling balances during sterling crises (dividing these into fundamentals, 
confidence and assistance) is reserved until Section 6. The raw figures are presented 
in Section 5.  
 
2.8 Data quality and sources 
 
The paper makes use of a mixture of existing and new primary data. The monthly 
sterling balance data come from a published source1088 and two sets of files at the 
Bank of England Archive. The first archival source, the Overseas Negotiation 
Committee (ONC) reports, covering the years 1949-58, was used by Schenk in a 
ground-breaking sterling area study in the early 1990s.1089 In addition to the sterling 
holdings referenced by Schenk, these reports are also rich in other balance-of-
payments information, such as credit assistance to the UK e.g. from the European 
Payments Union (EPU). The second source, the reports of the Committee for 
Overseas Figures (COF), has not hitherto been referenced by the literature and covers 
the period 1957-68. The monthly reporting of country sterling balances in 1957-68 
coincides with the earliest monthly reporting of official reserves in the IMF online 
database, and a comparison indicates the monthly operational reserve management of 
sterling area and other countries during this period.1090 
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Data quality issues need to be considered. In general, the reserves and sterling 
balances were much the most reliable elements of the UK’s balance of payments.1091 
There are no problems with the UK’s gold and convertible currency reserves (except 
that there were, as will be seen, also some ‘unofficial’ investments held outside the 
reserves). But the sterling balances, either published by the Bank of England or 
contained in its ONC and COF reports, require careful handling. In addition, the 
measurement of varied types of assistance, collected from a range of UK archival 
sources, was the hardest part of the data collection, and also involved judgements 
about selection. 
 
The sterling balances were reported monthly but figures were subject to frequent 
revisions. There were country departures from the RSA, and also occasional general 
changes of series definition, a major revision occurring in 1962. Calculating net 
external liabilities meant ensuring that claims were deducted from gross liabilities, but 
the claims and the net liabilities position are not always accessible at the individual 
country level in the 1958-62 years. There are also files missing from the COF reports, 
particularly a run of files covering much of the 1964-6 crisis period, which were 
probably removed for analysis by Kahn or his team, and not returned.1092 To ensure 
consistent treatment of the sterling balances data, they have been examined in three 
separate periods. The first, from December 1949 to December 1958, uses the ONC 
reports. The second, from December 1958 to December 1962, uses published data 
and the COF reports up to the point of the major sterling balances definition revision. 
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The third, from December 1962 to December 1967, mainly uses published data and 
reflects the new post-1962 series.1093  
     
The paper adopts two noteworthy policies towards the data. Firstly, there is an 
adjustment to be made to the sterling balances. The RSA is taken also to include a few 
countries which had exited the sterling area, and whose sterling balances were 
consequently still in run-off and had not reached a level consistent with other NSA 
countries. This might at first seem controversial, but it is the correct approach, because 
the sterling balances of these ‘exiters’ had arisen through their membership of the 
sterling area, and the run-off was a known problem facing the sterling area as a co-
operative system. The balances of relevant countries are deducted from the NSA 
balances and added to the RSA balances.1094 The quantitative effects of this 
adjustment do not alter the broad findings about the crises, as is apparent from Section 
6.  
 
Secondly, for the 1950-8 years, the paper adopts a different treatment of ‘assistance’ 
than did Kahn. When using this term, Kahn (and subsequently Capie) were talking 
about UK official short- and medium-term borrowing from outside the sterling area, 
amounts which would have to be repaid in short order.1095 In the absence of more 
evidence about assistance in the 1958-62 years, the same approach is undertaken for 
the 1961 crisis. However, in the 1950s, the UK was also receiving significant grants 
and long-term loans from the NSA.1096 Since the aim is to estimate, roughly, the scale 
of each crisis and the UK’s standalone balance-of-payments contribution to each crisis 
against that of the RSA, it seems appropriate also to include, within assistance, all 
                                               
1093
 While this paper is primarily looking at the behaviour of sterling balances during specific sterling 
crises, it is also informative to review trends in RSA and NSA sterling balances during these three periods 
1094
 The relevant countries are Egypt, Sudan and Palestine/Israel in the 1950-8 period; and Egypt and Iraq 
in the 1958-62 years. In 1962-7, while there were notable exiters from the sterling area, Burma and 
Southern Rhodesia, they had already reduced their sterling holdings to a low level prior to leaving the area 
so there is no need for this adjustment to be made 
1095
 Capie, Bank of England, pp227-35. Kahn ignored other types of assistance such as a ‘bisque’ 
(capitalised long-term deferral of interest) allowed by the USA in Dec/1964 (see Annex 2) 
1096
 Uniquely in the 1950-8 years, this additional data is accessible 
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grants and long-term loans (those which had an assistance motivation) as well. There 
were two broad types of assistance, one type matched by a net external liability in 
sterling to the NSA, and another not matched by sterling liabilities. The former type 
needs to be deducted from the NSA sterling balances, as indicated in Table 2. Each 
category of assistance is discussed in Section 4. Before proceeding to this, however, 
the next Section provides the principal ‘defender’s’ view, the Bank of England’s public 
and private statements on the connections between sterling balances and reserves.        
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Section 3: the Bank of England view – public and private 
 
This Section considers the Bank of England view, as a principal public defender of the 
sterling area system. The public attitude of the Bank of England to the (aggregate) 
sterling balances throughout the period is summarised in a speech given by the 
Governor to the Overseas Bankers Club on 30 January 1967. 
 
‘These balances are not the United Kingdom’s main problem. They do, of 
course, represent very large liquid liabilities but they have been 
extraordinarily stable since the war… No-one can deny that running a reserve 
and international trading currency is not made any easier when our gold and 
foreign exchange reserves are not as large as we should like but our 
difficulties in this respect have been caused entirely by our own inadequate 
performance in the balance of payments field. As this performance improves, 
which we are confident it will during 1967 and thereafter, the problem will 
recede.’1097  
 
These themes were expounded in more detail in a document, ‘The sterling balances’, 
sent by the Foreign Office to overseas missions in December 1966, which, given its 
statistical backing, was almost certainly drawn up by the Bank.1098 It claimed to be ‘a 
factual examination’ of the balances but understandably presented a defender’s point 
of view. Again, it reflected that the sterling balances were ‘remarkably stable’, but 
admitted that short-term movements in the balances were ‘quite large enough to cause 
strain on the reserves at particular periods’. The memorandum referred to each of the 
prior crises, highlighting the declines in sterling balances and their causes (see Table 
3). 
 
                                               
1097
 BEQB:1967Q1, p58 
1098
 BOE:EID10/25, ‘The Sterling Balances’, 9/12/1966 
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Crisis Stated cause of sterling balance movement leading to UK reserve strain 
1951-2 Korean War and its aftermath: reductions follow corresponding increase 
1955 Sizeable UK balance-of-payments deficit in that year 
1956 Uncertainties connected with Suez 
1957 Partly concern about UK wage costs and prices; partly RSA deficits 
1961 Weakening of confidence caused primarily by large UK deficit in 1960 
1964-5 Sharp loss of confidence following huge UK deficit (plus much smaller RSA deficits)  
Table 3: UK government explanation for declines in sterling balances during crisis 
periods, 1951-65 
Source: BOE:EID10/25, ‘The Sterling Balances’, 9/12/1966, sent by the Foreign Office and 
Commonwealth Office to ‘certain overseas missions’ 
Note: Sterling balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling 
 
 
As is evident from Table 3, this document largely attributed sterling balance changes to 
confidence movements in reaction to UK weaknesses (e.g. the UK balance of 
payments, Suez, UK inflation), downplaying RSA deficits. In response to a 
contemporary French government claim that RSA deficits destabilised sterling, the 
document argued that RSA deficits ‘only cause direct pressure on sterling when the 
deficits are with NSA countries’ and that such occasions were rare and the deficits 
small relative to those of the UK with the NSA. A third longer-term argument in support 
of sterling’s solid international position was that ‘sterling is both a reserve and a trading 
currency… reserve holdings have not fallen very much. Traders’ holdings have risen a 
great deal’.1099  
  
Against this public expression of confidence, the Bank’s archives provide evidence of 
some of its officials’ private concerns about the link between sterling balances and UK 
reserves. These became most evident during the 1956 working party which reviewed 
the sterling area. In a paper written in April 1957, the adviser Thompson-McCausland 
observed: ‘every substantial fall in the external sterling holdings has meant a broadly 
equivalent fall in the U.K.’s reserves’. The statement was accompanied by a graph of 
                                               
1099
 In making this claim, the document equated traders’ holdings with private holdings of sterling held 
outside central monetary institutions (then over £1,500m): however, as the Ireland and Australia chapters 
showed, private holdings of sterling were often monetary reserves of commercial banks (designated 
official reserves in Ireland and held as agents of the central bank in Australia), not an expression of 
traders’ confidence in sterling. The BOE made the same claim (that stable, increasing non-official holdings 
demonstrated the confidence of private traders in sterling as a commercial currency) in other documents 
(e.g. BEQB:1963Q4, pp264-78)  
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sterling balances and UK reserves between 1950 and 1957 which indeed showed this 
to be the case.1100 
 
The same graph tracking UK ‘reserves of gold and convertible currencies’ against 
‘overseas sterling holdings’ became a regular up-front item of the internal COF reports 
which began in 1957. The singular graph, which appeared monthly, was only dropped 
from the report in 1963.1101 The Bank’s Statistics office, responding to the Deputy 
Governor’s query about a similar graph in 1956, noted the ‘high degree of correlation 
between the two lines’ and explained it in balance-of-payments accounting terms. The 
paper observed that the UK’s current account surplus and overseas investment flow 
had been similar in scale since 1949 (these variables tending to offset each other) and 
in these circumstances, the change in sterling balances and change in reserves were 
also similar, since these two differences were automatically equal to each other 
through the balance-of-payments identity.1102 This was another way of saying that the 
balance on current and long-term capital account is roughly equal and opposite to the 
balance of monetary movements in the official ‘standard’ presentation.1103 In a 1965 
review, Bank analysts also highlighted the important role of the sterling balances in the 
crisis of 1957.1104 This paper’s findings, regarding the correlation between sterling 
balances and reserves, are discussed in Section 5. 
 
As for the question about the correct balance-of-payments metric for the UK and RSA 
(the overall balance or the balance versus the NSA), the NSA metric was often used in 
Commonwealth financial conferences. But interestingly British policy was framed in 
terms of the overall current account, not the balance with the NSA.1105 The view that 
                                               
1100
 BOE:OV44/33, Draft, ‘The sterling area’, Thompson-McCausland, 10/4/1957 
1101
 No explanation for the dropping of the graph could be found 
1102
 BOE:EID3/114, ‘Correlation between movements...’, Statistics office, for Deputy Governor, 6/2/1956 
1103
 Changes in reserves and the sterling balances being the main items in the balance of monetary 
movements 
1104
 BOE:EID16/8, ‘…1957, 1961 and 1964/65 Crises’, 12/1/1966 
1105
 Tomlinson, British macroeconomic policy, p58 
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the overall balance was relevant was also concluded by Commonwealth officials in a 
report about the sterling area’s balance of payments in 1955: 
 
‘The Overall Balance and the Non-Sterling Balance… it would be a 
misapprehension to regard the sterling and non-sterling balances of any 
particular country as being in separate compartments… an estimation of the 
overall balances of the sterling area countries is essential to the analysis of 
the causative factors influencing the non-sterling position of the sterling area 
as a whole.’1106   
 
Thus contemporary officials were at least aware of the indirect pressure that RSA 
deficits with the UK might pose for the UK reserves. There is a logical problem with 
ignoring all the UK-RSA trade and other flows shown in Figure 1.1107 The RSA was not 
a featherbed for the UK’s exports:1108 the UK’s net exports to the sterling area engaged 
real UK resources with genuine alternative uses. If so, those UK export resources had 
value and could theoretically have been redeployed in other directions. Still, as already 
noted, different contemporary analysts had different mental models and took different 
approaches. 
 
Kahn and the Bank would have been uneasy collaborators in the Kahn Reports. The 
UK officials who had to defend the sterling area, and who had responsibility for it from 
the mid-1950s until 1968, Rickett in the Treasury, and Parsons and Bridge at the 
Bank,1109 do not appear to have been set on changing the system to any great extent. 
When Kahn’s 1966 Report proposed a target of reducing the short-term liabilities 
                                               
1106
 NAA:A1838,708/13/4PART1,553815, ‘Sterling Area balance of payments…,’ 19/12/1955. Note that 
the word ‘balances’ in this citation means, not sterling holdings, but ‘balance of payments’ 
1107
 As argued in Scott, ‘The balance of payments’, pp211-2 
1108
 As argued in Schenk, Britain, pp54-87 
1109
 Denis Rickett, Maurice Parsons, Roy Bridge. Rickett was head of Overseas Finance in the Treasury 
and listed third in importance after the Chancellor and head of the Treasury William Armstrong in the 
Treasury address list for the first Kahn Report. Jenkins described him as ‘the last of the old-style Treasury 
mandarins’ (Jenkins, A life, p242). For Parsons and Bridge see Capie, Bank of England, pp403-5 
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represented by the sterling balances by £600m, the Bank’s internal response was 
negative towards such a change in policy: ‘any surplus available would be better held 
in the reserves because this would improve the assets/liabilities ratio’.1110 There was 
not much suggestion here of a desire to reduce sterling’s international role. And Kahn, 
in his turn, in the 1971 report was critical of the evolution of policy at the Treasury (and 
implicitly the Bank): he complained of Overseas Finance ‘mystique’ and ‘a somewhat 
“closed shop” and traditionalist attitude, sceptical of any contribution from external 
disciplines’.1111 
   
 
                                               
1110
 BOE:G1/497, ‘The Kahn Report’, 30/6/1966 
1111
 BOE:EID1/7, ‘Enquiry’ (1966-68, Vol.II), 12/8/1971, p192 
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Section 4: Assistance and the scale of sterling crises, 1951-67 
 
This Section reviews assistance to the UK from the NSA, indicates its role in the NSA 
sterling balances, and shows the consequent scale of each of the crises of the period 
through movements of the adjusted reserves.  From the work of Kahn and Capie, 
assistance (short- and medium-term borrowing from the NSA by the UK) has already 
been established for the 1964-7 period. A similar approach is undertaken for the 1961 
crisis. But assistance during the 1950-8 years is handled differently, because it 
consisted principally of grants and long-term loans, which are accessible to the 
researcher. Table 4 shows two types of assistance during this period, one matched by 
changes in sterling balances, and the other received without changing the sterling 
balances. 
 
Types of assistance received by the UK (1950-8) 
Matched by changes in sterling balances Not matched by changes in sterling balances 
 
IMF drawing (1956) 
Pre-quota EPU (1950+) 
New EPU credit (1951-8) 
West Germany support (1956-8) 
 
USA – ERP (Marshall Plan Aid) (1950-1) 
USA – Mutual Defence Aid (1951-8) 
EPU – initial debit balance (1950)* 
EPU – Katz-Gaitskell Agreement (1950-1) 
Last drawings on Canada 1946 loan (1950) 
Debt service, USA/Canada 1946 loans (1951-8)* 
USA 1946 loan service deferral (1956-7) 
USA Export-Import Bank loan (1957) 
Bank of England window-dressing (1956) 
 
*indicates negative assistance 
Table 4: Types of assistance received by the UK from the NSA, 31 December 1949 – 
31 December 1958 
Source: for left hand side, see sources in Figure 3; for right hand side, see Annex 2 
Note: ERP = European Recovery Program, EPU = European Payments Union, NSA = Non-sterling area 
 
Table 4 shows the complexity of assistance. The types of assistance on the right hand 
side of the Table (ERP, Defence Aid, loan service deferral and the Export-Import Bank 
loan being the four largest items) are explained in more detail in Annex 2.1112 In order 
                                               
1112
 The most difficult judgements for these items were how to treat debt service on the American and 
Canadian 1946 loans and the BOE’s window-dressing (essentially short-term borrowing in New York). The 
1946 loans were clearly assistance to the UK (they were long-term, low interest loans and interest-free 
until 1951), and so it is logical to treat the debt service on these loans as negative assistance: the debt 
service was a known liability for the sterling area as a co-operative system. See Annex 2   
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to indicate the role of assistance matched by changes in the sterling balances, the 
discussion now focuses on the three European types of assistance on the left hand 
side of the table, and their effect on the sterling balances of the NSA countries.1113 
   
The EPU (1950-8) was a credit mechanism designed to encourage the provision of 
multilateral credit in Europe. There were two sorts of sterling holding associated with 
the EPU. The first, known as the pre-quota EPU holdings or ‘existing resources’, were 
liabilities which the UK already owed to specific EPU members at the start of the EPU, 
and were settled during the 1950s. The second was the new credit extended to the UK 
during the operation of the EPU.1114 Thirdly, by agreement with the UK, West Germany 
from 1956 began to support the UK with sterling holdings in excess of its EPU 
holdings, in anticipation of redeeming its post-war obligations to the UK. These 
increased sterling holdings were helpful to the UK during the 1957 crisis.1115  
 
The NSA country sterling holdings in 1950-8 also included a large element 
representing the holdings of Egypt, Sudan1116 and Palestine/Israel, all of which had 
exited the sterling area during the late 1940s, but where the run-down of balances 
during the 1950s was anticipated and partially controlled. Since these holdings were a 
hangover from these countries’ membership of the sterling area, it is appropriate that 
they should be included with the RSA rather than with the NSA. 
 
After deducting all these different credit and sterling area elements, the remaining net 
external liabilities of the UK to the NSA countries, which, following Kahn, may be 
                                               
1113
 The IMF drawing in 1956 was a one-off form of assistance and not from a country. It is relatively 
straightforward and including it in the discussion would not be enlightening 
1114
 Deficits in the EPU, although settled in credit or gold with the UK, reflected the trading of the sterling 
area as a whole with EPU countries. There was also a one month settlement delay, so the credit extended 
to the UK included the credit outstanding at that month plus the deficit for that month  
1115
 The support particularly arose out of a UK-West Germany agreement to offset West Germany’s war-
related obligations to the UK under the 1953 London Agreement against the UK’s obligations to West 
Germany under EPU. The German central bank placed a £75 million deposit at the BOE in 1957 
(TNA:FO371/128293) 
1116
 Sudan was even described as being a ‘de facto’ member and mooted to re-join the sterling area upon 
its independence in 1956 (BOE,OV134/2, ‘Redemption…’, Johnston to Armstrong, 15/1/1957) 
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assumed to be a barometer of NSA confidence in sterling, were much lower than they 
appeared to be in aggregate. This puts quite a dent in sterling’s claim to be a willingly 
held reserve currency outside the sterling area in the 1950s. The decomposition is 
shown in Figure 3, in which the residual NSA holding is displayed in black and named 
‘NSA confidence’.1117 
 
  
Figure 3: Decomposition of sterling balances of NSA countries, monthly at end-month, 
December 1949 – December 1958 (£m) 
Source: Calculated from BOE:EID3/98–EID3/106 and, for EPU, also from TNA:T232/394–T232/412 
Note: RSA exiters = Egypt, Sudan, Palestine/Israel; EPU = European Payments Union; WG = West 
Germany; RSA = Rest of the sterling area; NSA = Non-sterling area; Sterling balances = Net external 
liabilities of the UK in sterling. NSA confidence is derived as a residual after deducting the four other 
elements, where positive, from the total sterling balances (the UK’s net external liabilities in sterling) of the 
non-sterling area countries. The non-sterling area figures shown are only for countries and do not include 
international organisations such as the IMF, which are treated separately in the analysis. The pre-quota 
EPU balances shown as existing resources at the beginning of the EPU in July 1950 are assumed to have 
been the same in the preceding months. Note that the negative EPU credit in 1950-1 (the UK started with 
an initial debit balance and at first benefited from sterling area surpluses in the EPU) was not matched by 
sterling balances 
 
With the calculation of assistance, the scale of the crises (declines in adjusted 
reserves) can now be revealed. For the crises of 1964-7, Capie has already presented 
                                               
1117
 Schenk provided a line-graph of NSA sterling balances (without the decomposition), based on the 
same data, which looks different from Figure 3. The differences are attributable to various factors. Firstly, 
this graph uses monthly rather than quarterly plots. Secondly, this graph does not include the sterling 
balances of international organisations such as the IMF. Thirdly, this graph adjusts for a series revision in 
1956 which reduced the NSA country sterling balances by £82m: the pre-revision balances are diminished 
by £82m. Fourthly, Schenk’s graph has three surprisingly low plots (Dec/1953, Dec/1954, Dec/1955) 
which I could not find in the source data. Fifthly, there may also be minor single digit differences arising 
from different treatment of revisions. See Schenk, Britain, Figure 2.2, p21  
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the transition from published to free reserves (after deducting assistance).1118 In Figure 
4, the crisis periods for 1964-7 have therefore been taken from the peak to the trough 
(in month 0) of free reserves, using Capie’s figures converted into pounds sterling at 
£1 = US$2.80.1119 Figure 4 shows the UK’s state of near-insolvency by mid-1966. 
 
 
  
Figure 4: ‘Free reserves’ during sterling crises, monthly at end-month, July 1964 – 
October 1967 (£m) 
Source: Capie, Bank of England, Table 5.1, Column (7), pp231-2, converted into sterling at £1 = US$2.80  
 
The scale of the 1951-61 crises can now also be estimated. Since, for the 1950-58 
period, we have been including grants and long-term loans in assistance, ‘free 
reserves’ cannot be defined (grants are not a claim on the reserves). Figure 5 
therefore shows the crises of 1951-61 in terms of what would have happened to 
published reserves if assistance had not been received. The first point in each line is 
the published reserves figure for that month, but subsequent points now deduct 
cumulative assistance. 
 
                                               
1118
 Capie, Bank of England, Table 5.1, pp231-2. In making the transition from published to ‘free’ reserves, 
Capie deducted emergency borrowing and added the dollar portfolio which was not originally part of the 
published reserves 
1119
 The 1967 crisis is truncated at end-Oct/1967, the month-end prior to devaluation. While the Nov/1967 
devaluation was an interesting month, it was the capitulation stage of the crisis, it is easier to avoid 
devaluation effects, and the decision to devalue was arguably already inevitable by end-October 
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Figure 5: Adjusted UK gold and convertible currency reserves during sterling crises 
(being published reserves less assistance from the NSA), monthly at end-month, June 
1951 – July 1961 (£m) 
Source: Calculated from published reserves (BOE Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 27, pp162-3) and 
assistance (see Table 4) 
Note: NSA = Non-sterling area  
 
The most striking feature of Figure 5 is the scale of the 1951-2 crisis, which, but for 
over £400m of assistance (principally from the EPU, Defence aid and the Katz-
Gaitskell agreement), came close to exhausting the UK’s reserves. Indeed this and the 
1956 crisis included a December month, and if the loan service on the American loans 
had not been treated as negative assistance in this analysis, the scale of the decline 
would have been more than £60m larger in each case. It is also clear that, with the 
exception of the 1951-2 and 1961 crises, the other crises of 1951-61 were not 
approaching the scale of those of 1964-7 (even allowing for inflation). 
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Section 5: The sterling balances and their contribution to crises 
 
Having established assistance and the scale of the crises, we now examine the RSA’s 
sterling balances. As noted, there has been a presumption in the literature that the 
sterling area’s sterling balances were stable. The RSA’s sterling balances looked 
stable from a helicopter view. However, because they were large, their absolute 
movements were large relative both to UK reserves and to the other contributors to 
sterling crises.   
 
As an overview, Figure 6 shows the quarterly levels of RSA and NSA sterling balances 
over the period, from published data (here the NSA balances include assistance 
holdings such as the IMF’s). 
 
  
Figure 6: Sterling balances of the RSA and NSA, quarterly at end of quarter, 
December 1949 – December 1967 (£m) 
Source: BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 21, p125 and Table 22(1), pp129-30  
Note: Sterling balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling; RSA = Rest of the sterling area; NSA 
= Non-sterling area 
 
The change in the sterling balances series in 1962 reflected a continuing attempt, 
through the 1950s-60s, to make the sterling balances definition correspond more 
closely to the idea of external short-term liquidity. The principal changes in 1962 were 
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to increase the number of reporting banks providing coverage, to decompose the 
previously reported ‘net liabilities’ into ‘gross liabilities’ and ‘claims’ (the latter now also 
including acceptances), to remove the gilt-edged holdings of institutions other than 
central monetary institutions (CMIs), to add the deposits of CMIs at commercial banks, 
and, particularly, to provide information about the types of holdings (e.g. Treasury bills, 
deposits, or gilts).1120 But there were earlier, less advertised, changes which were 
similarly motivated: for instance, in 1956, Dominion and Colonial sterling securities 
held by official bodies were removed from the RSA balances, and some UK 
government obligations (e.g. a negotiated debt to Portugal) removed from the NSA 
balances, as is revealed in the ONC reports.1121 
 
Given this change in 1962, it is obviously not possible to study the crises of the 1951-
61 period (our core focus) from the perspective of gross liabilities versus claims, CMI 
versus other holdings and the types of claims/liabilities. This is only feasible for the 
period from 1962, and some key illustrative graphs covering 1962-7 are provided in 
Annex 6 (the facts are readily available in the relevant tables in the referenced 
Statistical Abstract). Claims were unimportant in CMI holdings, and generally the 
principal source of short-term movement was the gross liabilities, although claims were 
gradually rising during the period, and significantly so in the case of NSA non-CMI 
holders. The largest holdings were those of the RSA CMIs, and these fluctuated. Other 
RSA holdings were dominated by monetary reserves of particular countries (e.g. 
Ireland, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Australia and certain currency boards)1122 so it is 
dangerous to infer broad conclusions about the movements in this group. NSA CMI 
holdings were strongly influenced by assistance to the UK, while other NSA holdings 
suggest more volatile confidence movements. The run-down of CMI holdings (and 
assistance uptake) was largely seen in Treasury bills, while other holders saw the 
                                               
1120
 BEQB:1963Q2, pp98-105 
1121
 BOE:EID3/98–EID3/106 
1122
 See Ireland and Australia chapters; Chapter 1, 3.3.4; and source data 
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principal declines in their bank deposits. However, perhaps the biggest story of the 
1964-7 crises, the diversification of the RSA holders (see below), is missing from these 
graphs. 
        
The apparent stability of the sterling balances in Figure 6 was misleading. For 
example, as we have already seen, the NSA balances consisted of a variety of 
different confidence and assistance holdings, and it is necessary to unravel these in 
order to judge the state of confidence in sterling from this source. When comparing 
NSA confidence balances against RSA balances, it is also the absolute movements of 
these balances that are of interest. Consequently, in Figures 7–9, the NSA confidence 
and RSA series, adjusted for ‘exiters’, are rebased to zero at the start of each of the 
three sub-periods (1949-58, 1958-62 and 1962-7).1123 While the trends of each series 
are different, in terms of absolute movements the RSA series was not less volatile than 
the NSA series. Indeed, for the 1950-8 period, the monthly standard deviation of the 
RSA series was £183m, while the standard deviation of the NSA series was £113m.1124  
 
 
                                               
1123
 The NSA confidence series in the two subsequent sub-periods (Figures 8 and 9) are calculated 
slightly differently than as described in the main analysis i.e. in the prior Section and in the first sub-period 
(Figure 7) and the results in Table 5. While there is data on assistance for each of the crisis months, it 
does not cover all the years in the latter sub-periods. Consequently, assistance in the calculation of 
Figures 8 and 9 is proxied by the holdings of regional Central Monetary Institutions (regions known to 
have provided assistance during the sub-period), which are recorded in the sterling balances data, as 
described in each Figure’s source and note. This allows the main trends to be seen. The differences are 
marginal. Graphs of the underlying NSA holdings for Figures 8 and 9 are provided in Annex 3   
1124
 This conclusion contrasts with that of Schenk, who argued that the NSA sterling balances were more 
volatile than the RSA sterling balances in this period, ‘especially in the last quarters of 1953-5’ (Schenk, 
Britain, p26). However, as earlier noted, I could not find these 1953-5 December low points in the source 
data (Schenk, Britain, Figure 2.2, p21)  
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Figure 7: Adjusted sterling balances of countries associated with and outside the 
sterling area (the latter after deducting holdings providing assistance to the UK), 
monthly at end-month, December 1949 – December 1958 (£m, rebased to £0m at 
December 1949) 
Source: As for Figure 5; RSA* includes, and NSA* excludes, Egypt, Sudan and Palestine/Israel 
*Note: The two series are designated RSA* and NSA* in order to acknowledge the adjustments which 
have been made to the original RSA and NSA data. Sterling balances = net external liabilities of the UK in 
sterling  
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Figure 8: Adjusted sterling balances of countries associated with and outside the 
sterling area (the latter after excluding Western European Central Monetary 
Institutions), quarterly at end of quarter, December 1958 – December 1962 (£m, 
rebased to £0m at December 1958) 
Source: The NSA* series, which excludes exiters and assistance, is calculated as follows: net external 
liabilities in sterling to non-sterling area countries (BOE Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 21, p125) 
less gross sterling liabilities to Western European Central Monetary Institutions, Egypt and Iraq 
(BOE:EID10/3–EID10/6). The RSA* series, which includes exiters, is similarly calculated (now using BOE 
Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 22(1), pp129-30), adding the same figures for Egypt and Iraq. The 
crosses are calculated from BOE:OV53/32, ‘Sterling Area Working Party’, ’25.1.68’, ‘Statistical Appendix’, 
‘Table I’, ‘Disposition of the Official Reserves of the Overseas Sterling Area (excluding South Africa and 
Burma)’ 
Note: The Figure uses gross sterling liabilities of the UK to Western European CMIs, Egypt and Iraq, and 
net external liabilities to all NSA countries. The sterling claims are not individually specified in the COF 
series in the 1958-62 years. However, the Western European CMI sterling claims were minimal (typically 
£0-1m from 1962 (BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 22 (3), p140)). Sterling claims of the ‘non-
sterling Middle East’ (nine countries including Egypt and Iraq) increased from £31m to £45m between end-
Jan and Jul/1961 (BOE:EID10/6). In Dec/1962, at the start of the new series, Egypt’s sterling claims stood 
at £13.6m and Iraq’s at £2.5m (BOE:EID10/7). So overall the gross liabilities are not likely to have been 
very different from the net, and claims also tended to be more stable than liabilities and were not easily 
liquidated (BOE:EID1/20, ‘Enquiry into the position of sterling 1964-65’, Kahn, 1/6/1966, p17). The reason 
for treating Egypt and Iraq as exiters is as follows. Although Egypt had been out of the sterling area for 
more than a decade, its holdings had been blocked by the UK due to the Suez crisis, so its sterling 
balances were still in run-off. Iraq left the sterling area in 1959  
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Figure 9: Adjusted sterling balances of the RSA and NSA (the latter after excluding 
Western European and North American Central Monetary Institutions), quarterly at end 
of quarter, December 1962 – December 1967 (£m, rebased to £0m at December 
1962) 
Source: The NSA* series, which excludes the sectors providing assistance, is calculated as follows: UK 
net external liabilities in sterling to non-sterling area countries, less net external liabilities in sterling to 
Western European Central Monetary Institutions and North American Central Monetary Institutions 
(BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 22(3), pp139-40). The RSA* series is taken from the same 
source using net external liabilities in sterling to all sterling area countries. Crosses are also calculated 
from BOE:OV53/32, ‘Sterling Area Working Party’, ’25.1.68’, ‘Statistical Appendix’, ‘Table I’, ‘Disposition of 
the Official Reserves of the Overseas Sterling Area (excluding South Africa and Burma)’ 
Note: Burma and Southern Rhodesia exited the sterling area during this period, but reduced their holdings 
to a low level prior to leaving the area, so there is no need to separate these holdings out 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9 also show through occasional crosses what would have happened to 
the RSA series holdings if the sterling area countries1125 had not increased their non-
sterling holdings at the expense of their sterling holdings. This ‘diversification’ is 
discussed in the next Section. However, the Figures clearly show that sterling area 
countries were not diversifying materially away from sterling (acquiring non-sterling 
assets) until 1964, but they were doing so to a considerable extent in the 1964-7 crisis 
years (the crosses diverging from the black line in Figure 9). 
 
What Figures 7–9 show is that the RSA sterling balances were playing a role in each 
of the crises of the 1951-67 years. In the 1950s crises, the RSA and NSA series 
experienced downswings together. In the 1961 crisis, the major cause of the crisis was 
                                               
1125
 Excluding South Africa and Burma, as explained in Section 6 
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the withdrawal of NSA balances (particularly non-official holdings from the USA and 
Western Europe) which had been attracted to the UK during 1960, largely by relative 
interest rates and the then weakness of the US dollar.1126 But the RSA balances also 
played a part: between December 1959 and March 1961 (the crisis month in which the 
Bank of England received central bank assistance at Basle), there was a downswing of 
more than £350m.1127 Finally, in the 1964-7 crises, while the net downswing of the NSA 
series was significant,1128 the RSA series was also subject to major downswings (e.g. 
1964-5), and the effect of the cumulative diversification by RSA countries was as 
important as the trend in the NSA series.  
 
The reader will also be interested in the extent of the statistical correlation between 
some of the aforementioned sterling balance variables and the UK reserves variables. 
Looking at the crude sterling balances data from Figure 6, and the correlation with the 
published reserves, quarterly from December 1949 to September 1967 (pre-
devaluation), the correlation with reserves was +45% for total sterling balances (and 
+32% for RSA sterling balances). These are not particularly high correlations given the 
underlying accounting identity. However, if one considers the monthly data from the 
ONC reports, from December 1949 to December 1958, the correlation between total 
sterling balances and published reserves for this earlier period was higher at +67%. 
Finally, for the same monthly 1949-58 period, using the series underlying Figure 7 
(adjusted sterling balances) against adjusted reserves, the correlation with adjusted 
reserves (net of assistance) was +80% for total adjusted sterling balances (net of NSA 
assistance holdings) and +55% for adjusted RSA balances (including exiters). These 
are stronger correlations. Correlation does not imply causation, but if one of the 
                                               
1126
 BEQB:1963Q4, p265 
1127
 The subsequent rebound in the RSA series was due largely to an IMF drawing by Australia in 
Apr/1961 (see Australia paper) 
1128
 The UK’s net external liabilities in sterling to NSA countries, other than North American and Western 
European central banks, declined from over £400m in 1963, to practically nothing by end-1967 (see 
Annex 3, Figure A2). This rather undermines the claims of BOE officials, in the 1960s: they had 
emphasised sterling’s ‘commercial role’, reflected in private traders’ ‘working balances’, saying that by 
1963 the non-official holdings of the NSA were ‘not much more than is needed for normal trading and 
commercial activities’ (BEQB:1963Q4, p275) 
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variables (adjusted reserves) is clearly being acted upon in a financing role, and if the 
other (adjusted RSA sterling balances) has autonomous fundamental drivers, there is 
at least the possibility of a causal connection.1129 
        
Having reviewed what was happening to sterling balances across the period, we can 
now show the relative contribution of the sterling area’s balances to decreases in 
adjusted reserves during crises, adopting Kahn’s methodology. The results are 
displayed in Table 5. 
 
Crisis period 
(end-months, 
peak to trough 
in adjusted 
reserves - see 
Column B) 
Assistance 
received 
 
 
Reserves 
movement 
less 
assistance 
received 
 
RSA 
sterling 
balances 
(including 
exiters*) 
 
NSA 
sterling 
balances 
(excluding 
assistance 
and 
exiters*) 
 
Residual 
(including UK 
balance of 
payments) 
 
 Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E 
 £m £m £m £m £m 
Jun51-Jul52* 410 -1178 -593 -411 -174 
Apr55-Oct55 54 -192 -133 -96 +37 
May56-Dec56* 210 -294 -71 -102 -121 
Apr57-Sep57 130 -298 -178 -110 -10 
Jan61-Jul61 296 -579 +80 -467 -192 
Jul64-Jan65 657 -792 -278 -308 -206 
May65-Aug65 319 -417 +58 -142 -333 
Jan66-Sep66 752 -701 +62 -371 -392 
Apr67-Oct67 545 -758 +154 -401 -511 
Table 5: Changes in reserves and sterling balances, and assistance from the NSA, 
during sterling crises, monthly at end of month, 30 June 1951 – 31 October 1967 (£m) 
Source: For 1951-7, as for Figure 7 and Annex 2; for 1961, as for Figure 8, except for assistance which 
derives from BEQB:1976Q1, pp78-81; for 1964-7, as for Figure 9, except for assistance which is as for 
Figure 4 
*Note: Not treating the American loan debt service as negative assistance would increase the absolute 
(negative) magnitudes of Columns B and E by £63m in 1951-2 and by £67m in 1956. Including window-
dressing in Nov/1956 would further increase these magnitudes by £43m in 1956. ‘Exiters’ in 1951-7 were 
Egypt, Sudan and Palestine/Israel. ‘Exiters’ in 1961 were Egypt and Iraq. In 1964-7, there were no NSA 
countries classed as ‘exiters’ for this purpose since Burma and Southern Rhodesia reduced their sterling 
balances while included within the RSA. (Sterling balances = Net external liabilities of the UK in sterling; 
RSA = Rest of the sterling area; NSA = Non-sterling area)    
 
Table 5 is interpreted as follows. The numbers In Columns C, D and E together sum to 
the number in Column B, which gives the scale of each crisis. Following Kahn, 
movements in the NSA balances (Column D) can be assumed to be confidence 
                                               
1129
 The data behind these correlations are the sterling balances, reserves and assistance series 
underlying Figures 5-7    
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movements responding to the fundamental elements of crisis. By contrast, movements 
in the RSA balances (Column C) largely reflected, until deliberate RSA diversification 
and UK capital flight to the RSA in the 1964-7 period, the fundamental balance of 
payments of the RSA. The residual (Column E) incorporates a significant fundamental 
element (the UK balance of payments) but also confidence flows (e.g. UK capital flight, 
leads and lags, and, in the 1960s, activity in the eurocurrency markets) which are 
expected to be negative during a crisis. The comparison of interest is in the relative 
magnitudes in Columns C and E since they contain the fundamental elements. 
Interestingly, in 1951-2, 1955 and 1957, the RSA sterling balance movement was more 
negative than that of the residual. In the 1956 crisis, the RSA sterling balances 
decreased materially although speculative elements (in Columns D and E) 
predominated (especially after making the adjustments noted in Table 5).1130 The 
negative movement of the sterling area’s sterling balances in the 1964 crisis was also 
significant. 
 
This first stage of the argument has shown that the sterling area’s sterling balances 
seemed to play a role in all the crises of the 1951-67 years. Sometimes the change 
was indirect (e.g. significant diversification during the 1965-7 period despite sterling 
balances increasing), or more in the run-up to the start of the crisis, and dominated by 
other capital movements overall (the 1961 crisis). But the sterling area’s sterling 
balances are particularly notable in the crises of the 1950s. Ultimately, of course, all 
these crises and reversals of policy were attributable to the UK’s inadequate reserves, 
in answer to which a stronger UK balance of payments on current and long-term 
capital account was certainly required.  
                                               
1130
 The scale of the 1956 crisis as represented by Column B seems smaller than Klug and Smith 
suggested. However, the approach is different. Klug and Smith were trying to demonstrate the speculative 
scale of the crisis by stripping out ‘one-off’ items such as the UK’s sale of the Trinidad Oil Company 
(US$177m), and gold sales to the UK by Australia (US$54m) and South Africa (US$47m) (Klug and 
Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, p193). However, here these items do not qualify as assistance from the NSA, 
and so their effect is implicit in Columns E and C respectively 
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Section 6: Co-operation and flows within the sterling area during crises 
 
The previous Section highlighted the changes in the RSA’s sterling balances during 
sterling crises. This Section examines the geographic and other sources of the 
declines in these sterling balances during the 1951-61 crises. It reviews the types of 
flows (fundamental, confidence and assistance) within the sterling area. It considers 
the nature of co-operation exhibited within the sterling area. 
 
Declines in sterling balances during the crisis periods tended to be concentrated in a 
few large holders, albeit in the 1957 crisis almost all the geographic regions of the 
sterling area were experiencing declines in sterling balances. Table 6 sets out the five 
countries or regions showing the largest declines in sterling balances during each of 
the 1951-61 crises.  
 
£m Jun51-Jul52 Apr55-Oct55 May56-Dec56 Apr57-Sep57 Jan61-Jul61* 
1. Australia   -399 Australia    -87 India         -132 India       -104 India        -39 
2. India         -133 Egypt         -30 N Zealand  -25 Iraq           -20 Ghana     -18 
3. Egypt          -92 Ireland       -17 W Africa     -24 Egypt        -15 Nigeria     -18 
4. Pakistan     -74 N Zealand -17 Egypt         -17 N Zealand -15 Pakistan  -17 
5. N Zealand  -48 BW Indies -13 Pakistan    -14 Pakistan    -15 Iraq          -16 
Top 5                  -746                 -164                 -212                 -169               -108 
All                  -593                 -133                   -71                 -178                +62 
Table 6: Changes in sterling balances of RSA/ex-RSA countries during sterling crises, 
showing five largest declines, end-month to end-month, June 1951 – July 1961 (£m) 
Source: Calculated from BOE:EID 3/98–EID3/106; EID10/5 
*Note: Gross external liabilities for the 1961 crisis (the net figures are not available). Otherwise, sterling 
balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling. 
BW Indies = British West Indies (principally The Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago), N Zealand = New Zealand, W Africa = West Africa (includes The Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone). RSA = Rest of the sterling area   
 
Table 6 suggests that there was sufficient liquidity in the holdings of some countries to 
cause problems for sterling. Was it possible that the declines in RSA sterling balances 
were confidence movements in response to the crisis, rather than being caused by the 
fundamental balance of payments of the countries concerned – as the UK government 
claimed (see Table 3)? In other words, did the cause of this possible contribution to 
crisis lie elsewhere? The answer is no. It is straightforward to identify large confidence 
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movements within the sterling area. This is because the sterling area countries were 
supposed to be pooling their reserves with the Bank of England and using sterling as 
their reserve currency. To deliberately accumulate non-sterling reserves was a breach 
of the pooling rule. Confidence movements are reflected in increasing non-sterling 
reserves. 
 
Sterling area countries’ accumulation of non-sterling reserves was closely monitored at 
the time by the Bank of England, and these ‘gold and dollar pots’ were a theme of 
diplomatic discussion which has been carefully recorded.1131 In 1966-8, in response to 
the crisis, the Bank looked back at the historical build-up of non-sterling reserves in the 
sterling area from 1955. This is shown in Figure 10. Figure 10 covers all then sterling 
area countries except South Africa (outside the pooling arrangements) and Burma, 
which in 1966 left the sterling area, having undertaken a rapid diversification since 
1964. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the rate of increase of non-sterling reserves in the 
sterling area was around £1m per month, an insignificant sum in the context of these 
crises. This lack of deliberate diversification was also true of the first half of the 1950s, 
as confirmed in a table from Schenk’s 1994 book.1132  
 
 
 
                                               
1131
 Particularly in TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’ 
1132
 Schenk, Britain, Table 2.5, p30 
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Figure 10: Official international reserves of RSA countries (excluding South Africa and 
Burma), divided into sterling, gold and other holdings, annually at 31 December, 1956 
– 1966 and at 31 October 1967 (£m) 
Source: Data extracted from BOE:OV53/32, ‘Sterling Area Working Party’, ’25.1.68’, ‘Statistical Appendix’, 
‘Table I’, ‘Disposition of the Official Reserves of the Overseas Sterling Area (excluding South Africa and 
Burma)’ 
Note: RSA = Rest of the sterling area 
 
There were, in addition, those countries which exited the sterling area, such as Egypt 
and Iraq. But their holdings were reduced gradually over time. As Figure 3 showed, the 
trend in their balances was different from the more volatile confidence movements 
experienced by NSA holders excluding assistance. 
 
Was it possible that the RSA’s sterling balances declined in crises not because of 
deliberate diversification (reflected in non-sterling reserves) but through other 
confidence movements of sterling from the RSA to the NSA? Again the answer is 
almost certainly no. Taking the case of Australia in 1951-2 or 1955, for instance, 
Australian exchange controls were strict and prevented such capital outflows, and in 
any event these were known balance-of-payments crises for Australia.1133  
  
                                               
1133
 See Australia paper. In addition, as already noted, in its analysis of the 1957 crisis, the BOE found no 
confidence movements in the RSA sterling balances (BOE:EID16/8, ‘…1957, 1961 and 1964/65 Crises’, 
‘Table III…Confidence Movements’, 12/1/1966) 
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Did some of the sterling area countries provide assistance to the UK during these 
sterling crises? This has been a claim in the literature.1134 However, there is limited 
evidence of such assistance. The countries which are most frequently named as 
providing assistance, through gold or dollar sales to the UK, were Australia and South 
Africa. Their sterling holdings during the crises are given in Table 7: 
 
£m  Australia South Africa 
Jun51-Jul52 crisis Jun 1951 626 73 
 Jul 1952 227 55 
 Change -399 -18 
    
Apr55-Oct55 crisis Apr 1955 290 30 
 Oct 1955 203 15 
 Change -87 -15 
    
May56-Dec56 crisis May 1956 182 12 
 Dec 1956 259 24 
 Change +77 +12 
    
Apr57-Sep57 crisis Apr 1957 354 6 
 Sep 1957 375 -5 
 Change +21 -11 
    
Jan61-Jul61 crisis* Jan 1961 233 13 
 Jul 1961 381 14 
 Change +148 +1 
Table 7: Changes in sterling balances of Australia and South Africa during sterling 
crises, end-month to end-month, June 1951 – July 1961 (£m) 
Source: Calculated from BOE:EID3/98–EID3/106; EID10/5 
*Note: Gross external liabilities for the 1961 crisis (the net figures are not available). Otherwise, sterling 
balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling   
   
Through a series of formal and informal agreements with the UK, South Africa sold 
most of its gold production in London for sterling.1135 This benefited the City of London 
as a financial centre and the Bank of England as a gold market participant, but South 
Africa’s net support for the sterling area was measured by its net holdings of sterling, 
which were small and generally declining. As Table 7 shows, the only crisis in which 
South Africa’s sterling holdings increased materially was the 1956 crisis, and even 
then the increase was a mere £12m. It has been claimed that South Africa’s use of the 
Bank of England as its gold selling agent in London gave the latter a degree of control 
                                               
1134
 For Australia, Robertson, ‘The decline?’, p113; for South Africa, Berridge, Economic power, pp38-44 
1135
 Berridge, Economic power, pp38-44 
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in protecting sterling from storms.1136 But if that were important, South Africa’s net 
sterling holdings would have increased particularly in the month of November 1956, 
which was the epicentre of the Suez crisis. In fact, South Africa’s net sterling holdings 
increased only slightly in that month, from £21m to £24m.1137 Thus South Africa’s role 
as a provider of more than superficial assistance can be largely discounted. 
 
Likewise, Australia’s policy focus was understandably on the level of its own reserves 
given the volatility of its balance of payments. It occasionally sold gold or dollars for 
sterling, but always because it was running short of sterling and needed to stock up on 
sterling as a transactional reserve.1138 The sale of £20m of gold to the UK during the 
Suez crisis in September 1956 has been cited as an example of Australian 
assistance.1139 However, the sale was motivated by an Australian need for sterling 
which had been anticipated by its officials long before the Suez crisis erupted.1140 
 
Given that the 1951-2 crisis as here defined lasted for just one month more than a full 
Australian financial year (end-June to end-June), and given Australia’s share of the 
RSA sterling balances decline set out in Table 6 (£399m out of £593m), one can 
explore this crisis in more detail using Australian data for the 1951-2 year. Australia 
was at the centre of the wool price boom and bust associated with the Korean War. 
The purpose is to get behind the figures to see how the UK reserves might have been 
affected by changes within Australia. From the ONC reports, the June-June decline in 
Australia’s sterling balances in 1951-2 was £391m (£626m less £235m). From 
Australian records, the decline in official reserves in sterling (‘Other foreign exchange’) 
                                               
1136
 Berridge, Economic power, pp62-4 
1137
 BOE:EID3/104. Referring to Nov/1956, Klug and Smith wrote that ‘significant losses would have 
occurred… had not $42.7 million been made available by the South African Reserve Bank’ (Klug and 
Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, p192). But the BOE source highlighted that this was the gross value of South 
African gold sales, both to the UK and the market. Moreover South Africa also separately contributed 
dollar losses of $20.3m (BOE:EID3/114, ‘Gold and dollar reserves’, ‘E.E.A…November 1956’, 3/12/1956)   
1138
 See Australia paper 
1139
 Boughton, ‘Northwest of Suez’, p437; Klug and Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, p193; Kunz, The economic 
diplomacy, pp100-1, 146; Kirshner, Currency and coercion, pp67, 109 
1140
 See Australia paper 
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over this period was £369m (£600m less £231m).1141 Australia’s current account deficit 
in 1951-2 was £435m, from a surplus of £100m in 1950-1. This was mitigated by a 
capital account surplus of £95m. Within the current account, the trade deficit was 
£283m, from a surplus of £203m in 1950-1, and the invisibles deficit was £152m.1142 
 
It is interesting to examine where this nearly £500m deterioration in the trade deficit 
occurred. For an indication, see Table 8 (albeit using trade figures on a recorded rather 
than balance-of-payments basis), which shows that, between 1950-1 and 1951-2, the 
balance with the UK deteriorated by £177m (the deficit increased from £29m to 
£206m) while the balance with ‘core NSA’ countries (USA, Japan, France, Germany, 
Italy and the Benelux countries) worsened by £234m (the surplus falling to zero in 
1951-2).  
 
Australia’s trade 
with (£m): UK Core NSA* 
South & 
SE Asia* Other 
1950-1 Exports 256 349 51 130 
1950-1 Imports 286 115 92 102 
1950-1 Difference -29 234 -41 27 
     1951-2 Exports 166 222 48 103 
1951-2 Imports 372 222 99 149 
1951-2 Difference -206 0 -51 -46 
     1952-3 Exports 288 260 59 90 
1952-3 Imports 172 103 54 83 
1952-3 Difference 116 157 5 7 
Table 8: Australia’s trade with selected country groups, annual, year ended 30 June 
1951 - 1953 (£m) 
Source: Calculated from Norton and Kennedy, Australian economic statistics, pp4, 6, 7, 9 
*Note: ‘Core NSA’ = USA, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and Benelux countries; ‘South & SE Asia = 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka (RSA 
countries) and Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos, Macao, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam (NSA 
countries)   
    
On the other hand, since a large part of South & South-East Asia consisted of sterling 
area countries, and there was a significant UK element also to the invisibles deficit, 
                                               
1141
 Calculated from Norton and Kennedy, Australian economic statistics, p26 
1142
 Calculated from Norton and Kennedy, Australian economic statistics, pp2, 23 
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Table 8 also shows that much of the absolute Australian deficit in 1951-2 was with the 
sterling area (e.g. the deficit of £206m with the UK), and, dependent on other trends in 
the RSA, the resulting pressures on the UK reserves would therefore presumably have 
been through the indirect channel (arrow c in Figure 2). This is also suggested by 
Scott’s UK balance-of-payments table for 1951-2 which showed an overall deficit 
requiring financing of £1,150m: the RSA’s deficit with the NSA was only £149m; that 
deficit plus the RSA’s current deficit with the UK amounted to £637m; and the change 
in the RSA’s sterling balances was £519m (Scott’s RSA numbers did not include the 
‘exiters’).1143   
 
However, to dismiss the decline in Australia’s sterling balances because its absolute 
deficit was largely with the UK seems questionable given that much of the deterioration 
was in trade with the NSA. This illustrates that the flows within the sterling area’s 
balance of payments were part of a balanced mechanism. In 1965, the Bank’s chief 
cashier, Fforde, alluded to this problem, suggesting that it was not the absolute 
balance with the NSA that mattered for the UK’s reserves: 
 
‘Strictly speaking, the pressure on U.K. reserves arising from a cyclical 
deterioration in the O.S.A.’s [Overseas Sterling Area] balance of payments 
consists of the difference between the prevailing O.S.A. balance with the 
N.S.A. and the balance that “would otherwise be the case”. What would 
“otherwise be the case” is a judgement, not a precise statistical quantity’.1144 
 
Table 8 also shows that the boom in Australia’s export income of 1950-1 translated 
into increased imports in 1951-2 (an example of macroeconomic knock-on effects that 
                                               
1143
 Scott, ‘The balance of payments’, p214   
1144
 BOE:OV44/151, Draft, ‘The problem…’, 29/10/1965, p10 
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was well-recognised at the time).1145 Those analysts who wrote about the 1951-2 crisis 
in the 1950s were clear that the sterling area’s problem was excessive imports in the 
RSA as well as the UK.1146 Thus Katz called the 1951-2 crisis the ‘lagged response to 
an export boom’1147 and noted that the UK’s reaction to crises was to cut back on 
imports and run down inventories, which had to be restocked with more imports when 
the crisis had passed: 
 
‘The recurring import deficits of the outer sterling countries, combined with 
Britain’s policy of periodically depleting import inventories, were the two 
factors mainly responsible for sterling’s recurring postwar difficulties’.1148 
 
This was recognised, however, as a boom-bust cycle, and by the mid-1950s, with the 
abandonment of cheap money and some controls in the UK, reduced liquidity in the 
RSA’s reserves and a terms-of-trade improvement for the UK from cheaper wheat, 
commentators were hopeful that the sterling area had achieved a better overall 
balance with the NSA.1149 
  
In this context, the scale of the decline in the RSA’s sterling balances during the 1955-
7 crises seems significant. In 1957, India was the biggest source of that decline (see 
Table 6). Bhagat found that India’s deficit with the (ex-UK) OEEC group of countries 
(continental Europe) was as large as £185m in 1957, albeit partially mitigated by a 
surplus with the dollar area.1150 
     
This Section has shown that the movements in sterling balances during the 1951-61 
crises reflected neither confidence nor assistance but the fundamental balance of 
                                               
1145
 See Copland, Inflation and expansion, pp50-1: ‘the price of wool… Unquestionably it is the biggest 
inflationary force in Australia, and it will spread and spread’ 
1146
 See Paish, ‘The sterling area crisis’; Stevens, ‘Some notes’ 
1147
 Katz, ‘Sterling’s recurring’, p221 
1148
 Katz, ‘Sterling’s recurring’, p222 
1149
 Katz, ‘Sterling’s recurring’; Stevens, ‘Some notes’ 
1150
 Bhagat, ‘Working’, pp213-5 
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payments of the RSA. To what extent did the sterling area co-operate to manage its 
collective balance of payments? Although, during 1947-52, the UK tried to propose 
dollar area and/or NSA balance-of-payments ‘rations’ to sterling area countries in a 
series of emergency Commonwealth financial conferences, these attempts did not 
receive a warm reception. Agreement was at best watered down (1949), or left 
unsettled (1952) and sometimes even refused (1950).1151 Given widespread excess 
liquidity in the RSA, Katz argued that the UK’s attempts to forge a ‘continuous common 
policy’ of import restraint in emergency Commonwealth summits proved, 
unsurprisingly, clumsy and unsuccessful.1152 After the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference of December 1952 and the decision to pursue sterling convertibility as a 
priority, sterling area balance-of-payments co-operation effectively ended: ‘the policies 
of individual countries became related to their own reserves position and not to that of 
the Central Reserves’.1153  
 
Thus there was really no formal co-operation taking place in the sterling area after 
1952 (arguably 1949), in the sense of ad hoc action. There was, however, shallow co-
operation, information-sharing, through bilateral central bank and Treasury contacts, 
and the ritual of approximately annual meetings of Commonwealth Finance Ministers 
usually held around the time of the annual IMF meeting in September. A Whitehall 
committee (initially two committees), attended by UK departmental officials, the Bank 
of England and London representatives of the Commonwealth, also met through the 
1950s and 1960s, to no great effect. The number of such committee meetings is 
shown in Figure 11. They steadily reduced in frequency and content save for a flurry of 
                                               
1151
 For Australian responses to these proposals, see, for 1949, RBA:B.1.1.1.C.5.2, F.11 and F.12, 
Dedman to Chifley, 18/7/1949; Chifley to Courtice, 15/8/1949; for 1950, Lee, Search for security, p145; 
RBA:B.1.1.1.C.5.2, Menzies to McEwen, 22/9/1950; RBA:B.1.1.1.C.5.2, ‘Dollar import policy’, Spender to 
Menzies, 26/9/1950; for 1952, RBA:B.1.1.1.C.4.4, Text of agreed conference communique, Fadden to 
Menzies, 21/1/1952; Menzies to Fadden, 21/1/1952   
1152
 Katz, ‘Sterling’s recurring’, p222 
1153
 TNA:T267/29, ‘Sterling balances’. A 1958 Australian review of the sterling area’s 1952 convertibility 
plan said that it ‘imposed no obligations on Australia other than to continue its existing policies’ 
(NAA:A1838,708/13/4PART2,330620, ‘An Australian view of “The Collective Approach”, May/1958). There 
was thus no fiscal or monetary macroeconomic co-operation. Even interest rates diverged, despite the 
peg, because there were capital controls in the RSA and money markets were not well-developed in the 
RSA 
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concern associated with the UK’s EEC application in 1961-2. While 15-20 meetings 
per year in the second half of the 1950s might still seem a large number, these 
meetings were attended by embassy (High Commission) officials who were already 
resident in London, and the real test of their relevance was their informational content, 
which was limited and avoided policy questions. There was a stark difference between 
the content of discussion in the late 1940s and that in the mid-1950s. 
     
     
Figure 11: Number of meetings in each calendar year, Sterling Area Statistical 
Committee (SASC) and Commonwealth Liaison Committee (CLC), 1947 – 1965 
(Number) 
Source: TNA:T236/3592; T236/3593; T236/3594; CAB133/18; CAB133/19; CAB133/21; CO852/1340/3; 
DO35/6928; DO35/6931; DO35/6933; DO35/5618; DO35/5620; DO35/5621; DO215/151 
 
Above all, there was deep, informal co-operation through the pooling of reserves and 
the design of national exchange control regimes. This continued for a long time. 
Despite diversification in 1964-7, sterling area countries generally followed the pooling 
rule throughout the 1960s as well as the 1950s. This can be shown, at country level, 
by comparing the monthly sterling balances in the COF reports with the aggregate 
official reserves from the IMF database.1154 Sterling balances and aggregate reserves 
tracked each other closely. Annex 4 contrasts the reserve management behaviour of 
RSA countries such as India and Australia, with the behaviour of NSA countries such 
                                               
1154
 The sterling balances data included non-official holdings, but the monthly correlation pattern is still 
evident (see Annex 4) 
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as Canada and Thailand, where sterling balances were uncorrelated with aggregate 
reserves. There were also a few hybrid cases on both sides. Within the RSA, South 
Africa allowed its sterling holdings partially to track its reserves at least until it left the 
Commonwealth in 1961. Within the NSA, the sterling balances of Denmark and 
Argentina, close trading partners of the UK, also, for a time, partially increased and 
declined with aggregate reserves.1155 
 
There can be little doubt that reserve pooling limited confidence movements against 
sterling within the sterling area. Deliberate diversification was likely to be observed by 
the UK, and the privileges of membership of the sterling area, such as access to 
capital, were potentially at stake. Reserve pooling thus helped to stabilise sterling to a 
degree. However, the important point is that reserve pooling did not address the core 
weakness of the sterling area, namely its overall (UK and RSA) balance of payments 
with the NSA. 
 
In summary, sterling’s vulnerability in 1949-67 was attributable to the balance of 
payments of the sterling area (UK and RSA) as a whole. Because this balance of 
payments was inadequate, the UK’s reserves, which were always the first line of 
defence for the sterling area given the RSA’s transactional use of sterling, did not 
increase in size even as the sterling area’s imports grew. As Figure 12 shows, the ratio 
of UK reserves to sterling area imports from the NSA therefore became increasingly 
stretched over time, so it is not surprising that the sterling area system’s demise was 
marked by crisis and devaluation. As a co-operative system, the sterling area was not 
set up to solve this balance-of-payments problem, and the UK’s own attempts to 
improve its balance of payments to match sterling’s international role were 
unsuccessful. 
 
                                               
1155
 See Annex 4 and its sources 
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Figure 12: UK published gold and convertible currency reserves at 31 December, and 
sterling area merchandise imports from the NSA, annually, 1952 – 1966 (£m) 
Source: BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 27 ‘Official reserves’, pp162-3; RBA:GDB-71-1, ‘The 
Sterling Area balance of payments’, International Committee, 2/5/1967, ‘Table IV, Sterling Area trade’ 
Note: NSA = Non-sterling area       
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Section 6: Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the sterling crises of the 1950s and 1960s in order to investigate 
the sterling area’s role in these crises and the nature of sterling area co-operation. I 
argue from new archival evidence that the sterling area, through negative movements 
in the sterling balances, and diversification in 1964-7, seemed to play a role in all these 
crises. In particular, the RSA’s sterling balances saw significant declines in the crises 
of 1951-2, 1955 and 1957, declines which were large relative to other explanatory 
factors within the balance-of-payments accounting identity. 
 
For contemporaries, this was not a new idea. Writing in the 1960s, Scott made a 
similar connection using annual (rather than, as here, monthly) data.1156 While some 
commentators denied that the RSA’s sterling balances were volatile or declined during 
sterling crises, the UK government actually commented on the declines (see Table 3), 
but attributed them mainly to a confidence movement, reacting to UK vulnerabilities. 
Against this background, the contribution of the paper has been twofold. Firstly, by 
quantifying the scale and timing of the crises in terms of reserves less assistance (a 
continuous peak-to-trough decline over a number of months), it has been possible to 
compare the movement in the RSA’s and NSA’s sterling balances with ‘everything 
else’: the declines seen in the 1950s crises were relatively large compared with 
‘everything else’. Secondly, by showing that the RSA countries were not diversifying 
much into gold and dollars before 1964, it reveals, contrary to the government’s claim, 
that these were not confidence movements, but fundamental in nature, driven by the 
RSA’s balance of payments – indeed that of a few large countries, such as Australia, 
India and a handful of others.  
 
                                               
1156
 Scott, ‘The balance of payments’, p214 
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The RSA countries were naturally looking after their own interests and development 
needs.1157 Co-operation within the sterling area, apart from information-sharing, was 
largely restricted to (informal) reserve pooling and, to some extent, exchange control. 
There was little evidence of other assistance to the UK. Reserve pooling limited 
diversification, and therefore had some stabilising benefits, but it did not address the 
sterling area’s fundamental vulnerability, namely its overall balance of payments with 
the rest of the world. Over time, the increasing stretch between UK reserves and 
sterling area imports made crisis inevitable. There are grounds for scepticism, 
therefore, in the merits of the sterling area as a co-operative system.      
 
While the paper has discussed the routes through which a decline in sterling balances 
might have affected the UK’s reserves, it is not conclusive. This is because it is a 
simulation of Kahn’s methodology, with associated limitations. Focusing only on crisis 
periods is incomplete analysis, and the critics and defenders of the sterling area 
system had different mental models about the sterling area’s balance of payments. 
The same arguments and mental models can be found in the subsequent 
historiography (which has generally been more favourable to the defender view) so the 
issue remains unresolved. The contemporary defenders denied that a net sterling flow 
from the RSA to the UK would have an effect on reserves, essentially because the 
effect was not ‘direct’. Kahn’s methodology implied that all such flow would have a 
macroeconomic effect on reserves. There is some support in the contemporary 
literature for Kahn’s methodology. Scott compared the two approaches: he argued 
that, as international settlements changed, the decline in the RSA’s sterling balances 
became a more relevant measure of the RSA’s contribution to crises than the RSA 
balance with the NSA.1158 
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 As Schenk observed in Britain, p135 
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 Scott, ‘The balance of payments’, pp 211-2 
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What does sterling’s history tell us more generally about co-operation and currency 
crises? Firstly, for an international co-operative regime to be judged successful, it 
should address imbalances, whether they be external (as in the case of the sterling 
area) or internal (as in the case of the Eurozone today). Secondly, the sterling area 
experience does not fully fit Kaminsky’s classes of currency crisis – financial excesses, 
self-fulfilling, sudden stop, current account, sovereign debt, fiscal deficit. Issuers of 
international reserve currencies may be a special case.  
   
The paper has also shown the scale of assistance during the crises of 1951-61, and 
deconstructed the sterling balances of the NSA to reveal that the core holdings of the 
NSA, after stripping out assistance, and exiters from the sterling area, were much 
smaller than the headline figures suggested. These net holdings were volatile and by 
the end of 1967 had effectively disappeared. This suggests that common talk in the 
1960s of reducing sterling’s ‘reserve’ role while retaining its ‘commercial’ role1159 did 
not make practical sense. There was little to sterling’s international role which did not 
rely on its reserve currency use by members of the sterling area, in conjunction with 
exchange controls.1160   
 
Even if one accepts a link between the RSA’s sterling balances and sterling crises, 
these findings do not exonerate the UK from the weaknesses of its own balance of 
payments, which were particularly evident in the crises of the 1960s.1161 Nor do they 
imply that co-operation in the sterling area could have been any deeper or stronger 
than it was. Nor is it obvious what palatable alternatives to the sterling area were 
available to the policymakers of the 1950s. Nor does the evidence of RSA contribution 
to crisis settle the direction of causation (if any) between sterling crises and UK 
                                               
1159
 Schenk, The decline, pp208, 254-5 
1160
 Similarly, the drive to convertibility in the 1950s is more easily construed as a move demanded by the 
sterling area, and required to preserve it, than a signal that UK policymakers had lost interest in the 
sterling area system. For a clear statement on this, see Fforde, Bank of England, p475 
1161
 Weaknesses in the sense of ‘overstretched’, rather than a more ‘declinist’ meaning. See Tomlinson, 
‘Balanced accounts’   
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productivity. Still, the striking observation over this period is the Bank of England’s 
defence and denial of the link: despite close attention paid to the sterling balances 
internally, crises were attributed to domestic weaknesses or speculative factors outside 
the sterling area. Since the Bank controlled the data, this may have had the effect of 
limiting broader policy discussion about the sterling area system, since outsiders could 
only guess what was happening at a granular level. This paper has highlighted the 
different assumptions made by the protagonists in the contemporary debate, and 
brought the evidence about the volatility of the sterling balances into the light.  
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Review of balance-of-payments categories, focusing on monetary movements 
Balance-of-payments category 
(categories sum to zero) 
Commentary (influence of fundamentals, 
confidence and assistance) 
 
Balance of current and long-term 
capital transactions 
Mainly fundamental. Some confidence flows (UK 
capital flight) and assistance elements. Not 
published on a monthly basis 
Balancing item Unknown; thought to be affected by confidence  
Balance of monetary movements:  
a Miscellaneous capital Various 
b Change in liabilities and claims in 
non-sterling currencies 
Small in the 1950s, larger in the 1960s due to the 
growth in the eurodollar market (sensitive to relative 
interest rates and confidence) 
c Change in liabilities and claims in 
overseas sterling area currencies 
Small, especially in the 1950s 
d Change in liabilities and claims in 
sterling 
Monthly data either published or available in Bank 
of England files. Divided between RSA and NSA. 
RSA mainly fundamental (some confidence in 
1964-7). NSA confidence (but also assistance) 
e Change in official holdings of 
non-convertible currencies 
Very small 
f Change in the account with the 
IMF 
Assistance 
g Transfer from HM Government’s 
dollar portfolio to the reserves 
Assistance. The transfer was only relevant to the 
1966-7 period 
h Change in the gold and 
convertible currency reserves 
Monthly data published. The main barometer of 
crisis, caused by the other moving parts. Deduct all 
assistance in order to show the true scale of the 
crisis 
Table A1: The UK balance-of-payments accounting identity 
Source: For column 1, BEQB:1968Q1, pp34-40; for column 2, idem and author’s assessment 
 
The balance of payments consists of current transactions (e.g. trade in goods and 
services), long-term capital transactions (e.g. long-term international loans), monetary 
movements (i.e. other capital items) and a balancing item which enables all the 
elements to sum to zero. In the table above, changes in the sterling balances are 
found in (d) and published reserves in (h). The table provides commentary on the role 
of fundamentals, confidence and assistance in each of these categories. For further 
information, see the BEQB source.   
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Assistance to the UK from the non-sterling area not matched by sterling balances, 
1950-8 
Dollar area 
assistance (+) or 
payment (-) 
 
Period Amount 
received 
(£m) 
Comment 
Canadian loan 
drawings 
Jan 50 – 
Jun 50 
+16 Last drawings under the 1946 Canadian 
loan 
European 
Recovery Program 
(ERP) 
Jan 50 –  
Oct 51 
+314 Marshall Plan aid 
UK’s initial debit 
balance in EPU 
Jul 50 –  
Oct 50 
-54 The UK initial debit balance was like a 
‘handicap’ in EPU for countries anticipating 
a surplus, in return for access to conditional 
aid from the USA. The debit balance had to 
be used up against surpluses before gold or 
credit could be accumulated. It thus 
represented hard currency foregone when 
those surpluses were earned 
Katz – Gaitskell 
Agreement 
Dec 51 – 
Nov 52 
+33 This was a UK-USA agreement designed to 
compensate the UK for gold foregone due 
to pre-quota settlements of its existing 
resources (initial sterling balances) in EPU 
Defence aid (grant 
and loan) 
Oct 51 – 
Jun 58 
+385 Mainly in the form of grant 
American and 
Canadian loans – 
service  
Dec 51 – 
Dec 58 
-533 Interest and principal repayments, around 
£60-70m each year, on these 1946 loans 
were due to be made every December, 
commencing 1951 
US loan service 
deferral 
Dec 56, 
Dec 57 
+106 Following the 1956 and 1957 crises, the 
USA granted ‘bisques’ to the UK, allowing 
loan service to be rolled up as capital and 
thus deferred 
USA Export-Import 
Bank loan 
Oct 57 +89 This was negotiated after the 1956 crisis 
and drawn following the 1957 crisis 
Total  +268  
Window-dressing Nov 56 +43 As reported by Klug and Smith, here 
treated as supplementary assistance. See 
text 
Table A2: Selected categories of non-sterling grants and loans from the NSA, 1950 – 
1958, amounts received by (+) or paid by (-) the UK (£m) 
Source: Extracted from BOE:EID3/98–EID3/106 for all categories except the following: UK initial debit 
balance in EPU (TNA:T232/394); Katz-Gaitskell Agreement (TNA:T232/397–T 232/403); window-dressing 
(Klug and Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, p189) 
Note: NSA = Non-sterling area  
 
There were certain categories of assistance from the NSA to the UK not matched by 
sterling balances. Firstly there were the large long-term American loans made to the 
UK by the USA and Canada in 1946. The USA loan had been drawn already but the 
Canadian loan was still being drawn in 1950. Logically, if one treats the drawing of 
these loans as positive assistance, which seems appropriate given their motivation and 
terms, then the correct approach is to treat the debt service on the loans, which began 
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in 1951, as negative assistance. The American loans had been made available as a 
gesture of post-war support to the UK. However, a significant proportion of the USA 
loan had effectively been used by the RSA as much as the UK during the 1947 
crisis.1162 Moreover, the debt service, an annual amount of over £60m equivalent paid 
in December, was a given quantity unaffected by the UK’s international trade 
performance, which would drain the hard currency reserves of the sterling area, and 
was therefore a known problem facing the sterling area as a co-operative system. So 
the debt service has been treated as negative assistance1163 (as an alternative, its 
effect is also separately stripped out in the analysis). In addition, following the 1956 
and 1957 crises, the USA offered a ‘bisque’ to the UK, allowing the December debt 
service in those years to be rolled up as further principal on the loan.1164 
 
There were also grants and loans made available to the UK by the USA through the 
European Recovery Program (ERP, the Marshall Plan) and subsequently Mutual 
Defence Aid. Then there were non-sterling elements to the EPU arrangements. The 
UK had an initial ‘debit balance’ in EPU, as the sterling area was expected to be in 
surplus with the EPU, and this debit balance was the price for receiving conditional aid 
from the USA. The debit balance was like a handicap which had to be earned before 
the UK could earn gold under EPU, so this was ‘negative assistance’. But on the other 
hand, the UK received grants of assistance from the USA under the 1950 Katz-
Gaitskell Agreement, in compensation for gold foregone as a result of pre-quota 
settlements. The UK also borrowed £89m from the USA’s Export-Import Bank in 
October 1957.  
 
                                               
1162
 Cairncross, Years of recovery, pp159-60 
1163
 This treatment is also consistent with Boughton, ‘Northwest of Suez’, p435 
1164
 Note that debt service was similarly relieved (amounts of £32m) in Dec/1964 and Dec/1965 
(Cairncross, Managing, p144). However in this paper, such assistance, being fairly immaterial in the scale 
of those crises, has not been factored into the figures for these latter years. For the 1964-7 period, 
assistance has been left as it appears in the literature 
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The final, most difficult, category of assistance comes under the heading of ‘window-
dressing’. This was short-term borrowing or asset sales designed to flatter month- or 
year-end reserve figures. Klug and Smith discovered that in November 1956 the UK 
reserves were supported by US$84.5m of ‘forward operations including swaps’ and by 
US$36.4m of ‘sale of US Treasury bonds’, these latter securities having been held 
outside the official reserves.1165 The difficulty with these types of assistance is, firstly, in 
identifying them, given that the Bank of England treated them with secrecy; and 
secondly, in identifying their timing, because short-term borrowing would have to be 
repaid, and the question is whether the repayment happened inside or outside the full 
crisis period. Since swaps were ordinarily constructed as UK dollar borrowings 
collateralised by gold holdings in America (in essence manipulating sales and 
purchases of gold and the associated value dates in order to create a temporary dollar 
boost without subtracting the gold), the ledgers for gold dealing on behalf of the 
Exchange and Equalisation Account (EEA) provide clues to such activity. As a result of 
reviewing these ledgers, it was decided not to include such assistance in the headline 
figures given the lack of evidence for a sustained window-dressing effect in other 
crises, and the risk that some of the window-dressing in 1956 might have been 
unwound before the crisis finally ended. But since much of the November 1956 
window-dressing probably did persist into 1957, the gross amount highlighted by Klug 
and Smith is included as a supplementary figure.1166 
                                               
1165
 Klug and Smith, ‘Suez and sterling’, p189 
1166
 There is uncertainty but there are reasons to believe that the Nov/1956 transactions were exceptional. 
The comments below offer a brief review of the gold ledgers of the EEA (BOE:2A141/8-2A141/12). The 
gold ledgers show the UK in particular difficulties during the 1951-2 crisis. Large sales of gold for dollars 
were made through New York No.1A account from the middle of 1951, and this was supplemented from 
Oct/1951 with sales of gold for US dollars in the Ottawa account. There probably was some end-Dec/1951 
window-dressing, evidenced by a flurry of gold sales for dollars late in that month. The sales continued, 
but from Feb/1952, most gold sales were recorded as ‘Ottawa/New York suspense account’, suggesting 
that gold stocks in America were getting low, with uncertainty about where gold was available for turning 
into dollars: assistance may have been provided around this time. All gold sales through these accounts 
then stopped after early Mar/1952. The next transaction was a purchase of gold with dollars in the New 
York No.1A account in Dec/1952. Given that the period of this crisis ended in Jul/1952, it is reasonable to 
assume that the effects of assistance would have washed through the reserves before the crisis ended. 
By contrast there were no particularly unusual patterns in gold sales during the 1955 crisis (the biggest 
gold for dollars sale was £12.6m equivalent on 19/8/1955), nor in 1957, when gold losses were principally 
through EPU settlements. During the 1956 crisis, there was some transfer of gold from New York to 
Ottawa in September, but the unusual gold sales were concentrated in Nov/1956, supporting Klug and 
Smith’s account. Some of this may have been playing with value dates at end-November (there were 
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Sterling balances of the non-sterling area, 1958-62 and 1962-7 
 
 
Figure A1: Decomposition of the sterling balances of the NSA countries, showing gross 
holdings of Egypt, Iraq and Western European Central Monetary Institutions, quarterly 
at end of quarter, December 1958 – December 1962 (£m) 
Source: Net external liabilities in sterling of non-sterling area countries, BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 
1970, Table 21, p125; gross sterling liabilities of Western European Central Monetary Institutions, Egypt 
and Iraq, BOE:EID10/3–EID10/6 
Note: In the 1958-62 years, assistance to the UK came from Western European central banks, particularly 
under the Basle arrangements of Mar/1961, and also an IMF drawing in Aug/1961. It is hard to judge the 
extent to which Western European central banks provided additional assistance to the UK under the 
auspices of the looser European Monetary Agreement (EMA) which succeeded the EPU. The holdings 
were now voluntary but they were also supported and incentivised by a UK exchange guarantee 
(BEQB:1963Q4, p271). At the end of the EPU in Dec/1958, the UK owed £135m to EPU members, which 
was settled during subsequent years. Sterling balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling; NSA 
= Non-sterling area 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
£35.5m of gold sales for dollars to the New York No.1A account on 27/11/1956), and some may even 
have been longer-term agreements (a £17.8m gold sale for dollars on 14/11/1956 was matched by a 
£17.8m purchase on 28/1/1957). So the Klug and Smith figures may be an overstatement of the 
assistance to end-Dec/1956, but it is reasonable to treat their gross figure as assistance for this study    
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Figure A2: Decomposition of the sterling balances of the NSA countries, showing net 
holdings of North American and Western European Central Monetary Institutions, 
quarterly at end of quarter, December 1962 – December 1967 (£m) 
Source: Net external liabilities in sterling of all non-sterling area countries, Western European Central 
Monetary Institutions and North American Central Monetary Institutions, BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 
1970, Table 22(3), pp139-40 
Note: Sterling balances = net external liabilities of the UK in sterling; NSA = Non-sterling area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
D
e
c
-6
2
M
a
r-
6
3
J
u
n
-6
3
S
e
p
-6
3
D
e
c
-6
3
M
a
r-
6
4
J
u
n
-6
4
S
e
p
-6
4
D
e
c
-6
4
M
a
r-
6
5
J
u
n
-6
5
S
e
p
-6
5
D
e
c
-6
5
M
a
r-
6
6
J
u
n
-6
6
S
e
p
-6
6
D
e
c
-6
6
M
a
r-
6
7
J
u
n
-6
7
S
e
p
-6
7
D
e
c
-6
7
£
m
 
N. Am CMI
W. Europe CMI
Other NSA
387 
 
Reserve management - examples of sterling area countries  
 
Australia 
 
India 
 
South 
Africa 
Figure A3: IMF official reserves, and sterling balances for Australia, India and 
South Africa, monthly at end-month, January 1957 – July 1968 (US$m) 
Source: BOE:EID10/1-10 and EID1A129/2-4; IMF International Financial Statistics DZF 
International reserves: data extracted on 21/3/2015 from UKDS.Stat 
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Reserve management - examples of non-sterling area countries  
 
Canada 
 
Thailand 
 
Denmark 
Figure A4: IMF official reserves, and sterling balances for Canada, Thailand and 
Denmark, monthly at end-month, January 1957 – July 1968 (US$m) 
Source: BOE:EID10/1-10 and EID1A129/2-4; IMF International Financial Statistics DZF 
International reserves: data extracted on 21/3/2015 from UKDS.Stat 
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Three different ways of dividing up the sterling area balance of payments 
 
(a) 
Balance 
with the 
NSA on 
current 
and long-
term 
capital 
account 
(yearly 
average 
for each 
period) 
 
(b) 
Overall 
balance 
on current 
and long-
term 
capital 
account 
(yearly 
average 
for each 
period) 
 
(c) 
Overall 
balance 
on current 
account, 
plus long-
term 
capital 
account 
with the 
NSA 
(yearly 
average 
for each 
period) 
Figure A5: Three ways of dividing, between the UK and RSA, the sterling area 
balance of payments on current and long-term capital account, yearly averages 
for four selected periods, 1952 - 1965 (£m) 
Source: Author’s calculations from BOE:OV44/115, ‘Report of the working party on the future of 
the sterling area’, 1/11/1966. Underlying data on following page. See note regarding balance-of-
payments revision 
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1952-5 1956-7 1958-61 1962-5
£
m
 
UK
RSA
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1952-5 1956-7 1958-61 1962-5
£
m
 
UK
RSA
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1952-5 1956-7 1958-61 1962-5
£
m
 
UK
RSA
ANNEX 5 
390 
 
 
 Balance of payments 
Yearly average (£m) UK with 
NSA 
UK 
overall 
RSA with 
NSA 
RSA 
overall 
     
1952-5     
Current balance -172 +67 +101 -138 
Long-term capital +13 -160 +128 +301 
Balance of current and long-
term capital 
 
-159 
 
-93 
 
+229 
 
+163 
     
1956-7     
Current balance -137 +216 -25 -378 
Long-term capital +88 -147 +174 +409 
Balance of current and long-
term capital 
 
-49 
 
+69 
 
+149 
 
+31 
     
1958-61     
Current balance -313 +48 -195 -556 
Long-term capital +72 -144 +378 +594 
Balance of current and long-
term capital  
 
-241 
 
-96 
 
+183 
 
+38 
     
1962-5*     
Current balance -299 -72 -454 -681 
Long-term capital +31 -213 +608 +852 
Balance of current and long-
term capital 
 
-268 
 
-285 
 
+154 
 
+137 
Table A3: Three ways of dividing, between the UK and RSA, the sterling area’s 
balance of payments on current and long-term capital account, yearly averages for four 
selected periods, 1952 – 1965 (£m) 
Source: BOE:OV44/115 ‘Report of the working party on the future of the sterling area’, 1/11/1966. The 
three ways correspond to those reviewed in Scott, ‘The balance of payments’, pp211-2 
*Note: There are doubts over accuracy of the figures for the 1962-5 period, because of the subsequent 
revision of UK balance-of-payments data. Prior to the revision, balance-of-payments figures overstated the 
UK balance-of-payments deficit due to the under-recording of exports. See Thirlwall and Gibson, Balance-
of-payments theory, pp238-9 
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Sterling balances - gross and net liabilities, by type of holder, 1962-7 
 
 
 
Holder: 
RSA 
CMIs 
 
 
Holder: 
RSA 
Other 
Figure A6: Sterling balances by type of holder: RSA countries, gross and net of claims, 
quarterly, 31 December 1962 – 30 September 1967 (£m) 
Source: BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 22(2), pp134-8 
Note: Sterling balances = Net external liabilities of the UK in sterling; RSA = Rest of the sterling area 
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Holder: 
NSA 
CMIs 
 
 
Holder: 
NSA 
Other 
Figure A7: Sterling balances by type of holder: NSA countries, gross and net of claims, 
quarterly, 31 December 1962 – 30 September 1967 (£m) 
Source: BOE:Statistical Abstract No.1, 1970, Table 22(2), pp134-8 
Note: Sterling balances = Net external liabilities of the UK in sterling; NSA = Non-sterling area 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
1: Did the sterling area matter? 
 
The three separate studies included in this dissertation deal with the sterling area 
monetary and exchange system of the 1950s-60s. Whereas these papers address 
various themes relevant to the sterling area historiography, they all show that the 
institutional organisation of the sterling area had significant financial implications for 
both the United Kingdom and independent member countries as well as for the role of 
sterling as an international reserve currency. The three case studies presented above 
have shown how the institutions of the sterling area had important consequences for 
reserve management and central bank development in member countries, as well as 
for the position of the pound sterling during episodes of currency crises. The sterling 
area system was not an empty shell: its rules, practices and organisational set-up 
‘mattered’ for the evolution of the pound sterling and international monetary system 
during the 1950s and 1960s.   
 
This finding nuances conclusions of the existing historiography on the sterling area. 
Most authors have attributed the persistence of sterling in international reserves during 
the 1950s-60s either to loyalty towards the UK1167 or economic self-interest1168 or 
external support,1169 and argued that sterling crises were purely driven by the UK’s 
balance-of-payments problems. While these factors certainly played an important role, 
the three studies show that they are not the full story. The case of Australia in 1950-68 
reveals that international reserves composition was not solely driven by transactions 
(currency peg, trade and debt) and risk-return considerations, but that the precise 
institutional rules of the sterling area system also mattered crucially for how reserves 
were being managed in the independent member countries. These rules also helped to 
                                               
1167
 Eichengreen, Global imbalances, p134 
1168
 Singleton and Schenk, ‘The shift’ 
1169
 Schenk, The decline 
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delay the decline of sterling as an international reserve currency. Similarly, Ireland’s 
transition from a currency board to a central bank in the 1960-70s was not just the 
consequence of a natural, gradual evolution of the financial system in a country 
characterised by close cultural and economic ties with the UK, but this transition was 
precipitated by changes in the rules and organisation of the sterling area system 
following the pound’s devaluation of 1967. Finally, while the UK’s own balance-of-
payments problems played an important role in the numerous sterling crises of the 
1950s and 1960s, an analysis of nine UK currency crisis episodes over the years 
1950-67 suggests that reserve movements in other sterling area member countries 
may also have contributed to amplify these crises. Speculative attacks on the pound 
sterling were not only driven by the UK’s fundamental weaknesses but also resulted 
from the balance-of-payments problems of the sterling area as a whole.    
 
Another common finding in each of these three studies is that sterling’s international 
role in the 1950s-60s was highly dependent on the sterling area. The use of the pound 
as a reserve currency would have been very limited without the rules of the sterling 
area system – such as the exchange control rules regarding intra-sterling area trade 
settlement – which determined RSA countries’ sterling reserve holdings. In particular, 
the three papers reveal the prevalence, consistency and longevity of reserve pooling 
within the sterling area. This is in contrast to some claims in the literature that reserve 
pooling had come to an end with the advent of sterling convertibility. Logically, 
convertibility seemed to remove the need for a sterling area or pooling system. But in 
fact, diversification away from sterling by the sterling area countries was limited until 
the crisis of 1964; it was constrained in Australia; and in Ireland the few acts of 
diversification seen in the 1950s had been driven by technical considerations (a 
shortage of sterling assets in one part of the central bank). The importance of this 
reserve pooling for the UK is even more apparent when one appreciates, through the 
sterling crises chapter, how limited were the sterling holdings of non-sterling area 
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countries once assistance to the UK (e.g. through the EPU) is excluded.  Therefore, 
the pound sterling was, in this sense, an international currency which was artificially 
supported, by a combination of sterling area rules (informal constraints), UK capital 
exports and the liberal provision of trade credit from London, and assistance from the 
non-sterling area. This explains the persistence of sterling as an international currency. 
 
If one examines Australia’s reserve management in detail, one finds that it was 
following the sterling area’s reserve-pooling rule closely. Sterling was the sole 
transactional currency; other reserve assets formed a rainy day fund. Acquisition of 
those other assets for risk-return reasons was not that of a free portfolio manager, but 
constrained to the opportunities consistent with acceptable or negotiated sterling area 
practice, such as gold production and the build-up of the IMF gold tranche, and 
reversed by minimum sterling needs during Australian crises in 1951-61. Australia held 
far fewer US dollars than its economic transactional orientation (trade, debt, and its 
direct dollar deficit) would justify, and it did not use them for transactions. Reserve 
pooling and the UK’s sterling area system suited Australia, allowing it to acquire 
sterling from net exports to the non-dollar non-sterling area and use this sterling to 
finance net purchases in the dollar area and the UK. 
 
Similarly, Ireland followed the sterling area’s reserve-pooling rules closely until the 
devaluation of 1967. Again, this suited Ireland, which could thereby finance its net 
imports from continental Europe with its net inflow from the UK and USA. One might 
want to attribute such transactional behaviour solely to Ireland’s sterling-based 
currency board system, but, if so, why did Ireland, with the same currency board 
system and sterling transactional needs, seek to diversify away from sterling so 
aggressively after the devaluation? It was not only because Irish officials perceived 
new sterling risks, for they were already, in 1965-7, concerned about the risk of 
devaluation. Irish officials refrained from diversification prior to devaluation, as they 
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said, because they perceived an implicit sterling area contract with the UK. In 1968, 
they took sterling’s devaluation to have been a breach of contract, so the old rules no 
longer applied. In Ireland’s financial system, reserves were decentralised and held by 
commercial banks which prized sterling liquidity given the lack of a money market in 
Ireland. The pre-devaluation sterling area system did not encourage Ireland’s financial 
development, and this decentralisation of reserves also hindered diversification. The 
devaluation set in train a chain of events which led both to the centralisation of those 
reserves in the central bank in 1968-9, and the development of an Irish money market 
in the 1970s. 
 
Looking at sterling crises of the pre-devaluation period, defined by the historical 
literature and measured in losses of the UK’s free reserves (net of assistance), one 
also finds considerable adverse movements in the sterling reserves of the sterling area 
countries – caused by balance-of-payments deficits in the crises of 1951-64 (albeit, in 
1961, mainly preceding the crisis, and buttressed by an Australian IMF drawing) – and 
diversification away from sterling in 1964-7. In the crises of 1951-2, 1955 and 1957, 
these adverse movements were large relative to other elements of the UK’s balance-
of-payments accounting identity underlying the decline in free reserves. This is not 
conclusive evidence that the sterling area’s deficits exacerbated, or caused, the UK’s 
reserve crises. This depends on one’s view of the methodology: there were rival 
mental models which were used both at the time and in the more recent historiography 
to assess this question. But it contradicts the statements of commentators who denied 
any possible role for these sterling reserves in particular crises and claimed that the 
balances were stable and illiquid. 
 
The fact that the sterling area mattered crucially for both financial decisions in the 
independent member countries and the role of sterling as a reserve currency has 
important implications for our understanding of international currencies. Scholars have 
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long debated what factors can account for the rise and decline of international reserve 
currencies. In particular, they have discussed the significance of network externalities, 
economic size, and risk-return trade-offs in countries’ choice of the currency 
composition of their international reserves. The history of the sterling area also 
suggests that, in a world of competing international currencies, financial alliances 
matter to aggregate reserve holdings and make a difference to a currency’s 
international status.  
 
2: Conclusions for the economic literature 
 
Chapter 1 reviewed the economic literature surrounding reserve management, 
highlighting supply and demand considerations, and, within the latter, the mean-
variance and transactions theories underlying international reserve holdings. There 
was a strand of the supply literature highlighting the costs of operating a reserve 
currency in decline. Although inconclusive, the crises chapter helped to illuminate how 
such costs might have arisen, as a decline in sterling reserves held internationally fed 
through to losses of UK reserves either more directly, through drawings on the dollar 
pool and spending in the non-sterling area, or indirectly, through the inflationary 
consequences of excess spending in the UK. 
 
With regard to the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves (COFER), all 
three papers unsurprisingly found strong evidence for transactional and risk-return 
drivers in reserve management. Both Australia and Ireland were found to be rather 
immersed in sterling transactions (Australia more so than the sterling area literature 
had indicated, due to new evidence about the currency of international payments). 
Indeed, through reserve pooling, sterling was their sole transactional currency. If 
dollars were required, sterling would normally be used to purchase the dollars and the 
existing dollar holdings would not be drawn down (save on a few specific occasions 
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such as during reserve crises in the case of Australia). While it could possibly be 
argued that the completeness of sterling’s transactional use was attributable to the 
implications of a sterling peg rather than reserve pooling, such a counterargument 
would not seem consistent with the transactions literature, which also attributes 
currency choice to trade and debt factors; nor does it explain why Australia’s gold 
production was allowed to augment its gold and dollar holdings, rather than being 
converted into sterling along with everything else. This behaviour was, by contrast, 
entirely consistent with the practice of reserve pooling in the sterling area. 
 
Dooley, Lizondo and Mathieson (DLM) theorised that countries would manage the risk-
return aspects of COFER through their net asset position, and transactions needs 
would drive their gross assets.1170 In practice, this did not seem to be the case in 
Australia and Ireland. In Australia, assets and liabilities were managed in different 
cities by rival organisations. At the central bank in Sydney, there was great concern 
expressed about the risk-return balance of the gross assets, despite the existence of 
natural hedges in the liabilities. This may have reflected a desire to avoid losses within 
that organisation. And, for the Treasury in Canberra, access to the sterling bond 
market was restricted towards the end of the period, so the share of sterling in the 
liabilities decreased even as the risks of holding sterling increased. Ireland at first had 
no external liabilities, and, while the net asset position clearly influenced COFER, Irish 
policymakers found in 1966 that their country’s access to the sterling debt market was 
curtailed by the British authorities. They had to resort to borrowing in other currencies, 
and did not respond on the gross assets until 1968. 
 
The literature has argued that the organisational form and governance of the reserve 
manager influences whether profit-maximisation is prioritised over other objectives in 
reserve management. The central banks in Australia and Ireland (and most sterling 
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area countries) had private histories but were now state-owned. While the Australian 
central bank performed some commercial activities in the 1950s, this did not seem to 
alter its state mission and character, which had been established long before the 
1950s. Both central banks were distinct organisations with balance sheets and some 
profits that were retained. So they were sensitive to profit opportunities (e.g. the extra 
yield available from longer-term gilts over shorter-term Treasury bills), but 
fundamentally risk-averse, and concerned with protecting the size of the international 
reserves and avoiding losses. Both considered their reserves inadequate relative to 
the demands that might be required of them. While aligned with government 
objectives, both pushed back against government policies which consumed or 
threatened those resources: but the governments were stronger. Both were also 
engaged in power struggles with the commercial banks, which were combative in 
Australia and entrenched in Ireland: the central banks increased their power and 
reached an accommodation with the commercial banks, but it was a protracted 
process, particularly in Ireland. The situation in the UK was slightly different. Although 
state-owned, the Bank of England enjoyed more independence and power by virtue of 
its privileged access to information and role in market intervention, and its pivotal 
position within the sterling area as a whole. 
 
The literature has also argued that the adequacy of reserves will determine whether 
transactions or risk-return drivers prevail in risk management: inadequate reserves 
demand a transactions approach. The cases of Australia and Ireland support this view. 
Both central banks prioritised minimum sterling transactional needs, leading Australia 
to sell gold and dollars during reserve crises (undermining the policy set in 1951 to 
accrue gold production in gold or dollar form), and Irish central bank Governors of the 
1950s-60s to focus on the core mission of preserving the value of the Irish pound 
against sterling, resisting government and other pressures to diversify, due to the 
inadequacy of sterling reserves. Through reserve pooling, sterling was these countries’ 
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sole transactional currency, so all other holdings effectively reflected a risk-return view. 
High levels of sterling in reserves thus revealed, indirectly, the importance of 
transactional needs. Organisational considerations also mattered, however. In the 
Australian central bank, a restriction on US dollars in the Note Issue Department may 
have caused technical complications in conjunction with other policies. Heller found 
that aggregate reserves in Ireland (unlike in the UK and Australia) were more than 
adequate.1171 However, because of the decentralisation of those reserves, and the 
division within the central bank between the Legal Tender Note Fund and the General 
Fund, the central bank felt unable to perform its functions, and in the commercial 
banks, concerned with credit growth, liquidity and the general convertibility of the Irish 
pound into sterling, sterling liquidity was under pressure by the end of the 1960s. A 
good depiction of reserve management in the sterling area can be based on the sub-
fund approach of Naameh.1172 There was an illiquid fund (all sterling) representing 
minimum reserve needs. There was a liquid fund (all remaining sterling) for 
transactions. And there was a ‘rainy day’ fund (all other reserve assets) held for 
insurance purposes. 
 
Other issues in the recent economic literature include trade invoicing and FX liquidity 
e.g. the costs of dealing. If invoicing does drive currency shares, as argued by Ito, 
McCauley and Chan,1173 then the sterling area’s rules and policies, specially designed 
to maximise sterling trade settlement, were well-targeted. Somewhat contrary to 
Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl’s argument about switching costs,1174 the evidence in the 
Australian archives did not suggest that FX dealing prices were uncompetitive for a 
sterling area country under Bretton Woods – the Bank of England often intervened to 
provide execution in the middle of the market – nor was Australia restricted in its use of 
the dollar pool. Fixed exchange rates logically may even have reduced some practical 
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dealing costs since there was less intraday FX price volatility. The drawback, 
acknowledged by officials, was that such dealing in London was undertaken under the 
gaze of the UK authorities. The Bank even had intelligence of what the Irish central 
bank was doing in New York.  
 
Chapter 1 also considered the literature surrounding international rules, agreements, 
institutions and monetary co-operation. It is apparent that the sterling area’s rules were 
informal constraints (in the language of North),1175 with only mixed evidence of 
enforcement (intra-sterling area settlement being a likely exception). They were more 
long-ingrained bargains than conventions. These rules can only be interpreted (as 
McKinnon interpreted the rules of Bretton Woods).1176 McKinnon’s rules provide a 
framework for the challenges faced by the sterling area, but logically they must be 
applied to the sterling area as a whole entity, not just to the UK. The same comment 
applies to the Mundell-Fleming monetary trilemma. The sterling area as a whole entity 
lacked policy credibility because there were no common policies designed to address 
the recurring balance-of-payments deficits of the whole sterling area. Bordo and 
Schenk argued that the lack of monetary policy credibility at the individual country level 
undermined Bretton Woods.1177 The problem was compounded in the sterling area 
because of the inflationary incentives built into the co-operative mechanism of reserve 
pooling against a policy background of growth and development.  
 
The sterling area can be characterised as a discriminatory regional arrangement 
comparable to the Gold Pool and the EPU. But it was informal, lacking the 
administrative underpinnings of these two institutions. Eichengreen highlighted six 
problems with the Gold Pool.1178 The sterling area shared some of these (no shared 
diagnosis of the problem, non-compliant free riding, incompatibility with Bretton 
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Woods, lack of transparency) but was slightly stronger in other respects. There was at 
least an implied enforcement mechanism (the diversity of bilateral relations with the 
UK, such as military support, the London capital market and the UK’s consumers), and 
there was longer-term stability between the UK’s sterling liabilities and international 
reserves (no obvious Triffin problem). With its core-periphery structure, the UK being 
naturally reluctant to cede decision-making over its currency to others, the sterling area 
did not match the problem resolution and symmetrical policy co-ordination evident in 
the EPU. Above all, its aims were less well-defined and changed over time. 
 
The sterling area also matched closely Lipson’s description of informal international 
agreements.1179 The difficulty of reaching a common balance-of-payments policy 
suggested a need for informal agreements, substituting for formal ones. Because they 
were informal, they were unreliable, and the tacit agreements were sometimes broken. 
There were misunderstandings about tacit rules – for instance, Australian anger about 
the EMA guarantees, despite a long history of the UK providing guarantees to non-
sterling area countries (but not to sterling area countries, which were expected to trust 
in sterling). The sense of betrayal in reaction to the UK’s devaluation of sterling in 1967 
suggested a tacit agreement that the UK would not devalue: violation of a perceived 
bargain, as illustrated by Ireland’s changed reserve management behaviour before and 
after devaluation. However, tacit agreements enjoyed a key advantage in relation to 
the formal rules of Bretton Woods. They allowed a discriminatory currency system, in 
which US dollars were forbidden in the settlement of intra-sterling area trade, to persist 
within a wider dollar-based system that insisted upon non-discrimination.    
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3: Conclusions for the sterling area literature 
 
Chapter 1 addressed three aspects of the sterling area literature. The first related to 
the perceived disconnect between the sterling area’s discriminatory purpose, rooted in 
British exchange controls and non-convertibility, and its lack of a raison d’etre after the 
achievement of sterling convertibility. It is clear from all three papers, in contradiction of 
some authors, that sterling area reserve pooling remained widespread and persisted 
through the 1960s. This may have reflected the fact that, while convertibility had been 
achieved, there was always the possibility, in extremis, of a return to non-convertibility, 
so the old mechanisms were retained. 
 
The second aspect was that of rules, or working practices. With regard to the sterling 
peg, this was a rational and natural choice for Ireland. It was rational too for Australia, 
and preferred to dollar pegging, given the priority of full employment. But in Australia, 
while policymakers indicated that they might follow sterling in a float, they were 
sensitive to its amplitude, had an eye on the parity with the US dollar, and had a 
preference for generally fixed exchange rates given the importance of counter-
inflationary policy. In other words, Australia’s support for the sterling peg was 
conditional on its general stability against other currencies. Other countries, e.g. India, 
Pakistan, and Ceylon, might well not have followed sterling in a float. This suggests 
that, if sterling had floated in the 1950s, as proposed by Burnham,1180 this could have 
led to an early break-up of the sterling area, and a resulting exchange crisis. 
 
The thesis has also highlighted the importance of certain sterling area controls, such 
as the hard rules regarding intra-sterling area settlement. These were acknowledged 
by the literature, but without great prominence. However, Australia’s case showed how 
the effect of such rules and London’s trade credit support for sterling was to immerse 
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Australia in sterling area transactions. By the early 1960s, sterling’s share of 
Australia’s payments was three times that of the UK’s share in its payments. 
 
Chapter 1 also drew comparisons between the sterling area’s pooling arrangements 
and more recent regional pooling schemes. As the Australian case showed, the 
sterling area shared the economising, risk-sharing benefits of reserve pooling, but also 
the weaknesses evident in the reserve-pooling literature, namely costs and benefits 
which were not shared equally, and inflationary incentives. Australia was an early 
beneficiary of reserve pooling given its direct dollar deficit: its manifest commitment to 
reserve pooling was rational. But there was a particular problem in the sterling area. 
Because of the different ways in which ‘contributions’ were measured (viz balance-of-
payments debates between authors such as Wright and others such as Kamarck, 
Scott and Zupnick),1181 there was little clarity or agreement about which countries were 
contributing. Australian officials regarded Australia as a net contributor due to its trade 
surplus with the non-dollar non-sterling area. These different ‘mental models’ were 
highlighted by the crises chapter: in effect they pervade the contemporary and 
historical literature. If all members of a pooling system regarded themselves as having 
either moral claims (due to ‘contributions’) or claims of need, then the consequences 
were likely to be inflationary. 
 
All three papers also addressed, directly or indirectly, co-operation within the sterling 
area, where there were different views in the literature about the extent of co-
operation. The findings were that co-operation was largely limited to shallow co-
operation (information-sharing) and reserve pooling. Ireland did not diversify majorly 
until after the 1967 devaluation, and Australia’s diversification was limited and 
constrained to opportunities that were consistent with sterling area accepted practice, 
or unobtrusive. Despite much concern on the British side with the diplomacy of ‘gold 
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and dollar pots’, sterling area diversification only became a general problem with the 
crises of 1964-7. The sterling crises chapter revealed the extent of that later 
diversification, which was significant. The Australia and Ireland chapters also showed 
major policymaker concern regarding the risk of sterling devaluation, from early in 
1965.  
 
The third aspect of the sterling area literature was the ‘sterling balances’, and within 
that subject, the three issues of the wartime accumulations, the volatility of the 
balances, and diversification (switching from sterling to gold, dollars or other reserves). 
The last of these we have just discussed. The broad view of the literature was that the 
wartime accumulations were well on the way to resolution by 1950. Certainly much 
recycling had occurred, but the crises chapter showed that there were still, in the 
1950s, significant sterling reserves held by countries such as India and Egypt, which 
contributed to declines in the sterling balances during crises, even into the early 1960s. 
 
The big debate highlighted in Chapter 1 was that between the ‘critics’ such as 
Shonfield,1182 and contemporary defenders and a later more revisionist historiography, 
regarding the liquidity and variation of the sterling balances and the consequences for 
the UK reserves. The Australia chapter found, in parallel to Schenk’s findings for the 
colonies, that there was a significant illiquid element to Australia’s reserves (of the 
order of £200m, as Schenk had originally observed),1183 and importantly explained why 
those reserves were illiquid (policymakers’ need for minimum sterling holdings). On the 
other hand, Australia’s sterling reserves ranged, with its balance of payments, between 
around £200m to £600m, so there was a large liquid element too. The crises chapter 
also found significant declines in the sterling area’s sterling reserves during or around 
the crises of 1951-64. Whether those declines contributed to losses of UK reserves 
remains moot, and conditional on the rival methodologies for examining this question. 
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But privately, despite assurances made externally, the Bank of England was 
concerned about the connection and correlation between the sterling balances and the 
UK’s reserves. The relevant (net of assistance) monthly correlations between the UK’s 
external sterling liabilities and reserves were high (80 per cent) in the 1950s. The 
principal source of crises against this background was the inadequacy of UK reserves, 
ranging between around £600m and £1,200m.   
 
The Australia case also revealed that, during the sterling crises of 1964-8, 
policymakers were sensitive to switching out of sterling (diversification), but, at the 
same time, relaxed about spending sterling reserves for balance-of-payments reasons, 
so long as sterling reserves were above those minimum levels. Given that 
policymakers would have been well aware of the 1940s-60s debate around potentially 
adverse effects, on sterling, from the spending of sterling (Hirsch named such 
‘conversion’ as one of three factors contributing to sterling crises),1184 the relative 
indifference towards spending suggests that they might have been motivated more by 
sterling area rules (where switching was discouraged, spending was allowed) than by 
self-interested concerns about the effect of that spending on the price of sterling (a 
‘sterling trap’). 
 
Finally, Chapter 1 considered the literature’s distinction between official and private 
holdings both within and outside the sterling area, and different interpretations of the 
private holdings: some authors equated stable and increasing private holdings in the 
sterling area with traders’ ‘working balances’ and international confidence in the 
commercial use of sterling, as opposed to its official, reserve currency use. The crises 
chapter highlighted how the UK authorities promoted the idea that sterling was 
returning to its pre-war voluntary, commercial role, and promised continued support for 
that role. It also revealed, however, that much of the holdings of the non-sterling area 
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took the form of assistance to the UK, and the residual confidence holdings were 
limited and volatile. The Australia and Ireland chapters provided an opportunity to 
consider the nature of private holdings within the sterling area. Due to Australian 
exchange control rules, the private holdings of sterling were simply those of the trading 
banks, acting as mobilisation agents for the central bank. In Ireland, the private 
holdings recorded in the ‘sterling balances’ were the liquidity reserves of the major 
commercial banks, and designated ‘official reserves’ within Ireland. The correctness of 
this description was shown when these holdings were indeed centralised at the CBI in 
1968-9. In other words, these sterling holdings were not traders’ ‘working balances’ 
and did not reflect commercial confidence in sterling, they were just another form of 
‘official’ holding.           
 
4: Conclusions from the three papers 
 
Above all, it should be emphasised, the three papers address different questions. 
Although the aim of this conclusion is to unify them, I would encourage the reader to 
address each paper as a standalone study. The papers reveal that the simple 
alternative stories are not wrong as approximations – Australia’s reserve management 
was driven by transactions and risk-return considerations; Ireland’s central bank was 
based around a currency board; sterling crises were driven by speculation and UK 
balance-of-payments weaknesses. But at the level of detail, these explanations miss 
how Australian reserve management operated and when the direction of policy 
changed (i.e. in 1962, after the UK’s application to join the EEC); why Ireland 
diversified and centralised its reserves in 1968-9; and what was happening to the 
sterling area’s sterling reserves during the sterling crises of the 1950s-60s.  
 
The microeconomic details matter. Because the detail has not been understood, some 
false claims have been made, as discussed in the papers. An example is the idea that 
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Australia supported the sterling area through ‘gifts of gold’ e.g. during the Suez crisis. 
In fact, it was simply shoring up its sterling holdings in order to meet minimum sterling 
needs. In the case of Australia, in order to understand how reserve management 
operated, it is necessary to understand the mechanism of reserve pooling, gold 
production and GPA sales, the IMF gold tranche, other more limited forms of 
diversification (e.g. retention of loan proceeds), balance-of-payments volatility, 
minimum sterling needs, the London funds and the Note Issue Department, the rules 
of sterling area trade settlement, flight capital from the UK, the lack of a foreign 
exchange market etc. There is no previous account, in the literature, of the interaction 
of all these factors.  
 
In the case of Ireland, in order to understand the centralisation and diversification 
events (of which this is the first detailed account), it is necessary to understand the 
tensions within the tripartite financial system, and debates within government and 
central bank and with the commercial banks and the UK government. The sterling area 
system in effect deterred diversification (through a perceived bilateral contract) and 
hindered centralisation and financial development (since commercial banks could rely 
on London as a repository for their liquidity). These inertial effects were also self-
reinforcing e.g. decentralisation of reserves further deterred diversification. Sterling’s 
devaluation, combined with increased liquidity stresses among the commercial banks, 
changed the environment, and set off a chain of events which produced the 
diversification and centralisation. The central bank’s currency board was orthodox in a 
narrow sense, but did not prevent commercial banks from lending increasing amounts 
to the government. It was no doubt a source of some inertia, but cannot explain what 
happened in 1968-9. 
 
Thirdly, the literature surrounding sterling crises has tended to focus on the potential 
risk of speculative runs on the pound, whether by countries within or outside the 
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sterling area. Perhaps this focus reflects the confidence concerns of the Triffin 
dilemma, or the currency crisis literature. However, given that reserve pooling was 
largely followed, this was a misdirected concern for the sterling area, at least until the 
1964-7 period. During the crises of the 1950s, there were relatively large declines in 
the sterling area’s sterling reserves, which derived from balance-of-payments deficits. 
Whether these contributed to the crises is inconclusive. But examining the details of 
the contemporary debates reveals the different mental models employed by critics and 
defenders of the sterling area system. The same arguments are also recognisable in 
more recent historiography, so the institutional effect of the sterling area on the UK’s 
exchange crises remains an unresolved question. 
 
In short, the longevity of reserve pooling, the importance of the UK’s implicit promise 
not to devalue the pound, the problems posed by the sterling area’s balance-of-
payments deficits, and the sheer complexity of the institutional apparatus surrounding 
the sterling area, from the organisational set-up of central banks to the rules of trade 
settlement, are the principal findings of this thesis. 
 
5: Wider applications? 
 
Apart from a desire to understand the sterling area system, and to fill study gaps within 
the sterling area historiography, this thesis was motivated by an interest in international 
currencies in a multipolar world, and the potential impact of financial alliances. Today’s 
international currency system is a different world, dominated by capital flows. Still, the 
sterling area system was a remarkable construction which was able to change reserve 
management behaviours in a major way (as seen in the difference between sterling 
area and other countries), and so allowed sterling to punch well above the UK’s weight 
in the international monetary system throughout the 1950s-60s. For a quarter of a 
century, the sterling area managed to discriminate against the US dollar within a 
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multilateral rule-based system that was centred on the dollar. Its informality (and US 
forbearance) protected it from challenge. But it was not as lax as it seemed and its 
members, on the whole, adhered to its rules. 
 
It had its weaknesses too. Contrary to nostalgic views of the decades before Britain’s 
membership of the European Community, the sterling area was far from being a 
golden age of Commonwealth co-operation. In this period, the UK discovered that 
being a reserve currency issuer is not always a privilege. However, the greatest 
difficulty lay in Britain’s inability to end its role as banker to the sterling area. As Fforde, 
chief cashier at the Bank of England, concluded in 1966 when considering what to do 
about the sterling area system: ‘we are a bank and have little option but to stay in 
business’.1185 
 
What lessons does the sterling area have for reserve currencies today? Clearly, the 
unique institutional context and somewhat artificial underpinnings demonstrate that 
sterling’s historic experience in the age of exchange controls is not relevant for 
predicting the dollar’s future in the age of globalisation. The sterling area lacked the 
organisational depth and multilateral co-operation of the EPU or the present day 
Eurozone. Its problem was external imbalances rather than the internal imbalances 
that have plagued the euro – and its ultimate failure a salutary lesson that imbalances 
must be addressed. But some international policymakers may find attractions in the 
subtle power of its mechanisms. It was an institution that seemed to perform best in 
conditions of conflict, scarcity or war. Who knows? Both rising and declining reserve 
currency issuers may seek advantage in building similar, informal, rule-based financial 
alliances, as they struggle for supremacy in the twenty-first century. 
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